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The emerging ecological consciousness


1 THIS IS THE REVOLUTION

Power and Control
The modern world is in the midst of a moral and psychological breakdown, with global economic restructuring shifting the social ground from under the feet of communities to such an extent that many people have come to lose confidence in their capacity to respond to problems. The scale of problems and the magnitude of the tasks before us only serve to magnify the mediocrity of our political leaders. Political leadership is one of the essential components of an effective programme of reconstruction to deal with climate change. Instead, a money-driven economy sets the political horizons, with packaged politicians focused firmly on the short term electoral cycle have turned the political system into an ugly joke whose punchline is on the people.


The sense of decay is pervasive in the developed world. The extension of monetary ties has advanced the erosion of civil society. In 1995, Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam wrote the book Bowling Alone. (Robert Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal of Democracy, January 1995, 65-78.) He had noted that whilst more Americans were going ten-pin bowling, fewer were joining leagues. The phenomenon points to the diminution of social capital in western liberal democracies, as evidenced in the most obvious sense by the breakdown of families and communities, but more generally affecting the whole range of civic and social associations. What Alexis de Tocqueville in the mid nineteenth century called the 'habits of association', upon which a flourishing civil society is based, are in retreat. The broken families, destroyed neighbourhoods, diminishing civil and voluntary associations all point to the withering of the intermediate sphere that was once the strength and the content of the political sphere. The result is a monumental eclipse of hope and a collapse of meaning. 
Mike Davis refers to the militarisation of the urban sphere to describe the collapse of the urban fabric and the replacement of self-regulating urban order with police and surveillance and private security. This is a civic violence in which the avalanche of casual, mindless and calculated crime within the social fabric is met with an increase in policing, surveillance, security and other forms of external control. The city was originally a civilising sphere. Now the talk is of designing crime out of the urban fabric. That design involves turning the urban environment into a prison, locking the people in since it is too expensive to lock the criminals up. The old civic ideal haunts the urban, suburban, and rural streets. Deteriorating physical infrastructures are everywhere, with the repair of roads, subways, bridges, and buildings deemed too costly with no expectation of an immediate return. Growing inequalities between rich and poor reflecting systemic class inequality. And this before we even mention the threat of an ecological devastation that in the end renders all concern with moral, social and physical infrastructure pointless.

Consumerism spawns addictive personalities and passive citizens and promotes a profound spiritual impoverishment, psychological emptiness and moral shallowness. It implies a loss of self and a loss of soul that is a death in life, a living death. TV, radio, film, bombard people with images and values and lifestyles that are violent, aggressive, certainly appealing but unrealistic. They seduce individuals into a fantasy world of desire and strip them of the capacity to confront the real-life traumas of despair, dread, and death. It is a microcosm of wider society, with the political and business class leading people by the nose in the short term away from the long term problems of moral and social decay, away from the self-destruction eating at the core of the human ontology and the global ecology.

A growing nihilism and cynicism is afoot. The intellectual fashion that is called postmodernism is a liberalism in an age of decadence and exposes the softness and flabbiness of the intellectuals and academics. At a time when hard thinking dealing with hard realities is required, we have intellectuals – they are neither philosophers nor scientists – denying meaning and truth. This nihilism in academia is part of a wider nihilism in a society that has lost its moorings. Meaningless is the lived experience of most people, those in work and those consuming as never before, as well as those living in the midst of unemployment, poverty, drugs, crime. With cynicism rife in political and intellectual circles, the body politic is left to ‘commonsense’, shrugs its shoulders and wades deeper into private opulence and public squalor. 

The environmental crisis cannot be detached from the societal crisis, for it is a product of a wider system failure.

The profound tragedy of globalisation is the obsession with economic gain in the absence of a weakened regulatory power, which amounts to a kind of global abdication of concern for egalitarian and democratic priorities such as employment, food, shelter, education, and health care for all. The unleashing of the forces of the capitalist market economy on an international scale comes with a social and ecological destruction of all forms that contradict the accumulative logic. It results in increased despair for millions around the world. The examples of local communities in Africa, Asia and South America in not only resisting this expropriation but in imagining, creating and sustaining alternatives to world-enclosing capitalist order put the cynicism and nihilism as well as the consumerism of many in the Global North to shame.

This cynicism and nihilism presents an obstacle in the way of exploring egalitarian and democratic possibilities for change. The question is how to put the fundamental issues of employment, health and child care, housing, ecology, and education on the public agenda in a world infused with asymmetries shaped by transnational corporations, international finance and political elites? How to develop a positive vision focused on improving the social and natural environment whilst also resisting the everyday impact of racism, patriarchy, homophobia, and ecological abuse? How is it possible to construct a public life worthy of the name at this moment of history?

 The first thing to challenge is the pervasive cynicism, nihilism and scepticism with respect to political ideals, ‘grand narratives’, and the future as something different or even better than the present. The way to beat this tide of hopelessness and apathy and decadence is by action in support of egalitarian, democratic and environmental concerns, efforts, and movements that seek, through practical and feasible endeavour, to achieve more and better jobs, adequate food, shelter, education, child and health care, and ecological balance. This also involves a fundamental critical self-examination of ourselves and our communities of struggle. Addressing the social and environmental crisis without requires scrutiny of the existential and ethical dimensions of life within. Before one fights or hopes for social change, the question of why needs to be resolved. Getting to the root of why people continue to hope and struggle for change for the better in these barbaric times is crucial in establishing the ontological basis for a future, more balanced and sustainable world.

This calls for a historical assessment and political reading of current morality and psyche so as to point a path towards well-being for those who are captive to the prevailing cynicism, scepticism and nihilism. This assessment should reveal the cultural sources of resistance immanent within a society saturated by market ways of thinking and acting.

The political and intellectual crisis of ‘the left’ is caught up with the collapse of the transcendent perspective that has ever given meaning and hope to life. The collapse is so great that such moral visions and values as apply in politics are either echoes of fading hopes or mere hollow phrases that no-one believes, least of all the politicians paying lip service to them. To act is to affirm that ideals as equality, democracy, freedom, and justice mean something and can motivate and mobilise sufficient numbers to make a difference.

Feasible ideals require credible politics, strategies and tactics. A critique that is not attached to an effective practice confirms hopelessness. The existential and ethical dimensions of struggle connected to robust analyses and sophisticated explanations of power, wealth, control, institutions must be translated into an effective movement and mobilisation so that the pressure of popular action can be brought to bear to transform society. This entails an examination of leadership, mobilization, and organization with a view to political effectiveness. 

A fundamental critical self-examination of ourselves and our communities of struggle is necessary to locate and situate the choices, possibilities and strategies with respect to the circumscribed options and alternatives available. All politics proceeds from there here and the now, not the then and the there - circumstances, traditions, contexts and situations that come with variable limitations and possibilities, fluid rather than fixed. Which choices to make, which possibilities to project out of the present shape the construction of the future.

The terrain upon which most people act is precisely the terrain in which people live, the everyday social life world. The truism of electoral politics that elections are won from the centre ground gives an insight here. The centre ground in the everyday life world is currently being pulverised by the encroachment of market relations and monetary ties. The pillars of this centre ground are the overlapping communities of kin, friendship and neighbourhood which form the social cement or social glue and which socialise individuals according to ideals and practices of dignity, integrity, uprightness, and humility. These are not just worthy ideals but are supplied with concrete moral examples within functioning communities. They are the existential and ethical resources to draw upon in resisting the shallow and sordid images and values of the media and of advertisement and in confronting the crises and undertaking the tasks for their resolution.

The globalisation of economic relations has exposed the relative inability of social and environmental movements to mobilize and organize over time and space in a way that counters global economic power. Greater international identity and coordination supporting struggle within is the way out of this impasse.

This requires leaders of vision, intelligence, and integrity, with the courage not to flinch under pressure but with a facility for building alliances and coalitions across broad sections of the public. The task for political leadership is to articulate in bold and forthright terms, combining a genuine but measured passion with analytical clarity and the power of evidence and example, the political imperative to address the asymmetrical relations of wealth and power, the unequal distribution of resources, the escalating tensions, animosities and rivalries, the moral confusion and spiritual impoverishment and the ecological devastation that the world is facing. Whilst that may not sound like a vote winner, that may be no bad thing. It isn’t votes, first and foremost, that are needed. The case for social transformation needs to be stated with a clarity, force and vigour that cannot be ignored. That statement denotes an effective politics that gives influence within or over the shaping public policy whilst also motivating and mobilising active support in the body politic. The question is how to relate movement to party? The great danger is a disparate and inchoate ‘movementism’ which confirms fragmentation, isolation, and insularity. What counts is a networking that expands the centre and squeezes those elites and interests who have colonised the public purpose out to the extremes where they belong. Given the power of political, business and financial elites, the greatest potency comes with effective political leadership and organisation is fed by extra-parliamentary organizational activity to energize and galvanize hitherto demoralized and depoliticised individuals across racial, class, regional, age, and gender lines in the community.

Demoralisation and depoliticisation is born not only of the past defeat and current reaction but of consumerism, with its addictive seductions and stupefying leisure. There are plenty of distractors which keep people’s eyes off the prize and sap the energies for collective action. Regardless of the nature of one’s pattern of consumption, the way that the market operates, atomizing people as choosing individuals, fosters a mentality that makes it difficult for people to arrange their lives in such a way that communal activity supersedes personal pursuits. In delivering an immediate satisfaction for an individual choice backed by money, the market fosters an individualistic mentality that makes it difficult for people to believe that foregoing personal pleasures in the present will make any substantial difference in the long run. Since communal activity oriented to the long term good requires counter movements and cultures, alternative institutions, and networks, the individualising effects of the market as a mode of experience presents a major challenge for a transformative politics. It is a clash between citizen democracy and consumer democracy.

As against the televisual style of electoral politics, addressing voters as individuals motivated by private concerns, a collective model of political organisation is centred on grassroots movements, community organizing, civic activism, and democratic accountability. The future of social and environmental politics lies with those engaged local activists who, together, can make a big difference. Their concern is not with careers in the conventional political sphere but with piecing the centre ground back together. They engage in a praxis that involves prolonged and extensive organizing in principled coalitions that draw broad sections of the community together and which build power, resources and capacity and which bring pressure to bear on a range of issues of direct, practical concern to the community — employment, housing, health and child care, education, and ecological protection, all of them issues which are best addressed in concert rather than as private individuals. Without such activism there can be no public goods. At the same time, political effectiveness also requires international, state, regional, and national interventions, connections, and networks. For this reason, nationally and internationally based collective models of leadership are needed to give a point and an effectiveness to locally and community based activism. These models must resist the temptations of focusing on the idea of the charismatic political leader. This may succeed in boosting electoral support for a while but is soon exhausted by the weight of the task. There is no endless supply of such leaders. The description of Lloyd George as a leader without a party is apposite. Political leadership is part effectiveness within the conventional sphere, part the maintenance of critical dialogue within and across social movements and organizations. 

Modern civilisation is dealing death, not only nation to nation, but to the planet. This realization is crucial to understanding the full depth of our predicament. The problem is not simply one of riches and poverty in a material sense. In the Marxist scenario, labour creates capital but is exploited and dominated by its creation. The solution is for labour to autonomize itself and achieve freedom in the society of the associated producers. Communism is therefore the conscious social control of communal production exercised by the freely associated producers. This creates a new social form and abolishes the supply of social labour through the value form. Marx envisages ‘a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community’ (Marx Cl 1983:82/3). Thus Marx urges: ‘working men of all countries, unite! …The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973). Well, there is a world still to win. But there are doubts whether a struggle over material power exhausts the meaning of revolution. It profits a man nothing to give his soul for the whole world. Whilst Marx’s alienation thesis was about much more than material power and addressed the conditions for human self-realisation, his modernist repudiation of past forms of organic solidarity and sociality as ‘feudal’ leaves him open to the charge of underestimating the dehumanising effects of modernity’s rationalistic desolidarisation. True, Marx argued for a society of free association. The problem is that he was almost silent on these associational forms. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the modern world is excessively rich in material wealth and desperately poor in the things that civilised societies have valued as social riches. These are the ‘constants’ of civilisation – sociality, civic associations and social ties, a sense of the sacred, shared norms and values. Modernity is rich in means and poor in ends.

The revolution that is coming will be a political act, not in the sense of political revolution, an act of taking already instituted power, but in the sense of reclaiming the political as the ground of being, politikon bion as public life. The roots of this revolution lie in the individual in community and are an affirmation of human culture. This revolution is a process of human growth. Political revolution as an act is merely the final act of this long term process. This revolution is a transition that does not require any force other than the force of the better argument. It is an organic evolution that affirms individuality rather than individualism, a more human community as against social atomisation, a higher rationality embedded in laws, institutions and social structures. Ultimately it will realise the Platonic trinity of truth, goodness and beauty through a holistic relationship of individuals to each other in society and of human society to nature. Sustainable living will therefore be a new and enduring wholeness and beauty.

This is the revolution of the ecological generation. The modes of thought, action and organisation of this generation is not a politics of protest nor a flight from reason but an attempt to move humanity to a higher rationality than the instrumental rationality imposed by systems, institutions and bureaucracies. This is an ethical reconstruction which demands recognition for the ethical component of reason.

Gandhi argued that there was no such thing as an economic crisis, only a moral crisis. To appreciate the environmental crisis as a moral crisis one must set the argument against a background of social and historical development, showing how reason has taken irrational forms through the inversion of means and ends. Through means coming to displace ends. It must be understood in light of the dialectic of Enlightenment, how emancipatory possibilities of reason took shape as repressive realities. How the ‘free market’ exists as a corporate state capitalism in which the system dominates, exploits, and ultimately destroys both nature and humanity in one and the same process. Rationality must be evaluated in terms of both means and ends and the relation between them, not measured by its instrumental power. Means elevated to the status of ends makes impoverishment, dehumanization, and even the extermination and annihilation of war seem logical and necessary. Rationality must be determined in relation to the fact that human action has not only made human beings appendages of the machine but has made human society as such one large machine. Worse, human beings have lost control of the machinery and have become cogs functioning for purposes which are external to themselves. Only a new rationality infused with values and culture can give comprehension and control. 
The meaning of ecological politics emerges from this historical perspective on the emergence of capitalist modernity. Ecology as politics is an environmental and social movement which attempts to bring modes of thought, action and organisation to terms with the revolution of technology and science that has already taken place. The new productive forces require that human beings achieve a higher, transcendent reason that is capable of controlling and shaping means by ends, rather than being determined by means as an unthinking monster. The power of technics demands a new moral responsibility for values, or the means will dictate the ends. This responsibility promises a life of truth, goodness and beauty, if humanity has the courage and the imagination to use the nous it was born with.

The challenge of dealing with the environmental crisis should also be seen as an opportunity for self-examination. Know thyself was the advice given by the Oracle of Delphi, turning any question directed to the Oracle back upon the questioner. The unexamined life is not worth living, said Socrates/Plato. The transformation that is required to deal with the environmental crisis invites us to re-examine our own way of life, our purposes and goals. It forces us to face some awkward questions, whether the cycle of work, income, consumption really is as liberating as was promised since school, or whether it is merely a new necessity, whether we live in a real community or merely one large factory grinding out profits. The question of how we are living comes with the follow up question of how could we live differently? In challenging the human race to secure the basis for a living environment in the future, the environmental question offers us the chance to recover the ground of being in the present. The environmental crisis is like the role of death in existentialism, like the dark side of the mirror that reflects our mortality back upon ourselves. The value of life is only grasped in its entirety when one realises that one day it will end. When someone is informed that they have a terminal illness, they never regret that they could have made more money; they always wish that they had more time to do the things they always wanted to do – and then use their remaining time to the full. This is the existential choice that cannot be evaded when life appears in all its finitude and fragility.

At the heart of the transition is a change of consciousness, not as a condition of transformation but as an integral part of it. This means a congruity between modalities and mentalities, a new modus vivendi, a new personality. This is what humanity is searching for, turning to outmoded means for new ends, each disappointment shedding illusions further until finally there is a turn to the new. As John Ruskin stated, the industrial revolution produced not just things, it produced men – human beings adapted to the demands of the machine. The emerging productive forces require a new consciousness of what it is to be human, so that the machine, having spread its means throughout society, may now be turned to human ends; so that the human being, currently crushed by its product, can once become a creative force. In thus creating his or her own life, human beings restore life and meaning back to society.

It is important to place the environmental crisis and the notion of social change as a self-change in a philosophic and historical perspective. Only by understanding how modern society emerged is it possible to have some idea of where it may go. The world at present is a confusing spectacle of power out of control, so much as to appear overwhelming. Indeed it is that lack of comprehension and control that is part of the human predicament, with people and governments being reactive in face of day to day events, tackling problems in isolation, confronting only immediate evils, and offering inadequate solutions that focus upon only part of the problem not the whole problem. A longer-range view is necessary for a more adequate, proactive stance.

Most people tend to see crisis not as one single phenomenon but as a collection of problems, with no necessary relation to each other, and capable of piecemeal ameliorative action. By addressing these problems not individually but as aspects of larger issues then it is possible to get to the root of the crisis in the structure of society itself. From this perspective, the environmental crisis is a holistic one in that it arises out of the basic premises by which modern society is organised and that incremental reform through existing institutions cannot touch it.

Disorder, corruption, hypocrisy, war
The television news and the newspapers tell the same story: the disintegration of the social, moral and ecological fabric and no hope of rescue from a political realm overcome by war, terrorism, corruption and deception or from an economic level which continues only with the public largesse. The result is a pervasive anxiety. 

From where is the solution to come? For Alasdair MacIntyre (1983), the barbarians are not outside the city walls but are inside; they have been ruling us for some time. And until we see this, they will continue to rule. The crime which has become pervasive in modern society is a manifestation of the lawlessness that is inherent in the capital system. Money is not an end and imperatives to make money are not laws. The symbiotic relation between state and capital puts this lawlessness at the heart of the major institutions of society – accompanied by an evasion of responsibility and an indifference to consequences, and a congenital incapacity to see the facts that are everywhere visible. This lawlessness is inherent in the capital system, in the very notion of an economic system founded on private property freed from moral, religious, communal and political constraint, the ‘anarchy’ of the ‘invisible hand’, the ‘free’ market. In time, this anarchy is manifested within the institutions of society so that government no longer governs, merely administers processes that are outside of it. The social theorist Derek Sayer writes of the violence of abstraction. The abstracting tendencies of capitalist modernity are nowhere more visible than in war. Beginning with the First World War, lawlessness and anarchy has found an increasingly violent expression in war, with its unprincipled destruction of civilised norms and standards, cultural and physical resources that took centuries to build, and especially in its casual, indifferent technological cruelty. This is what Picasso saw in Guernica and in The Charnel House.

Inequality, urban diremption, distorted priorities, and private power directly translated into public policy, the world evinces a dire poverty amid abundance, an extremity of contrast unknown to previous civilisations. An age of excess is also an age of endless want. There is a surfeit of goods, services and activities that are not needed – arms, consumer durables – at a time when real needs, such as education and medical care, are relatively neglected.

The disparities between public need and private greed, between what Galbraith in calls ‘private opulence and public squalor’ (Galbraith 1970: ch 17) are not accidental to a ‘free’ economy but are results of its absence of politics. The claim that the ‘anarchy’ of the market spontaneously produces the general interest justifies the protection of private power from outside interference whilst, at the same time, the structural dependence of the state upon the private economy gives private power an undue influence upon policy and law making. The anarchy of the market thus becomes the lawlessness of the public realm. Governments do not govern for the general interest, they use the claim to general interest to govern for the rich and powerful, tax structures and public spending which subsidizes finance and industry, preserves private wealth and produces luxuries and arms at the direct expense of exploited people and impoverished social services. Neo-liberalism targets and destroys every sphere or activity that hints at collective power and purpose. It calls planning ‘serfdom’ (Hayek), it justifies free trade against protectionism. The planned economy already exists, with public policy shaped by private power with no concern for the general good; there already is managed trade, with the leading TNC’s controlling some 80% of global trade, deciding what is produced, where it is produced, who produces it and at what price (Gill and Law 1988).

The lawlessness in economics and politics needs to be set within the general pathos of means and ends which characterises the modern world. Means have enlarged to displace the ends so that untrammelled technology aids economic expansion in the destruction of environment Technology and production are progressive forces as means, but as means alone they are mindless instruments. Without the guidance and direction of ends, means achieve an existential significance of their own, forcing human society to follow a momentum not of its own making. Without common conscious control, means elevated to the status of ends flatten everything in their path. Technology is a mentality as well as a modality. Organisation and bureaucracy both represent the application of technology to social institutions. The problem is that technique is not a culture, or an ethos, or a philosophy or a way of life. Organisation and bureaucracy create ‘the organisation man’ (Whyte) and the bureaucratic mind, but not civilisation. Technics comes to dictate the way of life, with the instrumental rationality of organisation and bureaucracy taking precedence over every other value crucial to civilised order – history, custom and tradition, the amenities and civilities of everyday life, the spaciousness of life, the aesthetic, and the fragile, evolving culture and social ties which bind us together, an appreciation of nature and the natural environment. 

Lawlessness is an expression of powerlessness. It is not power but the absence of power which corrupts. The evils of absolute power point to too much power too narrowly concentrated at one pole and a lack of power in the body politic. In this respect one can extend Francis Bacon’s point with regard to money being like muck, no good unless spread evenly. The same can be said of power.

Capitalism is a system that affirms the primacy of economics over politics. Power here is related to the money that the individual has to make desire effective as demand on the market. It is a system which has inequalities of money and hence power built into it. The people seek redress at a political level which is itself dependent upon the process of capital accumulation. The political realm is itself emptied of power, gradually becoming a managerial hierarchy, administering capitalism for the benefit of elites and redefining politics as the manipulation and management of the disenfranchised masses. Politics is diminished as power is increasingly monopolised by giant managerial institutions and transnational corporations. As administration, politics is not about value judgements but technical decisions made by experts, specialists, and professionals far removed from the people (Habermas The Rational Society; Brand 1990). Governments no longer govern, with political power shifting to administrative agencies. In the meantime, corporate power remains free from constraint. As politics as administration expand, so bureaucratic discretion takes the place of the rule of law. The attempts by citizens to reclaim the political as the sphere of ideas and values is met by state repression and surveillance in the name of security, the pervasiveness of police, the military, wars on poverty, crime, drugs, terror …. The ancient Greek ideal of polis democracy, the origin of politics, is replaced by police. 

The artificiality of work and culture
Life and livelihood becomes increasingly meaningless and empty, devoid of any human satisfaction. Not that there is a lack of socially useful work to be done, just that working lives are taken up in an endless cycle of production and consumption that lacks meaning: making useless or products that damage the environment, or servicing the bureaucratic structures, feeding the monster. For most people, work is mindless, dull, exhausting, servile and hateful, something to be endured. And even time away from work has been colonised by commercial imperatives, the gross materialism of capitalist production also taking over culture and turning it into entertainment for the stupefied and stultified masses. In fine, creative human activities have been taken over and turned to decreative ends so that human life has become artificial, vicarious and false to genuine human needs. Human beings waste their lives engaged in activities whose purposes are external to them and which have been manufactured by others and forced upon them.

Absence of community
Marx criticised the modern state as the ‘illusory community’. Denied true community in their everyday lives, individuals projected their need for commonality and solidarity upwards to the abstract level of the state. Lewis Mumford’s description of the contemporary city as the anti-city applies also to this illusory community. The modern nation, not just the state, is one vast, petrifying anti-community that has replaced the thickly textured, rich, warm social bonds of true community with the nexus of callous cash payment. The great organizations which claim the working day of most people, the towns and cities and suburbs to which people return at night, are equally places of isolation and separation. When people no longer know their neighbours, there is no longer a neighbourhood. The stresses of modern living has pulverized locality, community and neighbourhood and destroyed the connection of being with place, with the result that individuals exist more and more as pure egos, aware only of the anonymous separateness of their existence. The family, the building block of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, the basic form of society according to Aristotle, has been stripped of its functional essentials to be an adjunct of working life, grandparents taking over when breakfast and homework clubs are not available for child minding when parents are at work. Friendship, another Aristotelian prerequisite of a functioning social order, has been layered over with an electronic artificiality. Extended sociality leaves the wasteland of real community outside behind for the hyperreality of cybercommunity. People gather thousands of electronic friends. Meanwhile, in the real world, competition, hostility and fear erode the warmth of close ties and familiarity, with protocol of well chosen words replacing the banter of everyday life.

Loss of self
Marx offered the working class a vision of the world to win. But what kind of victory is required? For what kind of world? No material reward can compensate for the loss of soul. The poverty we witness and experience amidst abundance is not simply a material poverty, to be abolished by bringing the poor up to the level of the affluent. The loss of soul is a loss of self, a death in life, a living death. This view is implicit, at least, in Marx’s critique of alienation as a dehumanisation, describing a situation in which human products acquiring a life and a significance of their own over against their human creators. As objects acquire living force, the creative human subjects are reduced to the status of things. This loss of humanity is the underlying source of discontent in the modern world. Foucault refers to ‘technologies of the self’ to describe the practices that individuals subject themselves to fit the system. These in addition to social practices designed to suppress imagination, creativity, aspirations, dreams and autonomy, training to become a productive unit within mass technological society. Max Weber noted the irony of an economic system suppressing the most precious values of human society - spontaneity, autonomy, creativity, instinct, and feeling – in the name of freedom. A system of individual liberty crushes the individual underneath overwhelming forces. Separated from their own selves, separated from the constitutive ties that forge individual identity, the individual eventually morphs into the occupation, profession, or job, and from then on are strangers to themselves as well as to others. Perhaps this enforced loss of self is a condition of truly appreciating the value of soul, separation yielding a vision of a truly fulfilling life that is within reach of all.

In understanding the pervasive nature of crisis, one needs to locate the universal experience of powerlessness in alienative social relations which are designed to separate people’s value creating force from them. The result is a society that no one consciously created and that no one seems to want. It is just there as some ‘real world’ that those who hate it the most tell everyone else to come and live in. And that’s the point, you can’t live in it. The loss of self is death in life. The feeling of powerlessness is actually alienation, which is a revocable situation. Human beings are capable of resolving the problems that confront them. There are no social and political problems that lack solutions. The causes of crime and social disorder are known, the causes of social inequality are known, the causes of urban decay, unemployment, destruction of habitats and environments and so on are all known. The problems are great but not beyond the institutional and technical ability at the command of human society. [Spirit Level; Oliver James]

The crisis, then, is not lack of material, technical and institutional power but a pervasive powerlessness which issues in an inability to take effective action. This paralysis is a cynicism and apathy and hopelessness and it is born of a past experience of resources being misdirected. People may want peace and freedom and justice, but they cannot see how individual wills can be turned into common action on the part of society. It is not that individuals do not will action, but that to be effective, action requires collective mechanisms which do not exist. All that there is is the conventional political sphere, increasingly inadequate to the task and seen to be so. This leaves human society equipped with new productive forces but unable to put scientific knowledge and technics to use. The basic machinery of society no longer works, and human beings increasingly understand that they do not know how it could ever work.

The market economy and the electoral system are supposed to deliver individual liberty and democracy but these are the public face of a structure that is increasingly crisis ridden. All of the other machinery within a society dependent upon the private economy also falters. The principles are asserted all the more, but the means for applying them are in decline.

The Marxist critique analyses society in terms of antagonistic class interests, emphasising that those in charge of productive means exploit both people and the environment and seek to preserve the status quo. This class profits from poverty, inequality, and war and works to suppress democracy, liberty, and communal solidarity. The failing machinery of society therefore refers to its capture by class interests.

The analysis needs to be supplemented by a critique of the forces of bureaucracy, organization and technology. These are the forces of rationalisation which Weber argued possessed a reality of their own independently of class and capital. A failure to grasp this point, Weber argued, could make socialism the pinnacle of a bureaucratised society, Marx’s dictatorship of the proletariat taking the form of the dictatorship of the officials. Thus the problem is not simply one of capital and class exploitation but of mindless, soulless, impersonal forces that pursue their own instrumental rationality independent of human ends and values.

Whenever an attempt is made to confront current problems, there is a lack of understanding so profound that it seems more like a systematic misunderstanding. This is not a lack of knowledge, but an inability to translate this knowledge into effect. The real problem concerns mentalities shaped by previous modes. There is a striking unreality to pronouncements and statements concerning solutions to problems. The perceptions of how the economy works, of the nature of society, of the way government operates, what people think, internal and external threat, bear little relation people’s mode of experience. Indeed, the central fact of modern society is the discrepancy between the realities of current society and beliefs about what these societies, how they operate and considerations of how they should operate. This failure to match perception to reality goes some way to explain the inability to grasp the immanent potentialities of emergent productive forces and how these render existing social machinery obsolete.

This unreality is the true source of the inability to act, reinforcing the feeling of powerlessness that derives from alienation and exploitation. Without comprehension, there cannot be control; and without control, human ends cannot prevail over means. And so the major forces, structures and imperatives that comprise social existence come to dominate us. Thus a true definition of the environmental crisis is that human beings have lost control of their own powers and do not comprehend the systemic and structural forces which dominate existence. With human powers taking alien form, the system has acquired the power to control, unguided by ends, with instrumental rationality indifferent to human ends proceeding according to its own inhuman logic.

The great question is how human beings can live up to their creative potential and hence humanise technics so as to be able to live in a technological society; what mentalities and modalities are required to realise humanity and prevent subjugation to the forces created by human praxis? Answering this question is at the root of resolving the environmental crisis. It is this question which the members of new social and environmental movements are putting to representatives of an increasingly beleaguered system. The resolution of this crisis is a sustainable living that reclaims the connection of being and place, restores human power to source and returns the self to the individual.

The industrial revolution caused a major change of values in society, with scientific technique, materialism and the market system becoming ascendant over more humanistic values proper to a previous age. Behind the claim to individual freedom, these industrial values were really an instrumental rational concerned with means and indifferent to ends. This denigration of conscious moral purpose is inconsistent with democratic and spiritual ideals and soon began to undermine its own society.

Every stage of human civilization is accompanied by a consciousness appropriate to its technics and culture. This consciousness is likely to correspond with underlying material structures and relations. But emerging productive forces break this correspondence and subvert existing arrangements, leaving consciousness out of kilter with reality. This is the situation today, with technics and culture containing a potential to realise human needs which far exceeds perceptions of the possible which is fitted to a bygone age. Without more adequate mentalities and modalities fitting perceptions of reality to the potentials of the new productive forces, one is left with obsolete institutions and a morally and intellectually unanchored population, split between a nostalgic consciousness characterized by myth and an inhuman consciousness dominated by the instrumental rationality of modernity. Neither the nostalgic nor the inhuman consciousness is adequate to the task of guiding and controlling the vast institutional and systemic apparatus that human ingenuity has built. But, mindful of Faust and the sorcerer’s apprentice, they are more than capable of unleashing this apparatus of power as a mindless juggernaut, destroying the built and the natural environment, obliterating civilised values, and instituting a meaningless, soul destroying domination over all. 


Here is Erich Heller in The Disinherited Mind:

“Life is frightened out of its highly enlightened wits by the return of ancient nightmares: the tales of the sorcerer's apprentice, of dwarfs with magic powers. The promise of Heaven for the poor in spirit is understood to mean that, on earth at least, they should be educated into clever people able to manipulate and let loose the technical installations of Hell. And in art, there are sounds most skilfully organized, furies expressed in the most virtuoso fashion, and proud of signifying nothing.”

To the injustice and inequality and exploitation of nineteenth century capitalism, twentieth century corporate capitalism has added de-personalization, bureaucratisation and meaninglessness. The crisis of the natural world without stems from this fundamental crisis in human nature within. Weber quoted Goethe in calling this pinnacle of rational capitalism a ‘nullity’. Long before it destroys the planet, the system will have destroyed all meaning and morality, reducing human beings to a living death.

The environmental crisis has the merit of waking people up to realities. The threat to the external world has forced people to examine their own lives. Faced with this threat to life on earth, people are questioning the purposes of their own life. The environmental crisis has reacquainted people with their own nature within, causing them, as if gripped by biological necessity, to seek a new understanding and awareness of the meaning of life. Thus is part of a search to develop a consciousness which is appropriate to the new technics and culture and which is therefore capable of bringing the apparatus of power under human control. This new consciousness is based on emergent productive forces, and could not have developed without them. And it represents a higher, transcendent form of reason that reaffirms ends over means and restores instrumental rationality to its place as servant of a higher reason, reason with an ethical component.

The emergence of the new consciousness is part of the process of revolutionizing society, restructuring power, changing culture and emphasising the quality of individual lives.

We return to society and civilisation as a learning process. The new ecological consciousness does not just save us from destruction but educates us in the task of learning how to live in a new way. This ecological modus vivendi does not reject science and technology. On the contrary, it seeks to make science and technology work for, not against, human interests as means to human ends. The ecological way of life proposes a concept of work in which use value replaces exchange value and quality, skill, effort and excellence are rewarded; work is an expression of creativity and an affirmation of being in being integrated into a full and satisfying life. The ecological way of life replaces a decreative artificial culture with a culture of creativity and spontaneity. This is a community in which reciprocity, recognition, and a mutual search for wisdom replace the egoistic competition and isolation of atomised societies, and in which individuality replaces individualism as each and all are enabled to grow toward the highest possibilities of the human potential.

Once humanity has saved itself from the threat of ecological catastrophe, the ecological consciousness that will have grown will be a powerful resources in shaping the world as a home, a habitat, for human beings, a humanised nature and a naturalised humanity. The task of learning how to live ecologically in balance with nature thus represents the real transformation, the positive purpose of an ecological praxis. Rescuing life as we know it from the threat of ecological destruction begs the question – having rescued this life, what do you do with it? Why keep it preserved in its given form when it has brought itself to the brink of self-destruction? The purpose of life is not just to live, but to live well. [Aristotle] Sustainable living is a way of living well. [BP notes]

2 THE NATURE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

According to Nicholas Stern (2006), the ‘two great challenges of the twenty-first century’ are fighting poverty and combating climate change. 

The task before us is to identify the key factors behind progress on climate change at governmental level in terms of making and meeting explicit commitments. Sound analysis of evidence, options, policy and strategy also requires strong political leadership on the basis of that analysis. The scope of governmental intervention and action is also increased when there has been an effective programme, context or campaign that mobilises the public voice and generates pressure for change. 

The problem lies in how to ensure that knowledge takes precedence over opinion and is translated into effective public policy The scientists have done their job in analysing the climate and climate at the very margins of the discipline. What is lacking is the connection between science and politics, a bridge between theory and practice. The science now needs to be formulated politically in terms of an examination of the policy and strategic options in relation to the evidence of climate change.

Nicholas Stern writes that human beings are gambling with the planet. A little look at games theory here would help us place our bets and make the right decisions to get the best, long term outcomes for all.

The most striking thing about climate change is not the scientific complexity but the implications for life on this planet. The effects of climate change are potentially devastating with respect to human civilisation. As well as to other life forms. 

Stern writes of ‘the importance of direct experience in mobilising action: unless people have seen or felt a problem, it is difficult to persuade them that a response is necessary. With the effects of climate change becoming apparent only over a long period of time, this is particularly challenging’ The challenge is to make the ‘issues … much more immediately visible’ in terms of practice. (Stern 2010 ch 1). There is a need to innovate practices, institutions and policy frameworks ‘which could help create the circumstances in which people can alter their lives’. 

Climate change is both challenge and opportunity. Political theorists write of ‘crises with transformative potential’ (Held 1985). The environmental crisis comprises a series of crises which, in themselves, are hard to manage for political effect. The environmental crisis itself is the one, overarching crisis with transformative potential.

The inaction on climate change requires explanation in terms of political and psychological inertia. The two go together and in an electoral politics where opinion reigns in public and vested interests reign in private, political and psychological inertia reinforce each other. There is an inability to link actions to impacts, to see the problem and the challenge as it unfolds. 

The difficulties of responding to a scientific knowledge focused on the long range within a political world geared to short term opinion are particularly acute with respect to climate science. As Stern writes, ‘climate change is a problem which arises from a build-up of greenhouse gases over time and the effects come through with long lags of several decades. If the world waits before taking the problem seriously, until Bangladesh, the Netherlands and Florida are under water, it will be too late to back ourselves out of a huge hole’ (Stern 2010 ch 1). The political predicament is this, effective action to deal with the environmental crisis in the long term is required at the level of public policy now, even though the real magnitude of the crisis will only start to become visible to politicians and people over a longer period of time. The ecological imperative is much more clear to those fixed on the science in the long run. It is not so strong to outweigh short term political and material considerations which normally drive public policy. To delay action until the environmental effects are real and tangible is to conduct policy making in the most inauspicious of circumstances, collapse of livelihoods, mass impoverishment, mass movements of people, increasing conflict between greater numbers over dwindling resources.

The problem is one of translating scientific knowledge into public policy. The science of climate change is of long standing and is well established; dealing with the policy implications is a recent phenomenon. 

‘There is a pressing urgency to settle policy now; we must act according to what we already know. Postponing a global deal will put both policy and markets in a limbo that could be very destructive. Those making the crucial investments in energy-related and other industries will not have the clear signals necessary to make considered and responsible decisions. The relentless logic of the flow of emissions adding to the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will place us in an ever more difficult position. We cannot afford to wait until we know everything with certainty. Indeed, the pervasive uncertainty makes it imperative that we act now to reduce the risks of a planetary disaster’. (Stern 2010 ). 
From people in their communities to members of the political system, there is plenty that could be done to manage the risks not only to resolve the environmental crisis but to unleash a new era of progress and prosperity. New technologies, new sources of energy, secure energy supplies form the basis of a sustainable growth which creates new opportunities for investment, employment, and industry. The current high-carbon economy struggles to deliver on its promise of growth in the short term; it cannot deliver growth over the medium and long term. 
Since the environmental crisis is global in its origins and its impacts, it requires a global deal concluded at the supra-national level. Stern sets out the terms of this deal. ‘That global deal must be effective, in that it cuts back emissions on the scale required; it must be efficient, in keeping costs down; and it must be equitable in relation to abilities and responsibilities, taking into account both the origins and impact of climate change’ (Stern 2010). 

The problems of climate change derive from the economic dependence on hydrocarbons. The resolution of these problems requires substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions over a period of time. There needs to be climate change action plans, effective policy frameworks and evidence based policies at government level, investment in 'green energy', international agreement, coordination and cooperation and a profound shift in time scale and perspective. 

The problem and its solution

In essentials, the science is clear and straightforward. From the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the emission of greenhouse gases has been proceeding at a faster rate each year than the planet can absorb, particularly during the rapid and energy-intensive growth from the mid-twentieth century onwards. These gases create a greenhouse effect by trapping the sun's heat as it is radiated back from the earth, thus causing global warming which, in turn, causes climate change. If current practices continue to the end of the twenty first century, there is a strong likelihood of global warming at 5°C above pre-industrial times. Temperature increases of this magnitude will disrupt climate and environment to such an extent as to have a devastating effect on life and livelihood. The result will be severe hardship and hunger, mass migration, and global conflict over scarce resources. Green politics is sometimes described as a ‘post-materialism’, the reasoning being that once material necessities are satisfied there is a margin to explore a greater, richer sense of human needs. Ecological devastation implies a reversion to the most brutal materialism, Hobbes’ state of nature as scarcity in which life is ‘nasty, brutish and short’. Of course, Hobbes was guilty of reading the features of the emerging atomistic, egoistic, competitive capitalism back into nature, in which case we are dealing with a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The problems of economics and ecology are inextricably connected. The problems of economics is a problem of uneven development, over development in one part of the world and under development in another. Tackling climate change requires cooperation between developed and developing countries so as to achieve balanced growth. Poorer countries need development to bring them up to a materially sustainable level. This should be promoted at the same time as reducing emissions and introducing new technologies. By international cooperation, the over and the under developed countries can achieve low-carbon growth. It is more rational to identify necessities and work together to shape their contours. Whereas high-carbon growth has a limited shelf life, low carbon growth is sustainable. 

‘Scientists have been outstanding in marshalling the evidence on the risks. It is now the task of policy analysts and policymakers to construct strategies to reduce those risks and create a viable and attractive alternative to the high-carbon growth path we have been following’ (Stern 2010). 
The Green Party should be able to outline the contours of the future ecological society and map the path leading in its direction. 
There is a role for business in the ecological conception of the corporate society. ‘these policies and strategies are about incentives and opportunities for investments and technologies, and the relevant actions will mostly be from private investors, big and small. They must play a major role shaping policy’ (Stern 2010 ). 

The danger of global warming and the response
The great danger of global warming is not the heat but the water. Rising sea levels, storms, droughts threaten widespread devastation all over the world. Where we lives shapes how we live. A fundamental change in physical geography implies a similar transformation in the human geography which depends upon it.
The continuation of current growth gives a likelihood of an eventual temperature increase of 4°C and a fifty-fifty chance of a 5°C increase. The former would be profoundly damaging, the latter doesn’t bear thinking about given the unstable dynamics that are now observable at lower increases of 0.8°C and concentrations of greenhouse gases. 

Some indication of how great a 5°C change in temperature is becomes clear when one considers that the last time the planet was 5°C cooler than now was around 10,000 years ago, when most of Northern Europe, North America and corresponding latitudes were under hundreds of metres of ice and human life was concentrated around the equator. The last time the planet was 5°C hotter was 30-50 million years ago in the Eocene period, when the land consisted mainly of swampy forest. This throws the casual assertions that the human race will adapt to climate change in sharp relief. Temperature changes on this scale, and the climate change that issues, involve a transformation of the physical geography so great as to cause massive dislocation, huge new vulnerabilities and new patterns of habitation in the human geography. If civilisation is possible in these conditions, then it would be a first.

A presumption of anyone engaging in politics is that the reasons for hope outweigh the grounds for despair. It expresses a belief that collective action can make a difference for the better. But politics implies policies, practices and institutions rather than wishful thinking. What is the point of a ‘Green politics’ then? To affirm political action rather than an anti-political inaction. (Stern 2010 ). 

Stern’s arguments require a moral and institutional framework that predisposes individuals to eschew individualist competition for selfish ends in order to act cooperatively for the long term good. 

‘These huge risks can be reduced drastically at reasonable cost, but only if we act together and follow clear and well-structured policies starting now. The cost of action is much lower than the cost of inaction - in other words, delay would become the anti-growth strategy’. (Stern 2010 ). 

Climate Science
Contrary to the impression given by certain media outlets and newspapers, the science of climate change is not a conjecture which is maintained in the face of endless refutation simply because it is an institutional ‘gravy-train’. Over a period of three decades, the theory has been solidified by new researches and tests and new evidence and information, over a whole spectrum of indicators. The more sophisticated deniers exploit the uncertainty that necessarily exists on the margins of any scientific endeavour. The basic scientific conclusions on climate change are not in doubt. The argument that human activity is causing emissions to growing, and that greenhouse gases are causing global warming and will continue to do so, is not in doubt is sound science generating robust conclusions that have withstood close scientific testimony. The scientific logic is very clear, human activity emits more and more greenhouse gases which trap energy, cause the earth to warm up and the climate to change. The data clearly reveals the long-term trends associated with the effects of human emissions. 

For all of the claims to contrary evidence, the ‘arguments’ from those who would deny the science bear a striking resemblance to those of smokers who denied any link between smoking and cancer. Or those who, back in the nineteenth century, denied the link between sewage and disease. The were plenty of ‘sewage sceptics’ in nineteenth century America when the first municipal sewers were under construction. The science demonstrating the connection between sewage and disease remained uncertain for some time, and sewage sceptics exploited this uncertainty. Although, in time, Pasteur and Koch established the microbial theory of infectious disease, there were still people who denied the science and argued in favour of the old – cheap, nasty and infectious – cesspools. Even robust scientific theory along with many thousands of deaths was not enough to persuade some.

As late as 1885, in Harper's magazine, a physician by the name of J.S. Billings deplored the new municipal sewers:

But, it may be asked, if the dangers and discomforts which arise from the storage of filth in or near human habitations are so great, why is it... that proposals to do away with these evils meet with stubborn opposition, and sometimes give rise to bitter hostility against the proposers of such improvements? The answer to this is that the danger is in most cases not apparent to the great majority of people ... Moreover, cleanliness is not to be secured without some cost and labor ...

In time, the sewage sceptics went to their well deserved oblivion. Those who like their history tinged with irony would like to read that they fell victim to cholera and typhoid fever, but history is seldom as fair as that. In death as in life, the iniquity of the prevailing social order governs. The impact of climate change will hit the poorest people on the planet faster and harder than those in denial in the more prosperous parts of the world. The fate of the sewage sceptics is encouraging. People in all the developed countries came to accept that the benefits of organised sewage disposal far outweighed the costs. In short, they were eventually willing to pay to have sewage disposed of properly. Our friend, the physician J.S. Billings was doubtless ignorant of Freud and the notion of rationalisation. After all his lather and blather, he did identify two critical obstacles in the way of effective public action on environmental questions 1) ‘the danger is in most cases not apparent to the great majority of people’; 2) effective action ‘is not to be secured without some cost and labour…’

The rich don’t want to pay, shirk their burdens and their responsibilities and hide their self-interest behind popular ignorance. The invisibility or intangibility of a problem is a serious issue. People are motivated and will act when they can see a connection between inputs and outputs, practical results for efforts. The abstruse issue and long range goal needs to be given a practical, tangible focus, brought into the here and now as an ecological and a cognitive praxis. 
For sewage sceptics read ‘climate change sceptics’, deniers of scientific methodology, logic and evidence. The same process that took place with sewage is underway with regard to climate change, the links between human emissions, the greenhouse effect, global warming and climate change are being firmed up in the science and increasingly accepted amongst the public. Dealing with the effects of past emissions and reducing current emissions is a much bigger problem than building municipal sewers – and requires substantially more by way of ‘cost and labor’ – but it is well within human capability if we decide to do it. If we do it well, the result will not only be a safer environment; a social order could be built to confirm to the human ontology – indeed nature’s whole being – rather than contradict it as at present. 

The questioning of the science is crucial to good policy-making, asking the right questions in order to elicit the essential information. The right questions invite the right answers and once this point is reached, and the evidence is compelling, it is time to undertake the challenge of policymaking. That is what evidence based policy is all about. 

The question of solutions to the environmental crisis is a political one. However, this is not a matter of formulating the right policy in line with existing political institutions, but of establishing new rules – a new regulatory regime or framework based on new principles for the direction and social use of production, new habits. A new mode of regulation which is built on new hopes and new projects.

Being radical means going to the root but it must not be thought that the 'right' policy is determined by scientific knowledge derived from ecology. New laws are required from the integration of human culture and nature. At the very heat of the environmental crisis is a choice about the future world – can economics and ecology be integrated to deliver human growth, useful employment, quality of life and enhanced democracy within feasible economic arrangements? 
The facts of the environmental crisis are clear, meaning that policy options are circumscribed. In this context, economics has a role to play to the extent that it can break free from the presentation of abstract models or dogmatic justifications of the existing economy. Economics can explain current difficulties, the contradictions and the illogic of the current economy and the way it continues to undermine the best laid political plans of those who seek to work with it.


Political parties which conceive themselves to be the expression of new social movements will be responsible for what finally emerges from that social activity in terms of new institutions and development models. 

3 THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS AND ECONOMICS

“A spectre is haunting Europe - the spectre of Communism”. Marx’s justifiably famous opening line takes new form with respect to the spectre that is haunting the world as a whole – the spectre of ecological crisis. Martin Heidegger argued that human beings are ontologically nostalgic, always searching for home in the nature of their being. The spectre here however is not the lost Edenic past, but the prospect of a lost future. The green parties and movements growing around the world haunt politics with the promise of the future paradise and the threat of ecological destruction. 

'Economy' and 'ecology' are etymologically close relations. Oikos means ‘household’, nomos  means ‘laws’, hence  'economy' is the laws of the household sphere; with logos as meaning or rationality, ‘ecology’ concerns the meaning or rationality of the household sphere. It is the search for home as the good place, eutopia, the habitus of happiness, eudaimonia, good demon/spirit/god. When 'political' is added, this means that the sphere in question is the whole of the 'city' (polis). Politikon bion as public life, a more general conception of home which the human being, as a zoon politikon, social/political animal, requires.
Economics is the study of regularities in actions in order to enhance the household sphere; ecology determines whether these actions have a meaning or rationality. Economics is the science of the human activities of production and distribution. Ecology is a science which evaluates these activities according to the environment in which they takes place, noting wider interactions, changes and consequences. The environment is the condition not only of human activities but of human existence as such. It follows that human activities should be in accordance with the environmental condition of human existence.

In this respect, ecology is a broader critique of political economy than that launched by socialism. Socialism sought to highlight the social conditions of human activity, arguing that the economic laws of the day were not immutable but the products of particular social relations and therefore subject to alteration. Ecology expands the perspective. Just as human beings are social animals, so they are ecological beings, part of nature as a single living organism. Human beings are a part of nature. The problem is that as nature is altered by human activity, so the affirmation of human power is also a deformation of human nature. To the extent that nature is humanized, so humanity is denaturalised. Human beings get what they wanted but lose what they had. To resolve the human predicament requires that human culture and nature be so integrated that humanisation is also a realisation of natural potentials.

The conundrum can lead to misunderstanding of ecology as politics, holding corrupting human activity apart from pristine nature. This is to uphold the conflict between nature and human beings. As part of nature, human beings cannot but intervene in nature. The question is in what way. The environment now in existence is largely the product of human activity: hedgerows, cultivated forests, attractive residential areas, the built environment surrounded by green belts. In other words, ecology is a human ecology and involves politics. What kind of politics? The origin of the word politics is in ancient Greece, polites, those interested in public affairs, politikon bion as the public life that human beings as naturally social animals, zoon politikon, require. Politics, in other words, is natural to the species. The realisation of public life is the realisation of human nature.

Today, the planet is almost wholly humanized, yet human beings feel a profound sense of alienation from its own creation, a sense of not belonging. Human praxis has not built a home for man but a prison or an asylum. Because human activity has focused on the technical means rather than the natural end of self-realisation. The crimes against nature as a result of reality constituting human praxis are also crimes against human nature. A crime against nature is a crime against humanity. Moreover, they are quite systematic and rational, made by a species that claims to have identified the laws of political science and economics, that prides itself on creating civilisation out of natural wilderness. Ecology is therefore more than a natural science in that it concerns the human species, a species naturally disposed to action, ingenuity, creation, politics and morality. For ecologists, therefore, human beings are doubly a part of nature, at the heart of an organised civilised society that is itself enclosed within nature as a whole. Human creative power is also a responsibility to ensure the political and social order corresponds to ontology, the nature of being, a matter of achieving consciousness in morality and politics. 

The economics of discounting of the future 
Success will achieve more than the potential to deal with the problem of climate change, but will also globalise social and environmental justice, opening up an era of international agreement and solidarity to match the globalisation of economic relations. Failure will not only destroy the planet’s ecology but also, obviously, the planet’s economy, the natural capital which economics exploits, the international links which trade requires, the confidence of investors and markets. This is good economics only from the perspective of individuals as self-maximising agents in the short term. ‘In the long term we are all dead’ Keynes argued. A branch of free market economics denies the validity of public action for the sake of future generations who do not exist. The only responsibility the individual has is to the self. That economics will despoil the planet.

This branch of economics discounts the future. The welfare of future generations is no kind of priority. Future generations do not exist and so, therefore, any needs, wants or interests they may or may not are merely imputed by actors in the present, following their own interests. Individuals who are living legitimately follow their own self-interest as self-satisficing agents and have no responsibility for the collective interests of generations who do not exist. There are those who split ecology and economics and argue that the interests of future generations is best served by economic development in the here and now, generating resources for tackling climate change in the long run. Such arguments are based on the premise that individuals generally choose a more limited, but more certain, good in the short run over a greater, but uncertain, good in the long run. In this scenario, policy must be responsive to the present generation whose interests and desires are real rather than future generations who do not, as yet – and if ever - exist. The problem with such economic analysis is that it is itself as based on a fiction – homo economicus - as is the notion of the putative interests of future generations. The problem with ‘economic man’ is that in economic terms is not the real desires of real individuals at all but effective demand, desire that can be backed with the ability to pay. Lack of purchasing power on the market also serves to render people invisible in economics. In economic terms, they do not exist. Add the number of people around the world who have already died as a result of environmental impact, and there are generations past, present and future whose basic interest in having enough to make life viable has been and is being ignored.

There are two alternative paths of future economic growth. The first alternative is to move to a low-carbon green collar economy. This will require a major transformation in political institutions and social structures and will require substantial investment, 2% at least of GDP. But this would be a productive investment in the future, ushering in an era of sustainable growth, reducing global inequalities and building a cleaner, safer, more biodiverse and balanced world. It would amount to realising the old Pythagorean and Platonic trinity of the true (knowledge), the good (freedom, equality) and the beautiful (appreciation of the connection between nature within and without). The second alternative is to continue with the high carbon economy based upon non-renewable, finite resources, which ultimately is incapable of sustaining growth, and, through endless cycles of economic crisis, climate change and plain moral meaninglessness, generates massive dislocation and destruction of life. 

Despite the fact that the two sources of wealth are ecological, natural resources and labour, there are still many who make ‘the economy’ a priority over ecology. The simple reason for this is the fact that economic activity, actions and effects, are tangible in a day to day sense. These same people draw precisely the wrong conclusion from the financial crisis, arguing that dealing with the problems of the global economy should delay action on climate change. Apart from the fact that both problems can be tackled together with the same instruments, the point is that the current financial crisis is proof positive of the dangers of failing to recognise problems and act in time, building up the risk of an even bigger crisis. The economic crisis has been in preparation since the liberalisation of finance in the 1980’s, problems were anticipated and ignored, with the result that the world faces the biggest depression for a hundred years. A similar approach to climate change will destroy civilised life as we know it. Apart from anything else, in fiscally straitened times, it becomes even more important to reduce our carbon footprint, live lightly on the land, do more with less - energy efficiency, renewable energy, the sustainable economy are all powerful ecological principles of lasting economic and social value. (Stern 2010 ). 

4 ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

The scale of risk and uncertainty
In simple terms, the process of climate change begins with the diverse, uncoordinated actions of individuals and ends with massive, wholesale impacts upon people. One returns to the problem of how to relation the particular to the general, the individual to the collective, the short-term to the long-range. 

1.	Human activities generate emissions.
2.	since the planet cannot absorb all these emissions, there is a year by year addition to the concentrations or stocks of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The processes of absorption and addition constitute the 'carbon cycle'. The inability of carbon sinks to absorb all carbon sources leads to the ‘carbon imbalance’.
3.	energy from the sun is trapped in the atmosphere, causing a greenhouse which causes global warming. 
4.	global warming causes climate change which, in turn, transforms the physical environment.
5.	the transformation in physical geography transforms the human geography, with disruptive and even devastating effects on human life and livelihood.

‘Each of these links involves substantial risk and uncertainty which, cumulatively, are very large, not only because our knowledge is incomplete but also because solar, planetary and other processes have an inherent randomness. The whole subject of policy on climate change involves decision-making under risk and uncertainty. (Stern 2010 ). 

With reference to politics, political institutions and policy making, the most interesting observations of Stern here concern time lags between the stages.

‘The links involved in the chain also involve time lags of varying lengths, some of which are much greater than others. The lags between the first two stages - from people to emissions, and from emissions to increased stocks - are quite short. The lags between the third and fourth - from increased concentrations to warming, and from warming to climate and environmental change - can be quite long: there might be decades between increases in stocks and temperature changes. Some of the effects of temperature increases, such as rising sea levels, can take centuries to appear. These lags make it much more difficult to agree on the need for action to rein in emissions, since … there is no immediate reminder of the negative effects. Yet if action is delayed, concentrations build up, and by the time the consequences are apparent, the conditions for further temperature increases will already have been created. From that point, it will also take a long time to reduce concentrations. On the other hand, the lags allow us to look ahead and plan how to adapt’. (Stern 2010 ). 

Stern’s observations point once more to embedding a cognitive praxis within the institutional framework of government and politics so that actions and outcomes are more closely connected, greater cooperation and coordination is possible between actors, greater clarity and insight with regard to decision making results, and insight into long term ends informs short term choices.

The effects of climate change from global temperature increases of 0.8°C are already damaging. The heatwaves of 2003 caused excess deaths of 35,000. Severe water shortages were reported across southern Europe whilst it was even possible to walk across the Rhine at some points. What is considered to be extreme now is likely to be the average by the mid twenty first century.
Without strong and effective action, temperature increases of 4—5°C or higher relative to 1850 will be likely by the end of the twenty first century or in the first half of the next century. If the effects of a 0.8°C increase are so damaging in the present world, increases of this magnitude will be devastating, involving such a drastic change in the physical environment as to fundamentally alter the human world as we know it.

The last time the world temperature was 4-5 °C higher than now was 30-50 million years ago, in Eocene times, when the land was swampy forest. The fact that there were alligators near the North Pole makes the point that temperature increases of this scale will alter the location of many species, including humans. Those that could not change location will not survive. Desertification would extend to cover many areas, including much of Southern Europe; other areas, Florida and Bangladesh, would be under water. A critical point here concerns the pace at which these temperature increases will occur without prompt and effective action. A couple of centuries is extraordinarily rapid in relation to historical and evolutionary time.  

Temperature changes of this magnitude imply such a change in the physical environment that the civilisation which human beings have built on top will be affected in all fundamentals. There would be a mass movement of people. The stresses and controversies that have accompanied the migration of people into the politically secure, materially prosperous nations of the west are sufficient to indicate that the enforced movements of many millions of people in a short period of time is a recipe for a destructive cycle of ever extending conflict, more and more people fighting over fewer and fewer resources. 

The deniers
A number of people, including scientists like Brian Cox and influential figures like Prince Charles, argue that scientists should intervene and correct every piece of misinformation and distortion of the evidence concerning climate change science. Frustration, even anger, is understandable, but there is a danger of overestimating the importance of the climate change deniers. Stern estimates the balance in climate change science here as 99 (or more) to 1. ‘Not surprisingly, the loudest voices are not scientific, and it is remarkable how many economists, lawyers, journalists and politicians set themselves up as experts on the science’. The danger of scientists falling into this bear-pit of scarcely reasoned nihilisms, wilful ignorance masquerading as science and plain selfish stupidity is that it risks tainting the priceless asset of scientific knowledge and commitment to objectivity with the murk and bias of politics – ironically, the very charge which the politically motivated deniers lay against climate scientists. And there is the further point that once drawn into the quagmire of politics, it becomes well nigh impossible to get out. Time is too scarce and too precious for scientists to be dissipating their energies in this way. For the truth is the scientific logic and evidence is already overwhelming. Those who remain unpersuaded by the substantial contribution to knowledge made by scientists are unlikely to be persuaded by more of the same. There are plainly political, moral and psychological motivations behind the words and actions of those who would still deny the scale of dangers that the world faces and the urgency of action that is required. This is a question of effective government and politics allied to moral, cultural and psychological change.

Market Economics And Denial
The influence that the deniers have in the media so far outweighs the size of their numbers and the evidence for their arguments that it begs the question of who they are, what their motivation is, who they are connected with and who their target audience is. Why are they so politically influential when their scientific case is so weak?

The answer is not difficult to find. The neo-liberal reaction against Keynesian economics, social democratic politics, indeed any form of control and regulation is motivated by a scarcely reasoned identification of any form of collectivism as a ‘socialism’ which interferes with the ‘free’ market. For ‘free’ read powerful business and commercial interests being free to operate with minimal hindrance from politics and morality, from workers, consumers and communities. Hilariously, the same reasoning includes the European Union as part of this ‘socialist’ take over of the world. It is all of a piece with Hayek’s warnings of socialism, collectivism, regulation as the ‘road to serfdom. The results of this neo-liberal rejection of government and politics in economics is instructive. Leaving aside the looming ecological disaster, there is the growing disparity between rich and poor, tax evasion, debt ridden states, corporate corruption, and a global crash directly attributable to the unrestrained greed of international finance. Deregulation may be a libertarianism but it produces not liberty but a universal constraint of the freedom of all. Joseph Schumpeter astutely observed that it is because the car has breaks that it is able to go so fast. And keep going. With no sense of irony, neo-liberals turn and blame the breaks when the car crashes at high speed. 
Underlying this is a mythology, a religion. Just as Smith believed in the ‘invisible hand’, so Hayek believes that an unregulated economy would issue in ‘spontaneous order’. That all evidence is to the contrary indicates that we in the hermetically sealed world of true believers for whom arguments are self-evidently true. As governments use taxpayers money to bail out the banks to the tune of billions, it is clear that the ‘free’ market abhorrence of ‘collectivism’ is an article of libertarian faith. Those who are not true believers are entitled to point out that rather than enabling individual liberty, neo-liberalism is merely subsidizing irresponsible gamblers who use taxpayers’ money to feeding their highly destructive and expensive habit by wagering on someone else’s future. Not that they are totally opposed to collectivism. They may be concerned to monopolise the gains to themselves, but they are more than happy to socialise the losses, leaving everyone with a social and environmental wasteland. 
So intervention is justified to deal with the consequences of market failure. One can proceed from Schumpeter’s argument that it is because the car has breaks it can go so quickly. Those breaks are essential to the proper functioning of the economy. In other words, policy intervention is about enabling markets to function much better. 

The Long Term Planning Framework
The question of technology implies the need for a long term planning horizon. Technological innovation is rapid in renewables and price efficiency alters as more capacity is established. With different countries pursuing different technologies, there is an opportunity for mutual learning spurring further innovation. 
 There are many sources of low-carbon energy, some of which are already been used, others which are real possibilities in the near future. ‘For example enhanced photosynthesis might transform our ability to turn the sun's energy into usable plant material. Since plants absorb CO2 as they grow, energy based on using such material can be virtually carbon-free. The sun's energy coming into the earth is enormous, far more than we would ever need. Transforming it through solar thermal, solar voltaic or greatly enhanced plant material could give great leaps in renewable energy’. 

Strong and effective policy and a feasible timetable could deliver close to carbon-free electricity at reasonable cost by 2050. But this requires a long term planning horizon: ‘the later we leave it, the more high-carbon sources of electricity will be locked in and the greater the cost of trying later to do too much too quickly’ (Stern 2010 ). 

The design of towns and cities, public infrastructures and the role of public transport is an integral part of linking the transition to a low carbon economy to the creation of an ecological society. 

Good policy, involving congestion charging and taxation to make prices reflect the true cost of pollution, and good physical and technological design, can make more efficient use of existing infrastructure. 

There is a need for policy on air transport. Emissions from air travel could rise from 3-4% of the total at present to 15% of global greenhouse gases by 2050 as a result of the increase in demand for flying. ‘In the short and medium term, more efficient engines, lighter aeroplanes and higher occupancy can make important contributions, as can incentives towards these moves through pricing, taxation and regulation. In the longer term, alternative fuels with a strong power-to-weight ratio will be essential’. (Stern 2010 ). 

Enlightened Self Interest
Some consider environmental issues to be a politics of the middle class who, with a stable and certain standard of living, are more concerned with their own post-materialist concerns rather than the developmental and redistributive concerns of the poor. The response here is clear and simple, that it is not the western middle class who will be hit first and hardest by climate change but the poor, and specifically the poor in the poorest nations of the world. Social and environmental justice are one and the same, have common origins and common ends. Climate change and the struggle to overcome poverty are inextricably linked. A little of the ethic of ‘the Internationale’ would not go amiss here, supporting the design of global policies that foster economic development in ways that equitable and just from the perspective of the society and the environment. 

Stern calls for ‘enlightened self-interest’.
‘There are vested interests, particularly in coal and oil extraction industries, that see a move away from hydrocarbon-based energy as a threat… But the potential for dislocation is not an argument against change; while the adjustment costs from cutting emissions must be managed, the dislocation for society as a whole will be far higher if we continue with business as usual. Enlightened self-interest from those involved in hydrocarbons should lead to the support of technologies enabling the clean use of hydrocarbons, such as carbon capture and storage, and not to defend deniers and cranks’. 
There seems to be a vicious cycle in which the repeated failures of governments to live up to ideals and promises creates a cynical electorate who, despite not expecting much, are still disappointed. There is widespread mistrust of governments and politicians which expresses itself in an explicitly anti-political populism. Here are the massed ranks of people who respond to the deniers of climate change science, people who object to attempts to change their patterns of energy consumption via prices, taxes and/or regulation. Transport, the motor car, the costs of power, heating and cooling are major concerns for people and politicians, already struggling in the popularity stakes, are more than happy to sacrifice what should be done to short-term electoral considerations. ‘The response to those preoccupied with these short-run cost-of-living considerations is simply to show that continued high-carbon growth is impossible at reasonable cost, while low-carbon growth is achievable. Alternatives to a hydrocarbon-powered internal combustion engine are already available and many more will be created; similarly for power generation’ (Stern 2010). This argument needs to be publicised with full discussion of the issues. Political leadership and policy initiatives and commitments based on the evidence will promote much greater awareness and understanding. 




There are a number of arguments which are used to delay or deny the need for change. One argues that the small scale of risks, adaptation or discounting means that the costs of reducing emissions are greater than the benefits. This is wrong about the actual expense and what it achieves in the long run. The ‘approach is far too narrow in relation to the risks and misguided on the techniques of economic analysis such problems of risk require, particularly in the context of distorted or absent markets’. (Stern 2010 ). 

Above and beyond the techniques of economic analysis, ‘the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing' (Blaise Pascal 1623-1662 Les Pensees). Pascal was a philosopher, physicist and mathematician with a prodigious intellect and devout faith. His attempts to reconcile science and religion are instructive. Having made substantial contributions to mathematics and physics at a young age, Pascal underwent a mystical experience in which he came to question his achievements, seeing them as signifying human independence from God the creator. It was the story of the Fall in Eden. In supplying its own basis for knowledge, reason departs from God the source of all creation. It is the sin of pride.

'It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by the reason.'

Pascal’s argument that reason clears the way for faith but is not the cause of faith, which is a gift from God, is part of a general argument that in life in general, reason alone is insufficient. Many things are logically possible which are not in fact true. Which begs the question of how we are to decide between them. 'We know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the heart'. To recognize truth, it is necessary that we also feel it.

This points to living the truth, the truth as ethos, a way of life. Well done is better than well said. One could refer here to the Taoist principle on wu-wei, inaction. The Tao means ‘the way’ and refers to the cosmic force underlying all reality. Taoism is therefore a vision of ‘natural simplicity’ and ‘harmonious living’. Its key principle is wu-wei, which means non-action or natural action. Whatever needs to be done, will get done by trusting the natural course of things. It is a vision of human beings being at peace with the world, living lightly on the land and at ease in the Tao. One catches echoes of this ancient moral in Bertrand Russell’s conclusion to The Conquest of Happiness: ‘‘All unhappiness depends upon some kind of disintegration or lack of integration. The happy man is the man … whose personality is neither divided against itself nor pitted against the world. Such a man feels himself a citizen of the universe, enjoying freely the spectacle that it offers and the joys that it affords… It is in such profound instinctive union with the stream of life that the greatest joy is to be found’.

We are gambling with the planet, states Nicholas Stern. One could employ a form of Pascal’s wager here, in order to better place our bets on the environment. As a mathematician, Pascal constructed an argument which sought to prove that it was more rational to believe in God than not to believe. It’s not an argument that would satisfy a true believer, belief in God is a matter of faith rather than a bet. But as a proposition of mathematical and logical reasoning, it does make sense.

‘Belief is a wise wager. Granted that faith cannot be proved, what harm will come to you if you gamble on its truth and it proves false? If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation, that He exists.' (Blaise Pascal Les Pensees).

Since reason cannot prove God's existence, faith is required. If faith is lacking, then one must wait for a change of heart that comes of its own accord. Whilst this change of heart cannot be forced, it can be encouraged by reason. 
The easiest thing to say – and what tends to be said most – is that gambling isn't really a good basis for faith. Christopher Hitchens cites the argument to imply that believers think God must be incredibly stupid to fall for such a calculating approach on the part of believers. The kind of person who accepts such a wager is not a true believer and the kind of God who accepts the reasoning of such a person is not a true God. Obviously, for the reasons that Pascal gives. None of this is the point of the wager, which has nothing to do with faith, which is a gift from God and hence beyond proof, and nothing to do with the nature of God. The quibble that there are many different religions, and therefore many different gods, is minor. There is no good reason to choose one religion over another, whichever route to the one is most comfortable is acceptable. The One, the ultimate reality, the Tao, Brahman whatever one wishes to call it. Call God/Nature, Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura, and one undertakes the wager with respect to the one reality which sustains life and gives it order and meaning. That is what we are gambling on. So understand Pascal’s God as Nature and take a look at the wager through the gambler's eyes. 

The stake: the immortal soul/your Earthly happiness; 
The winnings: eternal life/the consequences of choosing aright. 

There are four options: 
1.	don't believe, God doesn't exist, and live a life to the full in pursuit of earthly pleasures; 
2.	don't believe, God does exist, and – to the extent that one pursued earthly pleasures - reap an eternity of suffering; 
3.	believe, God doesn't exist, but since no God means no afterlife either, there is no occasion to lament a pointless life of religious conformity; 
4.	believe, God does exist, and live a life of eternal reward. 

Pascal’s mathematical logic points to the last choice as the one which offers the greatest reward for the least risk. It is the mathematicians’ choice, the most rational choice to make. Betting on this involves the least expense; if it turns out to be true, the outcome is the maximum reward – eternal life in return for minor sacrifices in earthly pleasure. Least risk for maximum return. Not betting on the belief in God risks the maximum losses, choosing a single life's pleasure and pain but losing the reward of eternal life. 

Let’s apply this reasoning to the environmental crisis.
There are four options: 
1.	don't believe, the environmental crisis doesn’t exist, and live a life to the full in pursuit of earthly pleasures; 
2.	don't believe, the environmental crisis does exist, and – to the extent that one pursued earthly pleasures - reap an eternity of suffering/the end of civilised life on earth; 
3.	believe, the environmental crisis doesn't exist, but the effort and expense in dealing with the crisis is rewarded by a world that is clean, safe, just and biodiverse; 
4.	believe, the environmental crisis does exist, and live a life of eternal reward in a world that is clean, safe, just and biodiverse. 

Pascal’s wager is all about playing the odds. The environmental wager doubles the chances of hitting the jackpot (points 3 and 4). The option with the greatest potential losses is option 1, act as though there is no environmental crisis and continue with high carbon practices, ensuring that climate change changes the physical geography so drastically as to devastate the human geography. Maximise material self-interest in the present ensures that many millions, even billions, will have no future. Small sacrifices in the present – 2-3% of the GNP – yields the maximum return of a sustainable economy for the future. 

Of course, this reasoning does not form the scientific or ethical basis of ecology, no more than it proves the existence of God or the sincerity of faith. It is a piece of mathematical reasoning which gives a rational basis for gambling one way rather than another when faith, commitment, morality and intelligence is weak or absent. In the absence of conviction and certainty on difficult issues, you can at least play the odds. 

The argument is relevant in the context of mixed messages and plain misinformation concerning climate science. There are those who argue that the scientific evidence is clear and that this necessitates clear commitments from governments to make deep cuts in emissions and move to a low-carbon economy. This may be clear to scientists, but how are non-scientists to decide? By respecting the authority of the scientists? Yet there is a concerted campaign to muddy the waters here, claim that there is uncertainty, claim that maverick voices in the scientific community are being silenced, claim that climate change science is a ‘pseudo-science’ with political motivations. The question is repeated – how are non-scientists to decide? 

It is here that Pascal’s wager proves its worth. There are two alternative scenarios here:

1.	accept that the scientific advice is accurate, take action, find out that the advice is wrong;
2.	claim that the scientific advice is wrong, fail to take action or block action, discover that the advice is right.

Both options prove to be mistaken. The question is which error has the gravest, more irrevocable consequences? If the climate science is wrong and we have made large reductions in emissions and moved to a low carbon economy, only to find out that the risk of large temperature increases turns out to be less than expected, what really has been lost? Material expenditure and governmental and social effort. But the argument that this could all have been better invested elsewhere can be largely countered if the programme of moving to the low-carbon economy also addresses a whole range of social and infrastructural questions concerning health, housing, transport, towns and cities. There is, in other words, a tangible, beneficial result for expenditure and effort in a world that is more energy-efficient, with new and cleaner technologies, more socially just and egalitarian, and is more biodiverse as a result of protecting the forests. 

Now take option 2, the science is right but there has been a refusal to act on the advice. By the time the mistake becomes apparent it will already be too late to act, with the social and economic instability caused by climate change being enough to occupy governments even without the underlying ecological problem. By this stage, there will be another 30-50 years of emissions added, meaning that stocks will have reached levels where the risks of dangerous climate change becomes extremely likely. The problems of governmental inertia and mass psychology will, if anything, become worse. Even if the situation is not impossible, it may seem so. Government will have problems mobilising resources and people for a future that, to many, will look hopeless. And if action is organised, it will be inordinately expensive. At this point, the eco-monasticism of Rudolf Bahro may well be the only show in town.

Given the scale of the devastation that will occur if the climate science is accurate and yet insufficient action is taken, it would be a gross abdication of responsibility to reason from a low probability of climate science being right to continue to act as though the science is wrong. Manufactured confusions in engineered debates are deliberately surrounding clarity with obfuscation, encouraging a diminution of risks to unimportance and neglect. One does not need to be a scientist to decide where the balance of truth lies. If people, as active, informed citizens, cannot see through ‘arguments’ that climate scientists are engaged in a global conspiracy to create lucrative employment opportunities for themselves; that climate change science is a Trojan horse for socialism; that governments in a global capitalist economy, having seen off Communism, have invented the anti-capitalist force of ecologism in their midst; that somehow governments are sponsoring the ‘gravy train’ of environmental science to justify tax increases and bureaucratic intervention, then there really is nothing for science to do but observe. James Lovelock is sanguine about the prospect, seeing Gaia as a self-regulating organism fitting species’ to its own requirements. If the human species is congenitally incapable of learning to fit its environment, Gaia will knock it into shape or eliminate it.

The are grounds for thinking that the psychological failure is more a consequence of institutional failure than vice versa. Strong leadership and effective policy leading to tangible results and rewards will confirm the more reasonable sections of the population that there is a high probability that the science is right, and that the odds favouring the wager for strong action are overwhelming’. 

To wager for inaction, or for limited or postponed action, as a result of having reservations about the science, is only sensible if it could be known for certain that the risks are small. ‘In the face of the evidence we now have, that is a complacent, ignorant and dangerous position to take. It is not healthy scepticism or an openness of mind; it is a denial of evidence and reason’. (Stern 2010 ). 

5 COGNITIVE PRAXIS 

Ethics and the case for action




Policy making is guided not only by instrumental goals but also by values concerning the purpose and meaning of life. This means ethics as an analysis of moral positions and value judgements which is capable of informing decisions with respect to various acts and their consequences.  But it means more than this. A presentation of the ethics of ecology and the values sustaining the vision of the ecological society is fundamental in identifying and evaluating the relevant issues within a moral framework.
‘Ethical values are typically incorporated into economic modelling in a very narrow way. The level of social achievement at a point in time is generally measured by a 'social utility function' or 'social welfare function' that depends only on society's total consumption, population, time and a couple of 'ethical' parameters specified by the modeller - these can be varied to examine how results might vary for different parameter values. However, we should start with a much broader perspective before narrowing like this’. (Stern 2010 ). 
The problems facing the notion of a ‘Green politics’ date back to Plato’s question of how philosophy can come to rule. Green politics is in large part informed by science as well as by popular praxis. How can knowledge, theoretical and practical, shape politics. What is required is a theory of politics that conceives splits between left and right as a horizontal division that is part of a vertical ascent of levels of cognition. At the lowest rungs are desire, impulse and wants, then interests, self and collective, upwards to analysis, understanding, reason and wisdom. What matters most of all is not which side of the left-right divide the politics falls on but how far up the levels one can go. That is to conceive society, politics and evolution as a learning mechanism. It is to use the ancient Greek distinction between knowledge (nous) and opinion (doxa), emphasising that the solution to problems comes as we move forwards from the politics of opinion, where vested interests as well as impulses and inclinations prevail, to knowledge or reason, where ideas rule. That is the ‘forwards’ of the old Green slogan to me. And it is a forwards which respects the first law of ecology, the law of integrated systems. Left or right, the parts hold together and reinforce each other in an integrated whole.
The reasoning can be supported by rational choice theory, games theory, the prisoner’s dilemma. Two prisoners have been arrested and are being held in separate rooms. There is no contact between them. They are both offered deals. If both remain silent, they will each receive two years in prison, making four years in total. If one splits on the other, the one who talks goes free whilst the other receives eight years in prison, a total of eight years. If both talk, then each receives eight years, a total of sixteen years. Self-interest tells each to split on the other and so go free. Of course, the reasoning is symmetrical, they both think in the same self-interested way and so both receive eight years. Self-interest generates the worst possible outcome. The best outcome would be if both put the common good before self-interest and remained silent. The moral is that cooperative, communicative and communitarian structures and institutions ensure a common good which enhances the freedom of each individual and all individuals. Self-interest actually inhibits rather than enhances individual freedom. 

Kunzig and Broecker (2008) make a telling argument concerning the plight of the polar bears, the most dramatic and most highlighted example of the impact of global warming. With sea-ice coverage declining by 30 percent in the past twenty five years, the Arctic could be entirely ice-free in summer by the mid-twenty first century. The last time that this occurred was at least a million years ago. Polar bears are the public face of this dramatic event, with reports that some of them are drowning as they try to cross the increasing stretches of open water between ice floes in search of food. Even the Bush administration was moved, in 2006, to add polar bears to the U.S. government's list of threatened species, a step below "endangered." The Washington Post optimistically reported that the decision "could have an enormous political and practical impact" on U.S. policy on global warming.

That is the kind of wishful thinking that plagues environmental politics. ‘Televised pictures of clubbed and bloody seal pups, and highly publicized protests of the Canadian seal hunt, have never managed to end the hunt, even though it is an insignificant part of the global economy; in 2006, Canadian hunters killed more than three hundred thousand seals, about as many as when the protests started in the 1960s. So it seems unlikely that pictures of emaciated polar bears and even the threat of their extinction will convince the world to revolutionize the very foundation of the global economy—and it will take a revolutionary change to the energy supply system just to slow down global warming. (Even if we were to stop all emissions of carbon dioxide today, the planet would still warm by another 0.6 degree Celsius or so, as the ocean radiated to the atmosphere some of the excess heat it absorbs.) Human beings are not going to make that kind of effort, in our opinion, to save polar bears or any other wild organism. More powerful appeals to self-interest will be needed’ (Kunzig and Broecker 2008).

But just how is this ‘powerful appeal’ to be framed? At its most powerful, with the accent on the ‘self’, self-interest actually fosters the kind of short term self-maximisation of resources that is driving ecological crisis. The challenge is to avoid a dualism of extremes of altruism and egoism and this requires social relationships and institutions that connect each with all and all with longer range time scales.

The evidence that global warming actually kills people in large numbers is a powerful appeal to self-interest at its most basic level of survival. There is no need to make predictions of the doom to come. The World Health Organization has estimated that global warming is already responsible for 150,000 excess deaths a year. Considered alarmist when first published in 2002, it was made more plausible by the European heat wave of 2003. In the summer of that year, France and Italy recorded temperatures which were by far the warmest since records began in 1851, and probably the warmest since 1500. The heat wave caused between twenty-two thousand and forty-five thousand excess deaths. One can't give exact proof that global warming caused the heat wave and so many excess deaths, no more than a doctor can state precisely that smoking a pack of cigarettes a day caused a particular lung cancer. Such a level of proof is beyond the remit of any science. Ultimately, it is a matter of reasoned judgement. Certain things can be said. After modelling the summer of 2003, Peter Stott of the U.K. Met Office and his colleagues argued that global warming had made a heat wave of this magnitude at least twice as likely as before. Further, if CO2 emissions continue to grow at their current level, such heat waves will become more common than not by the mid twenty first century. 

The problem is that these warnings have been made many times before. The science is running far ahead of the governments and, indeed, the governed. As it always has done. It took a couple of centuries before Galileo’s findings finally found general acceptance. The difference now is that we don’t have a couple of centuries to evolve the necessary long term strategic thinking capacity. 

Substitute the ecological crisis for atomic energy below, and Mumford’s words in his Programme for Survival in 1945 are apposite.

“Up to now, because of man's slow development, the human race has operated with a wide margin of error. Man has undoubtedly made many false starts, has handi​capped himself with radical maladaptations, and has gone down many blind alleys; but none of these errors proved fatal to the human race as a whole, even though this or that culture may have suffered for its perversities. Today the margin of error has narrowed to a hair-line. If we make a succession of serious mistakes in the exploitation of atomic energy, or even if we make a single critical mistake, we may actually sentence the better part of mankind to extinction. Since all of man's custom's and attitudes have been formed under a regime that allowed him far more latitude for error, he is insufficiently pre​pared for this emergency; and must therefore take extra steps to correct for the current aberration that "everything will come out right in time." With the cosmic power man now commands, he can no longer afford to make mistakes, at least in this realm; for the first mistake may be the last one’ (Mumford 1945: 4)

The urgent nature of the scientific evidence and the tardy nature of political action needs explanation. ‘One reason is obvious as soon as you look at the color-coded world map in the WHO study, showing the number of deaths attributed to global warming in the year 2000. Almost none of them occurred in the developed CO2-spewing countries of the North; almost all occurred in poor tropical countries, above all in sub-Saharan Africa, because that's where the diseases promoted by warming occur (Kunzig and Broecker 2008).

That is the case for conceiving politics in terms of levels of cognition, knowledge and clear and distinct ideas rather than interests and opinion. But here is the problem. In the real world of necessity and interests and employment, individuals are governed more by the tangible than the intangible, by what they see, feel and touch than by what they think or are told to think. The ‘forwards’ in the ‘neither right nor left’ slogan refers to a future rather than a present, that long run in which we are all dead. At some point, Green politics needs to devise a practice which draws increasing numbers into a sphere which connects the tangible and intangible, allowing people to navigate their own way down the path to that ‘forwards’ of the ecological society of the future.

The Dictatorship of the Possible
Gresham's Law that bad money drives out good has spread throughout the monetary economy, the bad value of price and profit driving out the sense of true value, emptying everything subject to the commodity form of its true value. The inversion of value is nowhere more apparent than in the modalities and mentalities of the market economy. 
Talking of the wastefulness of repeated words, ideas and arguments, it is with hesitation that one adds to the voluminous writing with reference to the deteriorating ecology, pollution of the environment, about self-destroying technology. Those who have yet to get this message must be afflicted with an intentional deafness disorder. But behind the all too familiar, all too human inventory of human foibles and foolishness is the problematic on how to turn knowledge into practical effect. 

The fact of a deteriorating planet are well established and need no repetition here. The real question is why, having known so much for so long, why so little has been achieved in a political sense? Even more pointedly, why, in the teeth of all the evidence, are the forces behind environmental destruction still expanding and colonising what remains of the commons?

Strategic thinking is required. The problem is one of costs and benefits in the short and long term range, for the individual and the community, price and value. Thus, the relatively low cost to the individual of a particular good as measured by price compared to its incommensurately great benefit to him makes that individual choose that good more attractive to the consumer than a good which is of great social and environmental benefit to the community as a whole in the long run. Price measures the value of a good in exchange, not its true value. And it doesn’t include true cost in terms of social and environmental impact. But, in its own terms, a system which offers the individual a relatively low cost and a maximum benefit will trump a system that factors in collective notions of cost and benefit in the long run. The result is that the tragedy of the commons is institutionalised in a market system that encourages self-interested choices that maximise individual choice at the communal expense. The conundrum exposes ethical consumption as wholly inadequate, pitting an abstracted morality against systemic arrangements. Individuals can decide for virtue but there would be no impact upon the problem unless sufficient numbers make a similar decision. As in games theory and the free rider problem, people adjust their choices according to what others do. Why choose the common good when few others do? Eventually, the options for ethical consumption are reduced. Since there are so few ethical consumers, ethical production itself doesn’t pay. Gresham’s law works again, with ecologically bad products driving out the good. The problem of social and ethical responsibility requires the creation of a social identity that connects egoism and altruism, individual and community, short and long range good. This is to create the communicative and cooperative structures that embeds individual choice in a wider social matrix involving relations to others in community.

From this perspective, environmental destruction becomes not so much a technical problem as one of personal and social ethics. 

One wonders whether, in passing, the ethical philosophers and religionists have retreated from the field in face of the meaningless instrumental rationality of the modern world, opting for word games and existentialism instead of addressing the problems of human living, their traditional concern.

 In reflecting on the ethical—even spiritual—dimension of the environmental crisis, it is easy enough to identify the good old-fashioned sin of avarice alive and well. And usury too, the use of money to make money. One could go the whole hog and compare what Marx defines as alienation, the enslavement of the creative human subject to the created object, to idolatry. But proving Marxism to be a Judaeo-Christian heresy is not the current brief. The point is that there is as much a spiritual and psychological dimension to this crisis as there is a political and material dimension. The owners of the productive means seek profit not out of selfishness but out of the systemic imperative to accumulate capital; they have to continually expand values through exchange or risk going out of business. The greed and avarice are the aspects of human nature which the capital system encourages in the cause of mass consumption. The people as consumers are implicated in this perpetual cycle of expansion, expanded values and increased expectations. Unwittingly perhaps, the result of psychological suggestion through advertisement certainly, but the people who were once potential active citizens firing the public realm have become passive consumers. The advertisers promise of happiness and self-fulfilment, formerly goals of public life, have induced the people into avaricious conduct as self-serving egoists in the private realm. Kant’s categorical imperative returns with renewed relevance: so act as if your every action should become a universal law. How to ensure that each individual can so act is the problematic. An ethical reconstruction of social responsibility, communication and cooperation is plainly required.

A concern which runs through the discussion is the ancient contrast between nous or knowledge and doxa or opinion or ignorance. That knowledge should prevail over opinion and ignorance would meet with unanimous approval. But what kind of knowledge and how. Within a modern world in which means have displaced ends, ignorance refers to an instrumental rationality that functions without knowledge of ends. Ignorance in this respect is the failure of intelligence to be intelligent about itself. This indifference to ends explains the blindness of the scientist and technician, the bureaucrat and the functionary, who absolutizes the instrumental activity within the whole but fails to grasp its actual and potential relationships to all other activities and to any end in question. 
Then, there is the technological imperative; the new idolatry, the sorcerer’s apprentice, Dr Frankenstein's monster. Whether it was ever wise to engage in a Promethean quest with the gods for knowledge is a moot point. Since, as Nietzsche pointed out, we have killed god, it may now be wiser to creatively live up to the power that is knowledge and place our technical means in their proper place, restricting excess and tempering possibility according to humane scale and qualitative ends.
Inherent in the pathos of means and ends is the danger of rule by instrumental rationality indifferent to ends inviting a full blown reversion to irrationalism. The polytheism of values in the modern world may well raise some old gods from their graves to take their place in competition with the new gods of technics and economics. If reason ends in vice, then turn your back on reason. The answer to the irrational use of reason is not irrationalism but an understanding of how the bifurcation of reason between means and ends leads to its partial realisation in the service of vested interests. The problems of reason, it will be seen, are not inherent to reason but are the age old problems of politics, powerful people using any resource at hand, including reason, to extend and expand their power. Ignorance will not be defeated by ignorance but by a knowledge made larger by the inclusion of an ethical component relating to ends. The environmental crisis is therefore the opportunity to reformulate the old Platonic question of philosophy and politics and gives it a new content and a new urgency with respect to the intelligent application of knowledge in human affairs.

KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-REGULATION
Knowledge is power. For all of the overblown claims made for the ICT revolution, half truths are still half true. Information might not actually be power but, is social and ecological regulation can turn it into practical knowledge, information certainly can provide power. Information as practical knowledge can help the community to realize its potentials for self-reliance and independence. Information can be used in many ways to facilitate community development. Community indicators are an important expression of community values and are based on other information about the community; the region and the environment; material resources, products, and processes; the cultures and subcultures of the area; environing relations from neighbouring communities to the rest of the world.

The information society and the network society do not just refer to cyberspace but to places and people in community, including the environment and productive activity. In turning cities and communities into growth machines, the economy of mass production and consumption de-skilled citizens, users and consumers as much as it de-skilled factory workers. It conceived society as one big factory. A deliberately engineered public ignorance puts information and hence power in the hands of the state and business which properly belongs in a self-regulatory community.

The ecological economy must focus on knowledge-building as part of community capacity building, in areas of agriculture, manufacturing, the built environment, urban regeneration, communications, health, or social services. Green consumption can reward eco-production with communities supporting local ecological producers and practices and so exercise substantial control over their development. But this support requires information enabling product evaluation and labelling according to locally developed criteria.

Ecological planning and decision making of this character requires an accessible information utility that contains information about the locality and region, a regional resource inventory that provides detailed information about physical resources, demographic, economic, and social statistics. By such means, information is plays a role in ecological decision making, strategic economic thinking, establishing priorities and evaluating alternatives in the transition from the high carbon to low carbon economy, from external regulation to internal self-regulation.
In much the same way as they are establishing links to local business, universities can serve to boost the knowledge of local communities. Universities are powerful resources in developing the appropriate databases and geographical information (mapping) systems which facilitate the development of both community indicators and strategic planning. Schools, colleges, and universities can also be centres for community training and education. This community development focus helps create a degree of independence from the state and business.
In the long run, communities need to make effective use of information and communications technology, extending community information, education, discussion, and visioning and enabling the new technologies to realise their potentials for human emancipation. At present, these technologies are used for political misinformation and entertainment as escapism. Mass manipulation and stupefaction turns emancipatory potentialities into repressive realities. Most of all it is a massive waste of human potential. It follows that the environmental movement should engage in struggle concerning the design and use of ICT to enhance human and community power.

Power
The notion of the Philosopher Ruler implies a tyranny of the experts. This is an easy dodge that should satisfy no-one. Plato’s quest has not gone away and never will. The very fact of political argument and debate indicates not just different conceptions of government but assumptions that some forms are better than others. In other words, a notion of the good is at least implicit in political controversy. How, then, can we formulate the conception of good government? And it is at this point that we read Plato’s Republic again. One may disagree with the answers, but the question and the search for principled politics was valid. Plato raises the question of reason in politics in terms of the relation between competence and freedom. Individualist libertarians cry ‘totalitarianism’ in the face of Plato’s assertion that knowledge should prevail over opinion (Popper), only to shout ‘totalitarian democracy’ when the claims of the revolutionary masses are advanced (Talmon 1986). Those who continue to affirm the connection between reason and freedom will no be prepared to so easily dispense with the instructed intelligence on account of misuse by elites or masses. The tension between competence and freedom is all the more pressing in an increasingly complex world. The partisans of a romantic return to ‘the people’ seem to dissolve this tension into some collective wisdom, some primal Rousseauian general will. Which begs the question as to why philosophy has yet to have ever ruled through ‘the people’. The realisation of reason through politics is an educative process in which the people learn to ascend the levels of cognition from instinct and desire up to knowledge and then wisdom. That is inherent in the people as potential. Politics is about the actualisation of this potential.

One can discuss here 'community based power' that functions as a 'countervailing' power to the realities of constituted political power. This makes the point that political life is not co-terminous with the conventional political sphere and that a countervailing movement can buttress opposition parties without becoming adjuncts of them.

When something really new is underway, it can take centuries before its character is properly defined, understood and clear. It took a couple of hundred years before Galileo’s astronomy came to be generally known and accepted. The greatest minds of any age will have an awareness, of course. Greek philosophers, poets and scientists of the fifth and fourth centuries BC can be quoted at length to show that the Greeks were not unaware of what came to be known as ‘the Greek Achievement.’ But it took Cicero, writing in Latin about 50 bc, to encapsulate just what this achievement amounted to, above and beyond the details: 'By the use of our own hands we bring into being within the realm of Nature a Second Nature for ourselves.' (On the Nature of the Gods, II, 60.) This arresting idea establishes human beings as the architects of their own conditions of life, creating a new Nature without removing humanity from Nature itself. In creating this new Nature, human self-consciousness is enhanced. Technics comes to be the means by which human beings both masters Nature, creates a Second Nature and gains knowledge and understanding of the external world. This is self-knowledge of a self-made social world. This prescient theme makes Cicero worth quoting at length:

'How adaptable are the hands with which Nature has endowed mankind, how many the arts they serve! The supple joints facilitate that rapid contraction and extension of the fingers which make possible so many different motions. With his nimble fingers man can paint, model, carve, and entice musical notes from strings or pipes. But these are but the arts of entertainment. There are also the necessary arts - the cultivation of the fields, the construction of houses, the clothing for the body both woven and sewn, and all manufacture of bronze or iron. All our possessions come from the skilled hands of craftsmen turning to use what eye can see and mind discover. By this we are housed, clothed, and kept in health. By this we have cities, walls, dwellings, shrines. Nay, it is through the labours of men, in other words, the hands of men, that we enjoy both an abundance and a variety of food. (Farrington 1967 ch 3).

Marx writes of ‘the working millions’ who ‘have laid down the real basis of a new society - modern industry, which transformed the destructive agencies of nature into the productive power of man.’ ‘The labouring classes have conquered nature; they have now to conquer man.’ How? 

“By creating the inexhaustible productive powers of modern industry they have fulfilled the first condition of the emancipation of labour. They have now to realize its other condition. They have to free those wealth-producing powers from the infamous shackles of monopoly, and subject them to the joint control of the producers, who, till now, allowed the very products of their hands to turn against them and be transformed into as many instruments of their own subjugation”. (Marx AB SE 1973). 

“There is one great fact, characteristic of this our nineteenth century, a fact which no party dares deny. On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces which no epoch of former human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors recorded of the latter times of the Roman empire. In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it. The newfangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, modern misery and dissolution on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers and the social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted. Some parties may wail over it; others may wish to get rid of modern arts, in order to get rid of modern conflicts. Or they may imagine that so signal a progress in industry wants to be completed by as signal a regress in politics. On our part, we do not mistake the shape of the shrewd spirit that continues to mark all these contradictions. We know that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men - and such are the working men. They are as much the invention of modern time as machinery itself. In the signs that bewilder the middle class, the aristocracy and the poor prophets of regression, we do recognize our brave friend, Robin Good-fellow, the old mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy pioneer - the Revolution. 

Marx AB SE 1973

In making the ‘Second Nature’ that Cicero writes of, the creative human agents become enslaved to their technical means, their own powers in alien form. These powers are the instrument by which human beings master the Nature they did not make, but also come to be the means of their subjection to a new necessity. Human beings come to be free to the extent that they come to comprehend and control these powers as their own powers. With this, human beings have made this Second Nature a home, and by coming to make it thus, humanity demonstrates that it understands the materials of which it is made.

6 RATIONAL RESTRAINT AND GAMES THEORY

The midbrain is the seat of instinctual energies and explosive emotions, the forebrain is the seat of higher behaviour and inhibitions. The development of these inhibitions tempers the development of human inventiveness and curiosity to prevent self-destruction.

It is an old story. In the Jekyll and Hyde tale, Robert Louis Stevenson explores the possibility of separating the two sides of the human psyche, the good and the evil. If human beings can be gods, they can also be monsters. And the point seems to be that in aiming at becoming gods, human beings lose their inhibitions and instead become monsters.

In everyday life, individuals still, by and large, acknowledge inhibition of impulses (although the behaviour on Friday and Saturday nights is showing breakdown even here). Under pressure of a false identification of liberty with licence, an identification imposed by modern politics and economics and encouraged by advertisement and electoral campaigns, individuals have increasingly abandoned habits of restraint which eased living in common in favour of habits of relaxation. 
For the best part of a century, a long succession of thinkers, politicians and advertisers have urged individuals to throw off moral, psychic and communal restraint to act on impulse, yield to desire, and abandon measure in self-gratification. The promise is freedom and happiness. It is a false religion, Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ in the role of God. If human beings were wholly rational and wholly good, then this crude, naïve psychology, innocent of moral and institutional purpose, would have some sense. For Kant, out of nothing so crooked can something entirely straight be made. This moral and institutional nihilism actually unleashes not natural goodness but the demonic in human nature. 

Morality is itself part of the system of rational restraint and inhibition, guiding human beings in acceptable behaviour and, as such, is an integral part of the conscious control of the creative powers that humanity commands. Morality ingrained in habit and custom makes it possible to practise the highest forms of human inventiveness and creativity. The moral law within is in this sense an inner check, the rational restraint on short term impulse and desire to ensure long term health and well being. 

This rational restraint comes hard to individuals brought up to mistake licence for liberty, conflate needs with wants and seek pleasure rather than happiness. The economic system, and the political system which serves it, has operated as a regime of endless gratifications in which individuals get what they want with neither deprivation nor penalty. The whole notion of limits is overthrown. Hence the endless, purposeless, nihilistic nature of modern techno-industrial civilisation. Only something with limit can be filled and fulfilled. The individual is caught within a cycle of endless insatiable satisfaction. The quantification and commodification of life through the extension of the market economy has been accompanied by the systemic elimination of the natural limits and moral inhibitions that once set human action within boundaries of the right and the good. Civilisations fall from within rather than without, and part of this fall is a decadence and self-indulgence born of success. The margin of freedom won by technique and organisation, rather than being used for a greater expansion of human creativity, is dissipated in easy living. The reluctance with which any kind of regulation is confronted alongside the rush towards deregulation, the identification of the latter with freedom, indicates a popular unwillingness and inability to exercise self-control at a time when large parts of the world require substantial governmental and legal intervention and action to confront the challenges of climate change and global warming. This is a western public fashioned in the image of business and political elites, passive consumers rather than citizen-producers with an active and conscious orientation to the world they have created.

Politically and morally, such people, both leaders and followers, are unfitted for the conscious control of the sum total of human technics and power. It is akin to putting alcoholics in charge of a brewery and a chain of public houses. Individuals who have not only lost any sense of restraint and inhibition but equate them with lack of freedom are incapable of restoring the necessary self-preservative principle within society.

Experience requires recognition of the legitimate place of rational restraint and inhibition in human development. Deferred gratification, abstention, renunciation, self-denial are as much an essential part of human development as satisfaction, innovation, inventiveness.

 The environmental crisis refers to the social, cultural and moral sphere of human relations as much as it does to ecological disintegration. Indeed the latter is in large part the product of an unbalanced, nihilistic expansion of human technics. The challenge of social and ecological crisis requires that individuals recover the very habit of restraint and inhibition as part of a collective response, subjecting every action to proportion and measure, imposing by rational choice limits on wants so as to curtail the consumption of goods and resources, even those that may be available in limitless quantities. 

 The process of democracy, in both the political and the economic life of individuals, is crucial to human development, but requires a high degree of conscious moderation if it is to be true democracy. The word democracy comes from the ancient Greek meaning the rule of the people. It means that the individuals composing the demos must be capable of ruling. An insight into what this involves is given by Aristotle’s definition of the ‘essential function of a citizen’ is ‘to rule and to be ruled in turn’ (Politics Bk 3.iv). ‘But surely men praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and the virtue of a citizen of repute seems to be just this - to be able to rule and be ruled well’ (Politics Bk 3). Good citizenship depends upon the contribution a person’s 'virtue' makes to the stability and well-being of the constitution. Aristotle distinguishes the virtue of the good citizen from the invariable 'perfect' virtue of the good man. The point to grasp, however, is the notion of self-restraining and other regarding behaviour in the idea of the good citizen lying in the alternation of ruling and being ruled in turn, locating one’s best interests within the interests of the community of others. This is the virtue that every citizen must master, as a condition of true democracy but also as the condition of society's survival. The good of the whole requires the voluntary acceptance of inhibition. This is rational restraint. Democracy will be achieved when the individuals composing the demos are capable of exercising rational restraint and conscious control for the common good, seeing the realisation of individual in the health and well-being of the whole.

The individualistic orientation of contemporary business and politics creates mentalities and inculcates habits which deliberately and systematically undermine these assumptions and conclusions. The modern market economy, consumer and casino capitalism, electoral politics employ the devices of publicity to subvert public life, overthrowing the restraints and inhibitions that keep wants and desires in check so as to morally and institutionally disarm individuals and render them susceptible to the allurements of the advertiser. In both economics and politics, the notion of free individual choice is used to hoodwink and hook the masses, taking them further and further away from democracy as conscious self-rule, selling narcotics, stimulants, aphrodisiacs in the form of symbols and slogans which have the appearance of freedom and democracy but which render the individuals composing the demos stupefied and passive. C Wright Mills argued that all advertisement is political in that, beyond the material goods, the advertiser is selling a system. The goal of the advertiser is to create consumers out of citizens, encourage them to seek the satisfaction of their ends, freedom and happiness, on the market, endlessly want and habitually say Yes to every suggestion. 

Under the pressure of advertisement as a system of mass manipulation, the breakdown of restraint and inhibition has proceeded to weaken and undermine public life in the name of (individual) freedom. Good government, public spiritedness and common purpose are crucial to civilised society but these are all being forced into retreat by the rejection of ‘big government’ and notions that morality is a private issue. The result exposes the lie of many radicals yearning for a lost paradise, a lost human nature corrupted by civilisation. By abandoning restraint and inhibition, we have moved even further away from the lost Eden. Paradise will be regained only if human beings can learn to exercise rational self-control, regulate impulse and desire, and ascend the levels of sympathy, empathy, understanding and wisdom within the trust relations of an extended sociality. And this requires the building of institutions, not their destruction.

The renewal of rational restraint and inhibition within a common purpose on a global basis is now a condition for human survival. The environmental crisis is universal in nature and imposes the old ideal of universalism as a moral imperative upon all national governments. More than ever before, human beings need to think globally. In the book Civilisation, Kenneth Clark argued that progress has nearly always occurred when internationalism prevailed. For Einstein, nationalism was the measles of mankind. Nationalism is a limited communalism. Human beings need to think bigger. And act on these large assumptions. Individuals must institute these practices in their social practices to ensure that national governments follow their example on the world stage. 

The human capacity for restraint and inhibition must be proportional to the power humankind now commands.  Without this proportion between technical and moral power, it will be impossible to control the growing malignity in the world. Nuclear arms, weapons of mass destruction, etc are merely the physical material manifestations of an inner disorder. It was this that Picasso expressed in Guernica. The names of the wars and the weapons get forgotten as they accumulate. It is the lack of proportion in the human soul that really matters. The aspect of human nature which tends to destruction has lost its mooring and is no longer emotionally anchored, with the result that technical and material accomplishment has been accompanied by the eruption of malign forces out of the unleashed unconscious. It is no surprise, then, that the height of human achievement in technics, the conquest of natural necessity and the creation of a margin of freedom, should have been accompanied by the heights of barbarism. Clarke was right. In two world wars in just half a century, human beings came close to wiping out civilisation. In a physical sense, European civilisation was destroyed in large parts, reduced to rubble. The idea lived. But so too did the forces for destruction. This technically accomplished, highly disciplined and highly co-ordinated civilisation brought about a technically accomplished, highly disciplined and highly coordinated destruction, destroying cities and killing and maiming millions. 

Freud exposed the death instinct – thanatos - that is stalking civilisation. With trillion dollar arms budgets, the forces of production have indeed become forces of destruction, that very margin of freedom from necessity which Marx thought would be used for socialism being used to perpetuate a system of scarcity. Capitalism is a system of scarcity, not just material but emotional and psychological. It is not just, as Veblen argued, the institutional reproduction of scarcity to keep prices and profits up, keeping production below technologically feasible levels, but the mentalities of meanness and grasping which causes individuals time and again to fail to identify possibilities for freedom.

These mentalities need to change. The environmental crisis demands a change in political behaviour from parties, politicians and governments. And this will come if people see themselves as citizens rather than consumers. It all depends on whether individuals can ascend the levels of cognition and see the long term common good. The short term individual good is served on the market, freedom and happiness bought with the coin and sold by advertiser who promise to satisfy every want and desire. This is to exchange a limited freedom for a much richer freedom. 

If morality is not adequate, if everyday social practices are not informed by rational purposes, if human beings do not learn that restraint and inhibition serve long term health and well being for all, then the necessary political and institutional controls will always be lacking. Every political and institutional change will fall short of what is required if a fully awakened sensibility and personality is lacking.

‘Each of us must remember his humanness: it takes precedence over our race, our economic class, our politics, our religion, or our nationality. Only to the extent that the nations cultivate this humanness, becom​ing members one of another, can our civilisation achieve peace and security, to say nothing of the well-being and creativeness that will eventually issue forth from them. If we do not put humanity, in every sense of this word, before all petty and limited ends, nothing can be saved’ (Mumford 1945 ch 9). 

If human life is to thrive on a high level, as distinct from merely existing as a diminished primitive horde, the response to the challenge of global ecological crisis must be decisive, intelligent and universal. It really does require that each and every person makes an effort to rise above short term, egoistic impulse, desire and want to apprehend a greater and richer range of human potentialities in relation to others. ‘No habits must be uncriticised; no values must remain unexamined; no institutional procedures must be regarded as sacred; no life-denying goals must remain unchallenged. It is not this or that group, elected or self-elected, that must carry the burden of mankind's salvation. Every individual person must first mobilise himself to meet the danger, with a more unconditional acceptance of responsibilities and sacrifices than even the British did when they stood alone, facing imminent destruction, in the summer of 1940. Our best will hardly be enough to guarantee survival. Less than our best will be treason to humanity’ (Mumford 1945 ch 9).

An early appeal to neither left nor right came from Bertrand Russell. 

“There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.” (Russell 1872-1970 The Russell-Einstein Manifesto).

The prospect of universal nuclear destruction lay behind this appeal to common humanity. In the same manner, the environmental crisis is the occasion for emphasising what human beings have in common rather than what divides them. It affirms a realm above the institutionalised divisions of politics, a politics of ontology, of human being. It is to locate the common good on common ground. The appeal to the humanity of human beings is an appeal to reason, reason with its ethical component.

Games Theory
Although the conventional wisdom is that traditional morality has had its day, the case for conscious control is coming from disciplines outside of politics. Developments in mathematics, evolutionary psychology and biology and computer science have been creating a paradigm-shift in our understanding of the requisites of long term health and well being (Robert Wright, The Moral Animal; Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue, and Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption).

Homo sapiens, human beings as rational thinking beings, points to the existence of a rational human nature and implies that structures and institutions of cooperation, coordination and communication enhance human freedom and well being.

Games theory emerged in 1944 as a new branch of mathematics, devised by John von Neumann (1903-1957). One of the greatest intellects of the twentieth century, von Neumann was involved in the development of thermonuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and the theory of nuclear deterrence. The son of a banker, von Neumann recalled conversations he had with his father concerning the problems in running a bank. For von Neumann, economic analysis did not take adequate account of the complexities of human decision-making. Choosing the best of several alternatives is simple when consequences can be calculated. Life, however, is not that simple. The outcome of choice depends on the reactions of others, and these reactions can neither be calculated nor predicted. 

Games theory purports to show a mathematical representation of action under conditions of uncertainty. Its most famous application is the Prisoner's Dilemma. The dilemma involves the following scenario: 

The police have arrested two men under suspicion of having committed a serious crime. There is, however, evidence only to secure a conviction for a lesser offence. The only chance of getting a conviction for the serious offence lies in getting at least one prisoner to inform on the other. The prisoners are held in separate rooms with no communication between them possible. The suspects are then offered a deal. If one informs and the other stays silent, the informant will go free and the other will receive a jail sentence of ten years. If they both inform on each other, they will both receive ten years, making a total of twenty years. If both prisoners remain silent, they will be convicted only of the lesser offence, and will each spend only a year in prison.

The dilemma concerns the nature of reasoning. Reasoning alone, without communication, each prisoner pursues a self-interested strategy. The optimal decision for the individual is to inform on the other and hence go free. But since the reasoning is symmetrical, i.e. each thinks the same way as the other, each informs on the other in expectation of going free with the result that both are sentenced to serve ten years each. If both had remained silent, they would have been imprisoned for one year each. Had they cooperated and communicated and hence reasoned together, they would have opted for this strategy. The most optimal outcome is one achieved by mutual reasoning. Without cooperation and communication and mutual agreement, neither one can be certain that the other will do the right thing. Each follows the self-interested course and produce an outcome that is least optimal for all individuals.

The Prisoner's Dilemma offers mathematical proof that self-interest does not necessarily generate optimal outcomes, neither for the community nor the individual. On the contrary, self-interested reasoning inhibits rather than enhances individual freedom. The argument subverts the fundamental premise of Smithian economics. The idea that a number of individuals pursuing self-interest generate an outcome which is beneficial to all is turned on its head. What Marx had understood politically and philosophically was proved mathematically. To the contrary, individuals, acting rationally according to self-interest, produce an outcome which is the least optimal for all concerned.
Further light on the egoism-altruism relation was shed by evolutionary biology. A long running tension in Darwinian biology concerned the compatibility between the high value that all human societies placed on altruism and the notion of the survival of the fittest. In the struggle for survival, altruism should not thrive yet alone be held out for emulation. Clearly, the sacrifice of personal interest for the good of the group possessed some evolutionary advantage. This could go to extremes in the instance where the individual sacrifices his or her own life for the benefit of the group, losing the chance for his or her genes flourishing into future generations. Darwin was aware of the problem, arguing that the bravest individuals 'would on an average perish in larger number than other men'. The hero 'would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature'.5 Altruistic behaviour should not, in evolutionary terms, survive. Yet all thriving human societies value altruism. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma proposed the resolution of this supposed paradox, showing how self-interested choice and action did not always yield optimal outcomes and could generate the least optimal. The paradox derives from the artificial nature of the context in which the reasoning takes place. The reasoning parties involved lack contact and communication, a notion which lacks any social and historical basis. In real society, individuals meet repeatedly, communicate and negotiate and deliberate. Individuals reason in a social context in relation to other individuals. As social and rational animals, they eventually work out compacts, agreements and strategies which are mutually beneficial to each and all. In other words, they decide to co-operate within community: 'I will stay silent if you stay silent'. It is in each individual’s interest to reach a common agreement. Each individual acts in the interest of the other individual because it is in her or his interest to do so. To political philosophers this could sound like reinventing the wheel. This argument is familiar to social contract theorists and historians of the origins of political society. The argument transcends self-interest rationality by first of all suggesting context and agreement and then going further to propose repeated contact in the same context, the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma goes beyond the single contact to propose that since individuals find themselves repeatedly in the same situation, they have a chance to learn. Political society as a learning mechanism which enables individuals to ascend the levels of cognition to the long range common good. This is the long term strategic capacity which human beings need to evolve for survival in the opinion of James Lovelock.
If mathematics, economics and evolutionary biology were drawing conclusions which savoured a great deal of traditional political philosophy, so computer science used elaborate programmes to restate a traditional morality.
The political scientist Robert Axelrod announced an international competition to find the programme that won at playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma against itself and other opponents. The winning programme was called Tit-for-Tat and was devised by Anatole Rapoport. The programme began by co-operating and proceeded by repeating the last move of its opponent. The principle followed was 'What you did to me, I will do to you'. Although the more aggressive programmes did well in the short run, they would always lose out on account of the retaliation that aggressive action provoked. Tit-for-Tat thus demonstrated the survival value of reciprocal altruism. 
In the late 1980s, Martin Nowak developed a programme called ‘Generous’ which was capable of beating Tit-for-Tat. The weakness of Tit-for-Tat lay in the way it could be drawn into a destructive cycle of reprisal in face of a particularly nasty opponent. Again, the phrase of Gandhi springs to mind, ‘an eye for an eye leaves us all blind’. The fact is that the Biblical quote is an argument for proportionality, ‘measure for measure’ as in the Tit-for-Tat programme. A destructive cycle goes from bad to worse, which is what Gandhi meant. The history books are full of examples of this destructive cycle of reprisal at work. Franco-German rivalry came close to destroying European civilisation. Tit-for-Tat is vulnerable to this weakness. ‘Generous’ avoids this cycle by randomly but periodically forgetting the last move of its opponent, effectively allowing the relationship to begin again. Should France in 1919 have forgotten the war indemnities Bismarck imposed in 1871? France and Germany began a new relationship in 1945 and European civilisation recovered. Martin Nowak had produced a computer simulation of the human virtues of forgiveness and reconciliation which are central to all the world’s religions. How to embody these in political society is the key question, a question which motivated the works of thinkers like Grotius, Leibniz, Kant and many others.

The implications of these computer programmes specifically and games theory generally are profound. It sheds a penetrating light upon the ages old clash between individualism and communitarianism, liberty and authority, negative and positive liberty, Anglo-American and Continental thought. It suggests that the whole debate is based on a misplaced antithesis between individual and society, suggesting that society is composed of individuals in reciprocal relation and that it is the reasoning in that relation that counts. A whole political and moral tradition which asserts the rights and the liberties of the individual as such is not only misguided but literally misleading. Far from being protective of individual liberty, the liberal tradition systematically generates outcomes which diminish and inhibit individual freedom. Individual freedom generates a collective unfreedom, individual rationality brings about a collective irrationality. The argument offers proof that not only can a rational basis for politics and ethics be established, it can be established in a specific sense. 

Karl Popper famously wrote a defence of individualist liberal thought and politics in terms of the ‘open society’. He identified Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx as the ‘totalitarian’ enemies of this free and open society. His identification of liberty with the individual as such meant that he was unable to understand the way that these thinkers reconciled the legitimate claims of individual and community so as to produce a general good that benefits each as well as all. Against the whole tendency of individualist modern thought and practice, the insights generated by games theory suggest a rational basis for a communitarian ethic and politics. In a specific sense, both Tit-for-Tat and Generous demonstrate that individuals and communities as a whole thrive when organised around two fundamental principles, reciprocity and forgiveness, which may also be called justice and mercy. 

Reciprocity and justice are principles which are central to the Continental tradition in political philosophy, deriving from Plato and Aristotle and finding expression in the works of the likes of Grotius, Pufendorf, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx and many others. For Plato, justice is the social virtue par excellence.

Games Theory and Ethics
Forgiveness and mercy are central principles of the Judaeo-Christian faith, a faith which has sustained western civilisation for two thousand years. One can even relate this faith to the tradition of political philosophy outlined above. Plato’s ideal forms as the one true, heavenly, reality behind that apparent to the senses, Marx from a family of rabbis and Marxism as a Judaeo-Christian heresy.

The longevity of these principles is readily understood. They are not written into the historical process, although their embodiment can be described as a rational history; they are deeply rooted in biological reality. The philosophers and theologians, from Plato and Aristotle to the Stoics to Avicenna and Averroes up to Aquinas, Spinoza, and so on, were not, after all, wrong to build their arguments on the assumption of a rational human nature. Whether one looks at ‘nature’s plan’ in Kant or the progressive unfolding of reason in Hegel, where once we could be suspicious of a ‘windy metaphysics’, it turns out that we can locate the ideal within the real as immanent potentiality and can confront the ‘is’ with an ‘ought to be’ since these are moral imperatives grounded in biological realities. There is a direct correlation between morality and politics, between social justice and social order. A society which embodies justice and practises forgiveness will endure whereas an unequal and vengeful one will not.
The building and the endurance of civilisation depends less on individual power and more on the habits of co-operation. Individuals working together stand a better chance of achieving their goals if they can co-ordinate their efforts than they do if they work apart. Aristotle argued that reason was the feature which distinguished human beings from other animals. He has been accused of overrating the rational faculty of humans and underestimating the capacity of non-human animals to solve problems. But the name homo sapiens means rational man. The latest work in biology confirms that Aristotle was on the right lines. The distinctive feature of human beings is the 300 per cent increase in brain size since the species split from the other primates. The development of the use of language, culture, religion, art, technics etc. all followed. This distinctive feature derived from the advantages of extended sociality. Biologists even propose a close correlation amongst mammals between brain size and social group: the bigger brain is associated with the larger social group. One finds here a biological basis for the political principles of reciprocity and justice. And there is also a biological basis for scale in that this measure suggests that the human group has an optimum size of the human group. On average, the maximum number of people that any individual can know well and count as friends is 150. Community has its roots in a biological reality. The philosophical convention that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ breaks down against these constants.
Although self-interest has been sanctified as individual liberty and made the basis of modern electoral politics and free market economics, the figure of the self-interested, self-maximising individual is subverted by the Prisoner's Dilemma. This dilemma demonstrated the extent to which self-interested action and reasoning produced less than optimal outcomes. The dilemma was resolved only when the game was played repeatedly by the same participants who, over the course of time, learned the value of co-operation. This co-operation is predicated on trust, each individual believing that the others will reciprocate at some point the actions which that individual takes will benefit the other individual. 

This trust is the product of cooperative behaviour and is built up over time so as to create added value, a resource that is bigger than the individual parts. The simplistic slogan ‘there is no such as society’ is exposed in all its crudity’; it merely refers to the beginning of the game, before individuals have cooperated and learned. This trust as added value may be called social capital.

Social capital is generated through repeated interactions between the same individuals, the so-called Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Long term relationships build trust between participants and foster habits of co-operation. Scale and close connection are important. For Aristotle, the true city is one that can be taken in one view. At this scale, each member should know all others. Beyond this scale, human relations become impersonal and anonymous. They cease to be cities in Aristotle’s sense. Acts of robbery and violence increase in frequency with size. An individual is more likely to take advantage of others whom he or she is not likely to see again.

Transactional Encounters
In The Crisis of Global Capitalism, George Soros writes of the 'Open Society Endangered'. Whereas successful business depends on the patient building of relationships, it has now become 'transactional', a series of one-off encounters. The results should be predictable if one understands the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. One-off encounters lead to the least optimal outcome. In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma it is repeated encounters that build trust and foster the cooperation that leads to the most optimal outcome. One-off transactional encounters predictably bring about the destabilisation of the social order. 

In a perfectly changeable, transactional society the individual is paramount. From the point of view of the individual it is not necessary to be morally upright to be successful; indeed it can be a hindrance ... In a society where stable relationships prevail, this is much less of a problem because it is difficult to be successful if you violate the prevailing social norms. But when you can move around freely, social norms become less binding, and when expediency becomes established as the social norm, society becomes unstable.

George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism, 80.

At this point the argument revisits certain fundamental notions of political philosophy, Plato’s notion of justice as a social virtue, Aristotle’s zoon politikon requiring a politikon bion to achieve happiness. Plato set the size of population of the ideal city at 5,000. Aristotle argued that it was the quality of relationships within that matter more than quantity of persons, although the city should be taken in one view with each member knowing all others. 

It is scale that is all important. Hegel valued the thick welter of intermediary associations that connected the individual to the state. Hegel’s state as the universal interest, the ‘march of God on earth’, is not the abstract and mystical conception critics allege. 

Families, neighbourhoods, communities and so on are the intermediary associations which form the content of the association civic public. The universal interest of the state or political system is firmly grounded in a social ecology in which the smaller associations have a vital role to play within the whole. As Aristotle argued, the state or political community is the community of all communities, each accorded their appropriate place. There is nothing mystical or mysterious about this notion. Philosophers in the Anglo-American individualist liberal tradition see a problem that is entirely of their own making. In holding individual and community apart as antagonistic poles, any notion of common good or general interest is bound to appear oppressive of individual liberty, certainly when given institutional form in the state. 

Part 2
THE COMING REVOLUTION IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT

7 THE CRISIS OF VISION IN ECONOMICS

The Critique of economic science
The recession has exposed economic science as an ideology preserving relations and structures of power. The implosion of the financial sector was more than an economic crash, it finally undermined the claims of economics to be a science. Mathematical intelligence and huge financial support was sufficient to win Nobel prizes but fell far short in the task of building a viable economic order. Finance capitalism is a casino of snake oil, smoke and mirrors and double dare derivatives. The recession is not, to be fair, a failure of economics as such. Plenty of economists warned of the coming crisis. It is simply the story of ideology supporting one set of practices – that benefit the rich and the powerful – and blinding people to other ways of conceiving the world. A certain kind of economics, economics which favoured ‘free’ markets, is favoured because deregulation leaves the self-interest of the rich and powerful untrammelled by moral, political, and social responsibility. ‘Freedom for the pike is death to the minnow’ wrote Tawney. That is the kind of freedom that the lion likes to share with the lamb.

This is the time to finally see the end of neo-liberal economics. The thinking that put the world in recession is poorly equipped to resolve the crisis. The point goes further in relating the faulty assumptions of neo-liberal economics to a particular set of economic institutions and the way that they favour some groups over others. The highly political purposes of the ideologues of the ‘free market’ have been exposed as the claims to science have disappeared. In this scenario, thrusting, vigorous entrepreneurs fight the scourge of ‘big’ government, bureaucracy and red tape, trade union ‘barons’ and frankly anyone or anything that hints at collective purpose and power – what used to be called the building blocks or functional prerequisites of a viable, civilised society. Excoriating altruism and lionising egoism, this free market libertarian school of thought consistently argued that any form of restraint would result in economic disaster and political despotism, ‘the road to serfdom’ as Hayek wrote. Ironically, it is free market economics which brings about political authoritarianism and centralisation, precisely because it atomises society into a mass of individuals and hollows out the intermediate space between state and market. Collective purpose is denied in civil society and therefore has to be reinstituted at the state level. What seems a penetrating insight in an era pulverised by neo-liberalism is actually something of a commonplace to be found in serious social theorists, from Carlyle and Tocqueville to Marx and up to sociologists like Parsons in the twentieth century. It is the power of ideology to blind people not only to social theory but also to social realities.

Economics is an ideology in Marx’s critical sense that ideology is not a system of ideas or knowledge but a distorted knowledge concerning appearances which conceals contradictions and interests and power relations to the benefit of the dominant class. By ideology, the powerful appear 'not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society'. Ideology is trapped in appearances whereas science penetrates the phenomenal forms of reality to reveal the laws and the real relations beneath the surface (Larrain 1979 ch 6). 

Not surprisingly, then, the questioning of the free market economics forced this admission: "The only guy who really called this right was Karl Marx." (Time, "10 Questions for Jim Cramer," May 14, 2009.)

Explanations? Risk was incorrectly priced; the panic could feed back into the financial system through lack of a regulatory framework; the incentive structures encouraged traders to push financial risk far into the future; ideologists of the free market prevented and/or removed the kinds of circuit-breaking policies that could have helped. The point is deeper than this, though. A system of deliberate economic libertarianism has, by virtue of what it is, systematically eliminated all such checking and breaking mechanisms in the first place. The arguments that all of this could have been fixed at various points really amounts to one big point, the economy should have been planned better and planned differently in the first place. And this means going back to the fundamentals of government and economic policy.

The economic crisis is the occasion to question not just the free market economics but the ‘free’ market economy that the economics rationalises. The world has been turned upside down, with meanings reversed. The free market claim that unconstrained individual interest leads inexorably to the general interest has been exposed in reality to be an ideology. What was supposed to be to the benefit of all has turned out to be detrimental to the common interest. The people who have benefited are the rich and powerful and their lackeys in politics, the professions and the universities.

A new economics and therefore a new economy is required, based on a richer conception of human nature,  and which is therefore anchored in the norms and values of community. 

The Crisis Of Vision In Economics
The environmental crisis must be related to the crisis in economic thought and practice. For too long, economic thought has been having a conversation with itself, treating ‘the economy’ in abstraction from the political, social, moral and ecological context within which it functions as a means. Economics is not an end in itself. Part of dealing with the future orientated problem of ecology involves examining in what direction economic thought must go in order to once more become relevant to human beings. A couple of obvious first steps here are to distinguish economic inquiry clearly from natural science and to end the identification of economics with market capitalism. Economics was a field of study before capitalism and is a discipline which is independent of particular social relations. The most difficult task is to establish, as clearly and as precisely as possible, the principles which are most likely to give new vigour and relevance to ‘political economy’, to give economics a new point and purpose, a new vision.

Whilst the history of economic thought exhibits differences according to time and place, one big difference separates Political Economy from Economics. Political Economy gains its character from the way it situates economic activity in a wider institutional and moral framework, taking account not only of politics within and between nations, but of rivalries between classes and groups. It also recognises the importance of beliefs, morals and values, the cultural matrix in which economics operates. Economics is the self-image of the capital system, asserting an abstraction and independence from other essential aspects of human life – the state and politics, religion and morality, social classes and groups, community, in other words all those things that make human life human. That assertion of independence does not, of course, prevent economics from encroaching into these other spheres in search of exchange value. 

Putting the matter this way suggests a return to Political Economy as some golden age. One should remember that Marx titled or subtitled his works the critique of political economy. The perspectives of this paper lead to a vision of economics as the servant of humanity, as means are to ends. An economics that is fit for purpose must acknowledge that problems and predicaments arise from extra-economic considerations of a sociopolitical  and moral nature, and that, therefore, economics must embody and express a broader and deeper dimension. The considerations that shape the agenda of the contemporary world are far removed from the past of economic thought. Keynes is full of insight on this, noting that the economic problem, as a problem of natural necessity and scarcity, has been solved. Yet productive activity carries on in the grip of a new, artificial necessity of new, artificial wants. Mill wrote about this in the middle of the nineteenth century. But just as Political Economy started to get interesting, along came the marginalist revolution and the invention of economics. The world of value was left in the past and was replaced by the world of price. Away went discussions of value, with the political implications, and visions of the stationary state. The naturalistic and apolitical orientation of modern Economics deliberately and systematically suppressed political and moral considerations – in the manner of the capital system it rationalises – and is poorly equipped to deal with the challenges of the contemporary world.
This begs the question of the principled framework for economic theory and practice for the future. The answer stares anyone with a knowledge of the building and functioning of civilisations, the rise and flourishing of cities and city-states, the conditions of viable social orders. There have always been markets, trade and commerce, the exchange of goods and services. What distinguishes the modern period is the extent to which ‘the economy’ has become an abstraction detaching its laws and imperatives from its social and political and cultural context. The private sphere has not only detached itself from the public sphere but has taken this independence to mean licence. This is now the time to bring the public realm back in as the overarching political and moral framework bringing order in the arrangement of the parts.. The ‘anarchy’ of the market economy is producing not only moral and social malaise but ever more destructive economic crises, not to mention the biggest ‘externality’ of all, future ecological devastation. There is not only a need to embed the economy within public life but to widen the scope and deepen the penetration of public guidance into the operation of the economy. Predictable objections that the private economy should be free from interference from the public realm would have more credibility if contemporary capitalism was less reliant on the contemporary state in facilitating the process of private accumulation. The twentieth century has seen the increased intervention of the state into civil and social life in order to manage the conditions for private accumulation. Further, the contemporary age is witnessing what may be called the corporatisation of public business, private corporations encroaching on the public sphere to commodify as many public goods as they can get their hands on.

Looking at the key issues of the present, the idea of a universe of competitive egoistic agents falls far short of the vision and analysis required to create a sound foundation for relevant economic thought. This foundation is an appropriate balance between the public and the private sectors and a new understanding of the place and the purpose of economic activity in a world of sustainable living. This vision entails a considerably elevated conception of the role of public life, recognising the need for expanded public intervention and regulation in guiding the economy through the difficulties and dangers with which the world will have to contend. It is the illegitimacy of the public sector that lies at the core of the contemporary demoralisation and depoliticisation, the feeling that, despite material excess, life is meaningless. Modernity’s crisis of vision is at base the hollowness of capitalism’s claims that material goods produce happiness, fulfilment and flourishing. They do not. A public life that is worthy of the name does that.

The institutional separation of public and private distinguishes the capital system from previous social orders. This bifurcation is a diremption that separates individuals from wider purposes and deeper needs. The institutional separation of ‘the economy’ from public life constitutes an essential property of the capital order. Hence there has always been comment on the relative claims of the public realm. Adam Smith can be read detailing the "duties" of government, and Keynes certainly envisaged a substantial extension of public intervention and government responsibility. But these recommendations were based on the government action necessary to the efficient operations of the private system, not as an alternative to it. Keynes claimed that his own theory was "moderately conservative in its implications" and that there was "no reason to suppose that the existing system seriously misemploys the factors of production we use." (Keynes 1964: 377, 379.)

That self-assessment was actually remarkably conservative at the time of general depression; it simply does not apply at all to the current period of gross materialism and systematic waste. Capitalism has dissipated the moral and cultural capital of the social order that it has ever been parasitic upon. It is also busy dissipating the natural capital upon which all life on earth lives on. 

The current predicament is well beyond Keynes’ ‘moderate conservatism’. The elements of the new economic crisis are manifold. The application of automation and IT to the world of work has wiped out millions of stable jobs and generated severe strains in the labour market. The old idea of "full" employment has lost its meaning in a world of rapid turnover, short term, casual contracts, part-time working. And this refers to people in work. The result is prospective increasing dependency on government-financed programmes of credits for those in work and unemployment benefit or workfare. Dahrendorff refers to ‘the fact that relatively well-paid jobs disappeared and new ones were created at a much lower level of pay. If one takes into account the disappearance of perks with the jobs - of health care support and job security - the change is even more drastic’. (Dahrendorf 1990 ch 7). The millions of casual, part and short time jobs that have replaced the full time permanent jobs impressed many, but only at the expense of solving the unemployment problem by creating a poverty problem. 

This is apparent in the growing economic importance of public spending in the form of entitlements at all levels of society, from welfare, through social security, to health insurance. The fact that these entitlements are now the most rapidly rising part of government expenditures is significant. The public realm is being called upon to deliver what the private economy is supposed to generate but cannot, pointing to impending fiscal problems in all advanced nations.

Developments in the global environment have also dramatically enhanced the operational importance of the public sector. The globalisation of economic relations carries disturbing implications for all the advanced capital economies, including the competitive downsizing of social, environmental, and labour standards through market imperatives. Globalisation fosters the liberalisation of finance, digitalisation further increasing the volume of international financial flows. (United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations 1994). On a global scale, this liberalisation of finance undermines the regulatory frameworks of nation states and substantially limits the ability of advanced nations to undertake domestic fiscal and monetary policies that do not conform to the imperatives of a stateless world financial market. On the largest front of all, ecological problems on a global scale have been on the world agenda for some time, and are certain to increase as a result of carbon emissions and global warming. 

These developments are interrelated, thus confirming the argument for the widening of the scope and deepening of the intervention of public life. Together, these developments constitute the political and social background of the contemporary age and define the realities which economic theory and practice will need to address. There is a need, then, to investigate the implications of this change in realities for the kind of vision and the kind of analysis that economics and economic activity will have to incorporate.

8 THE FREE MARKET, GLOBALISATION AND ECOLOGY

The free market and ecology
Civilization depends on the planet’s ecology. The myth of the ‘free’ market is an assertion of the autonomy of ‘the economy’. The freedom from political, social and moral constraint is also a freedom from natural restraints. It amounts to an assertion to exploit untrammelled by laws, morals and limits. The denial of dependence of society and the economy upon ecology permits the ‘free’ market economy to exploit the Earth’s ecology to the point of death. Scientists argue that species’ extinction rates have been raised by one thousand times normal levels as a result of human activity. (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).

The enclosure of the commons is now being extended to the global ecology, emptying life-giving and life-enhancing processes of their natural value in order to extract a limited, short term commercial value. This untrammelled economics promises to destroy the ecological basis of life on Earth. This follows the way that the ‘free’ market destroys the moral and social basis of civilisation. It is one and the same process. The system of endless economic growth has turned humanity into an agent of its own extinction, systematically undervaluing the creative capacities of labour, overvaluing means and mechanisms, and turning technics against ecosystemic services that support life on earth. Herman Daly has sought to develop ecological economics.  As he writes: "Current economic growth has uncoupled itself from the world and has become irrelevant. Worse, it has become a blind guide." (Daly 1972: 950-51). Daly's views on population, including "birth licences," are worrying. Indeed, the whole subject of population control has disturbing political implications (Kasun 1988.)

In fine, the ‘free’ in the free market economy amounts to one big free lunch. The capital system is parasitic on the human and natural resources that it exploits but does not replenish, on the moral and social infrastructure that it destroys by replacing constitutive ties with monetary ties. Capitalism takes the moral, social and ecological supports that are the conditions for economic activity for granted, dissipating cultural resources that have taken centuries to create, destroying its own bases for existence.

Price and Value in the market economy

Underlying every tale of excess and crash is a set of assumptions. In neo-liberal economics, prices are the means by which wants, needs and resources are registered. The very idea of a bubble holds that things return to normal once bubble bursts, with price coming to reflect value more accurately once more. In this scenario, the bust that follows boom functions to restore a true sense of realities. The conception presumes that normality prevails in the economy and that bubbles are exceptions to the standard procedures of market valuation. However, if these procedures themselves are flawed, and price and value do not correspond, then the assumption of a return to normality is misplaced. That stable ground does not exist in a modern economy that has long since departed from realities.
The discrepancy between the price of something and its value is inherent to the profit-driven economy. This gap is something that has consistently troubled economists, so much so that rather than expose it as a flaw endemic to the modern economy, the marginalists like Jevons et al just declared it a non-problem. It says something that when it comes to understanding the principles of how an economy works, it is the political economists like Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Marx who are most rewarding and least in denial. The classical figures of the discipline would have had little difficulty in exposing the link between Nobel prize winning economics and the interests of those who profited from liberalisation and deregulation. The people running the economy were paid in the present for outcomes in the future that they predicted would happen according to a "mark to model" accounting practice – meaning that they could book today their projected earnings tomorrow. This sleight of hand was justified in terms of markets knowing best.

This idea that markets know best is an article of faith rather than sound economics. Karl Marx is reported to have said ‘I am not a marxist’. Had Adam Smith seen some of the theories to which his name is applied he would have been moved to make a similar statement of denial. Under pressure from socialism, an awful lot of hard ideological and political work went into making ‘free market’ economics the conventional wisdom that governments could not ignore. It is the religion of the rich and powerful, a belief system that governments had to pay tribute to. 

One can refer here to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, formulated by Eugene Fama, in the University of Chicago Business School in the 1960s. The hypothesis states that the price of a financial asset reflects everything that a market currently knows about its performance being good or bad, at present and in future. The price is a bet concerning the odds of performance being good or bad. It is sometimes argued that there is no problem with a theory, only its practice. The problem with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is that it doesn't work in theory either. If the hypothesis was true, then there'd be no incentive to invest, because the market would have already done it. Economists Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz and hundreds of economists since have shown how unrealistic the hypothesis is. (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). Far from always been rational, markets can quite often behave irrationally, as when investors herd behind a stock, pushing its value in a way unrelated to the stock being traded. Justin Fox exposes ‘the myth of the rational market’. (Fox 2009).

There was plenty of economic evidence indicating that the idea of efficient markets was false. Yet it became conventional wisdom of government economic policy. The result was that regulatory frameworks were kept deliberately weak on the assumption that the hypothesis was true, allowing traders to make their massive. As the money rolled in, the hypothesis was seemingly confirmed, justifying even less regulation making possible even bigger bets. The betting came with the safety net of government promises to pick up the tab for the finance sector's binge. It is the old story of capitalism writ large, internalise the gains and externalise the costs. The risk was socialised but the profit was privatised. The bet amounted to win big or win bigger. The financiers' bets finally broke the system. As government used public money to pick up the pieces, the financiers kept the profits they made from their bad bets. This gambling broke the economy and has cost the people of the world jobs and social services and health and education. The people least responsible pay the biggest price.

The justification of the free market is ideology rather than economics, concealing activities that are about politics and power rather than markets and how they work or should work. These nonmarket activities are little different to the practices that Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations identified as conspiracies against the people by powerful elites in business and government. 

People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. 

Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Edwin Cannan,ed. (Methuen, London, 1961), vol i, p. 144.

The interest of dealers ... in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public... . The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.

Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Edwin Cannan,ed. (Methuen, London, 1961), vol. 1. p. 278.. ibid., vol. 2, p. 284.

The symbiotic relation between business and government has implications with respect to democracy but also with respect to a functioning economy. The very institutions responsible for the regulatory and legal framework that allowed the activities which led to global recession are not equipped to resolve the crisis. One returns to Joseph Schumpeter’s point that it is because the car has breaks it can go so fast. The people who took the breaks off are not the ones who should be given the task of salvaging something from the wreckage. As Nassim Taleb argues: "People who were driving a school bus (blindfolded) and crashed it should never be given a new bus." (Taleb 2009.) The problem is that the structural dependence of the state upon the process of private capital accumulation means that governments are going to be more responsive to the bus drivers – business and financial elites – rather than the bus passengers. 

Globalisation
The globalisation of economic relations is turning potentials for qualitative development into its opposite. The principal agencies of this globalisation are the transnational corporations who command vast processes of investment, production and employment. The result is that possibilities for human self-realisation, community self-reliance, direct democracy, social justice and equality, and integration of human culture with nature are not only being suppressed but are taking negative form. The new potentials are being used negatively rather than positively, intensifying and enlarging its narrow monetary, commercial concern and producing urban decay, cultural decline, the dissolution of communities, environmental destruction and a pervasive sense of hopelessness and powerlessness. 

The capital system cannot even live up to its own nostrums. One hears ‘no such thing as a free lunch’ repeated as a mantra. Capitalism is the biggest free lunch in history. The two sources of wealth are nature and labour, and capital exists only on the basis of the exploitation of both. Nature and labour can certainly exist independently of capital; capital cannot live independently of nature and labour. Further, for all of the rejection of ‘big government’, capitalism has from the first relied on the centralised state. The economic agents pursuing their self-interest on the ‘free’ market do so with the safety net of taxpayers money when governments need to intervene to correct market failure. Capitalism prides itself on 'efficiency" but the fact is, in terms of inputs and outputs, it is the most ludicrously wasteful economic system in history. Resources which could have been used to secure basic needs and harmonize the human interchange with nature have been dissipated through wasteful of production, consumption, and competition. Of course, the definition of efficiency changes according to whether one is looking at quantitative or qualitative concerns. What is efficient for accumulating capital is not necessarily efficient for utilising natural and human resources and is often quite destructive in constraining them to a narrow purpose of money making. This is not wealth creation but its opposite. Capitalism’s biggest output is what Ruskin called "illth" (Cobb, Halstead, and Rowe, 1995). This period has been described as the "cancer stage of capitalism" (McMurtry 1999; Korten 1999; Korten, David. 1999) The cure is to unblock the social body, unleash suppressed energy and redirect this energy for regenerative purposes. The proceeds from a diverse mix of grassroots action within a holistic paradigm of qualitative development.

Globalisation and the reaction against the market economy
Breaking mechanisms point to the need for regulation. The market has been far too free for the good of the economy. In response to economic crisis and popular discontent, politicians are more receptive to ideas of how to regulate and restrain the market. The question is still not one of discerning the principles of a viable economic order but of politics, interests and power. A capital economy is a regime of private power. Have governments got the power, let alone the nerve, to regulate for the long term good of the economy and the interests of the people rather than interests of powerful elites in business and finance, elites with global influence and reach? 

From its beginning, the market economy has provoked reaction. It has survived any number of protests and campaigns. Broad movements are formed when increasing numbers of people identity the source of their discontent in free market activities and politics. When discontent coalesces across society as a whole, change involving limits to market and a restructuring of power becomes possible. What is unique about the contemporary crisis is that it is pervasively global. This situation is the universalism which Marx back in the 1840’s made a condition of communism: ‘only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the "propertyless" mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones.’ 

All the people of the earth ‘are swept by universal commerce into the universal competitive struggle’. ‘Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up  with communism.’ (Marx GI 1999 The German Ideology).

This unique situation of global crisis in the context of universal development and universal productive forces comes at precisely the moment when political and economic restructuring is being demanded in order to prevent a global ecological catastrophe through human induced climate change. The scale of economic and environmental crises shows how profoundly universal human technics and culture have become and how profoundly crude and outdated ‘free market’ ideology of money and power really is. 

It is not generally appreciated that Marx wrote relatively little on markets. Markets are institutions which function one way or another according to the social context in which they are embedded. Marx’s principal target was the commodity form and exchange value, the practice of turning people and things into commodities whose value or otherwise was determined according to the logic of accumulation.

One can refer to the philosopher Stuart Hampshire’s notion of ‘false fixities’ here. 





‘That an absolute monarchy leads to injustices; that it is unfair and exploitative to exact a day often hours' labour in filthy conditions from factory workers; that slavery is a grossly unjust institution; that it is unfair that women should not receive equal pay for equal work—these are all propositions involving the concept of justice which most people in the 1980s will confidently assert to be true. There have been long periods in the past when reasonable persons would not have been confident about them, and would not have endorsed them as certainly acceptable. Neither monarchy, nor factory labour and its conditions, nor slavery, nor women's rights were considered matters up for rational judgment as either just or unjust. Substantial, non-procedural conceptions of justice were embedded in ways of life, each with its distinctive conceptions of the good and of the necessary virtues, and no place was left for debate on institutions which were assumed to be the inevitable background to the prevailing way of life. Alternative possibilities in the provision of labour were not at the time open for discussion. We think that the society which tolerated slavery was in that respect an unjust society; most of Thomas Jefferson's contemporaries in the United States, even the more reasonable of them, did not think this. We think that they were blind to the injustice, and I shall argue that we are right to think this. They thought that persons were often unjust in their treatment of slaves, but they did not think that only an unjust society could tolerate slavery. Is it not irrational and arrogant of us to be sure that we are right and they are wrong? Ought we not rather to say that slavery was not an unjust institution in Athens or America, given the way of life and the supporting moral and metaphysical ideas of the time; rather the institution became unjust when the way of life changed together with its supporting moral ideas? (Hampshire 1992 ch 2).

These points apply to the notion of ‘free’ markets and ideas that markets know best and can’t be bucked. Alternative possibilities for the supply of social labour are certainly up for discussion. But it means penetrating the fog of moral and metaphysical ideas that try to conceal not just the injustices of the free market economy but also the way its inefficiencies favour one group of people at the expense of others. As Hampshire argues, ‘We need to consider what the so-called blindness of reasonable persons is.’ (Hampshire 1992: 58).

These institutions and values are subject to public controversy, intervention and alteration. The history of slavery, its justification and its abolition, demonstrates not only that market arrangements change but also that laws and norms determining what belongs in markets can be revoked. Slave labour was once widespread, now it isn't. This makes the point that there is nothing natural and inevitable about turning people and things into commodities and exchanging them for profit, and allowing markets to set their value. One comes back to Hampshire’s reference to ‘supporting moral and metaphysical ideas’. Before people and things can be turned into commodities to be bought and sold, they have to become objects capable of being thought of as commodities. In other words, even before the exploitation and injustice that are the targets of discontent, commodification, the source of all the trouble, has taken place. The fact that it still goes unidentified and undetected shows the real power of ideology to conceal causes and contradictions and power relations. Most of the things that people buy and sell without thinking were not commodities in past societies. Things such as land, labour, culture, music, education, health care, food and so on were once valued more for their use value to society as a whole than for what they could earn property owners on the market. There is a distinction here between exchange value and use value. These things were turned into commodities within historically specific social relations. It follows that they can be decommodified and reclaimed as use values by a similar historical transformation.
Markets are not abstractions but are institutions which function within the environing society. Capitalism is unique in that its economic determinism, its accumulative logic, gives the impression that the economy can be detached from and override society's institutions. This is a self-destructive delusion. The market economy only functions with supporting morals and ideas and social structures which permit the turning of things into commodities to be exchanged. In this manner, the most powerful groups in society turned land and labour into commodities, things that were valued for exchange and were therefore very different from the goods that had previously been valued for their use. The decisive event in Marx’s intellectual and political was the clash in which people living in the community attempted to defend customary rights against the new claims of property rights around the German forests.
It may sound odd to think about land or labour as ‘false fixities’ when the everyday world of work identifies work and money as realities which make possible the payment of necessities, but the point reforms not to the things as such but the commodity form according to which they are exchanged. The commodity form transformed social arrangements so profoundly that it is impossible to think of objects as having anything other than an exchange value. In other words, the process of commodification not only changed society, it also changed supporting ideas, metaphysics and psychologies, the way that people perceive reality and their place in it.

The rise of capitalism required massive social upheaval. For land to become a commodity, it had to be enclosed. The people who used the common land were evicted and left no option but to seek work in the factories in the overcrowded cities. Again, this is not a natural event but a social and political process, the result of actions, choices and demands of human beings. Capitalism required that the social rules which govern land and labour were rewritten, in the interests of some and to the detriment of others. As a result of this rewiring of social activities and practices, things which were formerly use values held and exercised in common became eligible for ownership, pricing, and exchange. The process of enclosure and commodification has never stopped, and is currently proceeding through the ecosystem, from the oceans to the air. Even the science of climate change is turned into a business, with cap-and-trade policies turning the right to pollute into a commodity.
This analysis makes it clear that whilst the economy functions within a social matrix of institutions, values and ideas, the determinism of capital’s accumulative logic organised through exchange value fosters the illusion that the market is independent of society. This is the origin of the myth of the self-regulating properties of the market. Capitalism needs society and ‘big’ government far more than it dares to let on. Bringing government and society back in makes the point that regulation takes other than internal or ‘invisible’ forms – people can have a say. The myth that the market economy on the one hand and government and society on the other hand are two distinct realms is required so that powerful business interests can expand commodification and marketisation further into the world of use values. 

The myth of the market economy being autonomous and self-regulating is exposed time and again with each periodic crisis of capitalism. The recent spectacle of the public bailout of the banks to preserve the economic fabric is the latest in a long history of state and social support of the ‘private economy’. Capitalism rose with the intervention and support of the state and law and it transacted business within a moral and social infrastructure created and sustained by pre-capitalist formations. Samuel Smiles’ ‘pull yourself up by your own bootstraps’ and stand on your own two feet is the kind of homespun wisdom that capitalists give to others but never to themselves. Far from standing on its own two feet, capitalism stood on the shoulders of a previous civilisation, living off the moral and institutional capital and cultural resources of that previous social order, replacing constitutive ties and shared ethics with the nexus of callous cash payment extended to enclose the whole social order. And when it crashes, it lacks the resources to save itself. The public realm bails it out, time and again, financially, morally and politically. The market economy has always depended on government and society, using its structural power and control over the material necessities of life to bully and browbeat those who wish to provide regulation and restraint in the common good. The practice of libertarian economics will always require a social base and a supportive state.

The economy is embedded in society which, in turn, is embedded in the natural world. The myth of the self-regulating market economy is not economics but an ideology which attempts to insulate ‘the economy’ from moral and political control. It succeeds to the extent that it denies the obvious dependence upon state, law and public finance as well as the social context. This same deliberate blindness also applies to ecology. The denial of climate change science in recent years is simply part of a bigger denial that ‘the market economy’ depends on anything larger than itself. The denial of politics, society, ethics and ecology is all of a piece. 

9 UNIT IDEAS THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF CIVILISATION

Markets, Morality And Modernity
Whether one looks at Aristotle’s community of communities or Hegel’s Sittlichkeit these communities and associations are the homes of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, places in which individuals are brought into reciprocal relation with all other individuals, interacting with them repeatedly, developing and sustaining long-term relationships with each other and generating trust as social capital. These intermediary associations have the capacity to foster and inculcate the habits of co-operation on which the public life of society depends. Beyond the polarities and divisions of interest and opinion, this is a genuine political ecology in which individuals learn the practice and acquire the habit of reciprocity and forgiveness. It is the individual of Anglo-American liberalism that is the abstraction, a fictional person who exists only in the figure of homo economicus. Real individuals exist and flourish within a social matrix of reciprocal relations and trust.

In The Sociological Tradition, Robert A. Nisbet (1953; 1967) persuasively argued that the ‘unit-ideas’ of sociology were constituted by three philosophical traditions (conservatism, liberalism and radicalism) in response to the two revolutions of the modern world, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. The most thought provoking aspect of Nisbet’s thesis was that the predominant issues and concerns of sociology, organised around the concepts of community, authority, status, the sacred and alienation, were derived from conservatism. And the point goes deeper than the character of sociology. For on this analysis, sociology is not just an analysis of capitalist modernity as a contrast to the world it had replaced, it is a disguised moral critique of the new world from the perspective of the eclipsed society. To explain this, Nisbet’s ‘unit-ideas’ of sociology are also core components of civilisation. Community, authority, status (identity, role, function), the sacred (religion, God and the church, morality) and alienation are constants which need to be clear, strong and stable for any civilisation to thrive and prosper. And that’s the point. Every single one of these constants are rendered problematic within capitalist modernity, for the reasons that Nisbet in The Sociological Tradition sets out. The importance of values, shared assumptions and a range of institutions and associations which guaranteed some form of social stability all throw the problem of order, loss of meaning and loss of community in the modern world in sharp relief. This is not nostalgia so much as a concern for the future of civilisation. Money is not a civilisation. Problematic on every ‘unit-idea’, capitalist modernity has no moral, cultural and institutional resources once the money runs out and the rivers run dry. 


In social theory this sense of despair was prominent in Weber's sociology of fate (Turner 1981) because Weber said that the future would be a polar night of icy darkness; E. Troeltsch in 1896 proclaimed to a gathering of theologians at Eisenach 'gentlemen, everything is tottering' (Hughes, 1959).

The loss of moral certainty is a key feature of the modern crisis. Where once universal morality and shared values had provided the unity of social relations and personal experience, modernity is characterised by a polytheism of subjective values. Capitalist industrialization, the collapse of traditional communities, the spread of scientific knowledge and the increasing social differentiation all combine to displace morality from the supremacy it once had. Maybe people really do think they have become gods, so in thrall to their personal success, money, power and status. So much so that they do not feel the need for a morality, or pick and choose between them according to fashion and mood. In a world exhibiting a pluralism of values, it is difficult to commit oneself to a moral scheme of life. In The Division of Labour in Society Durkheim gave a theoretical account of the transformation of social structures by differentiation. The moral coherence of mechanical solidarity had given way to a more complex and uncertain world of organic solidarity in which the collective consciousness had become generally thin and dispersed through society. Durkheim had been confident that the world of organic solidarity would issue in a new social unity. By the time of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life in 1912 and of the First World War, Durkheim was seeking possibilities for social unity in nationalist symbolism and social ritual. 

The collapse of moral and social unity results in a world characterized by relativism in ethics and a pervasive sense of uncertainty in politics. 

Adam Smith proposed a principle of self-interested behaviour that is appropriate only in times and places governed by the particular institution of ‘the market’. The notion is neither necessary nor of universal application. It is an abstraction from social, biological and psychological realities and survives as a quasi-theological concept, an article of faith which is defended and asserted with genuine religious fervour. It suits certain dominant interests as an ideology which conceals the way that certain power relations and institutions really operate in the real world.

With the passage of time, it is increasingly apparent that dearly held Anglo-American nostrums concerning the institutions of the ‘free society’ are specific and transitory products of time and place. Some of the defenders of liberal democracy seem to have been aware of the transitory nature of the free society. Isaiah Berlin raises the possibility that the liberal society 'is only the late fruit of our declining capitalist civilization: an ideal which remote ages and primitive societies have not recognized, and one which posterity will regard with curiosity, even sympathy, but little comprehension' (Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 172). 

And it also seems that the success of this historical aberration has depended in large part upon the moral, cultural and institutional resources of a previous civilisation. If this is so, then capitalism is parasitic not only on nature and labour as the two sole sources of wealth, but also upon the civilisation building of past generations. Capitalism depletes that moral, cultural and institutional capital of the past but, motivated solely by the endless, literally nihilistic pursuit of private accumulation, establishes no capital of its own.

For all of Smith’s arguments about the compatibility of morals and markets, capitalism is, as Keynes argued, ‘irreligious’. It’s not that capitalism doesn’t generate certain conceptions of morality, it does. But without an overarching moral framework, all that this creates is a polytheism of values, an irreducible subjectivism of competing positions, with no means of deciding between them. Capitalism destroys traditional morality but also destroys the grounds for taking any new morality seriously. Capitalism needs morality but renders it impossible. This argues that not only is capitalism destructive of traditional morality, it is also morally self-destructive. Whilst every society constructs its own form of morality, capitalism is unique in being unable to supply good reason for believing in its own principles and values. Capitalism presents a very clear conception of what it is to have reason to act, a conception of knowledge which denies the possibility of moral knowledge. Morality in this conception is a matter of subjective opinion rather than rational belief, with the result that moral imperatives have little purchase on the motivations of those to whom they are addressed. In an ‘irreligious’ capitalist world, morality lingers on as a matter of personal faith at best or dogmatic conviction at worst. Morality thus cannot command the authority it needs to play a central function in giving meaning to social and individual life. 

Modernity requires morality but cannot offer good enough reasons for rational behaviour.

Capitalist modernity is characterised by a plethora of competing conceptions of morality existing in unresolved tension with each other. The moral predicament of modernity is that there is no principled way in which the contentions between these various moralities can be settled. This was Weber’s position.

Weber described this world as polytheistic since the modern world was characterised by endless conflict between moral frameworks which was without resolution.

The collapse of genuine social relationships and their replacement by instrumental relations in which people become means to ends external to them involves the loss individual autonomy. With the loss of moral unity and social unity, the individual loses the micro-social connections which give meaning and identity to life and is instead subordinated to macro-social processes and institutions which systematically enclose and suffocate the individual in a world of bureaucratic dominance. The most famous theorist of this incarceration is Max Weber, who coined the term ‘iron cage’ to describe the increasing subordination of the individual to social bureaucratic relations. Some such notion is implicit in the process of civilisation, the imposition of the civil state upon the natural state, implying institutions which raise human beings above their ‘beastly’ nature and put them in touch with their ‘divine’ selves (Plato’s culture of virtue, Kant’s ‘culture of discipline). Rousseau saw social development as the negation of individual autonomy and moral coherence. Rousseau contrasted the autonomous savage in a state of nature with urban individuals in civil society who only know how to live in the opinion of others, which to Rousseau amounted to fashion and malicious gossip. Critical theory puts forward the idea that modern society is an administered world in which the isolated individual is subordinated to the overpowering logic of instrumental rationality. Adorno's conception of the modern world as 'the administered society' (Jay 1984) bears some similarities to Foucault’s notion of the carceral society. Capitalist modernity produces individualism whilst undermining the conditions for individuality and instead locating the individual within the vast supra-individual forces of the division of labour, the dominance of the discipline, the spread of bureaucracy and the regulation of persons by the State. From this perspective, the mythology of the individual in liberal politics and economic theory serves to mask the fact that capitalism is a world in which the individual is progressively regulated and dominated by systemic and institutional forces which undermine privacy.

In fine, capitalist modernity is a world which lacks moral and social unity, which is governed by autonomy-denying structures, administrative rules and economic systems, where close social ties permitting the direct expression of feeling have been destroyed, and where wants have been packaged as false needs to rule individuals by desire within an artificial and superficial consumer culture. The result is a merging of Weberian bureaucracy and Foucaultian discipline to create a system of personal controls (O'Neill, 1986). 

 The classic statement of the transition from feudal society to capitalist society as a social way of life is Tonnies (Freund 1979). Tonnies' regarded all forms of social life as representations of the will and his contrast between Gemeinschaft  and Gesellschaft is a contrast between organic will in community and reflective will in society respectively. For Tonnies, community is always a response to the needs of real, organic life whilst society is a form of social relationship based upon artificial and mechanical representations of reflective will. As Tonnies presented the contrast: ‘all intimate, private, and exclusive living together, so we discover, is understood as life in Gemeinschaft (community). Gesellschaft (society) is public life - it is the world itself. In Gemeinschaft (community) with one's family, one lives from birth on bound to it in weal and woe. One goes into Gesellschaft (society) as one goes into a strange country’ (Tonnies 1955: 38).

Human beings are not at home in a world that they have themselves made. The natural and organic world of Gemeinschaft was undermined by the development of exchange relations and finally replaced by a market society in which the natural and local relationships between individuals was replaced by external economic interest. Whereas once relationships were natural and interior, they now became artificial and exterior. Gesellschaft replaced Gemeinschaft and the reflective world of public opinion, exchange, cosmopolitanism and class replaced the organic world of the village.

In The Philosophy of Money, Simmel examined the process by which modern society emerged as the result of an expanding money economy. Simmel's key idea is the ‘tragedy of culture’ as pertaining to a contradiction between the vibrant content of social interaction and the reified forms of money.

The creative energies that human beings put into social relations come to be expressed in congealed and reified forms to produce a tragic contradiction between content and form. This culture is tragic precisely because all humanly constructed forms of life must gain an independence from their human creators. Human creation in the process of sociation takes reified form as expressed by money. ‘Money is the reification of the pure relationship between things as expressed in their economic motion ... the activity of exchange amongst individuals is represented by money in a concrete, independent, and as it were, congealed form, in the same sense as government represents the reciprocal self regulation of the members of a community, as the palladium or the ark of the covenant represents the cohesion of the group or the military order represents its self defence .. . This feature then assumes a structure of its own and the process of abstraction is brought to a conclusion when it crystallizes in a concrete formation’. (Simmel 1978: 176).

This reification of exchange in money is just one part of a general process. Modern society as a whole is reified upon the basis of the money economy, the growing dominance of monetary exchanges and the spread of monetary ties. The dominance of money has three central components: the transition from barter to a complex monetary system; the prominence of impersonal social relations as symbolically expressed in abstract money; the extension of exchange as the expansion of personal freedom but also the subjection and subordination of the individual to bureaucratic control. 

In many respects, Max Weber is the disillusioned heir of the philosophical tradition which sought to connect human reason with human freedom. This is apparent in his combination of reason and will and his normative concern with the appropriate regimen for the realisation of the human ontology. Weber is acutely aware that the triumph of reason in its technical and instrumental aspect has produced not freedom but an 'iron cage' of impersonal economic forces and of bureaucratically organised administration (Weber P 1994:314; Turner 1993:207; Schroeder 1992:114/6). The rational organisation of society has irrevocably removed the conditions of a universally valid ethical code. For Weber, the modern world has made it impossible to conceive the 'good' in anything other than subjective terms. Weber sees the fate of the modern age in the rise of a new polytheism taking the depersonified, objectified form of an irreconcilable antagonism among irreducible orders of value and life: 'Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces' (Weber SV 1991:149). This rationalised world of modernity is meaningless, an endless struggle between a multiple set of values, lacking the conditions for an objective, integral framework for the common good (Weber TL 1994:78/9; Habermas 1991:246). The fact that individualist liberalism argues for the ‘neutral’ conception of the state, leaving individuals to pursue the good as they see fit, is significant. This is a literally demoralised political theory to fit a modern world incapable of generating overarching morality. Weber argues that the modern world lacks intrinsic meaning: 'The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the "disenchantment of the world" (Weber SV 1991:155). The world is stripped of its normative dimension. 

Tragedy and fate are the dominant motifs of Weber’s sociology (Lowith 1982). Weber’s rationalization renders Simmel’s ‘tragedy of culture’ endemic and irrevocable within capitalist modernity (Brubaker 1984; Schluchter 1981). The paradox of rationalization as a disenchantment is that it frees human beings from magic and superstition but renders the world meaningless through its subordination to science. Science is not a morality and does not deliver meaning in itself. As the everyday world is filled up with scientific knowledge and practice, the world becomes devoid of values. Science is one the wrong side of the fact/value divide. It can answer the question ‘how’ but has nothing to say on the question ‘why’. Science can never tell human beings what they ought to do. Human beings are caught between the how and the why, subject to knowledge, disciplines and techniques that overload the former with means, but empty the latter of ends. The result is a bifurcation as individuals become objects of a struggle between unresolved and irreconcilable paradigms. 

What is most striking about Weber’s argument concerning disenchantment is the extent to which it savours of Genesis. Human beings have eaten from the Tree of Knowledge only to discover that their nakedness cannot be covered by science and its products. The pathos of means and ends in Weber is that the more we come to know, the less we come to understand. As a result, human beings are subject to a polytheism of competing value positions with no way of deciding between them. 

As Weber said in the famous 'science as a vocation': ‘the fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental real of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations (Weber FW 155).

With the collapse of the world of charismatic prophets, the social realm comes to be dominated by the objective, exterior regulating force of bureaucratic power and knowledge. A society of instrumental rationality is a society of means enlarged to the status of ends. Such a society denies the possibility of an ethic of ultimate ends. All that Weber can offer is the modest ethic of responsibility and the ‘polar night of icy darkness..’

There is no need to be shy of a ‘traditional’ morality and politics, for these are tried and tested by experience. Regardless of the debates over particular forms, there are certain constants in civilisation building. The institutions of the political and social order are firmly rooted in biological realities, realities which are embodied in a variety of way in different times and places but which overall indicate certain regularities and conditions of human well being. Without stable ties, loyalties and solidarities connecting each and all, extended sociality, reciprocal relations, human beings fail to learn the habits of association and co-operation. Whether one calls is Paideia with the ancient Greeks or Bildung with the Germans, this public mindedness is the basis of trust on which the economics and politics of a free society depend. Not only does self-interest not generate this trust, self-interest in itself generates a destructive cycle of reprisal in which each responds negatively to the self-interest of others. The result is a diminution in individual and collective freedom. 

But the loss of an overarching moral framework, the universality of a traditional objective morality, is merely symptomatic of an even deeper problem. Weber relates this loss of moral meaning to the spread and domination of an instrumental reason embodied in capitalist institutions. Instrumental rationality is not concerned with ends but with the efficient organisation of means and is so entrenched in the modern world that many identify this form of reason with rationality as such (see the editorial introduction to Elster ed. 1986). And the point is that not only does modernity not offer any good reason to decide between the disputing moral positions, it fails to supply good enough reason to accept its own instrumental rationality. Morality tells individuals what they ought to do as a moral imperative, but cannot supply a good reason for individuals to take this imperative seriously. Given the conceptions of human agency and reason which characterise capitalist modernity, a rational individual will reject the claims of morality. This was spotted as early as the start of the eighteenth century by Bernard Mandeville, for whom morality is merely a system of illusion, whose principal justification is its usefulness in serving certain social purposes. At a certain point, however, rational agents see through the illusion and so morality loses even its function as social glue or cement. At that point, modernity collapses into its own hollow centre.

Moral philosophy needs to recover its nerve and reacquaint itself with the big questions. To do this, it needs to engage with social and political life. This would reveal not morality to be the ‘illusion’ but the idea that the ‘invisible hand’ leads private vices to anything but public vices, a society of private vices writ large. As much as economics, morality is an aspect of social and political life, and ancient philosophers from Plato and Aristotle treated ethics and politics as complementary disciplines relating to the social nature of human beings. By recovering this perspective it will be possible to bring morality to bear on existing social practices. What is most in need of answer in this sense is not the social irrelevance of morality but the demoralisation of modern society.

A politics which determines public policy according to aggregates of individual votes and an economics which sees the market as the true democracy, with individuals using money as votes, places the focus firmly upon individual gain in the short term. Electoral politics and market economics generate outcomes which sacrifice the long term common good for short term individual gain. It is a politics and economics which systematically preclude the long term health and well being of all. And within its own terms, voting and consuming as private individuals, there is no resolution of the problem.
The challenge facing any renewal of politics lies in the unwillingness on the part of substantial numbers of people to defer short term gratification of wants and desires for the long term health and well being of families, neighbourhoods and communities. A ‘new politics’ succeeds or fails according to whether it can reinvest associational space with meaning and power. Back in 1987 The World Commission on Environment and Development headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland published Our Common Future, a book which argued for a marriage of economy and ecology to ensure the survival of the human race in the future. This responsibility belongs to us all. No politician or businessman holds our common future in their hands. An electoral politics which addresses individuals, atomises individuals, as voters and a free market which identifies individuals as consumers does not make individuals solicitous, law-abiding, honest, public-spirited or reliable. Nothing in this atomising experience encourages individuals to associate and extend civic and social engagement. The responsibility for reinvigorating public through revaluing associational space lies with the individuals composing civil society themselves.
The new politics is born the moment that individuals locate responsibility for change within themselves in relation to others, in the awareness that we can change ourselves and our behaviour at the same time as we change society, and in knowing that we are not alone.

Political Will And Citizenship
It is the passivity of people that allows the rich and powerful to rule. Society reclaims its social power from capital through active movement, not by passive requests to government.
There is a need not only to examine and restructure the market economy but to transform the political system that supports it. 

This is a definition of politics in which human beings live up to their claim to be social and rational animals. It realises the idea that human beings are able to think and act for themselves and that they are fit for politics as public, taking control and power rather than outsourcing it to external bodies and forces, reappropriating their powers and organising them as social powers so as to reclaim both democracy as social self-government.

Democracy In The City
In his 1968 book The Right to the City, Henri Lefebvre examined how city dwellers bringing their everyday needs under their control amounted to a challenge to the political order. Lefebvre called for an inclusive and transformative political reimagining of how cities could work for the people who lived in them. In 2002, a whole range of NGOs, parliamentarians, activists and citizens produced a charter The Right to the City. This charter is available to all who live in any urban space and includes everything from the right to work to access to drinking water and toilets. The affirmation of rights on paper needs to be asserted in practice; those who live in urban space need to mobilize to make their rights real. The insistence that those who live in the city have rights to urban space is not just a call for equality but a call for participation in the control of the city. It is an assertion of the use value of the city over against its reduction to a rational machine for pumping out exchange value (Harvey 1985; Harvey 2006).

Nostalgia
The argument presented here is quite often called ‘nostalgic’. The thesis that the modern world is nihilistic or meaningless is not new. Alasdair Maclntyre's After Virtue is an indictment of the moral failures of modernity, but has attracted criticisms for being nostalgic in its presentation and reactionary in its conclusions. Maclntyre seeks to salvage morality from within the wreckage of modernity by revaluing those residues of a lost past which survive in the modern world. The problems of the modern world, however, will not be solved by modes pertaining to the past. Hegel’s ‘high road’ of modernity and beyond is more socially and historically promising in the way it locates the ideal within the real. Hope, in other words, lies not in the past but in those lines of development and elements of social potential immanent in the present which point towards an alternative society in the future.

The crisis in moral philosophy reflects the deeper crisis of morality in a modern culture. The moral crisis is at the same time a crisis of reason. Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1973) shows how the emancipatory potential of reason has been realised as a repressive actuality. It is commonplace to refer to the end of the Enlightenment project and the collapse of reason. The most influential thinker in this respect is Nietzsche who, in the nineteenth century, declared that God was dead. This was no simple atheistic act of deicide. Nietzsche’s serious point was that the value system of traditional Christianity had been dissolved and the idea of a universal, objective morality could not be sustained within modernity. The death of God was and is a tragedy. It calls upon human beings to fill the gap and become gods by creatively living up to their powers. Instead, human powers in alien form have come to constitute a new absolutism. Human beings cannot supply their own ends but are lost in a disenchanted world of increasing rationalization. This rationalization relates to technique and the means to achieving social goals. However, the values which supply these goals are obscure.

For Marshall Berman 'to be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of our souls and the world - and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are' (Berman 1982 15). The title of Berman’s great work is a quote from Karl Marx, 'all that is solid melts into air.' 

Modernity is characterised by a crisis of morality, knowledge, and reason, replacing the traditional moral framework of universal values with instrumental reason and technique, and finding that not only is endless material and technical expansion humanly unsatisfying but that it comes with a bill for world war, economic crisis, social instability, anomie, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ecological disaster. Hobsbawm titled his history of the twentieth century The Age of Extremes, greater standards of living and greater disasters and tragedies for greater numbers of people. The book could have been called The Age of Excess. Overscale towns and cities, states and corporations, wars and weapons, peoples’ wants and desires, waste. And most of all, it is the scale of the crisis now facing the human race that is most beyond our comprehension and control. 

No wonder that many look back in an attempt to regain the world we have lost rather than look forward to recover certain constants - community, moral certainty and meaning, reciprocity and solidarity in social relations – on a higher level in a feasible future. Nostalgia is an attempt to seek identity and meaning in traditional modes and institutions. It is a pain for home, homesickness in English, malodie du pays for the French. In the contemporary age, nostalgia is a reaction to the loss of social stability and community in a world of endless social change and disruption (Davis 1974). Since modern individuals are not comfortable in their social roles and lack a social identity that connects them and their interests with others, they are no longer at home in the world. This is nostalgia as a painful sense of homelessness. ‘As we build, so shall we live’. The problem is that the building never ceases and the living never starts. Civilisation was founded upon a universal morality that commanded the common adherence of states, towns and communities. The death of God has rendered us homeless.

Without the overarching moral – and political – framework and the constitutive social ties to others, individuals are left utterly alone both in culture and in consciousness. The modern world is meaningless, nihilistic, and cannot long survive such loss of moral direction. There is a need to develop a new morality which is rooted in the prominence of our physical embodiment in the world as social, natural and rational beings. The collapse of traditional morality creates the opportunity to rethink reason and knowledge and identify the everyday lifeworld as the habitus for human embodiment, offering a context for anchoring rationalism and morality in practical life. The provides the springboard for embedding rationality in the lifeworld and everyday relations of individuals. The crisis of knowledge and reason is in part the failure of public institutions and vested interests but also stems from abstraction from embodied, lived human experience. The way that systemic power of economics dominates over the lifeworld of individuals, the abstract power of the state over society, and expertise over practical experience all points to a crisis of legitimacy which undermines the power and influence of reason and knowledge in the world. This paper, in short, attempts to bring reason back to its origins, namely homo sapiens, rational, reasoning man, through an exploration of association, friendship, fellowship (socius), by showing how cooperation and extended sociality increases social and cultural intelligence whereas individual competition diminishes human potential, by revaluing solidaristic exchange and reciprocity against the revenge of institutions and rationalism, by affirming the human being as a zoon politikon, by recovering public life as a politikon bion.

The argument which claims inevitability and universality in the connection between market capitalism, self-interest and individual liberty suffers from a shocking social, psychological and, indeed, historical illiteracy. Even within its own particular Anglo-American terrain, the evidence contradicts the ideology. At no point ever was ‘the market’ free. The state has always been in symbiotic relation with capital. The conditions for the ‘free market’ were created and sustained and enforced by state and law – enclosures, the separation of workers from land, the anti-combination acts, the rights of property and so on and so on, each and every one an example of a socio-institutional matrix supporting the figure of the self-interested individual.

And that’s within the Anglo-American home of ‘individual liberty’. Not all societies generated and sustained a ‘free market’ economy along these lines and, even more importantly, few of these were concerned to even make use of the ‘free market’ at the level of political ideology. Germany has consistently adopted a regulatory, institutional approach to economic development and restructuring, retaining the structures and the mentalities that date back to the medieval guilds, masters, apprentices and journeymen, an emphasis on training and skill and application. Today, there is a legal obligation on companies in Germany to train, there is an emphasis on the retention of skilled labour. Germany has an economy that competes at the high added value end of the global economy. It did not attain this position by letting outcomes be determined by uncoordinated decisions by isolated agents pursuing individual self-interest on the market. German economist Wolfgang Streeck comments here that ‘the apparently growing needs of Western capitalist firms for collective, non-appropriable production factors, like a rich supply of high and broad functional and extra-functional skills, opens up political arenas where corporate self-government of social groups may be a superior mode of regulation compared to both state intervention and the free market’ (Streeck 1989:103). This could entail workplace-based industrial training but also trade union involvement in the governance of training systems. Associative democracy between the state and the market, third sector economics. Democratic corporatism based upon patterns of functional representation may have a future after all.

Successful and sustainable economic growth requires a delicate balance between cooperation and competition, enabling creativity to flourish in a competitive market without undermining the co-operative habits and trust relations learned through long term, sustained interaction. A viable social order requires a particular social and institutional matrix which canalises individual action towards a beneficial long term outcome in the interests of all. 

In terms of technics, China was much more advanced than Europe in the Middle Ages. China invented printing, paper, explosives and porcelain. Yet it was Europe where the Industrial Revolution began (Landes 1999: 45-59). Max Weber established a causal connection between capitalism and Puritanism, both in the methodical behaviour of the Protestant but also in the way that the religious ethic promoted honest behaviour between strangers that develop trust relations. In this instance, individualism could be associated trustworthiness on account of an internalised religious ethic. The Protestant Ethic and Capitalism combined markets and morality in a particular time and place and sustained this mix long enough for successful economic development. But economic growth is not the same thing as civilisation build. True, it develops institutions and passes laws, but in the service of the process of accumulation. The capital system is a totalising system that subordinates all aspects of life to its single, overriding purpose. Capital proceeds inexorably to unbalance the mix and hence destroy the cultural and moral conditions of its own success. Weber saw this more clearly than most.

In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault argues that 'man is an invention of recent date, and one that may well be coming to an end' (Foucalt 1973: 386-7). That is what is at stake. But can we reverse social trends? Can what I propose be done? 

‘The market’, in fine, is an institution, a social and historical creation which depends for its functioning and survival on a wider moral, cultural, social and institutional habitus. No economy is autonomous of its social and cultural setting. The economy, the free market, whichever euphemism one chooses in place of capitalism, depends on virtues which are generated outside of the market, just as the state depends on virtues which are generated outside the realm of the state. Neither the state nor the capital system generate the virtues upon which a viable social order, including their own functioning, depend. For the origin of these virtues one must again turn to biology and the notion of reciprocal altruism, Aristotle’s politikon bion and Hegel’s reciprocal relations between individuals, and the culture, morality, habit and custom that are associated with them.
Which begs the obvious question: if the market economy depends upon moral and cultural resources it does not create, does its very success undermine its own basis? The continued expansion of the market economy serves to further the process of disintegration by commodifying areas of social life and bringing them within the terrain of the economy. The cultural and social spheres that create the virtues are increasingly marketised. In expanding its economic reach, the market economy is narrowing and thinning its moral basis. 

Modernity And Morality
Precious cultural and moral resources which have taken generations of cooperation and trust are destroyed and are replaced by the mercenary ties of money. And that is insufficient to sustain a civilisation. These are the most ephemeral of ties. In dissipating resources without replacing them, the market economy is destroying its own base. 

The idea that capitalism contains the seeds of its own downfall would hardly be considered novel. It is difficult to think of a major political economist who didn’t argue this proposition. Take Malthus and the population imperative, Ricardo. The stationary state of John Stuart Mill. And the elephant in the room, Karl Marx.

 The Austrian political economist Joseph Schumpeter rewrote Marx’s class war and capitalist crisis in a more general, sociological sense, innocent of notions of surplus value and exploitation and laws of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and all the other Marxist algebra which deters the uninitiated and non-obscurantist. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) Schumpeter argued that capitalism produces economic growth but in such a way as to induce social breakdown. Capitalism engulfs society in a 'perennial gale of creative destruction' which eventually erodes its own foundations:





It hasn’t happened yet. That’s the nature of predictions. They can never be precise for the very reason that human foresight is such as to identify and anticipate problems, learn to think and act differently and change direction. But the same logic that struck a Weber and a Marx, and myriad others like Veblen, as an inexorable necessity is still in place.

Just as Marx noted many counterveiling tendencies which could stave off the final crisis and collapse, so Schumpeter identified consumerism, with its emphasis on choice and its devaluation of loyalty, as a solvent of marriage and the family, neighbourhood and community. Consumerism is the real politics and ideology of contemporary society, commanding loyalties and motivating efforts far in excess of anything any political movement or party can generate. There is a book about the Spanish Civil War called The Last Great Cause. It has been a long time since great battles between competing visions and ways of life were fought in politics. The cynical little song says it all: ‘Why worry, put your cross in the bin. No matter who you vote for, the government always gets in’. Every government the same, every one concerned most of all to facilitate the process of private accumulation. First and foremost, individuals are taxpayers and only secondarily are they voters. As voters, they resent the way that their money is being spent by the government. The same people who, in Marxist terms, hand over a proportion of the wealth they have created in the form of surplus value, a tax that property owners levy on the propertyless, and are oblivious to this exploitation, object to ‘big government’ and the ‘nanny state’. Government with social purpose, mind. Spending on crime, law and order, prisons and police, arms and wars is immune from attack. Spending on war and repression seem beyond political controversy as concerning national security. Spending for health and welfare, social and environmental justice, genuine security, are subject to constant assault. This paradox is beyond the political level and concerns the psyche and culture, the ingrained mentalities of a people used to a certain way of life. That is an ecology of fear and despair that has to be turned around.

Least of all are these individuals citizens. They have little opportunity to be citizens. Where are the extensive public spaces in which to act as citizens?

The origins and effects of consumerism have been studied for decades now. The words of Veblen, Galbraith, Vance Packard and William Whyte can still be read with profit. One of the best of more recent critiques comes from Benjamin Barber.

This paper has sought to connect insights from mathematics and games theory with a certain ‘rational’ tradition in ethics and political philosophy. It has done so to contest the facile connection of individual liberty with the common good. Games theory demonstrates what rationalist thinkers in politics and ethics have always argued, that individual rationality generates a collective irrationality and that individual freedom generates a collective unfreedom, thus diminishing the real freedom of the individual in the process. Genuine freedom is negotiated between each and all within reciprocal relations. This is the long range strategic thinking and learning capacity that humanity requires in order to regulate its interchange with nature in the future. The problem is that all the power of ethics, philosophy and mathematics, Plato, Pythagoras, Jesus and German philosophy together cannot compete against the seductions of the slogan ‘free to choose’ when the winnowing away of traditional institutional and moral restraints have left individuals alone on the market to confront the psychological warfare and mass manipulation of advertisement. Just as games theory with mathematics and evolutionary biology give scientific proof to old political and moral truths, commercial society has gone careering off in precisely the opposite direction of identifying licence with liberty. Michael Walzer paints an appropriately lurid picture of a society of rampant individualism that has thrown aside ethics and institutions that drew people together in their common humanity: ‘We are perhaps the most individualist society that ever existed in human history. Compared certainly to earlier and Old World societies, we are radically liberated, all of us. Free to plot our own course. To plan our own lives. To choose a career. To choose a partner or a succession of partners. To choose a religion or no religion. To choose a politics or an anti-politics. To choose a lifestyle - any style..Free to do our own thing, and this freedom, energizing and exciting as it is, is also profoundly disintegrative, making it very difficult for individuals to find any stable communal support, very difficult for any community to count on the responsible participation of its individual members. It opens solitary men and women to the impact of a lowest common denominator, commercial culture. It works against commitment to the larger democratic union and also against the solidarity of all cultural groups that constitute our multi-culturalism’ (Michael Walzer, Citizenship and Civil Society, part 1, 11-12).

Freedom to Choose was the book by Milton Friedman. It purported to be a vision of human freedom. Walzer’s words reveal the utter inhumanity of this psychologically crude, institutionally naïve and culturally bankrupt nonsense. These ‘arguments’ survive and circulate for no other reason than that they ring true at the lowest rung of the levels of cognition, striking individuals in their egoism at the level of wants, impulses and desires. And what works in economics works also in politics. Thomas Jefferson warned of ‘manacling people by their own consent’. The politics of slogans, soundbites and images give voters what they want to hear, that they are the ‘aspiring classes’ and that they won’t have to pay too much for their politics. Flattire. Find what the people want, find what the people think of themselves, and give it to them back in the form of empty words bereft of political meaning and implication.

 This really is the end of public life and public spiritedness and the retreat of individuals into the world of private idiocy, the rule of the idiotes. These developments point to a decline in social capital. Political scientist Robert Putnam wrote about this decline in 1995 and coined the phrase ‘Bowling Alone’. What he meant was that whilst more people were going ten-pin bowling than ever before, fewer were joining leagues (Putnam 1995: 65-78).

 The liberal democracies of mature capitalism all showed the same tendency to the withering away of the associational space of civil society. The forces of family and intermediary associations which Hegel made the building blocks of his Sittlichkeit and which Burke identified as the ‘little platoons’ were all breaking down, families, neighbourhoods and communities. More and more individuals are withdrawing from the whole range of civic and social engagements. Church attendance is down and less people are joining voluntary groups. All of the spaces in which individuals meet and interact with each other in solidary exchange are being vacated. Increasing numbers of people do not even know their own neighbours. What Alexis de Tocqueville had praised as the 'habits of association' crucial to a viable civic and social order are being lost. Individuals are pursuing and seeking satisfaction of their ends in the private sphere. Not only are they abandoning politics, they are at least sceptical towards and often positively hostile to politics as a collective project aiming at some greater good. As idiotes, individuals don’t believe in such a politics and won’t pay for it.

The result is that society, in the mistaken belief that individual choice equates with human freedom, is closing down its public space, narrowing its horizons and undermining the conditions of freedom. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma holds that the repeated interaction of individuals within stable, long term relationships is crucial to the creation and maintenance of trust. When this contact and interaction is lost and these relations do not develop, individuals withdraw into a private space and become more suspicious of general goods and purposes. 

10 PRIVATE VICES PUBLIC VIRTUES

“Capitalism is the astounding belief that the most wickedest of men will do the most wickedest of things for the greatest good of everyone.”  (John Maynard Keynes)

There has been an explosion of interest in the connection of morality and markets. The demands that capitalism moderate its unethical activities implies a social identity connecting egoism and altruism that simply is not available within capitalist relations. Capitalists are compelled to accumulate capital as a systemic imperative, not out of moral choice.

For a better understanding of how capitalism cannot supply an ethical base it is worth examining the original thinkers behind the free market, who had a ‘political’ sense of how prices, value and the wider economy worked. Before economics became an independent discipline, a ‘science’ no less, economics was political economy and moral philosophy – the economy could only be understood in its relation to society, institutions, codes and values and cultures. Modern economics has forgotten its past and it shows.

This argument focuses upon constants to establish a non-relativism in politics and morality grounded in essential human nature and to point out the dangers of libertarianism and relativism.
The traditionalist case for public life and morality as essential for the common good would appear to have been contradicted in the modern world by the notion of the free market. As Mandeville satirised the point, private vices generate public virtues. As Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations made the point: 'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, brewer or baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love.'

Smith uses the phrase 'invisible hand' in a slightly different connection in
The Wealth of Nations, vol. I, book IV, ch. ii, p. 456.
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and in directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
The theorem about private interests and public benefits is stated particularly clearly in the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, without, however, the phrase 'invisible hand' being used. The invisible hand is a particular instance of the 'law of unintended consequences' which played a key role in eighteenth century social thought. (See Hirschman 1977; and Meek 1976.)

This argument resolves the split between egoism and altruism and shows how self-interest brings about the common good. There is no contradiction between individual and community. On the contrary the pursuit of individual gain leads to the collective good. For Smith, the free market and the division of labour harness private efforts and canalise them to the common good. One can understand the religious fervour of this form of faith.

In the place of God, Smith extolled the beneficial virtues of the 'invisible hand'. This really is the theological concept of divine providence, identifying as it does a pattern in human affairs that is greater than the intentions of individual agents. The common good emerges out of the disconnected decisions of individuals, each pursuing their own advantage. Through ‘the invisible hand’ the uncoordinated pursuit of individual gain produces the wealth of nations as something vast, benign and unplanned. To promote the common good of all, each simply needs to concentrate of themselves. The 'invisible hand' does the rest.

It is a view which is still the central dogma of what is called, with a religious fervour that ignores all contrary evidence, ‘free market economics’. A world of giant corporations which manage trade and regulate markets in their own interests is still referred to as ‘free trade’ in a ‘free market’. That is the power of religious belief.

Adam Smith was far from being an apologist of selfish behaviour and far from an uncritical advocate of unfettered markets. Smith’s is remembered most for the idea of the "the invisible hand", the pursuit of self-interest on the part of individuals producing the general interest of all, so long as the market is not interfered with. The problem is that this isn’t Smith’s argument at all. The term ‘invisible hand’ appears just once in The Wealth of Nations and it doesn’t refer to the beneficent effect of free markets at all. Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is the guiding force that makes Scottish investors behave parochially, preferring to put their money into the Scottish economy rather than investing abroad. Far from justifying global free trade, Smith’s argument is in favour of localism. Investment in the local economy means that both investors and the local community in which they invest get a return; since the investors live in this community, the investors enjoy the economic stimulus too. This is indeed the ‘invisible hand’ yielding a beneficial yet unintended consequence of investors' selfish motives. But it is only achieved on account of investors’ preference for domestic over international investment. This is nothing like the ‘free’ markets and ‘free’ trade that those who (mis)quote Smith advocate. On the contrary, this is an argument for scale and balance, ties of community and solidarity which gives investors an identification with the community in which they invest. 

Just as Karl Marx is a different figure to the one portrayed by many Marxists, so Adam Smith is a much more sophisticated figure than his free-markets caricature. Smith was moral philosopher before he was an economist, writing the Theory of the Moral Sentiments. Smith was clear that money and happiness were not related: "In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level." Smith makes this claim immediately after his only reference to the invisible hand in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith also exposed vanity as the animating principle behind economic activity, individuals working to buy things that brought estimation in the eyes of one’s peers. People work harder in order to buy positional goods. The problem is that no matter how harder people run on this "hedonic treadmill", they remain in the same place.

But Smith is most subversive of all with respect to modern economics when he discusses value. Smith is the origin of the distinction between use value and exchange value which remains the strength of Marxism. Smith makes this distinction with reference to diamonds and water. Diamonds are expensive despite being unnecessary. Water is a vital need and yet is cheap. Smith explained the paradox according to the two meanings of value:

The word value . . . has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called "value in use"; the other, "value in exchange." The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than wa​ter; but it will scarce purchase anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.

Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, p. 13.

Modern economics considers the distinction between "use value" and "exchange value" to be riddled with confusion. Having two categories of value - one for when something is used and one for when something is exchanged for something else – doesn’t actually determine how valuable something is. Neo​classical economics — William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and Leon Walras—solved the problem of value by turning it into a question about prices. (Clarke 1993). This was the marginalist revolution, so called looking at what happens when an extra unit of something is added to the market, by looking at the margin. This explains prices. Water is cheap because it is relatively abundant; diamonds are expensive because they are scarce. In neo-classical economics, the value of anything is a measure of what has to be given up in order to obtain it. And this value is not a property of a thing but is measured through exchange. The value of something is only discerned in trade.

Hence something necessary can have a low value and something unnecessary can have a high value. The significant point, however, is that there was no confusion around the issue in the classical tradition from Smith to Ricardo to Marx. Only in the late nineteenth century, when the radical implications of the labour theory of value threatened to explode the modern economy at its foundations, did it become a problem requiring a solution. The paradox was at the heart of capitalism as an economy organised around the pursuit of exchange value, systematically ignoring real needs as denoted by use value. This answer was not to the liking of the modern economy, and so the question was changed. Paul Samuelson's 1948 Economics presented the diamond and water paradox without acknowledging that Smith knew fine well why diamonds were more expensive than water. (Samuelson 1948). In his 1762 Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith could not have been clearer.





Just like the neoclassical economists, Smith explains price by relative scarcity. Smith and the neoclassical economists do not disagree in their explanations of price. The real difference is in their concepts of usefulness. The neoclassical economists have an abstract and quantitative utility, whereas Smith has a qualitative idea of value-in-use. In fine, the neoclassical economists are identifying price and value as given by the exchange value of something whereas Smith is  focused on the use value of something, value at a much deeper level than prices determined by exchange. It denotes a difference between a quantitative conception appropriate to a system of exchange value and a qualitative conception appropriate to real values. Smith understood the relation of prices to scarcity value but, far from being a confused anticipation of marginal utility, Smith offers something far more radical, penetrating the surface level of prices and exchange to relate economic activity to a more fundamental level. Smith opposes a deeper reality to the surface world of exchange by distinguishing between the market price, the price paid for a thing, and that thing's "real price."

The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. 

Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, p. 2.

Examining the links between value, labour and wages, Smith argued that the measure of the real value of everything was the time and effort that went into making it:

Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only.

Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, p. 7

The reason that some jobs paid more than others was because some people were more willing to suffer the loss of nonmonetary goods in return for monetary goods. In Smith’s view, wages would tend toward equality in the long run, with any minor discrepancies being explained by the amount of time people could take for holidays and compensating for the unpleasantness of the job. By this reasoning, the people who did the most and the hardest work ought to be the wealthiest. The fact that the world did not function like this indicated not that theory was wrong but that the economy was wrong, systemically distorting what people received for their work, some receiving more for less and many more receiving less for money. It wouldn’t take long for the labour theory of value to be developed into a theory of surplus value and exploitative relations based on the ownership and control of the productive means. This, of course, was Marx rather than Smith. But Smith has far more in common with Marx than he does with the apostles of the free market economy.

Karl Marx agreed with Smith that time and effort were central to the production of goods, but he drew the obvious conclusion in formulating "the labor theory of value." This is not a simple labour theory. If A spends an hour producing 100 units of a product and B spends that same hour producing 20 units of the same product, that does not mean that B’s units are five times more valuable than A’s. A is more productive. Marx addresses this question of productivity through the idea of the "socially necessary" labour time, the time that's the normal industry standard. This is "social" rather than "natural", the product of human invention, technics and ingenuity – and power and exploitation too. 

This idea of socially necessary labour time points to a difference between Smith and Marx on wages. In Smith’s view, wages were a return on the amount of work done. In Marx’s view, wages were the money the worker received in return for making his or her labour power available to the capitalists. For a part of the day, the labourer works to earn enough for basic needs. The value created in the rest of the working day belongs to the capitalist, that is what the employer has paid for in employing the worker. Labour power is at the centre of Marx’s theory of value. It is labour power add use value to raw materials. Any value beyond what is required to preserve labour power, the ability to work, is the "surplus value" which goes to the employer and is the source of accumulation. Capital isn't money, it is a social relation between the owners and nonowners of productive means and in which the process of extracting surplus value  to make profit and accumulate capital. Alienation denotes that capital, a product of human labour, acquires an existential significance in itself and comes to dominate the workers as an extraneous force. Based on the systemic imperative to accumulate capital, this conception explains the endless process of growth and expansion that capitalism requires to survive. The conception also explains the figure of Homo economicus as man made in the image of the new god of capital. A system of endless economic expansion necessarily needs to be populated by the endlessly rapacious creature that is self-maximising economic man. Fundamental social inequalities endemic to the modern world are also related to the asymmetrical relationship that is the basis of the capital system – the relation between those who own and control the productive means and those who have nothing to sell but their labour power. In short, Marx’s conception combines power, ownership, labour and profit within an overarching theory of value. This combination enables us to relate particular crises  together with respect to fundamental causes and indicates that serious social transformation requires an understanding of systemic imperatives driving the economy. To deal with crises that have systemic causes requires a fundamental social transformation that identifies the central dynamic of the system.

There are many reasons for thinking that the contemporary global crisis is not the one anticipated by Marx. The problem is one of alienation and exploitation, with finance capital taking on a life of its own. But the implication is that a return to normal industrial capital and an effective regulatory framework would resolve the crisis. Of course, this begs the question why regulations needed to be taken off to boost sluggish growth and why finance capital offers greater returns than industrial capital, but there are reasons for thinking that the current crisis is more the result of poor regulation or liberalised finance, to be solved by better regulation, than something endemic in the economic system and pointing to inevitable collapse. A further point is that it is more profitable to see the ‘revolution’ as a process by which social actors, motivated by a positive vision, build the future within the present rather than waiting for the collapse.

Markets And Morality
This has been present all along. The capital system as such is nihilistic in the sense of being endless, with end or purpose.
Adam Smith felt that markets and morality could be combined in an economy in which private vices resulted in public virtues. There are good reasons to doubt this. Within the market, freedom is conceived as right, the right to own private property, to exchange, to enter contracts, and the right not to be interfered with in the individual pursuit of these rights. But within the capital system, freedom is conceived as power, the power to act on and to change the world. Freedom as power challenges freedom as right. Capitalism continually promises power but can never ultimately deliver it. Whilst instrumental reason promises the efficient realisation of an individual's goals, in its capitalist form, these goals essentially unrealisable. This reveals capitalism as essentially endless, nihilistic. To take one instance, the end of consumption is not the satisfaction of one's pre-existing needs and wants, but the act of consumption itself. Satisfaction implies limits but the consumer ethic of capitalism is limitless. The satisfaction gained through the consumption of one particular object immediately gives way to the pursuit of further objects. The basic characteristic of consumption is not satisfaction, but repetition, and that is what marks it as endless. 

The goal of power within capitalism is equally endless, beyond achievement. This is partly a consequence of the power pursued being essentially comparative, possessing power meaning possessing more power than others. Any achievement one person has is susceptible to being undermined by the achievements of others, with the result that no-one can ever be certain about any achievement and therefore must endlessly strive for further success (see Ross Poole Morality and Modernity  ch 2 ). 

Capitalism is therefore a nihilism. The power which each individual strives to gain is not power as capacity enabling one to undertake and accomplish a particular task or series of tasks; rather, power is merely the means to acquire further means to further means in an endless cycle. Such goals as there are valued merely as means towards further ends which are themselves means. Economists employ the concept of deferred gratification to account for the attainment of ends that are of a greater quality than those immediately satisfied. What we have with capitalism, however, is an endless deferral of ends that far from realising human goals subjects human beings to a compulsive repetition that is ultimately unsatisfying. 

This nihilism is part of the dynamic of the capital system. Capitalism is a regime of private accumulation in which the system imperative, rather than purpose, is to accumulate resources for the sake of further accumulation. ‘Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and all the prophets’ wrote Marx (Capital I).

The contradictory dynamics, cycles and crisis tendencies of the capital system reveal this endless nature. Schumpeter coins the phrase ‘creative destruction’ to make sense of the crises which clear away inefficient capitals to make further growth possible. But this process of creation and destruction which is the dynamic of capitalist development serves nothing other than a systemic purpose, accumulation for further accumulation. Accumulation for the sake of accumulation.

In a historical perspective, this endless dynamic can seem progressive. For human beings subjected to this profoundly unsatisfying experience within the system, this optimistic assessment of abstractions like history and capitalist development is misplaced. To the extent that one can characterise capitalist development in a historical framework, it is of power without responsibility, power out of control, an anarchy and a nihilism of power outside of political, moral and institutional restraint. Of course, this is implicit in Smith’s notion of ‘the invisible hand’. If there is a purpose to the history of capitalism, then it is not one visible to the people who live it. We are the ghosts in the machine. Max Weber coined the phrase ‘without regard to persons’ to characterise the bureaucratised, rationalised, routinised world of modernity. Capitalism generates values - consumption, power – which promise but do not deliver satisfaction and in its cycle of endless competitive repetition cannot supply criteria in terms of which its dynamic can be conceived as the progressive realisation of some ultimate end. Capitalism is locked in the cycle of ends produced to make further ends and so on. Perhaps this is the corollary of ‘living; within a mechanical order. Teleology has been thrown out of the universe. The problem is that human beings are teleological beings who need a purpose in their lives. Without a sense of purpose or direction, there is only the anarchy of change and chaos. In conquering natural necessity, human praxis has resulted in the creation of a new social necessity. The inexorable power that was once ascribed to nature has long been overcome by technics. However, in the process, these technics, the means of technical conquest, have come to reassert this power at the level of society.

This is the Hegel-Marx alienation thesis. Capitalism generates power as a value but denies it as a practice. All pervasive yet absent, power is the most ‘invisible’ aspect of capitalism. The powers of capitalist modernity - the forces of production and destruction, of capital, of bureaucracy, of the market - are social powers in alien form. The product of the concerted action of many individuals, they are collective powers lacking a mechanism for their collective control. Since the dominant mode of existence is individual right – possession, property, contract – these collective powers are experienced as a supra-individual necessity, an anonymous and alien imperative that directs the lives of supposedly free and powerful individuals from the outside. In conditions where real power is denied, it can only be asserted as simulacrum, as fantasy or representation.

The capital system has replaced ties of personal dependency with an objective dependency of all, caging the individual within a network of social inter-dependency that is external to them, reified social relationships far more extensive and anonymous than anything in human history. In the name of personal freedom, capitalism has separated the individual from strong and constitutive relations with those others on whom he or she depends. By various means, the individual is encouraged to conceive identity as something distinct from other individuals. The individual will engage with others as a competitor for scarce resources, making contracts or transactions with others only for the prospective gain that issues from acting in concert. The result is the isolated individual who conceives any relations with others instrumentally, with the result that all are subject to an objective dependency. 

Isolated from others, the individual has no reason to be concerned with the specific interests of others, not even those involved in contracts and transactions. The social identity connecting the good of each with the good of all is simply lacking. The conception of individual identity which market relations makes available makes it impossible to conceive of any motivation other than an egocentric one. One ought to act in altruistic fashion but no good reason can be offered for the sacrifice of egoistic interests within market relations. The social identity which connects egoism and altruism is simply not available. It is always egoistic desires which motivate the individual, personal gratification which is aimed at. Not the least contradiction of capitalism in becoming the universal mode of production is the extent to which it has globalised the extent to which individuals are brought into mutual dependence with a conception of identity and motivation which is overwhelmingly focused on the individual self apart from constitutive ties to others. 
This thin, attenuated notion of the self lends a certain hollowness to the conception of social life. To the extent that the individual is conceived as separate from other individuals, social relationships are reified as abstractions inhibitive of individual freedom; and even personal capacities take on an alien character as means to external ends. As individual identity becomes abstract, so the individual in society assumes an elusive character. According to market notions of right, the individual is at the centre of social life, aiming at the satisfaction personal desires. At the same time, the individual disappears from view as no more than the place of origin and return of these desires. To call the activity of the market ‘endless’ captures the vacuous circularity of the route connecting desire and its satisfaction. 
The endless circularity of the market conceals the emptiness of the ends pursued from the individual agents and turns the rational pursuit of ends into an instrumental rationality which elevates means to the status of ends 
The overriding end is to pursue means in order to pursue ends as further means to further ends. In individual is locked into this endless circularity and must pursue means for the sake of means as relentlessly as Hobbes' natural man had to pursue power for the sake of power. 
A complementary goal is consumption. In a series of books, JK Galbraith showed how the enormously productive economy required a corresponding increase in consumption. The result is that freedom ceases to refer to the realisation and exercise of productive capacities, an active notion, but becomes the endless satisfaction of wants as an infinite consumer, a passive notion. 
The individual thus subjected to two desires which are not only incompatible but are also incapable of satisfaction on their own terms. Galbraith is right about the ‘enormously productive’ capitalist economy, but he is also right that this productivity has been dissociated from human happiness as a passive, purposeless consumption. This generates frustration rather than satisfaction; competitive repetition rather than creativity; ceaseless striving rather than fulfilment. Not the least of capitalism’s achievements is to have identified this nihilistic mode of experience with reason, freedom and happiness.

The social identity made available under the capitalist form is fragile. The individual is separated from the resources and constitutive ties necessary to provide substance and coherence to human life. The larger networks of meaning do not exist for the individual whose self-contained identity is conceived to possess the locus of all that is meaningful. However, the identity of this individual is not given but is a tenuous and unstable achievement which is constantly under threat as a result of the instrumental activities of other such individuals, and by the impersonality of the social relations to which all are subject. Each individual treats all others as means to personal ends with the result that all end in subjection to the reified laws of social activity. 

At present there is a perfection of means and an imperfection of ends. Science without conscience will doom us all (Einstein). Technics and the use of technics without a moral purpose grounded in the biosystem and lifeworld will indeed doom us all. It already is, with an extinction not seen for 65 million years. 

Public Goods and Private Power
The impact of the depression turned Keynes against the received truths of neoclassical economics with a vengeance, referring to ‘practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist’. (Keynes 1964).

Public Goods Turn Bad

If governments were as powerless and as incapable of acting in relation to capital as Marxist analysis implies, then the capital system would have collapsed a hundred years ago. The history of the twentieth century shows that governments and their institutions do indeed have some power to correct market failure and to regulate the economy with a view to the public good. Government can intervene to correct markets, subordinating the maximising of profit to public welfare. Governments can resist private power, decommodifying and demarketising the things that society deems valuable and which business seeks to commodify and marketise. Governments can shape the rules of the economic game, preside over the regulatory framework and marshal huge financial resources as well as popular support in order to provide for citizens. 

That said, the state is not independent of capital. The structural dependence of the state upon capital may not amount to a direct economic determinism that translates private power automatically into public policy. But government autonomy in relation to capital is limited without popular pressure.

There are many public goods that have a higher social benefit than the individual private benefit to the person who receives them. Health and education. There is also a class of goods which by their very nature need nonmarket means to provide them. Defence, the classic example here, also demonstrates what happens when public and private coalesce around the interests of power elites as against the interests of the people. In his final words as president, Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that we should remain vigilant against "the military-industrial complex." "The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes."

Eisenhower had anticipated the extent to which private economic power could work its way into the sphere of government, shaping public policy and helping itself to public money, using democratic institutions, the national interest and external – and internal – threats to mask the crime. Invent internal and external enemies, exaggerate threats, governments give contracts to industry to supply the military, militarization emphasises defence and highlights threats, citizens are kept in a state of fear and rally behind governments governing in the national interest and so on in perpetuity. The people are bullied into losing their liberties and democratic processes. This is the vicious cycle of the military industrial complex. Amidst public retrenchment, defence spending continues to increase. In 2008 nearly $1.5 trillion dollars were spent on defense worldwide. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2009: chap. 5.)

The scale of this expenditure is so far beyond rational comprehension that criticism is pointless unless it goes deeply into the real reasons why forces of production have now become forces of destruction. But to give some indication of how great these numbers are, John Lanchester reasoned thus, counting at a rate of one dollar per second, it would take twelve days to count a million dollars, thirty-one years to count a billion dollars, and six times all recorded history for a trillion dollars. Including all defence spending in the public sector, the U.S. government alone spends more than $1 trillion on the military. (Turse 2008). US defence spending is part of a general trend around the world, which is to be expected. Like positional goods, military hardware is only of any value in relation to others. Military budgets continue their upward climb in Europe, China, India. (Sharp 2009). When seriously dealing with climate change requires 2% or more of GDP, and when stable, sustainable, even development on the planet of some 7 billion people requires that swords be beaten into ploughshares so as to boost investment in education, training, health care and investment in sustainable energy and agriculture, governments are spending record sums on defence. The irony is that not only does this increase global insecurity by militarizing global relations and fostering a climate of fear, it leaves humanity wholly unprotected against nature’s revenge for ecological despoliation.

The coalescence of private interests and government in the inflation of defence budgets, with international tensions and wars following as a matter of course, is coming at a time when the systemic imperatives of the capital economy need to be curtailed in order to address the issue of climate change and the threat of global ecological devastation. Far from coalescing for the long term common good, we seem to be witnessing the rule of thanatos, a system in its death throes but determined to take the rest of the world with it.

It’s all there in the anarcho-syndicalist poem about knowing your enemy.

Know your enemy.
He does not care what colour you are,
provided you work for him;
he does not care how much you earn, 
provided you earn more for him;
he does not care who lives in the room at the top, 
provided he owns the building;
he will let you say whatever you like against him, 
provided you do not act against him;
he sings the praises of humanity, 
but knows machines cost more than men; 
bargain with him he laughs and beats you at it;
challenge him and he kills;
sooner than lose the things he owns,
he will destroy the world.”

(Front cover Workers’ Control Ken Coates and Tony Topham ed 1970 Panther)








11 CITIZEN AND CONSUMER DEMOCRACY

The totalitarian impulse of the market economy to wipe out alternatives is always vulnerable to contestation. Alternative practices, ideas and experiences persist in society and these offer resources which enable us to conceive new ways of valuing, indeed of communing, as against profit-driven markets. With economic and ecological crises coalescing. This is what political science calls ‘crisis with transformative potential’ (Held 1985). It is time, therefore, to build the social movement that is able to realise this potential in the direction of social self-regulation. The social and environmental movement seeks to restrain the tendency of ‘the economy’ to become abstract and thus to rebalance society, transforming the way that value is set, setting new rules and reinventing the commons.

At the heart of neo-liberalism is the claim that private property and profit-driven markets are guarantors of individual liberty. Commoning involves people together setting limits on what resources any individual can exploit and how much any individual can accumulate. To advocates of the free market, these constraints are inimical to individual liberty. Rejecting these constraints, the ideologues of the free market argue that the individual should be free to buy, sell, consume or produce whatever he or she likes, conquering the whole world with an entrepreneurial spirit. 
When economic crisis necessitated a public bailout, finance and corporate capitalism happily took public money. The merest hints of institutional constraint and regulation, increased taxes on the rich and superrich, closing of tax havens, brought howls of protest. After all, without the incentives to get superrich, the super-talented entrepreneurs of business and finance would take their entrepreneurial spirit to more congenial climes. Where, is not clear. Given that it was such unleashed entrepreneurial "talent" that had created a fantasy boom and brought the economy to the brink of implosion, it is not clear why governments and people do not call their bluff and send them packing. It suggests that whilst the practice may be demonstrably in error, this could merely be an accident of time and place that does not invalidate the theory. Is the theory right and does capitalism provide the most freedom?

The idea that capitalism brought freedom was certainly the view of Enoch Powell:





An obvious criticism is that some have more votes than others. This economic ballot box is a plain injustice. There is no allocation of 'votes' on an equal basis to each adult. Those with greater incomes are able to have more influence, and are able to choose and buy things of greater total monetary value. ‘Everyone’ may have a say in the 'economic ballot box' but some have far more say than others - a contradiction of a fundamental principle of democracy. This is an obvious weakness which Milton Friedman attempts to address. He affirms the superiority of the (effectively unequal) voting in the 'economic ballot box' to voting in the political ballot box where voters do not have to consider their own pockets and are not constrained by overall budgetary considerations. The result is an overloaded democracy full of commitments it cannot pay for (historians will note that governments have tended to govern much more for the rich and powerful than deliver on wish lists for the poor, but let that pass). Unequal incomes, and 'votes', in the marketplace arise from different 'contributions' through work, etc. As Friedman puts it: 'In the economic market... each person gets what he pays for. There is a dollar-for-dollar relationship. Therefore, you have an incentive proportionate to the cost to examine what you are getting.’ (Friedman 1976.)

There are some serious problems with this argument. Not all incomes are proportionate to what is 'contributed' through work or otherwise. The obvious example is inherited wealth, but in modern capitalist society a great deal of personal wealth is not 'earned' by the individual concerned. Indeed, capitalism as a system of private appropriation of surplus value through the ownership/control of productive means indicates that the very people who add most to value and hence make the biggest ‘contributions’, the non-possessing working class, get the least votes.

The New Right often depreciates the value of democratic institutions by suggesting, along with many other economists, that the market itself is a viable (or even superior) institution through which the individual can Vote' and influence the direction of the economy. This notion, of alleged 'consumer sovereignty', is at the heart of the defence of economic systems in which the market is the dominant means of allocating resources and attaching a value to goods and services. 

Individual liberty under capitalism is a function of money. Francis Bacon argued that money is like muck, it is only good if evenly spread. And that’s the point, money under capitalism has never been evenly spread and never could be. It is a system of asymmetrical relations. A system based in inequality can never generate anything but inequality. The market rations goods on the basis of money. The money decides the degree to which the individual is free. Those with most money have a greater range of options and are therefore more free. As any basic economics textbook states, demand is not desire but desire backed by ability to pay. Money is ability to buy liberty, to afford a ranger of consumer durables, a car, two cars, health care, good food and drink, a house, the security of not having to work in retirement, insurance against accident or unemployment? Those with a relative lack of money suffer a relative loss of freedom. Without money in a market society, the individual is free to have little, do little, and to die young. Not just the luxuries which are available to others but to the poor the basics of decent food, health care, housing are all substantially out of the reach of limited pockets. And this before we even look at the world picture.
Consumer Idiocy
Within this private space, individuals feel themselves to be surrounded by strangers, not friends. Suspicious of others and cynical about politicians, there is a decline in trust relations and a loss of confidence and hope with respect to goals and goods which individuals hold in common. The authorities and institutions which once gave an atomistic society an overarching order and ethos no longer command the legitimacy that they once had. The self-interested ethos of capitalism, its message that individuals are free to choose, free to do anything they want, has eroded the social, moral and institutional basis of the capitalist system itself. Consumer capitalism is a self-consuming artefact. Capitalism requires and is sustained by the very thing it destroys but cannot itself create, long term trust relations and civic virtues.

This is a matter of the way that markets, prices and values are set up in the first place; it has nothing to do with consumer choice, still less consumer sovereignty. Say’s Law holds that supply creates its own demand. Galbraith argued that the enormously productive capitalist economy simply had to create a mass market in order to sell the products it produces. The argument that the masses are seduced by the mass of cheap goods whose prices do not reflect the real costs incurred by others is plausible; but there is still a need to explain why so many people want so many goods in the first place. As Galbraith warned, business has been waging a psychological war teaching people how to want, how to consume, how to see public goods such as happiness, freedom, hopes for a decent life and future as private goods which were available for purchase on the market. C Wright Mills argued that all advertisement is political, selling a system rather than simply a particular product. In One Dimensional Man, Marcuse sees the potential for personal development crushed by work which is 'exhausting, stupefying, inhuman slavery'. Leisure simply involves 'modes of relaxation which soothe and prolong this stupefaction'. This cycle of stupefying production and consumption is based on and directed by 'false needs' which are largely constructed by a capitalism concerned most of all to make profits. Needs are true or false to the extent that they result in true self-fulfilment and real satisfaction. Marcuse argues that, 'Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate belong to this category of false needs'. Individuals no longer seek fulfilment in themselves, their own talents and abilities, and in their relationships with others. Rather, ‘the people recognise themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment'. The circle is now complete: homo economicus is alienated from every sphere of his life.

To continue producing and thus making money, corporations need to seduce  consumers to the market. Prices are part of the seduction. Consumers buy products they wouldn't otherwise buy if they had been faced with the full costs. The bargain becomes all the more seductive when budgets are tight. But the seduction goes further, the bargains tempting people into buying things they have been induced to want, but which they certainly do not need. Thomas Jefferson wrote of the dangers in democratic politics of leaders manacling people by their own consent. Consumer capitalism manacles people by their own wants.

The irony is that Adam Smith is far from himself being the apostle of the self-consuming ethos of self-interest. As great a book as The Wealth of Nations (1776) is, Smith wrote a greater and much more morally and psychologically richer book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). In this book, Smith set self-interest within a wider moral and social framework, arguing that 'to feel much for others, and little for us ... constitutes the perfection of human nature'. The moral sentiments, then, are social. German thinkers, for whom freedom is a common project setting the individual in a social matrix, referred to this apparent contradiction as das Adam Smith Problem. The Anglo-American world has resolved this problem on the libertarian side of self-interest, unravelling all kinds of social and institutional ties that bind individuals together. This is no resolution at all. A genuine resolution sets ‘the economic’ and self-motivated behaviour within a general framework as one part of a greater whole. No one part should encroach on another. 

Habermas distinguishes between the system world governed by the steering media of money and (administrative) power and the lifeworld of human reciprocity and interaction. In the terms of this paper, the market economy, ‘free’ or otherwise, belongs to the system world. Morality belongs to the lifeworld and is engendered by the concentric circles of family, friends, community and society. 

The paper has cited Hegel on the family, Aristotle on friendship. Here is Marx on the need for society. ‘When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new need - the need for society - and what appears as a means has become an end… Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its turn has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures’ (Marx EW EPM 1975). 

What Marx is emphasising here is the social interaction and engagement that fosters long term ties and trust relations that extends sociality and in the process social intelligence. It produces justice as a social virtue.

When the lifeworld encompasses the economic system, it generates the virtues of industry, honesty, reliability and trust upon which economic success. The problem is that the central dynamic of the capital system, private accumulation, tends to overreach its domain and encroach upon lifeworld domains, commodifying social and moral domains and subordinating them to the imperatives of exchange value. The capital system thus necessarily tends to subvert the moral order. As a moral philosopher, Adam Smith was well aware of the consequences that follow: 'luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, [and] the breach of chastity'. Some may take it as a sign of economic success that Smith's target here was the wealthy elite. Now, the affluent society that JK Galbraith wrote about in the fifties and sixties, has extended licence and hedonism amongst broad sections of society. 

The end of homo economicus
Perceiving realities through the lenses of the market has brought the world face to face with ecological catastrophe. The environmental crisis positively begs an alternate economics that values social and ecological resources for their use in giving, sustaining and enhancing life. Instead, commodification has been so profound as to colonise the world of mentalities and psychologies as well as the world of things. So accustomed to the rule of exchange value have people become that they find it difficult to conceive an economy that operates according to use value. A system of purported liberty and initiative, capitalism has denuded people of their capacities for governing their affairs so much that people acquiesce in leaving the market alone to commodify, price and exchange things. People cling to the myth of the self-regulating market economy out of despair of being able to discern or develop an alternative in which they assume control and responsibility. People have grown lazy, passive and reliant upon external mechanisms to such an extent that they no longer have confidence in their own conscious powers for exercising control and determining ends, values as an ethic ordering a humane way of life. Weber referred to modernity as an iron cage. The inability to break the bars of the cage indicate a collective case of Stockholm’s syndrome. The identification of the jailed with the jailor is understandable –  a system of alienated production means that humanity is its own jailor.

The case against the free market economy is not a case against markets as such. The idea of a market as a site where many individuals are able to exchange a diverse range of goods and services is a constant of human civilization. What is unique about the ‘free market’ of capitalism is that this exchange has become an end in itself as part of the accumulative logic of the capital system. (Economics as ideology obscures the difference between use and exchange value, conflating need and want so as to construct a world in which everything is for sale.)


The assertion that leaving markets alone ensures the general interest is plainly ideological in the critical sense of concealing the underlying reality concerning private accumulation through exchange value. The argument that markets function better minimal regulation serves the interests of the rich and the powerful, not the consumer and not the community. The collective Stockholm syndrome here means that people continue to fall for the promise that ‘free’ markets driven by the imperative to accumulate can deliver true value – despite all evidence to the contrary.
Which raises the question of how we can break out of the iron cage. This is no simply institutional question, government intervention or change in forms of government. This is not a problem that government alone can resolve, but requires a fundamental social transformation that rearranges relations and structures. At some point, people within society resist and fight back against systemic imperatives by asserting use values. Against the self-regulating market, they affirm societal self-regulation. As quickly as land and labour are transformed into things to be bought and sold, the movement of people in society seeks to decommodify and demarketise by affirming use values over exchange values.
Social movements are generated out of the original sense of politics, a concern with public life grounded in the human ontology, associational space and common purpose. The revolution in ICT permits this commonality to be extended in the cybersphere, the notion of extended sociality taken to a pinnacle that suggests the noosphere of Teilhard de Chardin. In many respects, the world wide web is an electronic grassroots movement that is the counterpart of the organic grassroots movement of society, tweets and blogs using the latest technology alongside direct action and campaigns in the fight for a sustainable world. The struggle for the future will be shaped by the human will to envisage an alternative kind of economy and society, involving new ways of valuing land and labour as against commodification on free markets driven by exchange value. Social movements and organizations concerned with restraining the power of markets and its principal agents are emerging globally and, in the process, are redefining politics, reclaiming it from the impotent state subject to capital.

The assumptions defining the conception of the human being as  homo economicus, as self-maximizing egoistic beings, are anthropologically, biologically, psychologically, and sociologically unsound. Illiterate, in fact. To take one example, the assumption that individual preferences are the same across all societies holds only if one is wilfully ignorant of anthropology, sociology and history. Different cultures within different social and economic systems foster and nurture different behaviour. There is not a human science that supports this abstract figure of homo economicus other than economics. Which says everything about the evolution of economics as a discipline in connection with capitalism as a dehumanisation, an alienated system of production that turns human products and powers against their human creators. In no human grouping, primitive or civilised, do individuals behave as selfishly as homo economicus, even though the degree of altruism varies widely according to constitutive ties and cooperative structures. The evidence is that individual behaviour varies according to the extent to which the social structure and value system reward or penalises selfish or altruistic behaviour. The question, then, concerns how society enhances or inhibits cooperation. And one of the most powerful forces affecting cooperative behaviour is the extent to which individuals are entangled in monetary and market transactions, exchanging things beyond the immediate famial and communal context. This implies that exchange alone is not the problem but the social and cultural context within which the act of exchange proceeds.
Evolutionary biology adduces further reasons why homo economicus is a fiction supporting a particular economic system. Human beings are not hardwired egoists. Human beings are not wired to be self-maximising egoists. This takes one part of human nature and turns it into the whole nature. Human beings are a complex of behaviours that include in-built capacities for altruism and egoism, a concern for others as well as a concern for self, a sense of fairness as well as a fear of others as threat. This is quite different from the notion that altruism is just an extended form of selfishness, a ‘you scratch my back’ reciprocity. Evolutionary biology indicates that altruism and a range of other nonselfish behaviors have a utility independent of individual self-interest, concluding that social relationships of mutual aid and altruism are conditions of human survival. Individuals who seek goals independent of the social group are more likely to face isolation. These suffer a much higher mortality rate compared to those who seek their goals in relation to others. 

In the series of interactions that comprise society, individuals take note of who does what to whom. Here, the psychological mechanism of gratitude means that individuals do not seek to gain advantage over others, but recognise fairness in giving and taking. This innate sense of gratitude and fairness does not appear in the conception of Homo economicus.





The notion is heretical to those brought up within consumer capitalism. The works of Vance Packard and JK Galbraith can be read afresh to expose ‘the affluent society’ as a form of psychological warfare which encourages individuals to seek happiness not as a public good shared in relation to others but as a private satisfaction to be obtained by the purchase of things on the market. The psychological harm that the egoistic pursuit of material objects is increasingly apparent. The more value a person places on money, the lower his or her level of well-being. (Srivastava et al. (2001).

One can refer in this context to the Easterlin paradox, named after economist Richard Easterlin. Easterlin’s research found once people achieved a level of income where basic needs for housing, food, water and energy could be met, average happiness did not increase with increased income. The Easterlin paradox is that up to a certain point – the satisfaction of basic needs – more money means increased happiness, but that beyond that point, more money doesn't mean more happiness. Beyond material security, increased money detracts from human needs. Happiness at this level is not about the realisation of human potentials and exercise of human faculties but about keeping up with and competing with peers on an endless hedonistic treadmill in pursuit of positional goods. Relative failure in this competition brings a diminution of happiness, even though a person has more money and more goods than before the competition began.

Research indicates that whilst a nation can act to increase its average happiness, the cost is high and, further, that beyond the level of income to meet basic needs, happiness is geometrically linked to income. In simple terms, this means that to advance from one to two units of happiness could cost ten dollars, but, beyond the level at which basic needs are met, to advance from two to three units of happiness would take one hundred dollars, from three to four would take one thousand dollars, and so on. In other words, beyond the point of material security, an exponential increase in expenditure produces a diminution in the rate of happiness. More and more money has to be spent in order to yield less and less happiness. 

With increasing social inequality and the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, the obsession with money making and getting rich shape the expectations of the majority who are presented with superrich lifestyles that are well beyond their means.' (Frank 2007). The result is a society stuffed to bursting point with material goods that in any sane and balanced society would be more than enough to bring pleasure, and a mass of profoundly dissatisfied people. The paradox is explained by the concern with "positional goods"—the kinds of goods that give the individual social status. This explains why the point that inequality doesn’t matter when the incomes of all are raised (deliberately) misses the point.  Inequality matters and it is growing on an international scale. (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2005). The rise of global media means that impossible lifestyles, body shapes, clothes and accessories are presented as a benchmark, creating a profound unease, a dis-ease which correctly exposes it as a form of madness, an illness of unbalance.
All of which indicates that money for the individual and gross domestic product (GDP) for the nation are poor measures of well-being and happiness. (Pogge and Reddy, "How Not to Count the Poor.") Indeed, it brings into question the whole notion of measuring well-being and happiness, as though these can be quantified and thingified in the manner of all the other resources that have been commodified within capitalist relations. The wealth of social connections, constitutive ties to others, membership of groups and activities, participation in political, social and economic life, health, education are much more reliable indicators of well-being and happiness. (Michaelson et al.  2009).
In all these respects, economics is reacquainting itself with its roots in philosophy and the concern with the good life. In Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia, happiness is defined as human flourishing in relation to the virtues, not money and what it can buy. This was Plato’s point about virtue being its own reward. The realisation of human potentialities and the exercise of the human faculties and capacities is the best that a human being can be. This is a function of the person, not a property of a thing. Money and power as external objects denote qualities of things. What matters most are qualities innate to the person. 

There is a branch of psychology that conceives happiness to be a function of something deeper—psychological well-being. Greater levels of psychological well-being issues in greater levels of happiness. Generosity and altruism are ways of constantly building up the store of well-being, generating happiness in the short run also. This hypothesis helps to explain the paradox of a situation in which happiness is achieved by giving money away rather than receiving it. (Konow and Barley 2008).

John Stuart Mill understood clearly that to be happy, the individual needs to stop trying to be happy: ‘Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness, on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way’ (Mill 1997: 73).

Mill attacked economic orthodoxy in the nineteenth century when he wrote: “I know not why it should be matter of congratulation that persons who are already richer than anyone needs to be, should have doubled their means of consuming things which give little or no pleasure except as representatives of wealth. ... It is only in the backward countries of the world that increased production is still an important object.” (Mill 1985). 

The Easterlin paradox, the inverted relation of money and happiness when extended beyond basic needs, is pertinent to the relation between the overdevelopment in the North and underdevelopment in the South. 

Mill’s words from 1848 put the Nobel winning economists of the twentieth century to shame. To orthodox economists, the stationary state is a great social ill. Mill disagreed. He envisaged the stationary state as a true wealth and a true happiness beyond the dissatisfactions of money making.

“I cannot... regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our present condition. I confess that I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anything but the most disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of industrial progress.

Principles of Political Economy

Mill’s most critical comments were directed towards the Northern and the Middle States of the USA. He considered the population of this area to be enjoying the highest stage of material advance. Poverty had been eliminated, and economic abundance was assured to those who were willing and able to work. Mill’s view of what this affluence had produced was outspoken in 1848 and remains timely: 'all that these advantages seem to have done for them is that the life of the whole of one sex is devoted to dollar hunting, and of the other to breeding dollar hunters'.

What was heresy to classical orthodoxy amounted to economics tapping into the human roots of economic activity. One reviewer extolled the book in these terms: '... here is no indifference to human suffering, no inordinate estimation of wealth, no sordid and groveling morality'. (Frazer’s Magazine, September 1848: 247). The words are revealing, not only in what they say about Mill’s Principles but in what they imply about classical economics – indifferent to human suffering, inordinate estimation of wealth, a sordid and grovelling morality – qualities that today would win an economist a Nobel prize. Another reviewer wrote in approval of Mill's evident relish of the stationary state, observed: 'It is no little novelty to hear a political economist speak in the following manner of the mere elements of national wealth.' (Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, October 1848, p. 410). The reviewer congratulated Mill for demolishing the arguments 'by which his scientific predecessors had attempted to mislead the man of experience or of empirical knowledge'. (Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, October 1848, p. 407). The same words apply today. Mill here has demolished economics as ideology.

12 PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Capitalism is not a public life which corresponds to and enhances the human ontology but a regime of private accumulation. The systemic compulsion to accumulate capital identifies the capital system as an endless productionism. The system identifies no self-limitation in the name of the collective interest, recognises no common good or commons, no moral purpose other than what indirectly results from individual choices and actions. And it recognises no right of future generations to the common heritage of humanity - a habitable planet. The logic is elegant in its callous calculation. Since future generations do not exist, their wants, needs and interests can only be imputed by living generations, which is an illegitimate move. Only real individuals can make such choices and it is not for governments or other collective organisations to make decisions, raise taxes and spend money by presuming to know the unknowable choices of people who do not yet exist. And who, on this reasoning, never will exist given the individual choices in the present that neo-liberalism supports.

Driven by its accumulative imperative, the capital system pursues endless growth as manifested in mass production for mass consumption. The role of advertisement is to stimulate consumption to the maximum, to train people to think that freedom and happiness are private goods which can be bought on the market through an endless supply of material goods. 

Such productive activity, of course, results in the transformation of the environment - the natural one (oceans, subsoil, atmosphere) and the social one created by humans (the built or urban environment, cities and states and all that they contain).

Business leaders and the politicians they influence repeat the phrase ‘there’s no such thing as a free lunch’. The two sources of wealth are nature and labour and capital is parasitic on both of them. Capitalism is one organised free lunch. Neither the natural nor the social environment is paid for by business, with the result that business tends to dissipate their resources or engulf them with waste. Business internalises the gains and externalises the costs. It believes in socialism when it comes to picking up the bill. Of course, the state could make firms make recompense for what they have destroyed, but only if it had the political will. Given the structural dependence of the political realm upon the private regime of accumulation, such will is usually weak. A collective agreement which applies to all businesses is possible. Business then passes the cost on to the customer as the price of 'reinstatement'. 

Only in recent decades has the notion of business paying the cost been generally accepted. Before this business had to be dragged kicking and screaming to pay more for welfare to compensate for the poverty and inequality caused by the economic system. From the 1970’s there has been a growth of ecological laws and regulations which in one way or another increased the cost of goods produced. The attitude before this was simple. Rather than acting to avoid pollution in the first place, production continued without constraint, with any ecological damage being addressed after the fact, with the advantage of giving a further boost to consumption. 

Adding the cost of reducing pollution to production costs to deal with the environmental crisis appears as a burden at a time of economic crisis and unemployment. Put this way, people are presented with a choice between economics and ecology, a choice which divides the popular constituency for change and thus aids the continuation of the productionist model. The new social movements that originated in the 1960’s and 1970’s were unable to resist the neo-liberal programme of freeing business from constraint, with a deleterious impact upon social and environmental problems. Economic policy was completely focused upon favouring business, ‘jobs’ of any kind, increasing the revenues and the consumption of the 'winners' so that wealth would ‘trickle down’. There was no concern that this economics used electricity derived from fossil fuels, filling the atmosphere with emissions of carbon gases, sulphureous compounds, methane and nitrous oxide; favoured the car economy, saturating the atmosphere with carbon gases; that nuclear power stations produced radioactive waste which cannot be safely disposed of; that trade policies encouraged policies that depleted the soil, deforestation, , the burning of land, emitting more carbon gases into the atmosphere.

As Keynes said, 'In the long run, we are all dead.' The problem is that Keynes himself is dead and we are facing long run problems that economics causes but does not address. The financial debt which is threatening the global economy is as nothing compared to the ecological debt with this difference, when resources supporting life on earth have been depleted and destroyed there is no bailout and no rescheduling. No government, no bank, no group of taxpayers can compensate for the loss of natural resources. Acid rain killing off the forests, the lungs of the earth, carbon emissions leading to global warming, melting icecaps, rising sea levels, deforestation, desertification, the poisoning of water tables. The time people who are in denial will one day confront the reality of the situation with the same psychology, from claiming that there is no problem they will swing to the other extreme of claiming that there's nothing we can do. 

The seriousness of the impasse in the economics and the psychology should not be underestimated. Neo-classical economics holds that in the long run the self-regulating properties of the market will work themselves out. Keynes had realised that the long run is unlikely to be as benign as neo-classical economics promised without a series of deliberate interventions in the short range to correct market failure. The same reasoning applies to the ecological crisis, a number of informed, strategic interventions in the short range to ensure the security of lives and livelihoods in the long term, motivating and mobilising people along the way with respect to a series of feasible goals.


As the productionist model spread through the globalisation of economic relations, it saturated the atmosphere with carbon gases, polluted the ecosystem, damaged the basis of life on earth whilst reducing the time scale enabling us to deal with the consequences. Partial remedies within the existing institutional frameworks will prove inadequate to the task. The ecological crisis is a global problem which does not respond to local remedies. The interconnection and interrelation of all subsystems means that the incremental approach which isolates problems and solutions will fail. The approach is designed to prolong life to expand opportunities for further exploitation. The environmental crisis reverses current priorities between economics and ecology. Ecology, previously considered a secondary concern to economics, is now right at the centre of the economic problem.
Contrary to what Francis Fukuyama wrote, history has not ended with liberal capitalism. On the contrary, there are reasons for believing that Marx was right and that we are now at the beginning of history. If anything, we are witnessing the end of liberal capitalism. The meshing of the economic and environmental crisis challenges us to take moral responsibility and conscious control of the powers we have brought into existence. Again, it means a proper relation of short and long range perspectives, being proactive rather than reactive. It is better to assume responsibility for the health and well being of the whole planet and thereby build a future for ourselves before being forced to attempt to rebuild this future on the ruins of what remains. Humanity needs to take that next step in coming to think about the connection of society with nature, about the connection of naturalisation and humanization.

This is not the end of history but the end of a specific period of history, organised around social relations of production which are too narrow for the emerging productive forces. It is time to unleash those forces and thus avoid escalating crisis. One either stops accumulating ecological debt or waits for catastrophe through climate change and nuclear waste to wipe that debt out. The human race is at the crossroads. The choice is to continue with the Faustian pact with Weber’s new rational gods or to assume moral responsibility for our powers and creations so as to humanise and naturalise the environment.

The global economic crisis is the old capitalist crisis on the global world stage. Globalisation is the ‘universal development of productive forces’ and therefore a ‘universal intercourse between men’. This produces in all nations the crisis tendencies and contradictory dynamics of the capital system. It is the closing of the frontier for capitalism. Marx concludes that this ‘modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all’. (Marx GI 1999). 

Against this is the field of conventional politics and the universal agreement amongst the main parties that ‘the economy’ – that ‘slippery euphemism for capitalism’ in the words of Jeremy Seabrook and Trevor Blackwell - and its accumulative logic is the overriding priority. ‘The economy’ constrains the most democratic of states and narrows the field of democratic choice within the parameters of ‘the market’. 

This unanimity around the centrality of the economic factor gives the impression of being the centre ground in politics. The 'end of ideology' in the 1960’s was actually the triumph of ideology, a general acquiescence in a productionism that keeps existing power relations concealed and preserved. Far from indicating positive consent, the end of ideology denoted the end of politics and morality in their subordination to economics (Lomasky in Paul, Miller, Paul). The irony of this claim to the centre ground is that it is associated with an economics that rents society with internal divisions between rich and poor, inequalities which are built into the social system in terms of asymmetrical life opportunities and which are reflected in the built environment with respect to housing, gated communities, surveillance. This is what Mike Davis calls the militarization of urban life. Every society is marked by a division between rich and poor, between those on the inside and the outcasts. Electoral abstention, xenophobia and racism, the prevalence of drugs and the substitute identities of gangs are symptoms of the hollowness of contemporary society. Education and training with no employment prospects at the end, only a debt which manacles the individual to the system. Mortgage comes from the French meaning the grip of death. From the start, individuals are compelled to mortgage their lives. A modernisation that never does anything but modernise is endless, meaningless; it is a rationalisation without reason. As Gramsci wrote: ‘The old is dead, the new does not manage to see the light of day .. in the half light monsters rise up.' This is not so much Goya’s Saturn eating his own children as human creations eating up their human creators. It is a call to enlightenment. 

The problem is not one of monsters but of human powers in alien form. The problem is that these powers are supra-individual powers, collective powers lacking collective mechanisms of conscious control. This requires a new project, an organic, centred alternative which is able to create new solidarities and reciprocities in bringing alien powers under social control, rebuilding social relationships and ties by bringing people together in the achievement of a series of feasible goals in making progress to sustainable living in the long term. These collective mechanisms make possible the public life which is the realisation of commonality and the realisation of individuality, creating the forms of social identity which make the common good a reality rather than an abstraction over individuals. 

These collective mechanisms for the common control of supra-individual forces imply an ecological economics as a public economics.

The argument proceeds by establishing the requirements for a new vision. A new economics must incorporate the political and social essence of the contemporary context, both in the sense of identifying the nature of the challenge that lies ahead and in the choice of the fundamental agents who will act to meet this challenge. The proletarian transformation of politics which was the lynchpin has still to occur and the present nature of current problems give little time for an extended period of chercher le proletariat. There is appeal in Marcuse’s deliberately vague assertion that the revolutionary agent will turn up in the revolution itself. Do Marxists narrow the field by limiting effective agency to those with the structural capacity to act? In an increasingly fragmented economic environment, it is not clear at all whether this structural capacity exists anymore, certainly not in any homogeneous sense. 
Whilst social groups and classes jockey and audition for the role, it is more profitable to set social action in a wider frame of sectors, public and private. This argument envisages the public sector as in an active, strategic capacity with the private sector incorporated as a relatively passive player, restricted to its own sphere. There was a trend in political theory a couple of decades which was in favour of ‘bringing the state back in’. (Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985). This resurgence needs to move beyond theory and philosophy to practice by envisaging government policy playing a dynamic, determinative role in setting the conditions of public life. 

This larger political, social and ecological context plays a background role as pervasive and important as the individualist perceptions of the market society.  This approach envisages a far-reaching application of governmental power, and a substantial recourse to government-sponsored social coordination.

There are a couple of vitally important preconditions for such an "institutional" vision. The requirement is the active consent of the governed and their involvement in extensive public spaces. The second, which accompanies the first, is the express legitimation that is accorded to public life.

A frequently heard argument illustrates the need to de-illegitimize public power and purpose. The ‘crowding out’ thesis holds that government borrowing and spending may "crowd out" private investment, thus diminishing the private resources upon which the state depends. The argument simply assumes that the social gains that would have accrued from private investment that has been ‘crowded out’ would have been greater than those from the public expenditure displacing it, thus justifying the private being given priority over the public. The tacit assumption of the superiority of private compared to public does not remain confined to economics but is a general way of life and mentality. On issue after issue, private choice trumps public good. How many politicians in parties campaigning for socialised health, education etc. betray those principles by sending their children to private schools? And how many times is this hypocrisy justified with the assertion ‘that they are only doing what any parent would do if they had the money’? That assertion is the trumping of public good by private choice and begs the question of how to achieve a reverse ordering of priorities.

The approach that is required to deal with the social, political and ecological realities of the contemporary world requires a completely different valuation. The private capital economy of today is a social order at bay before myriad but interrelated collective forces that require checking or channelling by strong public policy. The contemporary age needs governments that govern. The tacit assumptions of the ordering and legitimacy of private and public activity need to be exposed as wholly unreal and completely inadequate in face of the challenges facing the world. A much more considered approach implies a strategic vision and capacity, the very thing which the ‘anarchy’ of the market precludes. This concept does not mean that priority once given to the private sector should now go to the public sector, which is merely an inversion that keeps a failing structure intact. In economic terms, the public sector will conform to the disciplines of capital budgeting, cost-benefit scrutiny - from a social rather than a private viewpoint.

This does not mean that there will be a single "correct" conception of the role of the public sector. Plenty depends on unforeseen developments with respect to new technologies, ecological threats, domestic and international politics. It is all about identifying political limitations and projecting political possibilities. Thus, setting the frame for public life cannot be prescriptive. It does mean, however, checking and reversing the delegitimation of the public sector that has been such a pronounced feature of contemporary capitalism. This downgrading of public policy and purpose is unleashing stresses and strains that are testing civilised society to the limits, playing fast and loose with precious cultural and moral resources that are not easily replaced when destroyed. 


A much more profitable approach recognises the increasingly defensive position of capitalism in face of various social and ecological pressures and problems, in a global as well as a national sense. It means enhancing public purpose, morally, politically and institutionally in order to find a new centre for economic theory and practice.

The enhanced legitimacy of the public sector that we see as central to a new vision will require not only a change in the nature of economic analysis but also a transformation of the status of analysis in economic inquiry generally. The problems of global integration, social dislocation and ecological crisis presents the world with an unprecedented challenge and opportunity. In meeting this challenge and realising opportunity, knowledge needs to be translated into practical effect. The challenge is to draw on the various disciplines – politics, sociology, economics, psychology, biology, anthropology, ecology - but not as sciences offering the precise knowledge of the physical sciences but as tools offering insights that can be incorporated into a praxis that brings knower and known together in creating the world. 
In criticising the domination of self-interest in economic activity, there is no neglect of the tendency to concentrate power in politics. That is not a case against politics but a case for citizen activity, information and vigilance. It is the purest folly to continue to delegitimize the public realm in an increasingly uncertain and chaotic world. For all of the denigration of ‘big’ government, critics miss the point that excessive government intervention is often required to deal with the consequences of too little political order. To extol uncritically the virtues of self-interested motives and celebrate the apolitical character of the market against ‘government’ is utterly shortsighted, and at a time when long range strategic thinking for the common good is required. To argue that the economics of the market, by virtue of its subservience to the self-interested motives of individuals, has precedence over politics is merely to assert politics in a most underhand way. ‘The market’ is a ‘democracy’ of egoists, but it is not ‘everyone’ who rules, it is money. The consumer democracy of the market practises a politics that is congenial with private, individual choice. Which is to say that the capital economy has imposed its value system upon politics. And it shows. 

It follows that if economics is assigned to its proper place within the public order, and thus becomes the means for realising politically formulated goals, it has not been overridden by politics, but has been acknowledged for what it has always been, the necessary servant of the public order to which it ministers. This is a staggering claim to those habituated to a constant exaltation of the private realm and a constant denigration of the public realm. But it would be regarded as a truism by historians of the most enduring and most successful civilisations. It amounts to little more than a recognition that public forces are the foundation of every viable society, a statement that would be received as the conventional wisdom in any era and in any society apart from modern capitalism.

The claims on the part of advocates of the ‘free’ market that capitalism is an apolitical order can be exposed as the duplicity it is. It is an easy populism to be ‘anti-politic’, turning people against the politicians beset by problems that originate in the private economy. There is no such thing as an apolitical order. Human beings as social beings create associations of collective existence. These are necessarily political and are more or less effective, reasonable, responsible, representative and "just". To dismiss this essential aspect of the human ontology reveals capitalist depoliticisation as another dehumanisation, to add to its denigration of creative human capacities, its destruction of morality and devastation of surrounding nature. A public life which guides economic activity as an instrument in attaining politically self-conscious visions does not imply the over-politicization of life. Rather it is the political investment of civil life, politics incorporated into the practices and organs of a society of citizens that seek to be governed by its own choices, not by the blind imperatives of economics.

Such a fundamental transformation, involving a reorientation of public and private purposes, is certainly on the agenda. There is a deep and growing dissatisfaction with the condition of contemporary society. This means that if the general diagnosis and prescription depart from that of more conventional expressions, there will be greater public recognition of the relevance of the position taken as established positions falter and fail. This requires establishing and revitalising the inextricable connection between public policy and the underlying social order. The justification for creating a public life embedded in the associational space of the civic order is further strengthened by the diagnosis of capitalism as a system at bay, beset by forces of its making, but which are beyond its control. These forces are collective forces and require the collective mechanisms of control and coordination that only a renewed public life can supply. (Colander 1991; Daly and Cobb 1989; Davidson and Davidson 1988; Eatwell 1994; Etzioni and Lawrence 1991; Ferber and Nelson 1993; Hodgson 1988; Kuttner 1991).

Business, Labour, And The State
The key agents of ‘organised capitalism’ were business, trade unions and the state. Strategic change has either come through or come through the pressure of one or more of these actors. Much radical politics suffers from nostalgia in suggesting an idealised view of how these agents should act, something which reappears in the green movement. Ecocapitalists champion enlightened business, ecosocialists envisage common ownership through the democratised state. In fact it is clear that business, trade union and the central state have no vision beyond the capitalism they know. The impetus for restructuring power and social relations will come from community groups or social movements. That said, business, trade unions and the state are not one of a piece and are not monolithic entities in themselves. There are enlightened actors in business, trade unions and the state who are receptive to the science and the politics of ecology and these are influential people in various areas that ecologists can work with. This is one way of easing the transition from the old to the new.

The largest scope for the environment movement is probably in the area of small business. It is here that myriad social forces meet - traditional small business, not-for-profit enterprises, for-profit co-operatives, ecopreneurs rather than entrepreneurs. Green architecture and construction, community-shared agriculture, auto share networks, also belong in this arena, where social and community movements develop their productive activity and is therefore embedded in the associational space of civil society. Whilst economic activity in this arena does not require large capital outlays for start-up, it suffers from a relative lack of resources and power vis large corporate enterprise. However, when eco-development becomes prioritised within communities, this arena has the potential to generate greater resources from within. Green community economic development as eco-preneurialism is a major force for raising community consciousness and vision.

Large corporations have the greatest resources but also benefit most from corporate capitalism. These corporations are locked into the Casino Economy that has emerged on the manufacturing base. These transnational corporations are the main agents of globalisation and are pushing for the liberalisation of trade. In this scenario, the deregulation of controls at the state level forced by the TNC’s will have to be checked by a reregulation at the global level under the pressure of the environmental movement - new forms of liability, bioregional scale, community accountability, and worker participation. Leaving aside the structural constraints of the corporate milieu, there are people within the corporations who are doing serious work in the fields of industrial ecology and appropriate technology. The influence of these people will increase the more the environmental movement can mobilise pressure on the corporations to change.

By cultivating alliances with the enlightenment end of business, the environmental movement succeeds in embedding productive activity into the community. Once major changes are given shape as policy or are incorporated into law, the potential for expanding corporate allegiances should expand. Business will not change its behaviour for ethical reasons alone. A regulatory framework changing incentives and disincentives and communities providing opportunities for profit through environmental activities are crucial.

‘The state in capitalist society’ is a title used by Ralph Miliband (1976) to show how the power of the state is secondary and derives from the resources generated in the private economy. It follows that the state lacks political independence and must facilitate the process of private capital accumulation as a condition of its own power (Miliband 1976; Dahl 1956, 1978, 1979, 1985 and Lindblom 1977). The very capacity of governments to act in ways that the electorate demands – what is called parliamentary democracy – is constrained by the systemic requirements of private accumulation. Policy options are objectively limited in that the system of private investment, private property rests on the dynamic of capital accumulation which must be facilitated if economic growth, employment and prosperity is to be achieved. Clinton’s ‘It’s the economy, stupid!’ revealed more than was intended. The fact that people’s lives depend on ‘the economy’ is obvious. Less obvious is the institutional and systemic aspect of this economic determinism which keeps people in a state of dependency. ‘The economy’ is not some natural, objective datum but is a social product subject to political controversy, intervention and change. When people understand ‘the economy’ to be a euphemism for capitalism, then they may be more willing to challenge its determinism. 

The point is that, within capitalist relations, there are strict limitations on politics, morality and on the popular will. If the process of private accumulation is threatened in some way, then economic instability and even crisis follows and the legitimacy and popularity of the government is undermined. In other words, government power is secondary and derivative and is held on condition of acting to ensure the profitability and prosperity of the private sector. Critical pluralists like Lindblom came to understand the point very well:






The central dynamic of capital accumulation means that government policy must pursue a political agenda that is intrinsically biased in favour of the system of private enterprise and corporate power. This puts severe limitations on any kind of politics motivated by anything outside of the remit of exchange value.

The state has a role in facilitating and resourcing community-initiated activities, but on community terms. But to expect substantial social transformation to come through the agency of the state amounts to a serious overestimation of the state power and independence. 

Local government has greatest potential given its close proximity to the community. Local governments can respond and be transformed quickly in areas where social and community movements can establish viable alternatives. 

Trade unions are unlikely to be change-makers in any ecological praxis and transformation. The promised proletarian transformation of politics has long since stalled. The limited materialistic aims of workers as defined by trade unionism have long since been satisfied by capitalism. Marx once wrote of the bourgeois being happy in their alienation; the same applies to workers within the gilded cage of capitalism. That said, organised labour does have a role in the process of transition. Rejecting integration in the economy of unlimited material growth, organised labour must carve out its own position with respect to the redefinition of wealth, thus taking an interest in power and authority by rekindling an interest in worker-control and self-management.

Union initiatives in the conversion of production to ecological activity, a concern with useful work and a limitation of the working day extends ecoproduction and generates increasing fulfilling work opportunities for others. The workers must take an interest in the work they do and, in securing an identity with the work, determine how to make it fully ecological. Manufacturing workers, for instance, have an interest in introducing industrial ecology to companies and putting a humanising slant on it that emphasizes the creativity of labour.

In being well informed with respect to applications of eco-technology, labour will be well placed in a world of continuous technological change. At the same time. Trade unions work hand in hand with the community as a market for socially useful production, giving them more influence on investment decisions. Research into ecological technology and conversion strategies, trade unions need to be working with universities to form a green think tank and working with communities to implement development strategies. A labour-oriented green community economic development programme requires a long-term vision and strategy that attracts allies in the community and in the business community. It also creates the foundation for increasing worker’ control over productive activity and for raising demands for worker ownership. 

The Public Realm And The Capital System
A weakness of the broad approach can be a blurring of distinctions. Much that passes for sustainable development is merely economic development with a greenwash and plainly contradicts the goals of environmental as well as social justice. One hears the words of James Lovelock here, who refers the Green wing of the environmentally destructive techno-urban system. How about a concept of sustainable living? For all of the, often worthy, attempts to make incremental progress in greening production and consumption, there is still no shying away from difficult questions, making business face up to its responsibilities and making the public aware of some awkward realities. There is plenty about the investment, production and employment of the economic system that may never be sustainable. Do The Greens have a strategy that shows how a system organised around economic growth, that slippery euphemism for capital accumulation, can be replaced by a viable and functioning economic order? In making this case, The Greens will have to work with others to somehow bring private capital subject to public control, regulating their ecological, social and cultural impact in the public interest.

Whilst business remains unaccountable and unsustainable, its symbiotic relation with the political system continues. This is the corruption of public life, a public realm that has been captured by private priorities, vested interests and lobbyists. The relationship has to be challenged and changed. Once more, this is a question that is bigger than the divisions of Left and Right and once more points to the question of how we live and how we want to live. It is a question of civilisation, involving questions must bigger than the distribution of power and resources to address the question of the ultimate purpose of life and living. If we are to have ecologically sound sustainable living based on social justice and equity, then we need a politics that projects this as an ideal rooted in real possibilities in the present, identifying in current developments those elements and forces possessing social futurity and which point towards an alternative future. 

The current economic system, organised around the central dynamic of accumulation, cannot deliver sustainable living based on environmental justice and equity. But this criticism, under the alternative institutions requirements, begs the question of a vision of a coherent and realisable economic model that can deliver sustainable living. If the goal is social and environmental justice and equity, then there needs to be a system where people and planet are prioritised rather than profit. Which, ultimately, is to ask whether The Green Party specifically and Green politics generally is reformist or revolutionary. But here is another way of approaching the difficult politics: conceive revolution as a process rather than an event, a slow, organic accumulation of change and self-change in which the means are the ends in the process of becoming. ‘The revolution’, as such, is merely the end product of prior evolution based on creative praxis constitutive of social order. 
Which is to underline again the slogan, neither Left nor Right but in front. That ‘in front’ is the new social order of harmony, proportion and balance. By applying the first law of ecology, the law of integrated systems, a genuinely Green politics affirms an interactive cooperation between the parts within the whole to tip the scales towards harmony, proportion and balance. The new millennium is an opportunity to rebuild civilisation beyond the age of excess. With the dominant economic  systems  in disarray, the global environmental movement seems uniquely placed to serve as a vehicle for creating a new civilisation beyond instrumental power and monetary wealth.

Curiously, capitalism is failing for much the same reason that communism failed, an excessive, inflated material power abstracted from human nature within and nature without. Monetary ties are the most ephemeral of ties. Long before the full effects of ecological crisis become apparent, even before the long predicted collapse of the economic system comes to pass, capitalism seems ready to fall as a result of a moral implosion. Capitalism and communism seem to be the two sides of the same materialist coin, not a materialism rooted in a sensuous human nature based on human capacities, potentialities and loyalties, but an empty, denatured materialism possessed by covetousness and greed. Environmentally, both capitalism and communism have been disastrous. But if capitalism isn’t working, the question is still begged as to what socio-economic order can be put into place to provide long-term secure employment, on which individuals and communities can base a sustainable future.

This presentation of a viable constructive model of a sustainable social order could be the ultimate challenge facing the various Green parties of the world. Do they have an alternative, do they have an end game, do they have a process that shows progression from here to there? To find a global political and economic system that provides sustainable living without destroying the planet. To achieve a balance between the need for employment and security and the need for environmental protection. To formulate the practical politics that support an ecologically sustainable world, in which individuals order their existence within a civic public grounded in community democracy, equality and justice. Local empowerment via eco-cities and eco-communities is the way to connect people to the global agenda, offering an alternative to the top down global repression of the local that is the result of a globalisation in which the TNCs are the main agencies of power and control. This is to offer a locally grounded associative civil public against the unregulated anarchic global sweatshop ‘governed’ by all-powerful transnational corporations who use their structural power and global reach to cow nation states. The reaction has given the environmental movement the opportunity to expose to public controversy some of the private economic forces which are working to block social and environmental justice in the present and sustainable living in the future.

Neither Left Nor Right
So is The Green Party left wing or right wing? There are plenty, particularly those schooled in Marxist political economy, who urge Greens to be more clear that the problem is not some general ‘industrialism’ as such but the way that industrialisation is organised within capitalist relations. The problem is that the record of Socialist socialisation – as collectivisation and nationalisation, reformist and revolutionary – does seem to indicate an environmentally destructive logic in an instrumental and institutional conception of industry and technology. There are others who point to the more right wing lineage of Green politics, the Nazi worship of Nature for instance (actually, the Nazis exploited the general German love of Nature). And the phrase ‘eco-fascist’ can be heard every now and then. Certainly, right wing figures and leaders have been ecologists. Take Theodore Roosevelt, who played a leading role in the modern conservation movement, leading the revulsion against the unregulated and unreflecting mining of the land and destruction of biological capital, to replace exploitation by deliberate, scientific policies of conservation. One thinks also of Jan Smuts and his ‘Holism and Evolution’. There is plenty in that book which forms an essential part of an ecological politics. Smuts writes of the ‘subtle interdependence of functionings in an organic field’, an organism in which ‘everything functions as influenced and modified internally by everything else; and the result is not so much due to this or that element, this or that factor or gene by itself, as to the inter-relations between the factors in the general structure and field.’ Smuts refers to the ‘internal organic field constituted by the reciprocal inter-relations of the parts in the cell or the organism’. Here we have a principal of the ‘structural and functional evolution of organisms’ which takes place in response to environmental influence. External and internal fields together form the ‘total milieu for all happening and change in connection with organisms. And whatever takes place in this total field does so holistically, that is to say, not in isolation but in reciprocal and mutual association with all other functioning within that field. The past, the future, the internal elements in the organic structure as well as its external environment, all form integral features in the total field of an organism, influencing its functioning and its evolution.’

That principle is neither left nor right, it forms the centre as one of harmony and balance. That is the forwards towards which ecological politics must progress. That defines the centre of sustainable living as one of interactive cooperation in which the parts grow and flourish together in a functioning order.

Without shying away from the awkward questions that need to be directed to constituted power and business interests, there is a need to radicalise whilst keeping touch with the centre. There is a clear risk that Green politics can be dragged back down and into the sharp political polarities of Left and Right, becoming identified in the public's mind with political radicalism, unreasonable measures to protect nature, Government spending and unpopular ‘Green taxes’, and the endangerment of job security as a result of eco-friendly measures. There are more than enough ‘boo words’ in there for ideologues to play with to incite and feed popular fears. To repeat, there is only so much ground a genuinely ecological politics can make in the world of opinion. That world builds upon the tangibles of an already constituted social and economic order. Green politics will not triumph at that level but can be easily targeted, labelled, marginalised and contained. The future lies in the intangible centre of the future, that forwards of integrated systems and interactive cooperation of the parts, the process in which the sustainable future emerges as a result of a present praxis. This can only be brought about by citizens, not by voters and taxpayers.

The way that Greens are portrayed as ‘Red’ or communist subversives in ecological guise, threatening employment and consumption and lifestyles for their own ‘political’ ends may well be a travesty. But current politics is a world of opinion, not of knowledge and truth. The more of a threat Greens become, the more this hostile invective will be spewed against them. The solution is to avoid a politics abstracted from people and place and instead occupy that ‘neither left nor right’ centre by affirming the first principle of ecology, the law of "integrated systems." This is a genuinely ecological politics in that it models sustainable living on the way that nature actually functions, according to a principle of interactive cooperation. This is clearly the antithesis of self-interested behaviour, of reductionism, isolationism and individualism but emphasises real reciprocal relations between the parts within an interdependent whole. Bring the whole community within an expanded centre ground and it becomes impossible for vested interests, political operators and media ideologues to find the target to isolate and hit. 


13 WEALTH, QUANTITY AND QUALITY

The notion of a post-materialism implies a new way of conceiving wealth. “Economists must now change their models and assumptions to conform to the new reality: “inputs” to production are energy, resources and knowledge and the “output” must be more fully-human beings” (Hazel Henderson, Paradigms in Progress). Of course, this redefinition is not new at all. ‘There is no wealth but life’ Ruskin wrote in Unto this Last. ‘Life, including all its powers of love, of joy, and of admiration. That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings; that man is richest, who, having perfected the functions of his own life to the utmost, has also the widest helpful influence, both personal, and by means of his possessions, over the lives of other’ (Unto this Last, Essay IV).

This is an essay about wealth. Green principles, politics and economics all concern wealth, its true meaning as against its false meaning. The Marxist contrast of use value and exchange value is a variant of this search for the true meaning of wealth. The capitalist conception of wealth refers to money and things, objects that can be bought and sold on the market. It is a quantitative conception that transforms resources, human and natural, into commodities and gives them a price. It is all about an accumulation that concentrates and centralises wealth and power. The central dynamic of accumulation takes use value and turns it into exchange value and systemically drives an economy that destroys more than it creates. The concept of wealth as life is a qualitative conception that focuses on the potentialities and capacities of human beings, the actualisation of social being, the development of community, and the flourishing of all organic life and the plenitude of living systems. It is wealth as life that defines the purposes and processes of green economics. It is not a new conception at all, but exists as immanent potentiality in all living forms. Aristotle defined the human being as a zoon politikon. Zoon is zoe, meaning life. It is the origin of the word zoology, a discipline which concerns the properties and vital phenomena of animals. Human beings require a politikon bion in order to actualise their essential capacities. Bion referring to bios, the origin of the word biology, a discipline concerning living organisms and vital life processes. That’s wealth, natural properties, potentialities and capacities. Which is why Plato argued that virtue is its own reward. To actualise one’s potential and exercise one’s capacities as a human being to the full through the cultivation of the virtues is true wealth.

So far removed is the modern conception of wealth from these notions that arch-conservative Plato and the moderate middle of the road Aristotle appear to be extreme counter-cultural radicals. Not so. It is capitalism that has so destroyed balance, proportion and harmony and substituted its own extreme notions.

Green economics is typically considered as a branch of environmentalism and associated with interventionist measures, taxes, price systems, "clean up," ‘green; products, new energies and new technologies. The ‘greening’ of the economy and environmental protection is undoubtedly important and is better done than not done. But it would be a huge mistake if this ‘greening’ of existing business is equated with ecological economics as such. Apart from diverting attention from more fundamental problems and changes, environmentalism leaves the existing economic system intact, thus reproducing the central conflict between humanity and nature. As a result it upholds an irresolvable dualism in which environmentalism is limited to the futile task of forever protecting human and nonhuman nature from the intrinsically destructive economic system.

The point, of course, is that the economic system need not be so intrinsically destructive. On the contrary, human beings possess the institutional and technological know-how to adapt and fit practical existence benignly within natural processes. The preoccupation with ‘greening’ industry and protecting the environment actually presumes the continued existence of an inherently, systemically rapacious economy. A more positive agenda is possible. Given scientific knowledge, technological innovation and social learning, there is no reason why human beings cannot organise to redesign and implement sustainable agricultural, energy, and manufacturing systems. 

A green politics is not just about political effectiveness, it is about translating a vision into public policy, feasible proposals, workable solutions, and social practices. Means must have an end. This vision is possible. A green politics must continue to affirm the great and growing potentials for human and ecological health and happiness, what Aristotle called flourishing. The usual proposals for economic reform tend to focus on remedying the ills of the current system, correcting market failure and removing inequalities. Which begs the question as to why, if the private economy is so viable, why does it need continual public support, correction and regulation? An ecological economics affirms a much greater vision. This vision, however, requires social change strategies which are effective in tapping existing potentials, which pertain to all aspects of human development in relation to the nonhuman environment. That is to develop a true growth strategy.

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative conceptions casts "sustainability" in new light. The dominant conceptions of sustainability assume all economic activity takes the form of quantitative development. This leads sustainability being defined as sustainable development. At best, sustainability here is concerned to modify economic activity so that nature is destroyed no faster than nature can regenerate itself. This presumes a degree of public control over the private economy that evaded socialism. Just as delusional, this approach treats sustainability as a no-man’s land where humanity neither aids or destroys appreciably (Hawken 1993). To believe that capitalism is a public domain that enables us to impose limits or restrictions upon the private economy in order to reach this no-man’s land is certainly misguided. The capital system imposes its own imperatives, ensuring that development is on its terms. This is not a public choice between destruction or restoration on the basis of the existing economy, but whether economic life will be based on one or the other. Qualitative development is driven by economic activities that restore health and vitality to human communities and ecosystems. Quantitative development, driven by the dynamic of capital accumulation, is ecologically destructive. The key to the future lies not in constraining the capital economy, as though public limits could limit private imperatives, but in transforming the economic system. The concept sustainable living based on qualitative growth replaces sustainable development based on quantitative expansion. The point of ecological economics issue is not how to modify environmental destruction but how to eradicate it through a qualitative approach that embraces the social and the spiritual within the environmental. Herman Daly (1996) calls this holistic "development" as against quantitative "growth". (Daly 1996; Daly and Cobb 1989)

From Quantity To Quality
The contrast between quantitative and qualitative concepts of wealth is intended to locate green principles within a historical perspective of human evolution, examining the productive forces for potentials for qualitative change.

This notion takes its cue from Marx’s notion that at some point the "relations of production" become fetters on the emerging “forces of production". “At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.” (Marx Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy). In other words, the social institutions and arrangements of existing society constrain the emerging productive forces. In the context of this discussion, this suppresses the potential for a qualitative/regenerative mode of production. The accumulation of capital creates illth rather than wealth and can never serve as the means for creating and sustaining wealth as life. From being a means, economics has become an end subject to the imperative of accumulation. This is the economic determinism that Marx criticised as a dehumanisation. Rehumanisation requires that economics be put in its place as simply means to an end. Communities now need to determine what these ends are in relation to what they consider to represent real wealth. New forms of valuation are required to build real wealth creation into social practices. 

The fact that the new productive forces have emerged within capitalist relations and hence diverted to the purpose of capital accumulation has tended to obscure their potential. There has been plenty of good writing on postindustrialism — Alvin Toffler (1971 1980), John Naisbitt (1984), Charles Handy (2002) – which points out how inappropriate modern institutions are for the emerging technologies. The problem is that these works evade the question of the constraining character of capitalist social relations and therefore fail to identify the real block on the realisation of postindustrial potentials.

The argument of this essay is clear that, to realise the potentials of the new technics, postindustrialism would need to be a postmaterialism in the sense of going beyond the accumulative logic and imperative of the capital system, in going beyond economics as a system of scarcity. Materialism here is the dynamic of capitalism as an economic determinism, structured into its forms of exploitation and domination, its regimes of regulation, its market institutions. This system defines wealth as capital, defines labour and nature as exploitable resources, and the goal as the accumulation of as much capital as possible. Capital, the central goal of capitalistic economic activity, is essentially abstracted labour, what Marx called ‘dead labour’, a living quality reduced to pure quantity. Use-value, which is the service function of a good, shaped by social need, is subordinated to exchange-value. This system of exchange value is a system of exploitation (of labour and nature), accumulation and of qualitative waste. Economics is claimed to be the science of scarcity. Capitalism emerged from within natural scarcity and continues through an artificial scarcity. As a quantitative system, capitalism requires scarcity in order to perpetuate its existence, to keep prices up and profit margins high. The expansion of productivity has required that waste has been built into the system in order to reproduce material scarcity.

This perspective explains the tension that emerges whenever economic development and ecology are compared and contrasted. Whilst ecologists argue for constraining economic growth in the name of sustainable economists, others argue that the world’s poor require economic development. The ecological argument that current social and environmental problems are problems of abundance and affluence, of over-development, runs counter to the argument that they are problems of scarcity, of under-development requiring economic growth. Environmentalists need to be clear that social and environmental problems have one and the same cause and one and the same solution. The paradox of capitalism has always been ‘the poverty of abundance’, excess on the basis of artificial scarcity. 

“In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the epidemic of overproduction. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them.” (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973).





Of course, capitalism’s ‘free lunch’ comes at the price of ecological debt. The World Bank estimates that China's environmental costs add up to 8 percent of its GDP.18 This debt is measured by the impact on water resources, the overuse of water and pollution resulting in the diminution and poisoning of water tables. Formerly productive lands are now deserts and drifting sand, causing any number of deleterious health, economic and environmental effects. The story is the same all over the world. There simply is not enough given the wasteful way in which resources are used. Ecological debt refers to overuse in the present running up a tab against the future. The point applies to a situation in which overproduction is based on a dwindling resource base. Rather than learn the lesson and curtail use, the nations running up the biggest debts compete in a scramble for resources around the world, land-grabbing in developing countries rich in rain and groundwater—particularly in Latin America and Africa.

Fred Pearce’s book When the Rivers Run Dry (2006) points to the implications for civilisation of the overuse of water. In truth, the failure to value water as anything other than an exploitable resource is part of a general failure to value the natural world in the production of goods in pursuit of exchange value. If the true value of ecosystem services such as pollination, water filtration, erosion control, soil fertility and regulation of water and climate systems are could be calculated and added to prices, capitalism would be shown to be a highly inefficient economic system in terms of a comparison of inputs and outputs. (Swinton 2007). Far from adding value, capitalism seeks something for nothing, diminishing value in the process. 


Agricultural systems that respect sustainability put more back into the earth than those systems using conventional industrial techniques. The paradox is that agribusiness pays more than the sustainable systems. The true cost of industrial agriculture is not added to the price, which means that the food grown by such unsustainable practices is cheaper at the supermarket. (Sandhu 2008; Horrigan et al. 2002).

When these hidden costs are taken into consideration it is apparent that cheap food is expensive. 

The point applies generally. Sustainably produced goods and services appear to be more expensive, certainly at the level of price, since their cheap competitors are cutting corners in the short run but running up an ecological debt in the long-run that will be inherited by all in time.

This distortion of true values is a systematic result of production driven by exchange value. Having to keep driving down costs, corporations are hardwired to externalise social and environmental costs. Corporations are Homo economicus write large. Rational self-maximisers, they are compelled to reduce costs and increase their profits by any means. ‘One capitalist kills many’ declared Marx. Corporations that fail to compete this way go out of business, which means that in addition to all else it produces, the corporation produces externalities. (Martinez-Alier 2002).

If prices really did telegraph the relative abundance and scarcity of things, as economic theory claims, then they would reflect environmental and social costs. The fact that the goods produced by agroecological farming have positive social and environmental benefits should be reflected in prices. Were this to happen, then the market really would be using prices to allocate resources to their most efficient use. This should not be a matter of ethical consumption, leaving things to the ethics or otherwise of the individual consumer. Prices should reflect social and environmental costs so that consumers would have incentives to buy products that don't damage society and planet. The true costs and benefits of products needs to be reflected in the price for the proper functioning of the economic logic of markets. Otherwise, this is a corporate free lunch, capitalism surviving on an ongoing bailout from nature and society. For all of its claims to be an autonomous order to be left without interference, the private economy can never autonomise itself from labour and nature. But labour and nature can live, thrive, without capital.

To the extent that negative externalities are not paid for, capital is helping itself to free goods at the expense of those who bear the true cost. It is society as a whole that suffers from these negative externalities. Factor in the impact on health from global warming, the poisoning of water tables by industrial agriculture, the desertification of land, the loss of fish stocks, the loss of ecosystem services through deforestation, and the increased floods and drought because of climate change, and capitalism comes with a pretty hefty price tag – or it would if prices really did reflect true costs and benefits, the real value of things. When one tries to calculate the bill by comparing the value of capitalism’s output to the cost a degraded ecosystem, then capitalism’s claim to efficiency would be exposed as a fallacy based upon parasitism. The ecological footprint identifies the hidden costs generated through consumption and production choices and comprises areas of ozone depletion, overfishing, deforestation, climate change, mangrove destruction and intensified agriculture. The middle- and high-income countries are the biggest polluters; they also outsource their pollution, costing poor countries more than $5 trillion in ecological damage. By contrast, the ecological footprint of poor countries on rich ones is $0.68 trillion. The ecological debt of rich countries to poor ones dwarfs the entire third-world debt owed by poor countries to rich ones, which is only $1.8 trillion.

This systematic shifting of costs from the rich and powerful to the poor and dispossessed explains why negative externalities are allowed to continue — because wealthier consumers are sharing in the free lunch. When a well off consumer buys a product that should cost many times more than it does, he or she sees an immediate benefit rather than a greater, long term cost. Prices much lower than they should be are the consumers' dividend from this system of parasitism. One sees here how consumption should be a matter of institutions rather than ethics. It takes a powerful ethical motivation on the part of an awful lot of people to resist the "bargains" that consumer capitalism puts before the masses. With capitalism keeping down wage costs, trade unions shackled, with mass unemployment and part-time, short term contracts for those in work, bargain hunting as a matter of survival trumps ethical consumption as a political choice.

14 GLOBAL ECOLOGY MOVEMENT
A way needs to be found to live the ‘think global, act local’ slogan. Green politics starts locally, but it doesn’t end there. Connecting the local and the global is the way of constituting the universal. At present, the transnationals are the principal agents of globalisation. The TNCs are in command of vast processes of trade, investment, employment and production. They decide what is produced, where it is produced and how it is produced. With global priorities and exploiting a global reach, the TNCs tower over national governments, let alone labour organisations, community activists and ecological groups. There is a global repression vis fragmented, diverse social and ecological organisations.




The U.S. economist Elinor Ostrom is important for her work on the commons. The commons may be described as the politics of value, something of increasing importance. (Ostrom 1990; Caffentzis 2004). Following this line of argument it becomes clear that a polity with fewer free lunches can, paradoxically, have much more genuine liberty.

The word "common" is both a noun to describe a place and a verb that denotes a way of valuing and sharing the world. It is also a moral and political ideal, an ethic, a way of life. My old history teacher, a Catholic brother, kept hammering home the point in lessons that the origin of the word ‘commonwealth’ was common weal, meaning the common good. He was making it clear to socialist radicals like myself that notions of the common good were central to Catholic teaching.

The commons can be apprehended as place, principle and process. As a resource, the commons refers both to the land and to the ways people allocate the goods that come from that land. The commons provides sustenance to those who use it in the form of food, fuel, water and medicinal plants. As such the commons form the life-support system of the poor. It is significant that the event which set Marx on his way to communism was the struggle over customary rights to wood on the part of the poor living near the German forests. What supported life for the community was now expropriated by private interests. This is why the enclosure of the commons is the critical event in the rise of capitalism. There was nothing natural and spontaneous about this enclosure movement, it was a political and legal act with the state playing a proactive role at every stage. The ‘free’ market would never have been brought into existence without the ‘big’ state. Commoning and capitalism are diametrically opposed ways of valuing resources and determining the rules according to which they may be used. The result of turning common land into private property was not just that land became a commodity, but that the rural poor were deprived of their means of sustenance and were therefore compelled to sell all that they had left— their labour power. One appreciates here the rationale behind neo-liberal targeting and destroying of all forms of collectivism which moor individuals to social centres and give them options and alternatives other than those on the market. The ‘free’ market needs exploitable labour and this refers to isolated, impotent atoms lacking choice on the market.

The microbiologist Garrett Hardin coined the term "tragedy of the commons" to demonstrate what happens when individuals compete for a scarce resource as according to self-interest rather than common interest. (Hardin 1968). Given a resource held in common, individuals will be unable to restrain their selfish desire to consume it, even if they know that as a result they will destroy it. In a world of relative scarcity, individuals will be driven by egoistic urges of self-satisfaction to consume and ultimately destroy the very thing that they depend on for survival.

One has to recognise a danger in Hardin's reasoning, a danger that also affects many ecologists who lack a political, sociological and historical understanding. How human urges and instincts are expressed depend on the wider social context, institutional restraints, community control, shared norms. The customary rights to timber that Marx wrote in defence of had been held by the people of the German forest for centuries. No ‘animal’ self-interest overrun this community. Deforestation was a deliberate legal process in the interests of the capitalist market, not an animal process rooted in the nature of human beings. Failure to grasp this point leaves ecology without a critical and practical purchase on the existing world, and leaves the planet wide open to the voracious appetite of Hobbes’ ‘natural’ man – the very artificial construct of bourgeois society. Hardin’s reasoning is abstracted from historically specific social relations and structures so that individuals override what they know to be their common interest on account of their selfish natures. It’s as though those selfish natures are incorrigible. They are not. 

Marx against Thefts of Timber
In his first important article as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx dealt with the law against thefts of timber. The growing demands of industry had led to legal controls on the gathering of dead wood. This gathering had traditionally been unrestricted, but now  some five sixths of all prosecutions in Prussia dealt with wood, with an even higher proportion in the Rhineland. (Stein 1932: xiv 131).

Marx, in Hegelian manner, argues that the state should defend customary law against the rapacity of the rich. Some things could never become private property without injustice; further, 'if every violation of property, without distinction or more precise determination, is called theft, is not all private property theft? Do I not, by my private property, deprive another person of this property? Do I not thus destroy his right to property?' (Marx 'Debate on Thefts of Timber', MEGA i, i (i) 269 f.) Marx proceeds to argue that the principle of class interest cannot form the basis of the state. Since classes represent private interests, the state organised according to class is merely 'the instrument of private property contrary to the principles of reason and justice'. Marx uses the term ‘surplus value’ with reference to the supplementary fine payable to the landowner whose wood has been gathered. ('Debate on Thefts of Timber', MEGA i, i (i) 293 f.).

Finally, Marx states that 'any system of the representation of the particular interests gives pride of place to an unethical, uncomprehending and insensitive abstraction from a limited material   and  a  limited  consciousness   that   is slavishly subject to it.' (Marx 'Debate on Thefts of Timber', MEGA i, i (i) 304). This is reification, the way in which human relationships become 'fetishes' and achieve domination over human beings. Thus timber as a commodity is an objectified expression of socio-political relationships that exert an independence of human beings. In the process, timber determines the living human subject. Marx concludes that this dehumanization is a direct  consequence of the advice given to lawgivers: 'that, when making a law about wood and timber, they are to think only of wood and timber, and are not to try to solve each material problem in a political way - that is, in connection with the whole complex of civic reasoning and civic morality'. (Marx 'Debate on Thefts of Timber', MEGA i, i (i) 304). In other words, capitalism is a depoliticisation that asserts the primacy of economics and exchange value over the whole complex of civic reasoning and civic morality that comprise public life. At this stage, Marx was still arguing from an Hegelian perspective. In a short article on the Estates Committees in Prussia, published in the Rheinische Zeitung in December 1842, Marx becomes truly Platonic: “In a true state there is no landed property, no industry, no material stuff that in their capacity as raw elements can negotiate an agreement with the state. There are only spiritual powers, and it is only in their civic resurrection, in their political rebirth, that natural powers are capable of influencing the state. The state pervades the whole of nature with spiritual nerves and at each point it necessarily appears that what dominates is not the matter but the form, not nature without the state but the nature of the state, not the unfree object but free humanity.’ (Marx 'On the Estates Committees in Prussia', MEGA I, i (i) 335.)

Commoning entails locating the individual within a web of social relations which are designed to keep ‘animal’ instincts and impulses in check, fostering more rational and social ways of valuing our world. 

The destructive effects of enclosure are visible not only on the outer landscape but also on the inner landscape, the separation of individuals from each other and hence from their own social nature. 

Enclosure is a social destruction that involves a cultural loss, the disappearance of local knowledge about how to manage natural resources in a sustainable manner for the community. This local knowledge about how to value natural resources is vital to sustainability. The enclosure of the global commons is systematically destroying the commons systems that offer a way of valuing the world in a sustainable way. These rich networks of local knowledge are precious cultural resources, the collective practical wisdom of millennia that could teach us how to manage scarce resources in a sustainable manner, in terms of the technics, the practice and the social systems which keeps everyone within their fair share. These systems of practical knowledge offer means for valuing resources differently than the market, but are being pulverised by the accumulative logic of profit-driven markets. 

Part 3
SOCIETY AS A LEARNING MECHANISM






Notions of social transformation need to be reworked to take account of genuine change as a process rather than as event. It is a process because the new society only functions and flourishes if the individuals constituting it have developed their moral, political, intellectual and organisational capacities. In this sense, capacity building develops the capacity to constitute the new social order.

This emphasis upon process has the advantage of avoiding an identification of politics with the traditional forms and structures of the political party and state (representative institutions, parliaments, constitutions, elections). It can apply to these but also embraces all those things which are integral to the democratic governance of collective affairs, as practised through everyday interaction, communication and reciprocity as an associative process of shared experience. Extending democratic control throughout society in this way recovers the classical notion of politics as the politikon bion which is essential to the truly human life. Politics ceases to be defined as the conquest and monopolisation of institutionalised power, the persuasion of the masses in elections and the management of the masses in government; instead, politics is restored to its original meaning as something integral to human self-realisation. Distinct from state-centred perspectives, it has nothing in common with attempts to engineer the public through the ideal agency of 'the party’. Genuinely novel social, organisational and normative structures emerge through an associative process of everyday interaction.

The political implications are radical, affirming social transformation as a process of self-emancipation on the part of actual individuals organising themselves in their communities, as against action engineered from above and without via an abstracted form of political organisation. The citizens composing the body politic engender the ideal public community in their self-activity and self-organisation, thus constituting the new, associative public.

Community And Commerce
The argument draws upon the emergence of grass roots organisations and community organisations across the world and seeks to value the contributions that social movements can make not only to social provision but to urban governance. 

At some point the human need for something higher and richer than immediate and egoistic want and desire will rebel against the empty promises of endless gratification. And as the intensity and promise of consumer capitalism wanes, so individuals will see through its symbolism as a repackaging of essential human needs – freedom, happiness, family, community, sociality – to be sold back at a profit as dreams and fantasies. And as the system of endless gratification wanes, so also will the human desire to maintain it. Needs can be identified and satisfied, argued Keynes in Economic Prospects, but wants are infinite and hence can go on forever. This may apply to individual human beings, but a culture cannot be founded on an infinity of wants. Such an economy is parasitic upon the moral and social capital of previous civilisation and, as time goes by, progressively dissipates it without having the ability to replace it. Denied an ethos, a culture, constitutive ties and overarching institutions invested with public purpose, individuals lack a framework that allows endless gratification to continue. To this extent, infinity does have a limit. Any economic life, production and consumption, is closely embedded in the social structures within which human beings have lived, which make civilised social life possible. Economic behaviour is no different to social behaviour and is the product not of instincts but of tangible institutions, moral codes and norms, social relationships. Capitalism has succeeded in achieving economic development that gives a standard of living that is far higher than ever achieved before and for greater numbers of people. In its own terms, it is a success. But economics is only one part of civilised life, not the whole part. Capitalism has succeeded so well for so long on the basis of morals, institutions and structures built by previous civilisations. By steadily encroaching on other aspects of civilisation, the totalitarian tendencies of capitalist economics undermines its own foundations. 

Capitalism therefore weakens the institutional and normative framework of civilised life, thus inviting its own demise. Capitalism even undermines its own economic foundations. As Schumpeter explains: "The capitalist process, by substituting a mere parcel of shares for the walls of and the machines in a factory, takes the life out of the idea of property. . . . Dematerialized, defunctionalized and absentee ownership does not impress and call forth moral allegiance as the vital form of property did. Eventually there will be nobody left who really cares to stand for it—nobody within and without the precincts of the big concerns."

No civilisation can survive on the basis of social atomism, moral anomie, nihilism and widespread impersonalities. Civilisations only fall on such foundations, never rise. The ‘free’ market only thrives within the context of a flourishing associational life. Economic individualism can only prosper within the non-individualistic contexts of association and community, contexts which embody and exhibit moral purpose. Where these social and moral resources weaken, so capitalism itself weakens, no longer commanding support as a system of allegiances and incentives.

It is significant that the first targets of totalitarian regimes are trade unions and cooperatives. They are social forms which are capable of combining association and economic freedom. Such associations connect the goals of production, distribution, and consumption to a personal sense of belonging to a social order. These and other such forms of association in civil society are the foundations of freedom, giving the individual a sense of relatedness to the wider community, in time becoming an active member.
 
The irony is that in pursuit of an aggressively pro-business agenda, the neo-liberals have systematically targeted, destroyed or at least undermined the associational forms which are the foundation of a free economy. The philosophical, sociological and anthropological crudities and simplicities of neo-liberalism have damaged capitalism far more than socialism could ever have done. Identifying all forms of association as manifestations of collectivism, and hence of ‘socialism’, which somehow means ‘the State’, neo-liberalism has made a cult of individualism, with predictable results. 

The social structures of family, community, professional association or body, union, cooperative, or industrial corporation form a culture and generate communal spirit and ties. In weakening or destroying these social structures, neo-liberalism has set about turning a culture into an atomized mass. For reasons that conservatives like Burke would understand, let alone socialists, this atomized mass will lack the associational ties and connections to be able to resist the feared servile state. The intention was to create an atomized mass of individuals who will lack the will, the incentive, ability, the support, the connections to be able to withstand the necessity of the ‘free’ market. For the same reasons, though, they are unable to resist the collectivism of the central state. In defending a supposedly ‘free’ capitalism, the neo-liberals have eased the transition to collectivism by depriving people of the sense of social and moral belonging to and participation in their own associational life. As Marx well knew, denied community in the real social world, human beings will project their need for sociality upwards to the ‘illusory community’ of the state.

“And out of this very contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community, the latter takes an independent form as the State, divorced from the real interests of individual and community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life, always based, however, on the real ties existing in every family and tribal conglomeration—such as flesh and blood, language, division of labour on a larger scale, and other interests—and especially … on the classes, already determined by the division of labour, which in every such mass of men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others.

Just because individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them does not coincide with their communal interest (in fact the general is the illusory form of communal life), the latter will be imposed on them as an interest "alien" to them, and "independent" of them as in its turn a particular, peculiar "general" interest; or they themselves must remain within this discord, as in democracy. On the other hand, too, the practical struggle of these particular interests, which constantly really run counter to the communal and illusory communal interests, makes practical intervention and control necessary through the illusory “general" interest in the form of the State.

Marx GI 1999: 53/4

Marx On Community
Marx’s argument for the superiority of human emancipation over political emancipation centres upon community. Whereas human emancipation in general produces ‘true community’, political emancipation conceives democracy, individuality and community only within the alien control of economics:





This replaces true social ties that join individuals together with an 'estranged form of social commerce' in which the only bond between individuals is one based on egoism (Marx JM 1975:266). This estrangement of each individual from all others destroys the social conditions for human fulfilment: 'Since, in the process of exchange men do not relate to each other as men, things lose the meaning of personal, human property' (JM 1975:261). The emancipation of the individual from relations of personal dependence creates the egoistic individual of the modern world but this freedom is accompanied by mutual relations or intercourse which are external constraints upon all individuals. This freedom from ties of personal dependence entails the impersonal dependence of all upon alien powers. The individual 

lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.

Marx EW OJQ 1975:220

In presenting his conception of a true human freedom, Marx affirms Rousseau's 'description of the political man' as a truly socialised individual who substitutes solitary powers for powers that can be used only 'with the assistance of others' (OJQ 1975:234). The problem is that this 'rational' association is cannot be achieved in the political sphere so long as civil society is 'the sphere of egoism and of the bellum omnium contra omnes' (OJQ 1975:221). Since civil society 'is no longer the essence of community but the essence of difference', (OJQ 1975:221), the state can offer only an imaginary, 'unreal universality', not a genuine universality or common good (OJQ 1975:220). For Marx ‘a state which is not the realisation of rational freedom is a bad state’ (Marx and Engels 1927 vol. I, i (i), p. 248).

But the state can only offer an ‘unreal’ rational freedom as a necessary consequence of a civil society having become a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism. The state can offer no more than an imaginary communality on account of the 'asocial nature of civil life' (Marx CN EW 1975:412). As Marx puts it, the 'slavery of civil society is the natural foundation of the modern state' (CN 1975:412). Universality and communality, needs which are essential for human fulfilment, cannot be attained in the real lives of individuals (Thomas 1994:61 62; Bonefeld 1992:116/7). The political, moral and communal existence which the philosophical tradition of ‘rational freedom’, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, identified as being conditions of human well being becomes external to individuals, in their social relations and in the political community of the state. What Marx is arguing is that a solidaristic order based upon close personal ties between individuals is capable of generating community and the common good from within but with the atomisation of society any community has become a contractarian or legal order. 

The rise of capitalism and bourgeois civil society is therefore a process of rationalistic desolidarisation in which social relations become independent of individuals and are experienced as external forces inimical to freedom. In these circumstances it is futile to expect the state to be capable of representing the universality and communality of individuals, since its roots are in the asocial nature of civil society. 'The constitution of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals - who are related by law ... are achieved in one and the same act' (Marx OJQ 1975:233). This process dissolved civil society into its component parts - self-interested, isolated, autonomous individuals freed from communal and universal considerations and obligations (Marx OJQ 1975:233 234). The state is not a genuine community but is the institutional expression of this separation from community. It follows that the state can formulate and implement public policy for the good of all individuals only when this good can emerge from within social relationships which connect each individual with all individuals. Only such relationships overcome the split between egoism and altruism and make available a social identity which gives the individual good reason to choose the common good. 

Marx depicts political  democracy as  'Christian'  in  treating every individual as 'a sovereign and supreme being' whereas, in reality, this being is precisely the individual 'in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect', 'as he has been corrupted .. sold and exposed to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements of  the  entire  organisation  of  our society': 'in a word, man  who  is not yet a true species-being' (Marx OJQ 1975:225/6). The political as a 'heavenly' sphere means that communality and universality possess a purely abstract character in relation  to  'actual  individuality',  'true  life'  (Marx OJQ 1975:225).

The relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth. The state stands in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the same way as religion overcomes the restrictions of the profane world, i.e. it has to acknowledge it again, reinstate it and allow itself to be dominated by it. Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regarded by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered to be a species-being, he is the imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is divested of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality.

Marx EW OJQ 1975

Marx distinguishes the ‘egoistic’ character of political rights within bourgeois society (Merquior 1986:54/5; Femia 1993:65; Pierson 1986:168/9) from their communalist-universalist character to foster a demand for community and solidarity, something akin to a conception of a social citizenship. The view is contentious. For many, Marx’s positive conception of freedom, well-being and community is beyond legal and moral rules, beyond rights as such (Lukes  in Parkinson ed  1982:198/203;  Lukes 1985:chs 345; Tucker 1970:50; Miller 1984:chs 1 2). But Buchanan’s view that Marx never made reference to rights in defining human emancipation (Buchanan 1982:67) is not strictly true. Marx’s distinction between 'the member of civil society' and 'the citizen' entails a distinction between the rights of man, which Marx criticises as egoistic, and the rights of the citizen (Marx OJQ 1975:228/9). Rights have universal human implications beyond the separation of individuals from each other in bourgeois civil society and possess an emancipatory potential with respect to associative public life. Political rights are 'rights which are only exercised in community with others. What constitutes their content is participation in the community, in the political community or state. They come under the category of political freedom, of civic rights' (Marx OJQ 1975:227). The distinction between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen affirms the universal-communal significance of political rights against the particularism and privatism associated with property rights.

Having  affirmed  this  participatory  definition  of citizenship, Marx proceeds to criticise the 'so called rights of man' as the liberty of man as 'an isolated monad' (OJQ 1975:229) and whose practical application lies in private property. 'Bourgeois freedom' applies to  the nonpolitical rights associated with private property, equality as equal right to a monadic liberty, security as the guarantee of egoistic rights. Marx seeks to transcend the rights associated with property, egoism and atomism through the realisation of rights associated with citizenship, implying a true public life within real community (Marx OJQ 1975:228/1; Hunt 1984:164 165).

Marx’s conception of 'political community' highlights the universalism implicit in rights  and liberty and affirms the connection of reason and freedom through the connection of each individual with all individuals in a genuine public life.





Civic unity in this sense would resolve the dualism of ideal and real, rationality and actuality, Kantian duty and inclination. It would overcome the dualism of altruism and egoism and would create the institutional and relational framework which would enable knowledge to triumph over opinion. Irreducible to either private interest or abstract norms, this civic unity embodies moral association in a public life. Philosophy would rule.

Marx is careful to avoid this call for ‘political community’ coming to be projected upwards to the 'abstract and restricted’ community of the state; this abstract state is 'the intermediary between man and man's freedom' (Marx OJQ 1975:218/9). Marx’s 'political community' is the 'true' public life rooted in moral and civic association. This 'social' conception of citizenship is distinguished from the way that citizenship has been employed in the legitimation of the modern state, as 'an alternative "civil religion"' to replace the real forms of community destroyed by bourgeois society (Hobsbawm 1983:267/9). Dandeker  shows  the  extent  to  which, historically, citizenship, rights and democracy have been associated with the modern centralised state, exposing the coexistence of coercive or authoritarian rule within this discourse (Dandeker 1990; Polity Reader 1995:263). The arguments of Hobsbawm and Dandeker apply to the civic and republican turn in contemporary political philosophy, which largely leaves questions of political economy and social relations unaddressed. Marx emphasises the social aspect of ‘true community’, showing how the estrangement of individuals from each other in their social relations separates the individual from the essential bond to others. The social being is the essence of every individual; it is the egoistic individual that is the fiction, the abstraction.

The process of exchange both of human activities in the course of production and of human products is equal to the species-activity and the species-spirit whose real, conscious and authentic existence consists in social activity and social enjoyment. Since the essence of man is the true community of man, men, by activating their own essence, produce, create this human community, this social being which is no abstract, universal power standing over against the solitary individual, but is the essence of every individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth. Therefore, this true community does not come into being as the product of reflection but it arises out of the need and the egoism of individuals, i.e. it arises directly from their own activity. The existence or non-existence of this community does not depend on man; but as long as man does not recognize himself as man, and hence give the world a human organization, this community appears in the guise of estrangement. For its subject, man, is a being estranged from himself. Men, not as abstractions, but as real, living, particular individuals are this community. As they are, so it is too. To say therefore that man is estranged from himself is identical with the statement that the society of this estranged man is the caricature of a true community, of his true species-existence, that therefore his activity is a torment to him, his own creation confronts him as an alien power, his wealth appears as poverty, the essential bond joining him to other men appears inessential, in fact separation from other men appears to be his true existence, his life appears as the sacrifice of his life, the realization of his essence appears as the de-realization of his life, his production is the production of nothing, his power over objects appears as the power of objects over him; in short, he, the lord of his creation, appears as the servant of that creation.

Marx EW JM 1975

 Society, according to Adam Smith, is a commercial society. Which means that ‘each of its members is a merchant’ (Marx JM 1975:266). Marx defines community as ‘the self-activating essence of man’, ‘man's attainment of a species-life’, and ‘truly human existence through the mutuality of men’. Modern economics reduces this community to ‘exchange and trade’, a ‘series of reciprocal exchanges’. ‘We see then how economics establishes the estranged form of social commerce as the essential and fundamental form appropriate to the vocation of man’ (Marx EW JM 1975).
In contrast, Marx defines communism is the 'true community', the 'essence of man' (JM 1975:265), containing the 'real, conscious and authentic existence' of man's 'species-activity' and 'species spirit' through 'social activity and social enjoyment' (JM 1975:265). 
Only with communism can 'human needs' be properly satisfied. Since private property does not allow individuals to recognise themselves as human or 'give the world a human organisation, this community appears in the form of estrangement' (JM 1975:265). 'True community' as genuine public life implied by 'rational freedom' requires that this estrangement be replaced by a mode of existence realising human need. 

This is human emancipation in general: 'All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself’ (OJQ 1975:234). Complete human emancipation involves the establishment of communal human nature in those areas of life excluded from political society, transcending the opposition between civil society and the state itself to create a genuine public life grounded in the real relations between individuals in society:











Marx, Competition And The Common Good

The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975). 

The bourgeois age replaces the undifferentiated unity of the feudal age with a differentiation without unity. Marx challenges this identification of emancipation from ties of personal dependence with freedom as such. Liberal 'independence' 'is at bottom merely an illusion': individuals are 'free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom'. This appears as independence only by abstracting from 'the conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact, and these conditions, in turn, are independent of the individuals and, although created by society, appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable by individuals' (Gr 1973:163/4).

The definedness of individuals, which in feudal society appears as a personal restriction of the individual by another, appears in bourgeois society as ‘an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves’ (Gr 1973:163/4).





Marx thus criticises the 'absurdity’ of liberal thinkers who regard competition 'as the absolute mode of existence of free individuality’. It is not individuals who are set free by competition but capital. This is 'dogmatically propounded’ as freedom 'through constant reflection back on the barriers torn down by free competition’ rather than reflecting upon the 'real development of capital' in the present as an 'external necessity' constraining all individuals (Gr 1973:649/51). Competition ‘posits as an external necessity, that which lies within the nature of capital; competition is nothing more than the way in which the many capitals force the inherent determinants of capital upon one another and upon themselves’ (Marx Gr 1973). 'Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him’ (Marx Cl 1976:381). Hence 'the insipidity of the view that free competition is the ultimate development of human freedom; and that the negation of free competition = the negation of individual freedom’ (Gr 1973:652). This is ‘free development’ on the 'limited basis' of the 'rule of capital’ (1973:652).
Marx analyses what ‘free competition’ really is. ‘This kind of individual freedom is therefore at the same time the most complete suspension of all individual freedom, and the most complete subjugation of individuality under social conditions which assume the form of objective powers, even of overpowering objects - of things independent of the relations among individuals themselves’ (Marx Gr 1973).





A 'society in which the process of production has the mastery over man instead of being controlled by him’ has replaced the ancient worship of Nature as a natural necessity by the worship of Capital as a new social necessity. This appears to the 'bourgeois consciousness’ as a 'self-evident and nature-imposed necessity' (Marx Cl 1976:174/5). But capital's relations of objective and impersonal dependency suppress individuality in the name of individual freedom. Liberal freedom is the 'most complete' 'suspension’ and 'subjugation' of individuality under 'overpowering objects': 'things independent of the relations among individuals themselves’ (Marx Gr 1973:652). The equation of free competition with ‘the ultimate form of the development of the forces of production and hence of human freedom means nothing other than that middle-class rule is the culmination of world history - certainly an agreeable thought for the parvenus of the day before yesterday’ (Marx 1973:652).

Marx dissects the liberal assertion of competition over cooperation as generating the common good. The liberal claim that the pursuit of private interest unwittingly produces the general interest could just as easily mean that 'each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others' interests' so that the pursuit of private interests produces not a 'general affirmation' but a 'general negation' (Marx Gr 1973:156/7). The 'collisions' between 'mutually indifferent individuals' results in their 'subordination to relations which subsist independently of them' (Marx 1973:157). The 'mutual interconnection' between individuals, a 'vital condition' for individuality, comes to be 'alien' to and 'autonomous’ of individuals: 'In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things; personal capacity into objective wealth’ (1973:157). The  exchange  relation establishes itself as 'a power external to and independent of the producers', a means to production thus becoming 'a relation alien to the producers' (1973:146).

‘The product becomes a commodity; the commodity becomes exchange value; the exchange value of the commodity is its immanent money-property; this, its money-property, separates itself from it in the form of money, and achieves a general social existence separated from all particular commodities and their natural mode of existence; the relation of the product to itself as exchange value becomes its relation to money, existing alongside it; or, becomes the relation of all products to money, external to them all. Just as the real exchange of products creates their exchange value, so does their exchange value create money’. (Marx Gr N1 1973). 
 Marx's critique is organised around the idea that freedom is a common project in which each individual is united with all individuals in mutually supportive, life affirming, relations. This project is obstructed by the way that the necessary interconnection between individuals becomes alien and abstract under capital's exchange relations. Exchange and trade establish an enforced common life in which the self-activating human essence and mutual reintegration toward generic and truly human life is expressed as 'an estranged form of social commerce' or intercourse (JM 1975:266). The social bond, 'the reciprocal and all sided dependence of individuals who are indifferent to one another',  is  'expressed in exchange value as an alien 'generality' 'in which all individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished' (Gr 1973:156/7; Meszaros 1989:430 426). Equality and freedom within the capitalist mode of production are thus revealed as formal endowments confined to the abstract realm of law or vested in money, which establishes its equivalence value by levelling all distinctions between things and individuals (1973:156/7 161/2 296 409/10 651/2).

The 'rational' community which is essential to the realisation of the human ontology, human beings as social and rational beings, takes form as the 'objective bond' of money becomes the 'real community' dissolving ancient communities based upon ties of personal dependence (Gr 1973:146/7 161 162 222/3 225 226; Rosdolsky 1989:128/9). The medium of exchange is important because it indicates the extent to which the abstractness characterising social relationships renders real community unavailable: 'The less social power the medium of exchange processes .. the greater must be the power of the community which binds the individuals together' (1973:157).

The question is how to convert the basis of social life so that it is organised around use value rather than exchange value. Marx had the answer.

The transformation, through the division of labour, of personal powers (relationships) into material powers … can only be abolished by the individuals again subjecting these material powers to themselves and abolishing the division of labour. This is not possible without the community. Only in community [with others has each] individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. In the previous substitutes for the community, in the State, etc. personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed within the relationships of the ruling class, and only insofar as they were individuals of this class. The illusory community, in which individuals have up till now combined, always took on an independent existence in relation to them, and was at the same time, since it was the combination of one class over against another, not only a completely illusory community, but a new fetter as well. In a real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association. 

Marx GI 1999: 83/4

Add a passage on the need for intermediary associations connecting individuals to the state, organising particular interests for the general good, and this is about as concise and cogent a statement of the principles of conservatism as one can find. The point is that insofar as the individual is separated from a sense of belonging and participation in associational forms, he or she tends to move in the direction of collectivism as an ‘illusory community’. 

A civilisation is founded on social relations, constitutive ties and moral allegiances, firmly rooted in institutions and a variety of associations. Without this structure, there is nothing but an atomized mass. Writing about the city, Lewis Mumford argued that the contents are more important than the container. Civilisation is a process in which both go together. Without the container, the contents are merely a sand heap of disparate particles of humanity. And denied community and connection in civil life, human beings will seek to have their need for sociality satisfied at the artificial level of the centralized, omnicompetent state. The irony is that Hegel has been accused of making freedom mean worship of the state and Marx has been accused of ‘state socialism’ whereas both, the one a conservative the other a socialist have sought precisely to avoid the all-powerful state as an inevitable consequence of the atomistic, instrumental relations of the ‘free’ market capitalism. 

The important thing about community is the moral and social values that inhere in it. Community is an anthropological datum that satisfies the human need for the society of others. The community offers status, belonging, membership, social identity, public recognition and a coherent moral perspective. It recognises that the individual needs others in order to become and be himself or herself. Community serves social, moral and human needs which can neither be bought nor sold on the market. They are not economic goods. Economic goods alone are morally empty and spiritually insupportable and to the extent that non-economic goods are destroyed or commodified, the society that results is likewise morally empty and spiritually insupportable.

The greatest appeal of community lies in its ability to provide individuals with a sense of moral coherence and communal membership. Fostering this sense is the sine qua non of community capacity building. In weakening this capacity, the ‘free’ market has generated a series of social and psychological dislocations that will, ultimately, undermine the economic order. 

The dislocations and tensions of contemporary society are, of course, endemic to capitalism and the way that it has transformed loyalty to institutions, social ties, the location of social functions, the norms of culture, and, above all, in the origin and location of power. For all of the claims to freedom, capitalism is a force for centralisation. The mythology and cult of individualism conceals capitalism’s inherent tendency to totalitarianism and collectivism. The modern centralising state and capital rose as part of the same historical process and exist in symbiotic relation. The contemporary crisis of intermediate association in politics, industry, society and community originates in capitalism’s tendency to fracture and atomize society in order to concentrate power and control in the state and capital.

In the nineteenth century, English conservative Sir Henry Maine argued that modern history demonstrates a continuous movement away from the centrality of the social group, characterised by status and membership, to the primacy of the legally autonomous individual and impersonal relations of contract. "Throughout all its course [the movement of progressive societies] has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family as the unit of which civil laws take account."

With no hint of regret or nostalgia, Karl Marx borrowed from the conservative Carlyle (Past and Present) to comment on the monetisation of social ties under capitalism. "The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors,' and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment.' It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy waters of egotistical calculation. ... It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborers. The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation."

A number of German sociologists pursued the insights of Marx to analyse the processes which have brought about the an atomization and mechanization of the primary social relationships. Tonnies noted the progressive erosion of the ties of Gemeinschaft — the communal ties of family, guild, and village — and the rise of the impersonal, atomistic, and mechanical relationships of Gesellschaft. Simmel focused upon the depersonalizing effects of the spread of money as means of exchange upon traditional moral and social patterns. Simmel referred to the levelling and fragmenting effect of capitalism upon the contexts of status and membership as a result of the easy convertibility of all qualitative values and status relationships into fluid relationships of contract based upon money. Max Weber drew attention to the way that processes of rationalization and bureaucratization transformed systems of authority, patterns of culture, and the location of social function with the result that the impersonal office and mechanical systems of administration have supremacy over the primary unities of social life.

In France, Le Play and Durkheim also emphasised the socially atomizing effects of the modern forces of technology, individualism, and the division of labour. As Durkheim wrote, "What is in fact characteristic of our development is that it has successively destroyed all the established social contexts; one after another they have been banished either by the slow usury of time or by violent revolution, and in such fashion that nothing has been developed to replace them."
What these social theorists draw attention to is the transition from medieval to modern society in terms of a contrast between a past society characterized by the primacy of custom and community and a modern society, organized increasingly in impersonal terms and resting on the legally autonomous individual. 

The advantage that Hegel has over Marx lies in this sense of the natural pluralism of society, the respect for localism, for autonomous association in civil society and for the family. This pluralism is the surest safeguard against an overly centralized society. For Aristotle, the state is the community of communities, the legitimate claims of each respected in their own sphere. The smaller associations within civil society are intermediate forms in which the general will finds individual expression. Hegel made the estates, corporations, communities, guilds, and families integral to his state as ethical system, but for Marx this amounted to an attempt to resolve the problems of modern capitalist society by obsolete feudal forms. This displays a remarkable neglect of the associative aspects of human life for a socialist, a socialist who is explicitly committed to dissolving the state and capital as alienated social power to be absorbed back into society. Back into what kind of associational social forms? 

Marx's historicism led him to criticise ‘past’ forms as pertaining to past social relations. As to what future forms may look like, Marx was sketchy. Marx celebrated the "gigantic broom of the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, which swept away all these relics of medievalism" yet proposed nothing more than the sketch of commune democracy (Civil War in France). This evasiveness creates a vacuum which is quickly filled by political collectivism and centralization. 

The problem is that beyond the social and historical nature of specific there are certain constants to any social order - family, community, association, and religion are traditional affiliations in that there has never been a society or a civilisation without these in one form or another. Building the social forms of a future civilisation starts from these constants and embeds social and cultural plurality within a variety of social centres. This recognises the pluralism of society and the nature of solidaristic social ties, loyalties and allegiances. 

Totalitarianism is not just a centralisation and pervasiveness of power but the suppression of those constitutive social ties and associations within which individuality develops. The autonomous forms of social association function to ground political community in civil life, checking the tendency of the state to become an omnipotent institution separated from its social roots. The isolated individual separated from associative ties, loyalties and solidarities is powerless. With the atomization of society, the smaller communities of society diminish and the individual loses the sense of place and belonging. With social atomization, autonomous association is weakened and individual identity is diminished. 

An associative politics seeks to enhance the power of the smaller communities of society, to extend the range of cultural and social opportunities offered by productive activity, religion, and kinship, strengthen the social roots of the individual. Personality flourishes and develops autonomy against external power through the intermediate layers of value and association within the social ties and allegiances of community. The social contexts of family, church, production, association preserve the communal spirit against atomization. The political and economic enslavement of individuals to the centralised state and the ‘free’ market requires the emancipation of individuals from all associative ties and memberships that serve, in one way or another, to protect the individual from alien power. The inversion of the meaning of slavery and freedom reveals the paradox of modernity. Marx argues that the ties of dependence upon persons in the feudal age has been replaced by the impersonal dependency of all upon objects in the modern world (Grundrisse). 

The emancipation of the individual from traditional ties of class, religion, and kinship is a personal freedom; however, this personal freedom has left the individual isolated from other individuals whilst being confronted by vast impersonal forces and objective powers – capital and commodities, the state and bureaucracy, technology. Individual freedom is thus accompanied by social anxiety, insecurity, even disintegration. What we see is expanding masses of insecure individuals seeking communal refuge of one form or another, pop music, sport etc becoming targets for common loyalties and allegiances. The egoistic image of homo economicus is theoretically inadequate, morally impoverished, psychologically mean, anthropologically intolerable and socially impossible. The self-maximising individual of economic theory is not self-sufficing in social isolation. Human nature cannot be deduced simply from those elements which fit crude economic models. Individualism is a false mythology that ignores the fact that between the individual and social groups such as the family, local community, and interest association there is an indispensable connection which makes individuality possible and creates the context in which it flourishes. There is no conception of individuality which does not refer to the constitutive ties which normatively and solidaristically bind the individual to others from birth to death, generation to generation. Human beings are social, familial and historical beings.

Moral conscience and the sense of civilized decency is fostered by the associative ties. It is this connection of each individual with other individuals that generates, reinforces and gives expression to the moral imperatives of conscience. Individualist liberalism conceives human nature according to the model of market capitalism and thus seeks to separate individuals from the primary contexts of normative association so as to create a mass of atoms competing on the market. This separates individuals from primary contexts, social ties, culture and hence from the very sources which nurture individuality itself. 

A viable political philosophy proceeds not from the individual abstracted from society but with the personalities of human beings as they are actually formed and function association. What the actual world shows is not the abstract State presiding over a mass of unrelated individuals, a phenomenon of modern social relationships, but a vast complex of associations - families, clubs, functional groups, professional bodies, trade unions, colleges – comprising individuals.

The idea that the free individual is one who is emancipated from the binding ties of kinship, corporation, and community, characterises the individualist liberalism of the English speaking world. There was always an alternative in the corporate liberalism of Hegel. The autonomous individual is possible only in a social context of autonomous associations and groups, autonomous in their own sphere but joined together in a mutually enhancing and enriching social matrix of cultural norms, communal spirit, moral imperatives and functional institutions. 





16 CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social Capital And Local Culture
Building local cultural resources and social capital is crucial to community capacity building, enabling people to do more for themselves, participating as active members in their communities, extending relations and networks to restore health and vigour to social life. This is why it is so important to emphasise policies and practices that are able to draw communities together. Public transport is one but there are also schemes for sharing journeys by private transport; recycling to allow the reuse of unwanted items is another, bringing individuals together not only to make a for a cleaner community, but to form the community. 

Cooperation between nations on policies to deal with climate change can foster collaborative approaches on other issues, thus bringing the people of the world closer together in maker the world a better, cleaner, more pleasant and just place to live. Teamwork between and within nations reaches all levels, from the smallest community upwards, so as to improve the life for all individuals. 

The idea of cultural and social capital clearly resonates with the positive vision of a viable ecological society comprising community land trusts, local money, LETS, time banks, housing trusts, cooperatives etc. 

It is worth examining notions of cultural and social capital and community capacity building closely. And this revisits the notion of public-private partnership from a particular angle, examining not its successes or failures as a form of urban economic development – which is how it was understood – but as the organisational form of community regeneration and empowerment. From this perspective, partnership mobilises the talents and marshals the resources of communities within an urban regeneration project and as such offers a form of ecological praxis, organised practical activity that draws numbers into social movement as members, actors, citizens. 

In ranging between bottom-up and top-down approaches, certain aspects of partnership contain the potential to transcend the parameters of official, institution-led, private business dominated partnership by mobilising participants in the direction of a self-organising, self-governing community. This is particularly the case with respect to capacity building and reciprocal understanding across participating members. The measure of a successful regeneration partnership, then, is the extent to which a regenerated community is able to transcend the institutional parameters of the original partnership by replacing the representatives of ‘official’ society, public and private with more organic forms rooted in the community. A successful partnership is therefore self-transcending or self-dissolving within the active self-regulating community. The successful emergence of community organisation across a variety of fields implies the increasing capacity of a community to be truly self-ordering and self-governing.

This eco-community perspective distances itself from the practice of the partnership model in recent experience, not only with respect to urban regeneration but most of all with respect to political implications. The UK partnership model compares very unfavourably with the American inspired ‘broad based organising’ (BBO) (Farnell et al 1994) in which local ‘actions’ promote initiatives that are fully accountable to local communities. Most importantly, rejecting the top-down approach, emphasis is placed upon ‘political pressure’ proceeding from the bottom-up through organisation building. BBO gives a voice within the community to the ‘hitherto voiceless’ through a broad based form of community involvement sustained by a ‘day to day activism’ (Farnell et al 1994).

There is a need, then, to examine the conditions that enable community groups and agencies to develop their organisational, political, cultural and intellectual capacities so as to be able to participate effectively in community and urban regeneration schemes. This is to envisage partnership as resting upon genuinely bottom-up structures, powered dynamically from below as a result of the development of social capital on the part of local communities. This shows an aspect of capacity building within the community that possesses the organisational and moral potential to transcend the official institutional approach within ‘top-down’ partnerships. In becoming active in community organisations and in gaining access to the policy process through partnership, individuals – the hitherto marginalized and excluded – develop their capacities to engage in local regeneration and, ultimately, govern their common affairs.

Back in the 1980’s Kaase referred to the 'participatory revolution’ of contemporary society (Kaase 1984). And the contours of such a revolution are becoming visible in any number of social movements, some reactionary – concerned with tax and government – many much more progressive and expansive. There is a great and growing demand for participation in government and government policy and this could feed very easily into involvement in community affairs. As Colin Ward argues, if people no longer trust local or central government to analyse their problems and prescribe their solutions, they also reject the narrow presentation of alternatives on which they could comment before final decision. There is now a demand for much more proactive community involvement:





Ward identifies the central flaw of the concept of public-private partnership as a relationship between government and the private market - its exclusion of a third sector, ‘the residents of the community affected’.





It’s that ‘third sector’ that an ecological praxis building the green society should focus upon drawing into a participatory social movement. The potential in generating social and cultural resources and channelling them into a constitutive eco-praxis is substantial. If ‘the money motive’ is the only serious force in an urban regeneration project, then that project will almost certainly fail. There needs to be an input from members of the local community. This is the heart and soul of a genuine regeneration. ‘There is less chance of getting things seriously wrong if sensible and effective ways are found of consulting the existing inhabitants of our cities’ (Ward 1989:56). That ‘third sector’, the popular praxis of community activists and citizens, is the green constituency, generating the ecological sensibility through practical projects with tangible results. Local community organisations are highly effective getting things done and in winning the loyalties of the public in a way that government agencies and business interests are not. In contrast to the millions spent on official projects, which in so many cases seem to have little if any permanent effect, the community-inspired self-help activities lay the groundwork for first stabilising an area and then becoming a springboard for recovery (Ward 1989:62).

The idea of an ecological praxis building the eco-society points to the need to develop capacity building within communities. The purpose of capacity building is to empower communities and make it possible for individuals to do things for themselves in concert. Capacity building creates the organisations, structures and networks which facilitate the process of self-activity and self-initiative. The skills of local people are developed to enable them to take charge of their urban future (Geddes 1995).

Capacity building on the part of the community is a process that enhances:

1)	the empowerment of communities, because people increasingly do things for themselves;
2)	the ability to create structures and networks to assist this process;
3)	skills to enable local people to take charge of their futures (Jacobs and Dutton in Roberts and Sykes 2000:118).

Community organising through the development of grass roots partnerships is a creative response to a lack of material power and resources through the creation of social capital. The point goes beyond economics to envisage a ‘participatory’ conception of governance, with individuals emerging as active citizens, as against the more passive identity within the institutions of representative democracy. 

The idea of partnership possess the potential to transcend urban regeneration by embracing a broader range of activities. A wider scope increases the possibility of envisaging partnership as broadening participatory structures within the community, extending the participatory conception of democracy into the decision making sphere in community and public life. Examples here include residents’ associations, area fora, the users’ committees of a variety of facilities such as leisure centres and youth and age groups. Democracy is therefore transformed to mean working with rather than merely for local people (Hill 2000:182/3).

This raises a question as to whether this myriad of civic and community activity between the market and the state is a new form of social government in the process of evolution. Putnam (1993) employs the concept ‘social capital’ with respect to the ways in which norms such as trust, reciprocity, and social networks facilitate collective action in societies and communities (see also Foley and Edwards 1999:142). Putnam explains differences between the effectiveness of governmental units in different regions of Italy by differentials in social capital:





In one view (eg Fukuyama) social capital contrasts with physical capital (for example machines) and human capital (for example education). Social capital pertains to the social relationships, expectations, obligations and norms that facilitate productive human activity. But is there is something inherently limiting to connect the notion to productive human activity reduced to economics? Productive in what sense? Commercial life? Or community life? Productivity is capable of a much richer definition in terms of human creativity of the social world as a whole, not just institutions, manufactures, technology but ideas, culture, beliefs. 

Putnam makes a distinction between two types of social capital. The first type is bonding social capital, relationships within a group; the second type is bridging social capital, relationships that link a group with others. Together, these comprise the social capital of any given social group: ‘Bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilising solidarity. Dense networks in ethnic enclaves, for example, provide crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community .. Bridging networks, by contrast, are better for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion.. Moreover bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves’ (Putnam 2000:22-3). 

In Coal, Capital and Culture, an examination of the sociology of changing conditions in former mining areas, Warwick and Littlejohn define a concept of ‘local cultural capital’ in terms of the strength that the community drew from social networks ‘based in kinship, friendship and neighbourliness in household and community settings’. These networks held community together in a ‘period of change’ during which the local economy was destroyed. The networks were the strength of the towns and villages (Turner 2000:2). 
Margaret Thatcher’s dream of an ‘enterprise culture’ could never be easily embedded in a community which rested upon these solidaristic notions. Academics analyse local efforts at economic regeneration to determine how many and what kind of new jobs had been created; Training and Enterprise Councils produce figures about the number of training placements they provided; local authorities circulate glossy brochures concerning the number of multi-agency partnerships they had established; and regeneration agencies boast about the call centres they have established on shiny new industrial estates; local councils in medium sized towns in decline run ‘city growth strategies’.. But what is always missing is ‘spirit’, that elusive quality which Warwick and Littlejohn identify as ‘local cultural capital’. It may be true that urban degeneration is manifested most obviously in the deterioration of the physical environment. However, this physical degeneration is the outer manifestation of a moral, spiritual and cultural degeneration proceeding within the heart of the community. Strategies that focus exclusively upon the regeneration of the physical environment have merely one part of the problem in view. It may be possible, over time, with sufficient resources, to rebuild urban areas through training places and employment opportunities and self-employment starter packs. The fact remains that the communities that are most in need of regeneration were formerly held together by a ‘spirit’ that can neither be quantified nor objectified. This spirit was a cultural resource that members of the community had developed over generations, a culture based on collectivism, kinship and upon advancement by cooperation rather than individualism, solidarity rather than self-interest. The social institutions at the heart of community symbolised this collective spirit that true regeneration needs to recover: the Co-op; the miners’ welfare; the club trip; the union. Rebuilding the spirit of community takes longer and requires the active participation of community members themselves (Turner 2000:280).

The spirit of community is a collective spirit, a culture of collective purpose and identity which is not created by a property- or market-led regeneration which has the private sector as the lead agency. A regeneration which is orientated towards fostering an enterprise culture, where the engine is private effort and where the motivation is private gain, fails to address the real issue – the true spirit of a community and the consequences of its loss, the rupturing of society, the dissolution of a collective community through a rationalistic desolidarisation. Regeneration that does not address the loss of this collective culture will fail. Regeneration efforts need to enable members of the community to unite themselves so as to transcend a series of individualistic survival strategies and hence generate a local cultural capital.

In what sense does this regeneration as the creation of local cultural resources, community spirit and social capital count as an ecological praxis? The green collar economy, the provision of green infrastructures and the greening of the city address all the issues of urban regeneration and more – social housing, local employment, transport, landscape, urban ecology, facilities and so on. But it does this with a view to boosting the quality of life and control of the residents of the community not increasing their dependence on outside interests with non-local priorities. 

In seeking to establish the character and content of the urban public realm as eco-community, it is worth drawing a distinction between use value and exchange value in relation to place. This is to distinguish between the use that individuals make of the built environment as a site for work, life and recreation and the market exchange value of that environment to commercial interests (Fainstein 1994:1).

Molotch and Logan argue that ‘there are two distinct sets of urban interests (and local political agendas that follow from them) in any .. urban area. Some people seek wealth through the development, sale or rent of land and buildings; others’ primary interest in place is as a setting for daily life and production. These two corresponding sets of purposes, often in direct conflict with one another, correspond to the Marxian description of commodities as providing for both exchange and use value’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144).

This distinction sets up a contrast between the capitalist reduction of urban space to exchange value on the one hand and the attempt on the part of the citizen community to reappropriate urban space as a use value on the other.

Urban regeneration in the US in the 1980’s focused firmly upon exchange value. Dominant in the redevelopment and gentrification of US cities were ‘a set of actors who push for local growth maximisation to increase returns from real estate manipulation and other business activities specifically dependent on local growth – collectively making up the “growth machine”’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). The focus upon the activities of ‘local growth coalitions’ in the US reveals the extent to which restless and aggressive commercial interests dominate at the expense of the community. The policies pursued by such coalitions are often ‘environmentally destructive, fiscally damaging and socially regressive for urban populations’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144; 1987).

The argument of Molotch and Logan shows how the interests comprising the urban environment can be polarised. The purposes and priorities of urban growth coalitions dominated by commercial interests not only do not necessarily coincide with other urban interests but may well conflict with the interests of others in the urban locality, particularly in the sense that citizen interests are primarily ‘oriented towards use values of urban space’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). Commercial interests concerned with the exploitation of exchange values can override local citizens more concerned with use values. Urban space is characterised by a latent tendency towards conflict and divergence between the users of urban space and the exploiters of urban space, between those who conceive urban space as a living environment for citizens and those who conceive urban space as a site of commercially exploitable economic activities. This implies antagonism between citizen interests and commercial interests, between community groups concerned with living space and growth coalitions concerned with accumulation and profit.

The city as a growth machine is a capitalist machine organised around accumulation and in which banking, finance, property, building, developers as well as representatives from within the formal political sector have the initiative. The purpose is to produce the social and physical infrastructures as prerequisites of accumulation, facilitating the conversion of surplus capital into new commodity production through combining surplus means of production with surplus labour power. 





A regeneration conceived in terms of community building, spirit and cultural and social capital seeks to reclaim the city as use value as against attempts to reduce the urban realm to a sphere for producing exchange value. This emphasis upon the local community realm does not imply parochialism. Local economies in the advanced world could establish trading arrangements, having greater control at this level than is the case with anonymous transfers of exchange value via business interests with private priorities independent of place. The point with respect to city regions goes further than the nation. Establishing links with other parts of the world could effect an enduring international understanding that involves the transfer of goods, people and ideas. It is possible to act locally and think globally. But it is also possible to think locally and act globally. Greater self-sufficiency makes sustainable employment possible. Given uneven development, some cities will be better placed than others to begin with. But self-sufficiency would make local economies less dependent upon a range of goods and services from outside the area. This would have the effect in the long run of reducing costly transportation. The end in view is to abolish the tyranny of exchange value as a systemic imposition upon place and people and to affirm the primacy of use value as determined by the citizen body. ‘Ultimately, capital would be for the use of people rather than people for capital (Short 1989:21).

Examining the forms that this principle of use value could take brings the discussion into the area of community empowerment, organisation and development. The distinction between use and exchange value identifies the polarities that exist in regeneration strategies by exposing competing perceptions of the urban environment on the part of different agents. The idea of the urban environment as the site of commercial activity producing preconditions of accumulation is a very different notion to the idea of the urban environment as a lifeworld site of everyday human activity. The tension that this creates ‘lies at the heart of a number of urban problems and also helps to define the limits within which solutions can be constructed and applied’ (Roberts 2000:10/1).

Partnership approaches to urban regeneration have been accompanied by numerous attempts to coopt ‘the community’ as just one partner among many. It isn’t. The community is the content of the place, its moral, cultural, solidaristic essence. Part of this process has involved reducing ‘social capital’ to being merely a ‘factor of production’ like labour and machines and raw materials. For Francis Fukuyama ‘if people who have to work together in an enterprise trust one another because they are operating to a set of ethical norms, doing business costs less’ (Fukuyama 1995). This is an impoverished notion compared to the way that ‘social capital’ is being defined and used in this argument. Proceeding from Warwick and Littlejohn’s conception of ‘local cultural capital’ as the behavioural norms specific to a local community, social capital is to be defined as a solidaristic notion that pertains to the collective resources that a community generates through its self-organisation and self-activity in order to counteract its lack of material power. 

The concept of ‘social capital’ defines the capacity of those lacking material power and resources to create capital through their organisation and activity. Community organising creating ‘social capital’ transcends ‘the economic’ and its emphasis upon quantifiable measures of how much land and how many buildings have been brought into industrial use, how many training places have been provided, etc. It is more than producing preconditions for private accumulation and instead focuses upon the urban environment as a lived space and experience, a use value controlled by the people who live there. This is a conception that concerns the strengthening of social bonds and relationships between members of a community. Unlike physical capital, measured in terms of products, or human capital, developed through education and training, social capital possesses a cultural dimension pertaining to ethical and behavioural norms within a community. ‘Social capital’ generates cooperation, trust, self-discipline and recognises that psychology or culture, the ‘spirit’ of a community is as strong a factor in urban well-being as the level of capital investment, employment opportunities, training places. 

 To emphasise the importance of social capital is to widen the scope of community building beyond the emphasis on exchange value in which everything is quantified, commodified and measured. It is to organise around use value in building upon the local community and the mobilisation of the new social movements. This initiates a trend away from official agencies and institutions towards people reclaiming their productive activity and living space as a use value, thus absorbing politics into the grassroots. In engaging in politics at both local and regional levels, individuals empowering themselves within the communities in which they live. Community organisations can be actively involved in the provision of social services and economic activities in the local environment, enhancing mutual aid mechanisms and strengthening social solidarity. Such movements thrive on the social and cultural capital they create, thus overcoming the relative lack of material resources. Such movements can pressure the conventional political sphere into providing a supporting framework for the empowerment of local populations, a framework which fosters cooperative organisation in the provision of services, of housing and in production. Such an approach nurtures the formation of skills through being able to tap the resources in the local community.

Such local community development is crucial to the creation of an ecological sensibility and to the building of an ecological urban public. Nothing succeeds like success and nothing motivates more than positive outcomes and tangible results. The creation of local cultural resources and social capital is an empowerment that affirms people’s capacity to generate use values. The strengthening of local networks and the development of community life improves urban life markedly through increased public activity. Organisation can begin with community protest and campaigning. Castells points out the extent to which urban protest actually creates a community; a community as such does not exist until its members raise their voices and take action on urban issues. ‘The struggle for community created a communal foundation on which to base a broader fight’ (Castells 1983:260/1). Urban social movements are, then, important in building the public life of a community by sharing mobilisation through a network of activities and organisations. 

Community building and mobilisation from below extends structures and practices of participation and encourages demands for participatory democracy at higher levels of organisation.

In the contemporary world, civic order is being overtaken by civic attrition, leading to the extension of coercive forms of social control. The heterogeneity of neighbourhoods is being replaced by the homogeneity of bureaucratic imposition, the constitution of a civic order through a socially active citizenry is being replaced by an economic development which is fiscally supported by government agencies. The principal concerns of those who run cities in the contemporary world are economic growth rather than civic culture, public integrity and community activism. City dwellers are treated as clients rather than as citizens, and are the passive recipients of services, not active participants in the provision of services. With success measured in economic rather than civic terms and with freedom coming to be relocated from the public to the private realm, urban governance becomes a matter of bureaucratic management and manipulation of the masses so as to deliver the objectives set by a pre-determined developmental business agenda.

The diminution of public spaces for citizen discourse, interaction and association amounts to the death of the city. The classical conception of city-state as a public sphere, an arena of communication and administration presumes the existence of public spaces for the formation of public consciousness. Without such a public arena in which individuals assert themselves as active citizens, there is no polis, no community and no citizenship. There is no public consciousness and no learning through the exchange of ideas and information. Instead, public life takes the form of political and business agendas formulated by professional elites in abstraction from the demos and promoted via top-down ‘public’ institutions. This is the very antithesis of public life. The bureaucratic management of social space in the interests of accumulation has the effect of turning the urban environment over to the imperatives of endless economic development. Such things as the gentrification and the mallification of the city symbolise the extent to which individuals are treated as consumers rather than citizens, reinforcing the extent to which the pursuit of freedom is no longer a collective project undertaken in conscious deliberation with others in the public realm. In this depoliticised urban landscape, individuals not as citizens but taxpayers. Politics is given a price. Freedom is identified with keeping that price as low as possible. Proposals for radical change and social and environmental justice falter before a mass electorate of passive voters who see themselves as taxpayers locked into the pursuit of freedom and happiness in the private economy rather than citizens joined together in a public realm.

Movements for community control look to realise the goal of civic self-management, overcoming social domination in favour of a free, self-governing citizenry independent of the formal state sphere. This active citizenship is realised in institutional forms organised within a civic public sphere. 
The urban social movements represent the self-constitution of public life through citizen identity and activity. The urban social movements can be valued to the extent that they are based upon extensive participatory structures which are autonomous of the formal political sphere and its dependence upon financial and business interests. They are vehicles for the repoliticisation of the civil sphere against the abstracted public of the state. This is a self-socialisation which contains the potential for filling civil society with political content, organising society around collective issues properly considered ‘public’. 
Associations of civic groups are part of a process in which the demos cease to be a mere aggregate and instead become a citizen body. The urban social movements extend and embed social structures and encourage and facilitate citizen participation in contrast to the way that formal political structures narrow the scope for participation. This is to foster empowerment and a sense of political involvement and so check the pervasive sense of powerlessness that disfigures contemporary city life. Urban social movements are evidence of a burgeoning civic awareness, activism and responsibility and contain the potential for social transformation driven by notions of long term public good. Social movements represent the assertion of social structure over political structure through the participatory aspirations of their members. They represent a claim to urban governance on the part of members defining their individuality in terms of citizenship, forging the associative relations and communal bonds of public life through deliberation, interaction and cooperation.
The complex networking of community groups and associations promotes a conception of decentralised urban governance practising forms of self-management through neighbourhood government and grassroots democracy. Social movement networking generates a sense of social awareness and develops a degree of civic liberty in everyday life activity. The mobilisation of city dwellers through urban social movements thus reclaims the city as an urban public space constituted by an active citizenry. Rationality here denotes a civic self-awareness and public consciousness. This presumes an urban environment in which individuals as citizens can conceptually comprehend the forces that shape social life and thereby assume control of them. Comprehension and control are crucial conditions of autonomy and rationality. And these require the practical reappropriation of power alienated to the state and capital and the reorganisation of this power as a social power. Power is diffused throughout civil society, investing it with political significance and governmental capacity. The mental, material and institutional appropriation and exercise of social power cultivates the growth of human being, generating social forms and organs of popular control which expand rather than inhibit the human ontology.

Such a conception of the urban future is ‘rational’ in being scaled to human dimensions, being accessible to human comprehension and control. For Aristotle, the core of the city is an active, rational citizenry. In talking about the city, Lewis Mumford argued that the most important thing about the container is its contents. In truth, the two go together. Without the container, the contents are spread and dissipated, without character or identity. The true city is constituted by and can be reshaped by citizen activity; but it is also the form which gives shape, order and significance to citizen activity, gives citizens an identity. The city is a form which contains the active citizen body as its content. Without this citizenry, there is no city and vice versa. 


Aristotle’s argument is a political ecology in the broad sense of a humanly scaled public life, as politikon bion, being a condition of human self-realisation. In conditions of overscale power this argument implies decentralisation. Power is to be kept within human proportions so as to ensure everyday human contact and exchange. Human scale is not merely institutional but intellectual and spiritual and anthropological. It is a political ecology which defines an existential civic arena based upon an active rational citizenry. And it is a human ecology. Marx’s demand for the restitution of social power to the social body and for conscious common control of relations affirms the classical principle of scale as the condition of the politikon bion which is crucial to self- and social fulfilment. The ideal city asserts the ‘rule of man’ over the ‘rule of property’ (Marx 1975:208).

ICT And Community
There is another sense in which the creation of cultural and social capital can be conceived as a ‘rational’ ecology. Defining social capital as a dependent variable of a community network, Riedel et al focus upon the three essential components of social capital (interpersonal trust, social norms and association membership) and evaluate the impact that computers and network use can have on these elements. From this perspective, proposals for electronic democracy are valued as a means to achieving equality of political participation. Such a notion implies equality in terms of access to information technologies and to the skills necessary for using the technologies. The authors argue that such equality can be achieved by accentuating social or group-based forms of participation. In this respect, social capital is a valuable concept since it ‘deals directly with equality by predicting the conditions under which those lacking resources can co-operate to accomplish collective ends’ (Riedel et al 1998:375). 

The emergence of the new information and communications technologies (ICTs) has added a potentially radical dimension to the notion of community control and promises to realise the ‘rational’ ideal of an intersubjective community of active, interacting citizens in its most direct and literal form. There may well be a direct connection emerging between citizenship as an active designation, community culture, communication and political self-management.

The implications of the new ICT’s for community capacity building and social capital are profound. ‘A new, “wired” political community is emerging, a net-polis. The contours and nature of this political community are only in formation, nebulous. The task of research is to study what is happening, why, and what possible patterns might emerge. A major concern – for politicians, scholars and citizens – is maintaining democratic values in cyberspace: equal access, responsibility, representativity, public control and accountability’ (Walch 1999:23). These democratic values point to the need to revalue the potential of individuals to shape the new communication media in forms that are liberatory, creative, educational and socially supportive. This suggests the need to explore the potential connections that exist between electronic communication and local community. Whilst ICT implies new electronic networks which are independent of geography, there are grounds for believing that new technologies may be integral to the recovery and strengthening of place based social meaning. The activities of community groups, social support networks, voluntary organisations and government agencies have highlighted the liberatory and transformative potentials of the information and communications technologies (ICTs) in myriad ways. 

 Community informatics (CI) are engendering new possibilities for fostering social cohesion and inclusion over against social exclusion and polarisation, strengthening neighbourhood ties, overcoming cultural isolation and giving community members, urban activists, and policy-makers an awareness of feasible alternative futures (Rheingold 1994; Schuler 1996). In this perspective, the new media contains the potential for reviving community life for individuals. ICT is something that individuals can access and use in sharp contrast to the vast abstract processes beyond human comprehension and control which govern the wider world. To the likes of Rheingold, computer mediated social relations function as the conduit through which spontaneous electronic interaction engender new forms of community structures and culture.

The new ICTs enhance remote or distributed self-management on the part of local communities. Local information has the same capacity under networked local control and management as when it is under central management and control. Connecting decentralised computing capacity with a communications capacity enables work to be undertaken from any remote location that is networked. There is the potential here for the local ownership and management of information; the potential to engage in information-intensive activities at a distance, to exploit local nuance, accent or timbre in the processing of information and of products; and the ability to exploit economies of disaggregation, the synergies of distributed production networks and the flexibility of small-scale distributed management and control. The implications for small communities are significant, easing access to markets and suppliers, to information providers and to others for mutual support. This enhances the possibility of competing effectively from a distance with globalised producers (Gurstein 1998).
The rapid expansion of Internet-enabled activism and organising is most clearly manifested in the anti-WTO protests, but it contains the potential for future lines of development involving distributed opportunities for information-management and information control. It offers not only a way of connecting the local with the global but of connecting a plurality of locals across the global to effectively assert local priorities against global imperatives. The activities of others in distant places but with common concerns and common goals serves to inspire the emergence of local groups concerned to assert these issues and interests on the local terrain. Information is exchanged seamlessly between different locales and serves to counteract the systemic pressures of a supra-communal and supra-national business and finance. Community networks or community networking provide a means of developing and sustaining locally based information systems to buttress local development, facilitating local empowerment through the management and use of local systems. The broader struggles are supplemented and complemented by local concerns and local resources, strengthening both through pooling numbers, resources, experiences, knowledge and information.

The development of community information infrastructure of systems and networks creates the means by which local interests, objectives and responsibilities may be served. ICTs are set within a framework which permits their use to manage local processes and to participate in global processes. Increasingly, these local processes are in opposition to and even in direct conflict with the global processes and the way that technology and economic activities are remotely managed and controlled.

In this sense, community networking forms a potential counter-current to globalisation (Castells). There is a need, in this sense, to develop the pragmatics with respect to the means for adapting ICTs within community processes – community development, e-health, e-culture, e-government and e-politics and not least e-exchange and e-commerce.

Community networking offers the organisational means for grounding a local framework of ICT within community. The management and control of a locally based computing buttresses collaborative community-based activities. The true potential of local computing is realised as local empowerment achieved by enhancing computing access with the effect of integrating individuals into local structures of computing and community. 

As access to computing facilities increases, there are numerous and parallel applications, including the opportunity for the community to assume ownership and control of its own identity, especially the ‘products’ of its culture and language. This is important at a time when the corporate forces of globalisation are looking to capture and commodify vast swathes of culture and knowledge as intellectual property, protected by rules of copyright and patent. Communities have the ability to resist privatisation by affirming their own sense of public space and public resources, utlilising ICTs to preserve, capture and exert ownership over the products of local cultural development, production, history and knowledge (Turk and Trees 2000).
Networking, a basic ecological principle, is the key to the new urban future. Whether one refers to traditional development organisations or the newly established community-technology centres, networks are integral to the most successful strategies for ICT-based development. This doesn’t simply apply to a network of computers but applies more generally to the process of linking individuals together using computers – thus combining the ICT resources with local capacities in flexible, creative structures.
The emergence of new types of networked small enterprises, both public and private, demonstrates the potential for exploiting the synergies of scale and of intra-organisational linkages (ease of communications, common administrative systems, creation of common organisational cultures) that had formally been considered to be available only to the large corporations. Here one sees the basis of the ‘third sector’ economy that can expand within the bloated shell of public state and private market (see Hirst 1994).
Projecting visions of the ‘information society’ has largely been the preserve of those who have profited from new developments: ‘wired condos in the sky, high-tech communications between the suburban semi-castle and the Caribbean island time-share, wired cities speeding the commerce of the rich and bringing infotainment to the rest. These are actually the dullest aspects of the potential of ICT, commercial, consumerist and conformist. The real potential of ICT lies in its capacity to reinvigorate the ‘local’ community and economy and, most importantly of all, in the extent to which it stimulates the activity, involvement and enthusiasm of individuals who have long since abandoned conventional politics. The public form that the ‘wired world’ may take if ICTs were adapted into the social practices of counter-publics creating their own social capital is an area which of massive, untapped political potential.  The true radical potential of the ICTs lies in the decentralisation of power, control and resources. The mainframe era characterised by the concentration of computing power and the supporting technical resources is disappearing. Personal computers permit powerful yet decentralised computing for local users and not just, as in the past, for those who can afford specialised technical support. The potential for the empowerment of individuals and local communities arising from the personal computer is in the process of being realised.

This has a bearing on precisely how the local and the global relate and intersect. The nexus of power and the rejuvenation of citizenship are likely to reside in the interaction between the virtual and the real. Physical place will be empowered by the global reach of the virtual; the virtual will be empowered by the material force of the real. It is in this zone of engagement that the true resistance to the global and the globalising will be contested.

The ongoing attempts to subordinate communities, whether virtual or real, to commercial objectives will flounder for the simple reason that the most valuable activities within communities share the ethic of the ‘gift’ and ‘hacker’ culture as opposed to the commodity cultures of the e-commerce juggernauts. This points to use value as a prior and permanent resource over against exploitative exchange value, hence the continuous attempts of business to commodify all non-market resources and bring them within the domain of the market. Communities are primarily concerned with assuming responsibility for the immediate environment – whether physical resources, the cultural environment of the education and arts and language and music, the reproduction of ethical systems, the virtual environments of communications and vital usable information. These are the use values which are the true sense of a public life and community. The economic exchange and commerce which takes place in a community are undertaken as elements of re-production, emerging as the unintended consequences of more vital urban activities, not as the overriding imperative. The potential for community control will be realised when virtual and physical force merge so that the ‘hi touch’ of the physical is reinforced by the ‘hi tech’ of the virtual.

17 SCIENCE, LEARNING AND CIVILISATION

One returns to the notion of a learning mechanism embedded in a social order enabling human beings to ascend the levels of cognition, from impulse, instinct, desire and want to interest (both self and collective, individual and sectional) and further up to empathy, sympathy, understanding, knowledge and reason and wisdom. On the horizontal level, the split between left and right are simply alternative versions of the same thing. It is the vertical level that matters, exchanging opinion (doxa) for knowledge (nous). 

The question of civilisation as a learning mechanism is also a question of political and social organisation – what institutional framework is necessary to turn knowledge into public  policy, theory into practice. Appropriate structures, systems and institutions embed learning and culture and technics within public life to ensure that knowledge is translated into public policy. That mechanism guides individuals to knowledge.

There is plenty of ‘passionate intensity’ in the world of opinion. The worst always do seem to be full of passionate intensity. Bertrand Russell’s words are apt here: ‘the more I know, the less I assert’. The real paradox is that it is always the world of opinion that seems to generate passionate intensity sufficient to drown out knowledge. The world of knowledge, by definition, lacks certainty. 

For all that it analyses, the scientific worldview cannot form the basis of a civilisation. For all that it is, science is not a philosophy, an ethos, a culture. Which is why an Enlightenment focused on reason in the scientific and technical aspect keeps falling short of its promise, even turning against the peace, freedom, democracy it promises. For all it contributes to knowledge and understanding, science does not and cannot deliver meaning of itself. The domain of science is on the other side of the subject/object, fact/value, material/spiritual divide. The Enlightenment continues to struggle to redeem its promises precisely because it focuses on the one side of this divide, failing to realise that knowledge and its accumulation does not deliver meaning nor increase wisdom. The Faustian pact upon which the modern world rests places its faith in science, its method and its results on the assumption that the expansion of reason it delivers will be meaning enough. This faith is misplaced. The result is a culture of uncertainty and even anxiety since, ultimately, science is not so much about ‘truth’ as its endless questioning. The achievements are real but are not integrated into a wider culture. Human beings live more copiously but not more happily; more proficiently but not more meaningfully; we live with more knowledge but not more wisdom. To know how does not answer the question of why.

As Bertrand Russell argued: ‘Science, by itself, cannot supply us with an ethic. It can show us how to achieve a given end, and it may show us that some ends cannot be achieved. But among ends that can be achieved our choice must be decided by other than purely scientific considerations. If a man were to say, 'I hate the human race, and I think it would be a good thing if it were exterminated,' we could say, 'Well, my dear sir, let us begin the process with you.' But this is hardly argument, and no amount of science could prove such a man mistaken.’ (Russell 1950 in Gardner 1984: 406-7.)

Many will take their cue from Darwin and will insist that there is ‘splendour’ in the scientific worldview. But this is not meaning, as Darwin himself understood. Perhaps meaning will always be elusive: '[The] ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry,' was the way that Hume put it, implying that meaning will remain as mysterious as the ultimate questions on which it depends.
However, meaning is not a mystery but a quest. Meaning is not found only in that domain where object, fact, matter are the limits of possible knowledge, building a world around so as to assert that that is all there is, all that can be known. Shakespeare’s comment, that ‘there are more things under heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy’, captures the sense that the yearning for meaning is satisfied by not by knowledge, or knowledge alone, but by living on the thresholds of ignorance.

And it is a way of living in its Socratic origins, ethos as a practice and a way of life. For Socrates, philosophy was not an ivory tower profession conducted by experts but something that was lived with others as rational beings. For Socrates, philosophy was something that was practical as well as contemplative. ‘Only this I know, that I know nothing’ said Socrates. Claiming to know nothing, he set out to find out. Not knowledge but the profession of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom.

There is an old Taoist saying that ‘he who knows does not say; he who says does not know’. The way out of this paradox is to place the accent what is done rather than what is said. Well done is better than well said. A politics of knowledge can never win at this level against a politics of opinion. The kind of passionate intensity that comes with certainty is associated with arrogance, ignorance and dogma and against these reasoned argument cannot win. Much more promising is the notion of an ecological praxis, valuing the active contribution that people make to the building of the ecopolis or biocentric civilisation rather than soliciting their passive support for the chance to build that order via traditional political institutions. 

Technics, potentialities and social relations
The argument that fundamental change is necessary is insufficient in itself. People will act when they are convinced of the desirability and the possibility of change. The environmental crisis is the result of an economic system that is beyond human control and comprehension, human society and politics being subservient to quantitative economic imperatives that systemically suppress qualitative growth. These cultural, political, and technological potentials for the new qualitative economics have been building for over a century. Scientist and inventor Nikolai Tesla (1856-1943) is well known for being the first to develop AC current for widespread use and for inventing the means to convey information via radio waves. His ambitions expanded far greater than this, he wanted to utilize radio transmission and send electricity through the atmosphere through an energy saving device. Ultimately he wanted to attach ‘machinery to the very wheelwork of nature’. This would mean free energy without suppliers. At this point, Tesla’s backers pulled out. The technics contradicted the economic purpose of making money. As Veblen showed, capitalism restrains production below what is technologically feasible in order to keep up prices and profit margins. Such technical capacity has been partially expressed within capitalist economics but is largely suppressed for the reasons given by Veblen. 
In the Principles of Political Economy John Stuart Mill states that 'It is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being.' But as Marx comments, lightening the day’s toil ‘is .. by no means the aim of the application of machinery under capitalism. Like every other instrument for increasing the productivity of labour, machinery is intended to cheapen commodities and, by shortening the part of the working day in which the worker works for himself, to lengthen the other part, the part he gives to the capitalist for nothing. The machine is a means for producing surplus-value’. (Marx CI 1976 ch 15). Surplus value goes to accumulate capital, the central dynamic of the system.

What Marx argues with respect to human toil applies also to technics and the way that it is subservient to the process of accumulation. The potentials of the ICT revolution will be constrained within this process and dynamic without fundamental transformation. Technics revolve around a special role for human creativity and require a new relationship of culture to the economy for their potentials to be realised. The new productive forces express and are grounded in a human culture that, as culture, is capable of being an end in itself. Instead, they are used as a means of accumulating capital. Realising the potentials of culture as a co-evolution with nature is precisely what ecological activism is about.

Desirability and possibility are coalescing. The institutional and cultural possibilities for humanity to harmonize technical activities with nature, meet everyone's basic needs and start to fulfil higher needs, and practise participatory and direct democracy alongside representative forms are great and growing. The green polity – ecopolis – is the institutionally and structurally appropriate expression of the level of technological and economic development that has now been achieved. This appears extreme or utopian to those whose horizons are narrowed by economic necessities – society is organised around money, wages and consumption, hence the concern with investment, employment and production; by what may be called ‘false fixities’, the belief that transitory and historical institutions and practices are eternal and unchanging; and last but not least because powerful interests exploit the natural conservatism of people and inertia of institutions to mobilize opinion and pressure against new ideas and aspirations. This impasse can be broken only by broadening horizons, not only affirming values beyond existing parameters but actually practising them.

Social arrangements and relations shape the extent to which the economic system suppresses or channels emerging human potentials to human ends. Relationships of superordination and subordination are intrinsic to an exploitative system concerned with quantitative development. The central dynamic of this system is accumulation through the extraction of surplus value. In contrast, a system concerned with the qualitative growth of sustainable living is geared to the enlargement of human culture in co-evolution with nature. The emerging productive forces represent potentials which transcend the exploitative relation to human and natural resources and subvert all forms of domination and subordination. Governed by its accumulative logic, capitalism is compelled to use the new productive forces within its own narrow confines; it can never unleash these forces without thereby undermining its own relations and values.

A broader perspective  science and technology in politics
An ecological politics seeks to apply scientific knowledge and employ technological innovation in a socially appropriate and ecologically sustainable way. This ambition needs to be set within a broader intellectual framework. Science and technology have continually been steered into trajectories that are too narrow and one-sided, becoming sterile or even counterproductive. 
The understanding of reality has an irreducible historical dimension emphasising the reflection upon human praxis as it unfolds. Reality as it presents itself at any specific point in time is the product of social and cultural change over time. A short-term time perspective can result in serious misunderstanding and narrow, one sided analyses. History is more than a narrative chronology of events but is a dimension of any present reality, conditioning mentalities and modalities. History is a cultural memory of the species, the present continually emerging on the basis of traditions or legacies as cultural resources which have evolved over time (Eyerman and Jamison 1998). History is a stock of human experience which flows into the ongoing construction of the present reality. ‘Without the perpetual rediscovery and reinterpretation of history, without free access to that reservoir, the life of any single generation would be but a trickle of water in a desert. The limited conventions of historians have made us forget, however, that history has an anticipatory side: it is the domain of the possible, the starting point of the ideal... The creation and selection of new potentialities, the projection of ideal goals, is, with reference to the future, the counterpart of an intelligent commerce with the past’. (Mumford 1944: 12-13)

In this essay, the discussion of contemporary issues will be infused with historical reflection, setting the emergence of new social actors and movements, as well as the understanding of science, technics and social learning within a broader historical perspective of continuity and change over time. This identifies emerging forces for change in the social order in relation to underlying forces of inertia and resistance. Such an approach delineates the conditions for the human appropriation of scientific, technological and socio-economic developmental processes into the domains and institutions of social life.

Cognitive and ecological praxis recognises that the relations between environmental perspectives and cultural subpolitics and public policy should be informed by a social pluralism. An ecological sensibility is also a pluralist sensibility. The task is to develop an alternative to the universalizing conceptions of the dominant capitalist-technocratic paradigm without lapsing into a relativist particularism. This is a challenge to create a genuine universalism through unity through diversity, the interdependence of the parts within the whole. This universalism emerges through the co-construction of culture and nature. This is to challenge the universalising perspective of the technoscientific mindset that has emerged within the totalising imperatives of the capital system not by rejecting science and technics but by humanising the context or milieux through which they are applied. Science and technology are part of the global cultural commons and furnish the means of human progress. But what also requires recognition are the contributions that different cultures and the diversity of technological interactions have made to the constitution of technoscientific knowledge. Innovation is not a matter of transferring techniques from one society to another but is shaped by a technological dialogue in which techniques are selectively exchanged and communicated in an interactive process (Pacey 1990). Technological innovation is a pluralist movement of ideas and experiences. 
The question concerns the organisation of science, its use as means to very political ends. One is mindful of the critique of ‘big science’. The laboratories of ‘big science’ – in both the state and the corporations - were akin industrial factories and formed a core component of the "technostructure" (Galbraith 1967). The use of science as means has become systematized and, as a result, politicised, identified with the existing social order and power relations. This provoked criticism and cynicism amongst the generation of student radicals in the 1960s. The danger lies in identifying the particular use of science and technology applied as means to the purposes of  specific institutions with science and technology as such. Marcuse thus criticised the "one-dimensional" science and technology of mass society: ‘Technology has become the great vehicle of reification — reification in its most mature and effective form. The social position of the individual and his relation to others appear not only to be determined by objective qualities and laws, but these qualities and laws seem to lose their mysterious and uncontrollable character; they appear as calculable manifestations of (scientific) rationality. The world tends to become the stuff of total administration, which absorbs even the administrators. The web of domination has become the web of Reason itself...’ (Marcuse 1964: 168-169).
The problem with such an all embracing web of domination is that it is also guilty of the inversion of means and ends, identifying the enemy as the scientific-technological state rather than a social system that employs science and technology as its means (Jamison and Eyerman 1994). It would be more accurate to criticise the subservience of scientific knowledge and technics to the dictates of the "military-industrial complex," the colonization of technological rationality by the reasons of state and commerce (Mendelsohn 1994). 

Lewis Mumford examined the notion of ends this way: ‘A good technology, firmly related to human needs, cannot be one that has a maximum productivity as its supreme goal: it must rather, as in an organic system, seek to provide the right quantity of the right quality at the right time and the right place for the right purpose. To this end deliberate regulation and self direction, in order to ensure continued growth and creativity, must govern our plans in the future, as indefinite expansion and multiplication have done during the past few centuries. The center of gravity is not the corporate organization, but the human personality, utilizing knowledge, not for the increase of power and riches, or even for the further increase of knowledge, but using it, like power and riches, for the enhancement of life’. (Mumford 1972: 167)

The domination of the state and the corporations, with their commercial ethos and their hierarchical logic, over science and technology has ensured that knowledge-making has assumed an authoritarian mode of operation over against a democratic forms of technics (Mumford 1971; see Mendelsohn 1990). 

The misuse of science and technology explains why hopes for human progress continually misfire. The danger is that reaction turns not against the institutions and systems which organise this misuse but against science and technology as such. The revolt of life against rationalisation and mechanization does not mean a revolt against reason and technics. 

Part 4
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

18 THE GOOD SOCIETY

The ethics of the good life is inevitably involved in politics. In a definite sense, all political action involves a vision of the good society. When aiming at preservation, political action maintains the present order to be the best and aims to prevent a change to the worse. When aiming at change, political action is intended to bring about a future order better than the present. Notions of better or worse imply some standard by which to evaluate courses of action and results and that standard is ‘the good’. 





Ethics as outlined above with respect to Aristotle and Spinoza is the royal road to happiness through truth and knowledge. Reason is the highest and the best part of human nature and ethics entails a good life guided by reason. In the strict sense that the best life is necessarily the happiest life, the intrinsic satisfactions of the free mind are the most lasting and secure. Happiness is achieved when human beings realise their highest and best part, and it is the good life alone that which provides the context (Jacques 1971). 

Green politics fosters personal development by publicising the real impact that local and community action can make, showing the extent to which individual efforts can have transformative social and political consequences. People like to see tangible results and are motivated to make further efforts and commit more time and resources when a real result is visible. Nothing succeeds like success and here activity feeds itself. Green political praxis can embody a real sense of conatus in Spinoza’s sense, expressing ‘joy’, unfolding people's creative essence and giving it permanent form in the work of transforming society. Respecting unity-in-diversity and interactive cooperation within an integrated whole, the ecological movement fully values and validates the contributions of all individuals in all fields of endeavour and in all forms of expression.

All over the world, the basis for a new earth-centred culture is being created by the practical efforts of a variety of groups. Artists and poets are turning back to the earth as a source of inspiration. Scientists like Rupert Sheldrake and philosophers like Arne Naess have brought a renewed reverence for the natural world into their work. Through a variety of practical efforts, human beings are engendering new forms of personal and community rituals to express their bond to the earth, viewed once again as Gaia, the nurturing goddess of all life. The term Gaia has entered the public consciousness through the work of scientist James Lovelock, indicating the extent to which even the natural sciences are regaining a renewed sense of the ancient view of the earth as a living organism, generating new insights into the origins of life, the regulation of the atmosphere, and the role of cooperation and consciousness in biological evolution.

The most remarkable thing is the stark contrast between this broadening and opening of outlook and vision in the scientific world and the narrowing of horizons in politics. The globalisation of economic relations has been used to buttress a political agenda of liberalisation which has involved the rolling back of any number of governmental and institutional regulations and controls upon business and finance. In terms of the levels of cognition outlined earlier, the politics of the neo-liberal reaction has focused firmly upon the selfish and the stupid, using the command over public policy to deliberately cultivate changes in people's attitudes towards the private, the individualistic and the materialistic. Although coated in words like ‘aspirational’, this represents a stifling narrowing of aspirations down to the most obvious and the most immediate satisfaction of desires and impulses in relation to material objects. Neo-liberal politics has served to raise to the surface, indeed elevate to the level of highest principle and purpose, the lowest and basest aspects of the human psyche – desire, impulse, fear, hatred, acquisitiveness, aggression. In other words, all those passive emotions attached to particulars that Spinoza identified with inadequate ideas which inhibit knowledge and freedom. Within a deliberately engineered ecology of fear and insecurity, many people withdrew from public life and society to protect whatever resources they could claim for themselves as individuals.

19 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY

In The Politics of Nature, Andrew Dobson and Peter Lucardie (1995) identifies a number of anti-democratic tendencies in the ecological position. They identify a strong potential contradiction between green policy values and green (direct) democracy.
The green claim is that society, civilisation as we know, cannot survive on the current basis and that a sustainable society can only be built on ecological principles (Dobson and Lucardie).  For O’Riordan, greens offer a ‘simple binary choice’ between two opposing 'world-views' (O'Riordan 1981: 300). Except that there is no real choice between survival or self-administered destruction. Kvaloy contrasts the 'Life Necessities Society (LNS) to 'the 'Industrial Growth Society (IGS)' (Kvaloy 1990). Sale contrasts 'Bioregional’ and 'Industrial-Scientific' paradigms (Sale 1985: 50). These are not choices but alternatives, with green values or principles as imperatives. For Ophuls, 'liberal democracy as we know it ... is doomed by ecological scarcity; we need a completely new political philosophy and set of institutions' (Ophuls 1977a: 3). This means that incremental reform and a piecemeal gradualism within existing political institutions is part of the problem and can never be the (Ophuls 1977b: 160).
Many green thinkers have recognised the potential conflict between green values and green politics and have sought to modify their position. Stillman acknowledges the implications for the notions of consent:





Boris Frankel claims that Rudolf Bahro’s vision of an ecological society is 'anti-democratic' since politics as conflict disappears in a sea of 'givens' (Frankel 1987: 230). The problem is the old one addressed by Plato of whether and how philosophy can rule. Is ecology a science or a politics? How to reconcile the world of knowledge and the world of opinion? If the science clearly points to certain policies and practices as ecologically sound or ecologically unsound, how does this not become an imperative or a ‘given’ regardless of popular opinion?

Science and ethics will point to certain things as being desirable in an ultimate sense –  the very principles that makes one a green, or a socialist etc. - but attachment to democracy implies equal weight be given to alternative platforms, a plurality of values, divergent opinion (Frankel 1987: 158). The dilemma can be posed from the other direction. If popular opinion to a large extent contradicts or rejects green principles based on science and ethics, to what extent does green politics abandon the principles for reasons of electoral appeal and government by consent of the governed?
The solution will lie in the final realisation of Plato’s Philosopher Ruler. Ophuls is right to call for a ‘completely new political philosophy and set of institutions' (Ophuls 1977a: 3). This ‘new’ politics will resolve the conflict between knowledge and opinion by making political society a learning process in which the individuals composing the demos can ascend the levels of cognition to reach higher, richer, more expansive possibilities. This is to change the conception of democracy to mean something not merely more direct but more active and more functional with respect to people’s contribution to public life.

Ophuls defines the predicament: 'Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? . . . how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives' (Ophuls 1977a: 7-8).

To recognise ‘ecological imperatives’ as the basis of a green politics is to oppose knowledge (nous) to opinion (doxa) and is to this extent anti-democratic in the way that democracy is conceived to function today. But is it democracy? Or is it mass manipulation and manipulation of passive individuals at the level of individual desires, wants, impulses (often manufactured from the outside).

Failure to develop a new political philosophy and a new institutional framework keeps resting on an internal fracture between an authoritarian vision based on fundamental green values and a democratic vision which, within an unchanged parliamentary and electoral politics, which is based on people’s own opinions. Without a transformation of political institutions, green politics is extremely vulnerable, either to diluting its principles to widen electoral appeal, to accommodation and absorption within the existing system, or even supplying the rationale to justify authoritarian government when the impact of ecological crisis starts to be felt.

The solution is ecological praxis, the idea that the practical transformation leading to the ecological society is also at the same time a political transformation in which the individuals composing the demos come to be capable of participating within communitarian direct democracy. As a goal abstracted from the constitutive praxis that brings it about, communitarian direct democracy is utopian, cannot be achieved and will lack electoral appeal. The same applies to all other ecological values. To accept the horizons of the existing political system is to limit aims to incremental tinkering within the system, green politics as administering ecological crisis and disaster.

Ophuls is accused of ‘authoritarian tendencies’ by Dobson and Lucardie for suggesting that with a return to scarcity we must 'question whether democracy as we know it can survive' (Ophuls 1974). Note that Ophuls is questioning rather than repudiating, and note also that he refers to ‘democracy as we know it’ and not democracy as such. Given the extent to which western ‘liberal democracy’ has effectively removed substantive political questions from serious debate, has systematically favoured money and influence, not just through lobbying but simply through the dependence of politics on the process of private accumulation (a point which the pluralists like Dahl and Lindloam came to recognise) and serious argument has been replaced by brand names and soundbites, what perhaps is most in need of explanation is why ‘democracy’ as currently practised has been fetishised to such an extent as to be identified with the particular institutions of a particular time and place – institutions which on many other definitions count as extremely anti-democratic in themselves.

Ophuls is to be credited for addressing the knowledge-opinion divide, reaching back to Plato as the basis of western political philosophy:





What Ophuls calls a return to 'competence', Dahl presents as 'guardianship' (Dahl 1989). A reprise of Popper’s The Open Society on the totalitarian implications of dividing society between the wise few and the ignorant mass is not required. That may be one possible outcome but it is not an inevitable outcome and is not the most serious point at issue. The idea that the more human beings are guided by reason, the more they are free originates with Plato but pervades the western tradition – Stoics, Aquinas, Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, Russell et al. The serious question concerns how reason is to rule so that human beings are actually free. Plato, it is often overlooked, was not writing a blueprint in The Republic but establishing the central principles of the best polity. The question of who guards the guardians is one that Plato would accept. The ultimate guardian is an active, informed citizenship capable of participating in public life. Nothing in Plato denied the rational faculty on the part of each and all as a condition of their humanity and that is the key to turning the Philosopher Ruler into the notion that philosophy should rule through homo sapiens as rational man.

One can simply rule the question out, dismiss Ophuls as the ‘clearest credible example of the authoritarian tendency in green political theory’ (Dobson and Lucardie 1995). But only at the price of reducing values and principles to just one more brand in the political marketplace, with the electorate subject to the institutional-systemic constraints of market relations having no good reason to choose one brand over another. Socialism wasted away in parliament waiting for the proletarian transformation of politics that never came. Greens may do the same, ecological disaster as a self-administered doom.

The alternative is to take seriously the ‘new’ in the ‘new politics’ promised by the Greens’. 

Where green thinkers have outlined the contours of green democracy, they have invoked visions of direct democracy in small communities based on face-to-face relations and characterized by labour-intensive production, self-reliance if not self-sufficiency, and a minimum of trade and travel. Decision-making is by face-to-face assemblies along the lines of the Athenian assembly or New England township democracy. The emphasis is upon extensive public spaces for citizen interaction and discourse, decentralized units breaking down the distinction between government and governed and affirming the need for passive voters to become citizens through participation and involvement, exercising power rather than delegating it, ceasing to be individual agents by engaging in collective action.

The German Greens began by making direct democracy the foundation of their political structure. They discovered the difficulty of conducting politics according to the principles of a future polity within the context of an existing political framework that denies them (Spretnak and Capra 1985: 38-9). To be politically successful within this representative framework of electoral politics requires policies and practices which actually negate the end of the green polity. Greens win more votes and seats at the expense of green principles. ‘On account of life, to lose the reasons for living’ (Terence).

Much of what greens and ecologists write about politics are variants of direct democracy in decentralized communities.  Sale writes of the 'bioregional' organization of communities, Bookchin of confederal municipalism. The specific forms matter little without the popular support, activity and consent to make them work.
The biggest question is not whether the green vision of direct democracy is possible – it is, if the individuals composing the demos want to live as active citizens in conscious control of their practical existence in relation to others – but is it desirable. If it isn’t desirable, it will never be desired in sufficient numbers to make it possible.
As an ideal, green direct democracy can be presented in a desirable form: small scale decentralized communities, face-to-face assemblies and proximate forms of participation and accountability, rotation of representatives and an equal valuing of contributions from all members of the community. All within strong constitutive ties that connect each with all others.
Is it desirable? Not everyone, probably not most people, would like face-to-face participation and deliberation. How about the danger of the political becoming personal and divisions coming to poison everyday relations in a close knit community? Power, charisma, influence may even be more iniquitously used when relations between individuals are direct rather than subject to some form of institutional check and restraint. Breaking down divisions between government and governed turns politics into administration and leads to problems of encroachment and incompetence. In fine, this isn’t politics; it is the end of politics. It assumes away the basic nature and challenge of politics and courts disaster on a gamble (Frankel gives a number of other deficiencies 1987: 175-6). 

Lacking an institutional structure that is formalised and public, the vision of direct democracy invites the emergence of informal leaders who are able to impose their will on others. And these are problems within communities. The problems of relations between communities are even more serious, with all manners of inequalities and conflicts opening up. With trade and travel minimised this may seem not to be a problem, but that withdrawal from the world, opting for an inner regarding parochialism, is itself an undesirable feature that runs against the grain of globalisation, with all its potentialities for broadening and deepening connections between people and realising the ultimate in extended sociality. It all depends on where the balance between inner and outer regarding relations lies: ‘the more self-sufficient and numerically limited a community is, the smaller the range of activities and choices it can offer to its members. If it has no opening to an area of exogenous activity, knowledge and production, the community becomes a prison’ (Dobson 1990: 124)

In sum, green visions of communitarian direct democracy are to be evaluated according to whether they enhance existing potentials for an extended human sociality, locating the local within the global and vice versa. It is difficult to see how informal, small scale, face-to-face, self-reliant communities fit this expansive conception and even more difficult to see how it would appeal to any but those seeking to opt out of civilisation building. John Lennon’s Imagine is frequently quoted: ‘you may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one; I hope some day you will join me, and the world will live as one’. Well, the world is well on the way to living as one. With the globalisation of economic relations and digital connections, the world is technically more integrated than it has ever been. The challenge is to catch up at the level of morals and politics so that the world and the people in it really do live as one. 

The principles of a green political theory that sets political institutions and practices along a continuum from the local to the global is possible. This sets direct and participatory notions of democracy within functioning political institutions so as to (a) enhance citizen interaction and discourse within extensive public spaces, (b) be feasible in the sense of proposing an institutional framework capable of translating principles into policies that are practicable and programmatic in the here and now, and (c) works for and achieves the consent of the governed through nurturing green values in the praxis of the citizen body. 

There are five key areas to this ‘politically feasible ecologism’: 

The possibility of digital community and participation; the vision of eco-cities as an urban public realm based on sustainable living; the pragmatic combination of direct and representative forms of democracy; the acceptance of confederal institutions which are based upon power being invested at its most appropriate level, stretching from local to supranational institutions; finally, philosophy as praxis.

The idea that the revolution in information and communication technology contains the potential for new forms of direct political participation is not new. ICT has possibilities for interactive forms of voting, consultation, conferencing, and so on, removing the mediation between power and the people. ‘Public opinion will become the law of the land’ (Arterton 1987: 18). There are problems of access, agenda-setting and citizen apathy (Arterton 1987). 

New interactive technologies contain the potential to improve communications in politics, strengthening both vertical communications between rulers and ruled from the 'bottom-up’ and 'horizontal' communications between citizens, overcoming individual isolation to bring people closer together (von Alemann and Tonnesmann 1990). Technology can be used to encourage and enhance the impact and quality of citizen participation (Arterton 1987). Barber’s ‘strong democracy’ seeks to revitalize local participation and local political power through new technologies. Proposing the creation of 'neighbourhood assemblies' as an integral part of an ambitious programme of reform, Barber advocates 'a national civic communications cooperative to regulate and oversee the civic use of new communications technology and to supervise debate and discussion of referendum issues' (Barber 1984: 307).

Many Greens’ have been, at least, sceptical of technology. As Bramwell writes: 'Technophiles and technophobes have always warred within ecologism' (Bramwell 1989: 7). One can accept Bookchin’s point that: 'we could expect that . . . members of the communities would be disposed to deal with one another in face-to-face relationships rather than by electronic means' (Bookchin 1982: 345). But this applies only where face-to-face relations are possible for spatial reasons. Wider connections using technologies are possible and are being utilised by millions of people. A modest claim is that some new communications technologies could help to stimulate and enhance the direct forms of democracy which are part of the green vision. Face-to-face proximity can be supplemented by 'virtual proximity", teleconferencing, for instance.

The second component of green democracy is the urban public realm, eco-cities as a form of urban governance and sustainable living. The rural vision of local villages and communes is increasingly outdated in an increasingly urbanised world. The connection between cities, citizenship and civilisation have long been known. We can have garden cities, green cities but there will never be a world without cities. Green writing demonstrates a pronounced antipathy, even hostility, to cities. For Sale: 'The contemporary high rise city ... is an ecological parasite as it extracts its lifeblood from elsewhere and an ecological pathogen as it sends back its wastes' (Sale 1985: 65). But the contemporary city of this character is what Lewis Mumford called the ‘anti-city’. The way forward is to stress the cultural, political and ecological advantages of urbanism as a way of living. These are many, particularly high-density urban living: city homes which are in close proximity use less energy; a greater use of energy-efficient public transport; reduced travel distances; pedestrian pockets and cycling routes can replace cars; recycling, re-use and repair cost less; problems of acid rain and greenhouse gases are not caused by cities and will not be solved by a return to the country; hazardous waste treatment facilities with greater coverage can be used; greater diversity of activities and increased contact between more people. Further, the opportunities of ICT mechanisms boosting direct democracy increase with urban concentration. 

The third component of a new green political theory refuses to oppose direct and representative forms as mutually exclusive but instead seeks to combine both on a continuum in which each complements the other in a greater range of possibilities (Weale 1983; Bobbio 1987). Nicos Poulantzas's approach is valuable in informing this view, seeking to transform the state so that 'the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy' comes to be 'combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of self-management bodies' (Poulantzas 1978:256). The 'democratic road to socialism' is a 'long process' involving the creation of 'diffuse centres of resistance which  the  masses  always  possess  within  the  state networks', establishing 'real centres of power on the strategic terrain of the state'  (Poulantzas 1978:258). This idea suggests an urban public sphere grounded in the associational space of 'pluralist  civil  society'  (Cohen 1983:184; Laclau and Mouffe 1985:140; Mouffe 1988:32/4). Granted, there is a need to distinguish clearly between the less than pluralist contemporary civil society, structured around asymmetrical relations of power, and the ideal of democratic civil society (Marx CHDS 1975:191; Schecter 1994:20 184; Parekh 1982:32; Lane 1995:144).

It follows that direct democracy is not an alternative to but a complement to representative institutions. The format of public enquiry and consultation along with interactive technologies can enhance participation of groups and individuals and make decision-making procedures more accessible (Arterton 1987: 97ff). 










These four principles pertain to technical and institutional questions. The final principle is the most important in that it deals with philosophy, people, politics and change. 

The idea of philosophy as a practice, ethos as a way of life not only takes philosophy back to its Socratic origins as a popular, lived, quest for wisdom, it offers a way of mediating the split between knowledge and opinion. Green political theory and practice is extremely vulnerable on this point. Ecology as a science clearly comes with certain implications regarding policy, policy formation and political appeal. Scientifically compelling evidence and research clearly translates into ecological imperatives and overriding principles that prejudge popular debate and deliberation and assert green values as political and moral or imperatives over and above popular choice. Not only is such a position electorally unappealing and political enervating, it does nothing to extend and deepen green values and principles where they are most needed, in the body politic. Taking a cue from Vico’s ‘New Science’, the principle of verum ipsum factum holds that the truth of something is a condition of having made it. The possibility of knowing the world lies in having made it. We come to Hegel: ‘I am at home in the world when I know it, still more when I have understood it’. And finally Marx’s conception of praxis.  “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

Marx Thesis III on Feuerbach

This is the predicament of ecology caught between science and politics. As a science, opposing the knowledge of the educators to mere opinion, ecology divides society into two parts, one of which is superior to the other. But no-one learns truth in this way. Marx thus affirms the unity of theory and practice – knowledge both informing and being informed by human activity – by affirming the changing of circumstances as a self-change on the part of the people. “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” (Marx Thesis XI on Feuerbach)

Philosophy as praxis implies that the science of ecology becomes an ecological praxis in which the ecological sensibility emerges in the process of creating the ecological society. 

The split between knowledge and opinion, affirming nous over doxa, is certainly open to the charge of being anti-democratic. It implies the rule of the few who know over the many who don’t. It seems to be a modern version of Plato’s Philosopher-Ruler.








The key question is how this democracy of purpose, place and person can be embedded within a political and institutional framework. Here, I want to ground the idea in a rational capacity, developing cooperative, communicative mechanisms that are oriented towards the long term collective good of each and all. This entails a switch from top down, hierarchical, bureaucratic monological modes of thought, organisation and action to dialogical modes which emphasise cooperation, communication, networking. Public life is reconstituted as good government via an active sovereignty and citizen democracy that canalises individuals towards the long term common good.

The Countermovement As A Civic Public

Whilst economists assert the independence of ‘the economy’ from the world of politics, society and ecology, governments cannot claim such sovereignty. Governments are structurally embedded in market society. Increasing numbers of people believe that their governments are run in the interests of big business, diminishing numbers think that their governments represent the will of the people. People continually demand that government should reflect the popular will more than it does.

But here's the difficulty. The people making those demands on government – which amounts to an assertion that government separate themselves from ‘big interests’ and serve the people, are also part of the market economy in one way or another. Government cannot autonomize itself from private economic power if the people do not also take steps to autonomize themselves. Government and politics cannot act against private economic power without an organised social movement on the part of the people. An inchoate reaction on the part of the people could easily take xenophobic, parochial and chauvinistic form, falling into the hands of the very elites controlling the system. Everyone believes in community. The question is which one. There is a danger of countering the assertion that markets know best with a similarly misguided communities know best. Not always. A reactionary notion of community leaves minorities vulnerable to persecution. Social transformation means moving forwards to realise immanent potentialities for a broader and deeper conception of freedom. This is a fundamentally open, outward looking and other regarding notion, not a nostalgic retreat into a politics of exclusion. This requires more than hard thinking, but the integration of strategic thought into social praxis. To argue that people should stop thinking of themselves as consumers and start thinking of themselves as citizens sounds worthy but begs the question as to why people, in given social relations and engaged in existing social practices, are much more inclined to act as consumers rather than citizens. 

The citizen identity comes with a whole range of roles, practices, ties and institutions that are not available in the market society. People cannot choose to be citizens or think themselves into a citizen identity, the extensive, empowered public spaces to exercise citizenship do not exist. These spaces need to be created. The danger is that without the reality of citizenship, the citizen identity becomes a mask for some repressive policies in the name of the national interest. The Stoics advanced on the ancient Greeks with a broader conception of what it is to be a citizen, a human being, affirming the cosmopolis over the polis, a citizenship of the cosmos or the universe rather than of one tiny part of it. It is this expansive notion that is needed at a time of global ecological crisis.

The expansive notion of politics derives from ancient Greece and the idea that the human being is a zoon politikon or social animal requiring a politikon bion or public life in order to realise individuality in relation to other social beings. This is different to arguing that a common humanity unites individuals as a species. This is a biological basis for justice and equality. The arguments of Plato and Aristotle take this a stage further by focusing on the social and political nature of human beings, so that justice and equality are political principles capable of forming the basis of public life. This conception can delineate what is involved in building a politics around a common humanity. 

This is well trodden ground in political philosophy. The argument of this thesis favours the line taken from Plato and Aristotle through to Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx.


20 THE CONCEPT OF RATIONAL FREEDOM

"The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nature, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason." 

Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy

There is one big idea running through this essay. This idea is the connection of reason and freedom that belongs centrally to the mainstream tradition of Western moral and political philosophy and that therefore the most advantageous way to examine conceptions of future alternatives is to locate them within broader historical and philosophical movements and traditions. There are a couple of reasons for this approach. First and foremost, the idea that reason and freedom are connected is not only the most structured, coherent and satisfying line of emancipation in history, it comes with a social dimension that recognises the coincidence of the freedom of each individual with the freedom of all individuals. It is built on an ethic that is expansive and seeks the individual not only to ascend to reason but make connection with others. Secondly, one hears plenty of ‘new’ politics. New in relation to a specific context and a specific practice maybe. But one is reminded of Aristotle’s wry comment that there’s nothing new, just a lot of things that we have forgotten. In this sense, the environmental claim to be breaking new ground much of the time looks like recovering lost ground. Which is no bad thing. Local knowledge and commons system integral to using, valuing and sharing the world are cultural resources dating back hundreds of years. They are being lost, as plenty of other human powers have been lost, to a rapacious capitalism busy expropriating anything and anyone capable of being turned into exchange value. Which brings us to the third point, politics as a division between right and left. To criticise capitalism as ‘rapacious’ and exploitative would immediately identify an argument and a politics as being on ‘the left’. Not necessarily. This criticism is mounted on the basis of the tradition of ‘rational freedom’, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, taking in the Judaeo-Christian heritage including Augustine and Aquinas, and whole number of philosophers who are absolutely central to the Western intellectual tradition – Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza, Montesquieu and Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx. In other words, those who maintain the connection between reason and freedom occupy the centre ground and are firmly within the tradition of Western civilisation, that is civilisation as social and moral order built with ideas, shared ethics, shared commitments, constitutive ties, reciprocity - all those things other than raw, independent money and power.

Which comes to the fourth and final point here. Capitalism, the system of private accumulation, is parasitic upon civilisation in the same way that it is parasitic on labour and nature. It practises its ‘free’ market economics and indulges its entrepreneurial spirit within the framework of civilisation that past generations built and which others keep alive in an endless struggle to resist the encroachment of the pecuniary motive. Capitalism and its systemic imperative to accumulate is concerned only with the internal accumulative logic of the system and its self-expansion of values. It destroys the notion of ends but cannot supply any of its own other than the pursuit of self-interest. Capitalism “has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment'”. It is significant that this, one of the most cited passages in Marx’s Manifesto of the Communist Party, is based on Thomas Carlyle’s coruscating verdict on capitalism in Past and Present. Significant because it begs the question, the left and right wing of what? Taking in the sweep of the whole of Western civilisation and its ethics and philosophy, it is capitalism which has gone to extremes and which, in the grip of its inexorable accumulative logic, continues to do so. The centre ground has been pulverised. When Green parties say ‘neither left nor right but in front’, I take this ‘in front’ to be a reclaiming of the centre ground, a recovery of sanity and balance after a period of hubris. The alternative to this reconstitution of the centre ground in the future is, of course, nemesis.

What this interpretation will indirectly question is the view that the critique of capitalism is, by definition, left wing and also extremist. This interpretation actually holds that it is capitalism which possesses the thoroughgoing 'revolutionary' and extremist character, subverting and repudiating the underlying values and organizing concepts basic to Western civilisation. Extreme in the way that constants of civilisation – a sense of the sacred, an overarching ethic, community, local knowledge, customary rights – are hollowed out, even enclosed, expropriated, and taken to market in the thirst for exchange value.

There are no values and concepts affirmed in this paper which are not derived from or inherent in the Western mainstream. They may be given a radical or democratic twist, but only to bring out the latent revolutionary message of the originals themselves. Does anybody seriously believe that what Plato and Aristotle defined as the good life corresponds in any way with capitalism? 

So here is a paradoxical formulation: the thinking in this paper is revolutionary because it is traditional and because it affirms that our great historical heritage of building civilisation through religion and science, art and architecture, philosophy and ethics could produce something better than capitalism. The view affirms the old Platonic trinity – which dates back to Pythagoras – of the true, the good and the beautiful. Modern mathematics and physics are putting that heady notion within human comprehension. In contrast to these potentialities of the higher part of human nature, capitalism looks like a primitive stage in evolution, a period the human race has to go through as it learns how to use its complicated technics in a wise and sober sense. 

This argument has an underlying unity which can be understood as a conceptual gathering organised around the idea of ‘rational freedom’. This idea is a powerful prism through which to gain an informed glimpse of some disturbing aspects of capitalism in light of our inherited culture and civilization. 

This first part is concerned with the 'conception' of ‘rational freedom’ as integral to the Western tradition. Western political philosophy and social thought has principally been concerned with the notions of 'reason', 'movement', 'community' and 'freedom'. 'Reason' denotes the ability of human beings not only to think or contemplate in some passive sense but also to abstract and generalize from experience and to have experience guided by thought. The view holds that human action is most effective and most satisfying when it is integrated with thinking. It follows from this that the human understanding of reality culminates in action. Making a difference for the better to the world through action guided by thought is the high point of reason as understanding. Action brings us to movement.  'Movement' indicates a recognition of infinity and change, the acceptance that social and political forms, states and cities, are subject to decline, collapse, replacement, that human history has a flow leading somewhere. 'Community' means both the place and the practice of human sociality, the warm, rich bonds and solidarities and shared norms and values and constitutive ties that form individual identity in relation to others. Finally, 'freedom', the positive value attached to human experience. This is not merely the negative ‘freedom from’, a narrow conception which is more concerned with avoiding experiences, but the positive freedom to do something and be someone, a true individual achieving the mastery of self and external reality. Freedom enlarges human time and space. 


It is in light of these four unit ideas that the underlying conception of this paper should be defined. The paper is concerned with human emancipation where 'emancipation' is understood as leading to 'freedom' in the distinctive sense of rational mastery of the self and external reality.

 There are three aspects to this human emancipation.

1.	emancipation occurs in the relationship between human beings and nature: freedom in this respect is the full realization of human reason in the natural world. This realisation of the human potential does not necessarily mean the domination of nature, though this has certainly been its historical incarnation. Human reason is capable of recognising the embeddedness of human beings as natural beings in the natural world and therefore identifying freedom as the intellectual appreciation of natural necessity, ordering human affairs accordingly. 
2.	emancipation proceeds within the realm of human society. This is of course the distinctive achievement of Socrates in bringing philosophy down to earth and into the human world. Philosophy has possessed a moral, social and political core since Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The idea that the emancipation of society is coincidental with the emancipation of individuals in and for society follows the Platonic and Aristotelian premise that the human individual is a zoon politikon – a social animal. 
3.	emancipation as the realisation of community follows the premise that human beings are social beings. The realisation of this social nature implies the elimination of conflict between determinate social groups, sectional interests that divide community, 'classes'. It certainly means the end of domination, oppression and exploitation of some groups by others. Plato’s argument that justice is the social virtue par excellence seeks to order society according to notions of the good life.
4.	emancipation of the mind is the lynchpin of the whole process. This follows from the identification of the rational faculty as the distinctive characteristic of homo sapiens. In distinguishing between nous or (knowledge, reason) and doxa (opinion, ignorance), the ancient Greeks affirmed that the more that human affairs was governed in accordance with the true, the more it is free. The essence of this claim is the complete understanding of the moral freedom and self-sufficiency of the human species. The human being as a rational being is free, self-creating and self-determining within natural and social relationships, recognizing no alien superior beyond the bounds of rationality. Which begs the question of what happens when human powers are alienated and human agents have their lives determined by systemic imperatives, bureaucratic edicts and instrumental rationality.

Having outlined the contours of rational freedom as a conception of human emancipation, it will be clear that the central ideas of this book derive from the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition. From this perspective it will also be seen that, for instance, Adam Smith, the apostle of free markets is also a moral philosopher who, on many substantial points, is aligned with the philosophical tradition against many of the features of the modern capitalism with which his name is routinely associated.

This approach emphasises freedom in the human relationship to nature, society and the mind; these three dimensions are connected by freedom as the supreme aim and value connected to the achievement of human reason. Freedom and reason are the supreme values in Western culture and civilization, the points of departure and arrival in all undertakings worthy of the name moral, political and social, and in connection with the ideas of movement and community they constitute the distinct identity of Western thought and civilisation. Freedom comprises the most important moral, social, political values of European culture and civilisation; reason is the highest expression of the vital role played by knowledge, thinking, concepts, and arguments. In this respect, freedom and reason are twin poles of valuation and cognition. 
‘Rational freedom’ therefore possesses an ethical element, involving value-assumptions and ultimate ends; freedom, happiness, the good society, the common good all fall within this rubric. And ‘rational freedom’ also possesses a cognitive element, connoting knowledge, the scientific understanding of the world. The conception both looks beyond the ‘is’ of actual existence by virtue of an ‘ought to be’ but proceeds in this vision through 'insight' into the existing world. Reason therefore apprehends the 'movement' of human history in terms of a progress towards freedom. 

Four key ideas 
The idea of the benevolent universe holds that there is a basic underlying rationality in reality which human beings can come to comprehend and which, if apprehended through what Descartes called ‘clear and distinct ideas’, will aid human beings in their activities to realise their goals and satisfy their aims. This benevolent universe has been conceived in many ways: as a deity, as creator and creation, a lawgiver, or as an impersonal Nature governed by immutable and inexorable laws, as both God and Nature interchangeably. The crucial point is that this universe is rational and therefore accessible to human beings, in so far as they use their reason and act in accordance with it. The benevolent universe more or less guarantees that rational efforts are not in vain; this ultimate reality shows human beings, through reason, how to transcend actual existence. 

The notion of ultimate reality entails the idea of transcendent and objective morality. This sees concepts of 'good' and 'evil' as being built into the universe, integral parts of reality which derive from above or from outside or from our 'innermost being', unalterable and universal; good conduct will be rewarded by nature and evil conduct punished. The 'good' here refers to those qualities or ways of life which most closely reflect the nature of the benevolent universe. To the extent that human beings live in accordance with their 'real' selves, putting aside immediate inclinations and impulses, they also live in accordance with the rationality of the benevolent universe. The good is that which corresponds to the human ontology and enhances life, bringing human beings into contact and union with ultimate and benevolent reality; evil is that which is a diminution and destruction of life, keeping human beings chained to mere actual existence and all of its frustrating desires, wants and inclinations. 

The elevation of the species is a notion which affirms the uniqueness of the human species. The human species alone is of transcending its own actual existence in order to achieve something higher. Humanity alone amongst all the species is capable of penetrating beyond immediacy and using reason to access ultimate reality, the higher benevolent universe, appreciating transcendent goodness. This power is fraught with dangers. The human species is unique in fitting the environment to its own nature rather than fitting itself to the environment. In the process, it can access not some ultimate and benevolent reality but become so enamoured of its powers that it becomes a prisoner of a new, artificial necessity. This in itself does not invalidate the point; it points to the need to be rational about reason. From Moses through Plato and Aquinas to Marx, the claim is repeated that it is reason that distinguishes the human species from all other species. This distinctiveness is qualitative and fundamental in that it means that the human species alone possesses what the Stoics called the ‘divine spark’, the spark of transcendence which gives the reasoning animal alone the potential to become the 'lord of nature'. A recent version of this idea came with Teilhard de Chardin and his Omega Point. Human beings are created in the image of God and are distinguished from animals by their ability to reason, to think, to use language, to create and maintain 'culture' over and above external nature. Whether this elevated conception of the uniqueness of the human species is hubris destroying the ecological basis of human life on earth is the key question. Again, it all depends on the rational use of reason, whether human beings are rational enough to apprehend the good and the true and identify human purposes with those of the benevolent universe. The claim to uniqueness, even superiority of culture over nature, does not give the right to some irresponsible domination of nature. This may be how religion and science have been understood and used, but this is in large part misuse. Dominion in The Bible refers to stewardship. Bacon is completely misinterpreted with respect to putting nature on the wrack. Higher being comes with a higher sense of 'duty', something which includes a moral responsibility with respect to nature. That said, the idea remains a form of speciesism which elevates human culture above nature and other species. A more appealing aspect of this uniqueness of the species, however, is the sense of oneness, giving an ideal of a common humanity sharing a common identity in the natural world and also a common future. Regardless of differences in terms of language, ethnicity, colour, gender, ability, virtue and vice, intelligence, inclination, foibles and so on there is an underlying or transcendent 'equality' which insists that human beings  - even those who do ‘evil’ and shun the good - are to be treated in the same way. Again, the fact that this way is different to other creatures highlights the flaw in speciesism and requires an ethic that embraces all life forms. 
The idea of community is a supreme moral value, a place, a principle, a constant of civilisation, a functional prerequisite of a viable social order, the condition and context of human self-realisation. Human beings as social beings require an extended sociality in order to individuate themselves. Aristotle used the phrase ‘all things common amongst friends’ to indicate how close bonds and ties could involve the sharing of material goods. Now, Aristotle defended private property against Plato, but his argument highlights a fundamental notion of sharing as an essential aspect of human nature, connoting a human sociability that is found in community, in communication as the sharing of hearts and minds, modes of experience, customs, traditions, feelings, attitudes, communitas as habitus, a communal modus vivendi which embodies and expresses the unity of the people in a 'spiritual' rather than merely a racial or anthropological sense. Marx the communist wrote precisely in these terms with respect to the company and companionship of the Paris working people, society as a need, an end in itself.

When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new need - the need for society - and what appears as a means has become an end. This practical development can be most strikingly observed in the gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its turn has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 365/6

Company, association as community, conversation as communication, the realisation of the old religious ideal of the ‘brotherhood of man’, Marx affirms ‘the nobility of man’ over against the proletarian identity. It is a stark assertion of elevated rational species capable of transcending the limitations of actual existence to apprehend the ultimate and benevolent universe.

Company, association and communication are presented as the highest kind of human satisfaction available. What Marx refers to as ‘society’ is actually community, community not simply as a means to other ends but as the supreme end itself. Community is the cultivation and living of company, conversation, the on-going meeting of minds. Community is the extended sociality that is the key to the expansion of human intelligence. It is through community that human beings have been able to create and maintain both culture (inner excellence) and civilization (outer potency) and thus achieve elevation through reason. Conscious social intercourse and identification with fellow human beings generate good conduct, thoughts and actions, all those attributes which properly befit a species able to live in accordance with benevolent purpose. Community is therefore the highest moral value in that it enables human beings to overcome their mere immediate self, the self locked in a cycle of natural inclinations and chained to the world of actual existence, and realise their higher, moral selves. Community is reason, Plato’s world of Being that has left behind the limitations of the world of Becoming, heaven, true happiness, nobility and lordship over nature. In contrast, the isolation and separation from others that is associated with mere 'individual' satisfaction are evil, the falsification of the human essence, and amount to slavery to nature, one’s impulses, desires, wants. Hence, the idea of community is the supreme human achievement, living in accordance with the good, bringing together the ultimate and benevolent reality, objective morality and the elevation of the species. 

This general presentation of the fundamental ideas of rational freedom is a heuristic device which draws on many sources. There are big differences between Plato and Aristotle as there are between Aquinas and Averroes, and between Kant, Hegel and Marx. But behind the variety of formulations there is a consistency which holds at a very general level. 

These general ideas can be broken up further in terms of historical evolution and the unfolding of rational freedom in the Western tradition. This outline can only highlight the crucial sources out of a vast and complicated history.

The first source is Old Testament Judaism. The sacred texts and Hebrew prophets state the of monotheism, the idea that there is the one God whose ‘law’ prescribes the moral conduct for humans, in whom the benevolence of the universe is concentrated and who maintains a personal, direct relationship to the 'chosen people'. This idea comes with a powerful moral strain in that the ‘chosen people’ are those distinguished by 'righteous living', which involves keeping the commandments of God, treating others as they treat themselves, being generous and neighbourly in their conduct, and identifying their purposes with the community. The ultimate triumph of the just and omnipotent God is the triumph of 'good' personified. As the good triumph over the wicked, Jerusalem as the world of transcendence destroys Babylon as the world of actual existence. 

The second source is ancient Greek philosophy. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle together created philosophy, defined the terms and mapped the field. Both the ethical and the cognitive perspectives were created by the ancient Greek philosophers. Before Socrates came the natural philosophers arguing about the nature of the universe. The great achievements of Greek scientists not only generated a certain overweening arrogance but neglected the human world. Bringing philosophy down to earth meant addressing the why question as well as the what and the how. 

The key component of Plato’s transcendent 'idealism' is the idea that the world of empirical reality, 'actual existence', is a world of Becoming which is secondary in both logical and practical moral terms to the transcendent world of 'ideas' or 'forms', the world of Being. The world of Being is the true reality which human beings enter by virtue of their innate ideas, the reason that they are born with. Human beings transcend the world of particulars and its limitations for the true reality of the world of forms, leave the world of Becoming to enter the world of Being, on account of their rationality and intellect, the power of their thought. At the pinnacle of human society is the knower and lover of reason, the person who goes beyond the empirical world of particulars, the world immediately available to the senses, to enter the true reality, the world of forms, by thought – this person is the philosopher. Morality, goodness and happiness are achieved through rationality. 

In his political and social thought, Plato has been criticised for organising society on the basis of substantive inequalities. Plato’s conception is best conceived as an organic hierarchical functionalism in which individuals are fitted to positions best suited to their talents and proclivities. 

The point to grasp is that the hierarchy that Plato establishes in his philosophy is paralleled by the hierarchy he establishes in the political and social world in terms of valuations and ways of life. The best life is the life of reason. There is an intrinsic relation between philosophy and community for Plato and this relation is established by reason. Plato’s Republic delineates the perfect city governed by reason. And this reason determines the internal arrangements of the city according to functional capacity. The 'guardians' are the rulers of the city, the men and women of reason, who are the most qualified to rule by virtue of their transcendent vision, their ability to perceive and dispense impartial 'justice' in accordance with the immutable, objective, universal 'idea' or ‘form’ of the good. The old question of who guards the guardians arises only the practice of the imperfect empirical world of particulars. The familiar criticism directed towards Plato as a totalitarian justifying elite rule misses the point that Plato is establishing principle in the ideal world of Being, not practice in the world of Becoming. If the guards do need guarding, then the principle is flawed. This still leaves the practical problem of how to translate the principle into political arrangements, but Plato was concerned to establish the principle that the rulers ought to rule through knowledge of ultimate reality and impartial justice. Therefore the guardians hold no private property and have no particular or sectional interest of their own. They rule for the common good. They have true knowledge of the world of ‘forms’ and ‘ideas’ and can penetrate the immediate world of particulars and senses to perceive the higher good, the true reality. It follows that is in the true interest of every inhabitant of the city, including the metics and the slaves, that philosophers should rule. Those who accuse Plato of writing a blueprint for manipulative rulers cloaking their own self-interest in the claim to the general interest completely ignore the point that Plato’s philosophers are defined as the knowers and lovers of wisdom. Their reward is not political or material but the satisfaction for ruling impartially in accordance with the true, the good and the beautiful, in identification with and selflessly 'serving' the community. Idealistic maybe, but we are dealing with the world of ideal forms in comparison with the empirical world of particulars. (In other books, such as The Laws, Plato offered a conception of the ‘mixed life’ which combined idealism with realism and humanism. Critics tend not to be able to make the fine and subtle distinctions with Plato).

To ensure that the general interest prevails over particular interests, the lives of the guardians are arranged so that they are at one with the community. In the ideal city the guardians do not possess any private property or live in restricted familial relationships or individual houses. Through the thoughts and lives of the guardians, the community achieves its highest excellence. In the community the universal of reason is joined with the universal of human fellowship. 

The third source is Christianity. Adding a New Testament to the Old, Christianity extended the ideas of a divinely ordained objective morality. In Christianity, the chosen people are universalised beyond the identification with the tribe. God's people are the pure in heart, all who observe the 'law', Jew and Gentile alike. In being their 'brothers' keepers', Christians have a responsibility for the salvation of the souls of others, not only their own. The Christian mission extends to the whole of the human race, meaning that they have to spread the faith and work to establish as much of the 'kingdom' of heaven on earth as far as is humanly possible. Further, Christianity contains a very definite and categorical repudiation of the world of 'actual existence', with barbed reference to the world of 'Mammon'. The word Mammon is a transliteration into New Testament Greek of the Aramaic tnamona, meaning 'wealth' or 'profit'. The attachment to wealth estranged human beings from God since 'No man can serve two masters . . . Ye cannot serve God and mammon' (Mt 6 : 24). Jesus Christ urged, 'Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness' (Lk 16 : 9). Christianity therefore enjoins individuals to avoid dishonest gain and use their money for the benefit of their fellow-men. The Sermon on the Mount affirms the spirit of poverty to be true happiness, the gateway to heaven. The mighty will be vexed and the humble will be raised, the meek will inherit the earth. There will be ‘a new heaven and a new earth’, a ‘new Jerusalem’, where ‘the dwelling of God is with men, and he will live with them… There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away’ (Revelation 21:1-6). This is a conception of transcendent hope and dignity. This notion confers a dignity on 'lowly' forms of human life, along with the hope that one day present suffering on the part of the poor in spirit will be rewarded by eternal bliss. 

That said, Christianity’s ‘otherworldly' orientation has always been combined with a strong political profile and even a recurrent radical message. This was apparent before the establishment of the church, when the 'poor' and the 'meek', suffering oppression and persecution in the Roman Empire, sought to create God's kingdom in a spirit of brotherly love and communal sharing of goods. 

The fourth source is the principle of human equality, a recurring theme in the Western tradition. This principle is the offspring of Christianity and classical philosophy. The shift from the hierarchical Platonic conception to intrinsic human equality began with Stoicism, the pagan 'religion' of intellectuals in the Roman Empire. Stoicism founded equality on 'reason' as the highest human faculty common to all members of the species. It is worth pointing out, however, that Stoicism, in Platonic manner, retains a hierarchy of ways of life in which 'wisdom' is declared to be the highest human quality. Christian doctrine in contrast holds that all human beings possess an ‘immortal soul’ and are equal 'in the sight of God'. St Paul began the codification of Christianity but the classic early statement of Christian thought is Augustine's The City of God. In this massive work, the Christian conception of human equality and human dignity is established with eloquence and vigour. In contrast to the self-serving evasiveness of the ancient treatment of the subject, Augustine emphatically rejects the principle of slavery. Augustine is no less forthright in his condemnation of unjust and oppressive government, likening tyrannical rulers to leaders of criminal gangs. Augustine’s words are worth quoting in full:

Set justice aside, then, and what are kingdoms but great robberies ? because what are robberies but little kingdoms? for in thefts, the hands of the underlings are directed by the commander, the con​federacy of them is sworn together, and the pillage is shared by the law amongst them. And if those ragamuffins grow but up to be able enough to keep forts, build habitations, possess cities, and conquer adjoining nations, then their government is no more called thievish, but graced with the eminent name of a kingdom, given and gotten, not because they have left their practices, but because that now they may use them without danger of law: for elegant and ex​cellent was that pirate's answer to the great Macedonian Alexander, who had taken him: the king asking him how he durst molest the seas so, he replied with a free spirit, "How darest thou molest the whole world? But, because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief: thou, doing it with a great navy, art called an emperor."

Now, to war against one's neighbours, and to proceed to the hurt of such as hurts not you, for greedy desire of rule and sovereignty, what is this but flat thievery in a greater excess and quantity than ordinary?

This city of the actual world is in marked contrast to the divine city, the city of the righteous and the pure in heart. The ‘city of man’ is the mundane city of vice, egoism, materialism, oppression and violence. Yet Augustine states a view of human progress, human beings moving out of the darkness in one determinate direction towards the light. The original Fall of the human race has been redeemed through Christ's early presence, death and resurrection, opening the way to eventual salvation. ‘The society which is the City of God realizes in an eminent degree the two values, justice and peace (Justitia and Pax)’.

Of course, the Stoic and the early Christian principle of equality is not the modern principle; the Augustinian philosophy of history is not the Enlightenment conception of progress. A moral and spiritual conception of equality operates on a plane above the practical sphere of government policy and social relations. In castigating tyrannical rulers as criminal gangs, Augustine is not advocating emancipation as the overthrow of these autocratic rulers within the ‘city of man’, to be replaced with just ruling increasing material prosperity and distributing it more equitably. His point is that the ‘city of man’ as such, as a mere empirical sphere of worldly existence is necessarily limited, transitory and ephemeral compared to the ‘city of god’ beyond the senses. But these principles are the foundation of later views. For all of Augustine’s condemnation of the earthly city, it was the city of people’s everyday existence. The earthly city mattered to the people who had to live there; it mattered to Augustine. And it continued to matter. The justice, peace and equality that Augustine valued as attributes of the city of god were valued also by members of the earthly city. However transcendent, Christian ideas fed into the temporal realm. Christianity’s equality of moral responsibility fed into modern doctrines of legal, political and social equality. Attempts by the apostles of the ‘free’ market refer to the equality of ‘everyone’ voting with their money, according to their ‘contributions’ (Friedman). Compare this ‘equality’ with Christianity’s equality of each through the possession of an immortal soul. This moral and spiritual conception of equality is the source of modern equality, not economics and material notions of desert and contributions. Only equally transcendent individual units, those possessing an 'immortal soul', can reasonably claim a formal (and a substantive) equality in terms of political decision-making and legal provisions. And no philosophy of historical progress would make sense without being infused with an idea of transcendence. 

The principles drawn ancient Greece and Rome, and from Judaism and Christianity lasted well beyond the end of the classical and medieval eras. The ideas of the ultimate and benevolent universe, objective morality, the unique nature and destiny of the human species, and the moral value of the community became the absolute presuppositions of the culture and civilisation that followed. Life in society would be meaningless in the absence of these presuppositions at its foundation. This point needs to be remembered when addressing what Durkheim calls the ‘anomie’ of the modern world. The inversion of creative human subject and created object is associated with the Weberian pathos of means displacing ends, rendering the world meaningless. Which begs the question whether civilisation can survive capitalism’s disenchantment of the world. 

21 THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE
The notion of transcendence is the foundation of the visionary aspect Western thought. This future oriented perspective guided by ends motivates activity in the present with a view to building the future. But ideals outline and map that future, they do not actually construct it in practice. This requires technics, know-how. This is the cognitive perspective. The relation between the ethical and the cognitive perspectives is not one 'end and means', the former setting the end point, the former providing the know-how. There is an interpenetration between two perspectives, a cross-fertilization. Further, the ethical and cognitive co-exist in a state of permanent tension, sometimes complementing each other, other times contradicting each other.
The cognitive perspective holds that the ever-increasing knowledge of the workings of nature, human nature as well as the natural world, makes it possible to envisage a radical transformation and reorganisation of the conditions of human life. This perspective proceeds not from a vision of some ultimate ideal world but from the empirical world itself. 
It is a perspective which is firmly focused not on what human beings ought to do, think and want, but on the things that human beings actually desire in the everyday world – basic needs like sufficient food, drink, shelter, but also a diverse range of activities, companionship. The cognitive approach deals with the science, technique and organisation in their attainment. Here the notion of human beings being chained to the actual present is confronted not by a transcendent ideal but by knowledge and technical power, freeing people from want, fear, ignorance, idleness. The cognitive perspective focuses on the way that science, technique and organisation satisfy the 'materialistic' aspect of human aspirations. Putting the ethical and the cognitive together means giving moral transcendence and community a material foundation in practical power and plenitude. The ideal and the real are therefore reconciled. Socrates is said to have brought philosophy down to earth. In the process, however, earth is raised up to the level of philosophy. This means that the realization of the material aspirations of human being in empirical life within the moral framework of an ideal organization of society. 

There are three key ideas in the cognitive perspective. 
In the first place, the natural world is knowable and therefore can be made to serve human purposes. There is no 'rationality', still less benevolence, in the universe, only in the human skill and insight in investigating nature to discern its laws. Nature is considered to be a machine rather than a living organism. As nature is subjected to scientific investigation and technical manipulation, the human intellect is considered the key to advancing knowledge and therefore power. With disenchantment, the benevolent universe becomes value neutral. Where once the moral guarantee for the ultimate success of human endeavour was given by the benevolence of ultimate reality, now human goals are dependent on the advance of human knowledge. But not the reversal: where once the good life was defined in living in accordance with the moral nature of the benevolent universe, now it is realised through the satisfaction of material aspirations.

The scientific examination of nature is accompanied by the scientific examination of human society. This is the second key idea. As nature is denuded of moral purpose, so too is society and politics. The natural and the social world are made neutral and indifferent to ends. Disenchantment is also a demoralisation. Society is made an object of scientific study, capable of being understood, managed and manipulated. Again, scientific laws replace moral ends. Society ceases to be an arena concerned with the realisation of moral purposes but instead needs to be understood in terms of its institutions of government, law and order, crime and punishment, war and peace, economic production, consumption and exchange, education or the family. All of these social institutions can be examined in terms of their actual processes and regularities, with no need to have recourse to such moral and value-laden notions as the good, justice, right, or to such political values as power, control, authority and obligation. In other words, the cognitive approach is also a demoralisation and a depoliticisation, it robs society of all those things it is to be human above and beyond observable material actualities. The approach lacks vision, it narrows the horizon to the actual world and is not concerned with moral values and political ideals that point to alternate possibilities. The production, distribution and exchange of societal goods of all kinds - economic, cultural, political etc - proceed, like external nature, in a 'law-like' manner. These can be examined scientifically, by recourse to logic and empirical observation. 

In the third place, human values, morality and the 'good society' are derived from human interests, wants, desires, needs, as experienced in the actual world rather than something 'given' by an ideal deriving from objective morality. Morality is whatever is conducive to the attainment of satisfaction in the here and now in terms of human appetites, natural instincts, possibilities and limitations. 
It is apparent that the cognitive perspective, embracing natural and social science, has become dominant in the modern age. It was, however, present in the Western tradition from the start and in fact, with Thales and the other natural philosophers of ancient Greece, was in the field first. One can find it in Epicurus, for whom there is no spiritual reality, no transcendent deity, no personal immortality in the universe, only the actual empirical world. Once people accept this reality as the only reality and identify their nature within with the nature without, then life can properly be enjoyed. The here and now is all that there will ever be, make peace with the world since there is nothing else to come. 

There are a couple of aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy which are pertinent here. Plato upheld a transcendent or other-worldly conception of the good in light of the ultimate reality beyond the senses. In contrast, Aristotle's conception of the 'good life' is defined in this-worldly terms of balanced satisfactions which focus on human needs as given in empirical reality. Aristotle is keen to relate moral and social 'values' to variables and regularities observable in actual societies, establishing causes and effects. Further, Aristotle turns away from Plato’s ideal of organic functionalism to examine existing political societies as they actually are. Aristotle here does two important things, classifying political units in terms of the nature of power wielded in them and then defining conflicting groups within these units according to their social position, as determined by their differential possession of material wealth. Aristotle therefore identifies the conflict between the rich and the poor as the basic conflict in society. 

The cognitive perspective involves claims which are open to question. To begin with, it seems implausible that the 'increasing' knowledge of nature and apparent 'mastery' of it is in itself a benign, let alone a benevolent process. In ‘mastering’ nature, it seems that human beings have shackled themselves within a new necessity dominated by their own technics. Human beings have conquered nature but have in turn been conquered by their own powers in alien form. This worship of technical powers is a new religion based on the optimistic faith that the growth of knowledge ultimately ends in human happiness and freedom. The understanding and mastery of nature is the ‘ascent of man’ out of a state of ignorance and barbarism towards the state of enlightenment through increasing scientific knowledge. 

The increasing sophistication in the understanding of nature has led to a greater humility, with further advances tempered by a greater sense of awe and even mystery. The self-understanding of science is now much more sophisticated, with new discoveries and new knowledge being met not with overweening confidence but with an awareness of reach a new plane of ignorance. 

The idea that with the perfect knowledge of society it will be possible to organize society in accordance with rational and scientific understanding stands revealed as the technocratic utopia it is, not only impossible but also undesirable. The notion of a scientific government is born of the view that individual human action and conduct and collective social structures, processes and relationships, are essentially the same as the law-like phenomena found in nature (which in turn is based on the questionable assumption that external nature also behaves in such law-like manner). The scientific approach is an explicit denial of 'transcendence', of a world beyond the senses, an ultimate reality beneath or behind the observable and the measurable, a world beyond present immediacy. If human beings are governed by a law-like natural necessity, then what role creative human agency, choice, action? Law-like regularity, cause and effect, can be demonstrated after the fact, but not before or while the fact is in the process of creation. The perspective of science in this regard not only proceeds from but actually remains within the narrow horizon of existing empirical fact. How can such a science account for such regular aspects of human behaviour as spontaneity, unpredictability, inconsistency, irrationality and self-contradiction? The most profitable line to develop here is Spinoza’s argument that such behaviour is the result of 'inadequate ideas' with respect to the self-contained substance of God/Nature. The difficult part lies in seeing human life and society as ever being so rational as live wholly in accordance with ‘adequate ideas’. 

Scientific speculation predates Socrates, the natural philosophers were in the field before the moral philosophers. The ‘Age of Reason’ in the seventeenth century was succeeded by the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. If science in itself was going to set us free, it would have done so by now. This observation reveals something about science, technology and knowledge in the modern world. Far from rendering human conduct and the processes and structures of society 'transparent', the world evinces nothing so much as power out of control. An assertive and confident scientism is plainly untenable. The failure lies in believing that the cognitive approach was self-sufficient, causing it to systematically exclude ideas belonging to the moral perspective of transcendence. Historical experience indicates that this scientistic paradigm has continually misfired and fallen far short of its claims. For this reason, the cognitive dimension is one dimension of reason, not the only one. One returns again to the ethical perspective that seeks to transcend a reality given to the senses by reference to ends. It is highly questionable whether any kind of 'hedonism' focused exclusively on the satisfaction of material or natural satisfactions in the empirical here and now could ever be considered a fulfilling human life. It certainly bears no relation to the moral experience of all known civilisations, it offers no adequate foundation of values and no convincing account of the cooperative structures that an enduring social order requires. No lasting society or civilisation has been built on satisfaction of individual material aspirations alone. The view sounds more like the short term live for the day and very soon gone rampages of Hittites and Vikings. And it may fit the approach of rapacious, greedy modern consumers as they help themselves to what remains of nature’s largesse. Which makes the point that everyone is in some way a practical 'Epicurean', in that in the immediate sense all individuals see their 'good life' in terms of plain material aspirations and satisfactions. But values and morality, like community, culture and civilisation, do not follow from natural needs. The simple fact that it is difficult to sacrifice immediate satisfactions for the sake of enduring general principles (e.g. truthfulness, respect for life, helping one's neighbour, etc.) indicates that morality necessarily entails transcendence in some way. 

 This observation points to the conclusion that it is the idealistic perspective concerning values, morality and ends that establishes the foundation of civilisation, the physical world being built by technique, organisation and know-how in accordance with the ideal. The inadequacy of scientism, hedonism and humanism shows that empirical, hard, worldly, secular materialism stands in need of a principle of transcendence, an overarching end or vision which is not derived  from or translatable into the desires and satisfactions experienced in the world of the senses. This principle of transcendence has succeeded in evoking a spirit of sacrifice and self-denial on the part of generations whose ‘contributions’ together built civilised society. No scientific approach to nature and society could on its own have produce anything like civilisation. The words of James Lovelock are pertinent in this respect.

“I am too committed to the scientific way of thinking to feel comfortable when enunciating the Creed or the Lord's Prayer in a Christian Church. The insistence of the definition "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth" seems to anaesthetize the sense of wonder, as if one were committed to a single line of thought by a cosmic legal contract. It seems wrong also to take it merely as a metaphor. But I respect the intuition of those who do believe, and I am moved by the ceremony, the music, and most of all by the glory of the words of the prayer book that to me are the nearest to perfect expression of our language. When atheistic science can inspire anything as moving as Bach's St Matthew passion or as seemly as Salisbury Cathedral I will respect it but not be part of it.” (Lovelock The Ages of Gaia 2000: ch 9).

Civilisation is more than the physical, more than a power than can be measured and quantified, but something that points to something that is enduring in the human spirit. The point is that civilisation is most profitably considered as a unity of the ethical and the cognitive, combining an active concern with the ‘here’ with a view to getting to the ‘there’. This combines the ideal and the real, the transcendent and the material, the visionary and the scientific, in a seamless web.

The disenchantment that Weber referred to was described by Herder as a ‘disgodding’. Nature was conceived as a machine rather than as a living organism and the universe was relieved of its benevolence. At the same time as the gods departed, Christianity retreated from central stage and the idea of transcendence passed to secular political philosophies concerned with creating earthly heavens. 

What characterises this secular idealism in the modern world is the way that the human capacity for transcendence is located in the advance of scientific knowledge and understanding. The good society is no longer an ideal requiring moral conviction but is capable of realisation through technique and organisation. Science and technics brings the attainment of the ideal within historical time and space, not as a result of living up to a moral conception of the good life but as the direct result of rational human action. 
The Lutheran revolution proclaiming spiritual self-sufficiency through the direct relation of the individual to God must therefore be viewed alongside the Copernican revolution which, in assigning the earth a humble place in the universe, made the human race just one natural species among many others, inhabiting just one planet among many others. The Copernican revolution ought to have led to humility and modesty on the part of the human species, instead the very fact of being able to make such scientific discoveries encouraged a certain pride and optimism in the powers of human reason. The fact that scientific method was able to discover the humble and modest position of the human species on a planet that could no longer be considered the centre of the universe was itself a source of inspiration. Copernicus and Kepler were followed by Galileo and Bacon, then Newton. Instead of humility in face of our small place in the universe, there was hubris. Francis Bacon’s The New Atlantis in 1627 was quick to give a concise statement of the idea that the advance of scientific knowledge – the ‘advancement of learning’ to use the title of another of Bacon’s books - leads logically and inexorably to the increasing of human mastery over nature, and also to the rational organization and control of society:

The End of our Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of Things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible.

Two hundred years later and Saint Simon was developing the technocratic ideas which were to unite utopian and scientific socialism.

In the ‘Age of Reason’ philosophy took its cue from science and freed itself from theology, even though the first of the modern philosophers trod warily with respect to religion – Hobbes, Vico, Descartes, Spinoza. With Descartes we enter the realm of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ achieved through the method of doubt. For Vico the condition of knowing something is to have made it. Locke’s empiricism raises the very sensory experience formerly condemned as the mere world of particulars as the only reliable way in which to acquire knowledge of the natural world. Hume made reason the slave of the passions. Onwards to the Encyclopaedists and the French 'materialists' of the eighteenth century and the religious and theological casing of civilisation is finally cracked: war is declared between science and religion. With the palpable evidence of the achievements associated with scientific advance all around, the moral authority of the church and the weight of tradition could not resist. The contest gave science a cause to rally behind, a crusade seeking the triumph of the natural over the supernatural, knowledge over belief, discovery over ignorance and reason over superstition. The gods were to be banished from human life. But much else went with them – ends, values, purposes, morality as something that was shared, and not least the humility and modesty that could restrain the new scientific powers within their limits.

The fact that this war of science and religion is still going on, albeit in increasingly sterile terms, should indicate that for all of the many victories of science and the many defeats of religion in the past three hundred years, there is something awry in the notion that the advancement of scientific learning alone suffices for human life. The perspective of transcendence, ethics and idealism has been pulverised but never routed or extinguished. The sooner this phoney war is declared over, the sooner it will be possible to press on to the task of being rational about reason, a task which requires recovering the ethical component of reason, of identifying the ideal within the real.

This is to argue that a sane and balanced approach is to see the ethical and the cognitive as complementary perspectives which apprehend the same reality from different angles but with goals that are not contradictory if each remains within its own sphere. This makes it possible to overcome the pathos of means and ends that afflicts modern society. The apparent sundering of a 'unified' ethical framework by the instrumental rationality of modernity has denied modern human society its innermost spiritual substance, rendering the world meaningless with every advance in scientific knowledge. The more we know about the world, the less that world has any meaning. Without the perspective of transcendence, scientific knowledge and reason closes in on an ever smaller world, knowing more and more about something that matters less and less. One of Richard Dawkins’ books is entitled The Greatest Show on Earth. It is a book about life on earth which, for all of its celebration of diverse forms of animal and plant life, is curiously silent about the threat to the global ecology. Interestingly, Dawkins’ objected to the religious overtones of James Lovelock’s Gaia thesis from the first. He prefers nature as a machine to Nature as a living self-regulating organism. The difference is this. When a machine breaks down, the parts are replaced from the outside. When Nature breaks down, it repairs itself. Nature may well be ‘the greatest show on Earth’ but human beings, as part of Nature, want a meaning that is greater than being part of a food chain, a struggle for survival, a cycle of life and death. And Nature needs more than that. Life is wholly unintelligible without the sense of transcendence.

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is the pinnacle of the Enlightenment, for this reason – it negotiates a path beyond the conflict of knowledge and belief, reason and empiricism, and ought to have ended the war between science and religion long ago. Kant's philosophy is an intellectually sublime synthesis of ethical and cognitive perspectives. Uniting Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism, Kant's philosophy of the knowledge of nature is wholly secular. For Kant, the knowledge of the external world of 'phenomena' comes from the experience of the senses as made intelligible and organised by the categories of human reason. The world of ‘things-in-themselves’ is beyond human experience and is inaccessible to human reason. There can therefore be no transcendence here. 

The world of 'practical reason' or morality, however, is radically different. Human beings are co-creators and co-legislators of this moral world, the world of ‘noumena’, and partake of a real world as distinct from a merely 'phenomenal' world. Whereas once either revelation (religion) and nature (science) had been the fountain-head of morality, Kant makes human reason the source of being able to understand good and evil, to prescribe right conduct through the ‘categorical imperative’ and to author the universal. The moral law of reason enjoins human beings to live in accordance with the ‘categorical imperative’. Kant defines a number of formulas which in essence convey the substance of the gospels in a secular idiom. The categorical imperative affirms the fundamental equality of rational moral agents, arguing that human beings be treated as 'ends in themselves'. True freedom is achieved if, in moral conduct, human beings follow the law of reason only, in contradistinction to natural inclinations and without regard to practical consequences. This is the moral and rational foundation which enables culture and civilization to flourish. With this foundation secure, human beings can look forward to a future of 'perpetual peace'. 

Kant’s philosophy transfigures the ideals of transcendence into the ethico-rational freedom of citizens who live as co-legislators in a moral world of their own making. Without any recourse to supernaturalism, Kant’s ethico-rational freedom transcends the world of empirical reality, rising above the limitations of a world beset by antagonism, desire and natural inclinations through the power of human reason. Human reason is called upon to impress its sign upon empirical reality, thus expanding the sphere of human freedom. Kant’s ethico-rational freedom encompasses Plato’s sublime morality, the righteous, the poor in spirit, the Gospel love thy neighbour as thyself, the Protestant emphasis on good works, and it does so without any need to have recourse to such elitist or selective notions as Platonic guardians, the ‘chosen people’, the elect, or, reaching into the century after Kant, ‘the party’. Kant achieves this by emphasising the creative power of human reason within each and all, conceiving human beings as co-authors of their moral existence and co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends. In establishing the limits of reality within the confines of reason and nature, Kant actually opened up the possibility of the most expansive moral and rational freedom, a 'kingdom of ends' which is realised in the three dimensions of nature, society and the mind. 

22 THE TRANSCENDENT ASPECT OF REASON
The ethical or transcendent aspect concerns ends. The other perspective of the Western tradition, the cognitive perspective, concerns means. Civilisation would itself be meaningless if it contained the assumptions of transcendence only. People who do nothing but wait in expectation of the heavenly civitas deii do not build civilisations in the earthly sphere. The cognitive perspective concerns reality, what it is and how it can be known. This is the world of science and technology, the instrumental manipulation of the world of actual existence. The transcendent ethics of the elevated rational species living in accordance with an objective morality to access the ultimate and benevolent reality establish ends which inspire — but they point beyond the existing reality. Without complementation they live in a half-world, somewhere between here nor there. 

In dealing with meaning and a rationality of means and of ends, a number of critical observations concerning the architectonics of civilisation are in order. Community in itself is an abstract notion. Who isn’t in favour of ‘community’? And how many powerful groups have sought to conceal a sectional interest behind a claim to the communal good? Only misanthropes would take issue with Marx’s affirmation of company, association and conversation. Additional clauses and qualifications with respect to social relations and scale of sociality to avoid a vague, remote, abstract and utterly impossible ‘identification’ with ‘the human species’ as a whole. As social animals, human beings need the companionship and communication that follows association, but this ‘need for society’ says nothing about the actual arrangements of the community. The 'sharing' of all important things in common is a sublime ideal, but question begging this side of heaven. The question was put to Jesus Christ that if men and women had been married several times on earth, to whom would they be married in heaven. The answer is that the spiritual plane is beyond the limitations of the material plane. Turning the question on its head, how can people live on the material plane in accordance to principles appropriate to the spiritual plane? Does all things in common refer not only to material goods but also to marriage-partners?

The empirical facts of egoism, avarice, vanity, possessive individualism, competitiveness, desire, lust denote real aspects of human nature which are manifested in human society and politics. They cannot be 'spirited' away in some simple sense, transcendence merely being an escape from hard realities. The question comes down to how human beings can move from here to there? Whatever the answer to that question, it is clear that the journey starts in the reality of the here, with all its imperfections. The point is that the ethical perspective setting ends in abstraction of the means for realising them sets an impossibly high ideal and, ultimately, becomes an impotent ought-to-be with no critical and practical purchase within actual reality. 

The uniqueness and superiority of the human species is the most question begging of all in that it sets – or seems to set – the human species apart from other species and above nature as a whole. The elevation of the human species seems to be bought at the price of the denigration of nature as a whole. The idea seems to invite the destruction of the ecological basis of human life. Human beings are distinguished on account of their 'reason'. But how, exactly, does this elevate the species? The notion involves a whole number of ambiguities and paradoxes. Human intelligence, knowledge and understanding may be quantitatively different — extended sociality creating the 'larger' brain — from other species but is it qualitatively different from the ways these species adapt themselves to their environment? It is too soon to answer that question. Human beings have transformed their environment to fit their needs and purposes, but this is an ‘adaptation’ that is generating a whole range of adverse ecological consequences that threaten human life as we know it. In ecological terms, human beings continually show themselves to be less 'adaptable' and less fitted to their environment than other species of animals. But to be aware of the ecological failures of human technical and instrumental manipulation of external nature is itself evidence of the rational faculty. The criticism is not a repudiation of reason but a demand that reason live up to its fullest and highest possibilities, including an ethical and ecological component and supplying the ends to guide means.

Reason, in other words, is an end to achieve and is not to be judged by stages that fall short of the ideal. The rational capacity of human beings affirms the ability of individuals to transcend their individual selves and achieve goodness through identification with the community. If one tests the claim empirically, in terms of historical experience, the claim is fantastical. What is unique and distinct about the human species in this respect is not its rational nobility and elevation but its capacity for organised intra-species competition, conflict, torture and war. 


“The critical issue is that human beings are different from animals. Man creates symbols and bases his culture upon them; the flag and patriotism are examples, as are status, religion, and language. The capacity to create and deal with symbols, actually a superb achievement, also accounts for the fact that we are the cruellest species on the planet. We kill not out of necessity but out of allegiance to such symbols as the flag and fatherland; we kill on principle. Thus our aggression occurs on a different level from that of animals, and not much can be learned from animals about this distinctively human form of aggression.” 

May 1976 ch 7

Human beings ‘kill on principle’. The capacity to create and deal with symbols is an achievement that also accounts for the fact that human beings are the cruellest species in terms of organised conflict and war on principle. That is not the case against reason, it is the case for reason. May is worth quoting further here, lest the impression be given that he rejects reason as inherently self-deluding and destructive.

“The word power comes from the Latin posse, meaning "to be able." We can see the vicissitudes of the emergence of power as soon as a baby is born into the world—in his cry and in the waving of his arms in demand that he be fed. The cooperative, loving side of existence goes hand in hand with coping and power, but neither the one nor the other can be neglected if life is to be gratifying. Our appreciation of the earth and the support of our fellows are not gained by abdication of our powers, but by cooperative use of them”. (May 1976 ch 1). 

Here, Kant’s argument is required. The historical record, experience, cannot establish the limits of human possibilities, rational or otherwise. That potential lies in rational human nature as a potential for creating a future which is feasibly different and better than the present. Were it otherwise, nothing would change. The fact that human beings had never driven motor vehicles, flew in aeroplanes or used the Internet up to 1800 was not proof that they could never do these things. And that’s the point. The rational faculty is the potential to put an end to intra-species (and inter-species) competition and conflict.

Exercising humility and restraint, using power and knowledge wisely is rational in a way that (self) destructive arrogance is not. So, the human race is an animal species, no better and no worse than other animal species, all with a common origin and maybe even a common destiny. But the reference to destiny points to another distinguishing feature of the human species, the awareness of mortality. This consciousness is why the human animal can be expected to be different.

23 OBJECTIVE MORALITY
Turning now to the idea that morality is objective, something universal and eternal, an integral part of the universe. The empirical world exhibits a wide variety of moral codes and practices according to time and place. This variety can be made to conform to a common objective standard only by losing concreteness and practicality. But this rejection of objective morality implies that there is an irreducible element of subjective and contingent valuation in moral experience. How does this avoid moral relativism in the understanding of good and evil? Does this mean that slavery in the southern states of the USA is not worthy of moral condemnation because, by the values of that time and place, it was acceptable, justifiable, supported by notions of racial inferiority? The treatment of women in ancient Greece? The Japanese treatment of prisoners of war? Without objective morality, why do we feel that Hitler’s extermination of peoples to be abhorrent? This is not some instinctive fear or concern with self-preservation, since the abhorrence is felt at historical distance. 

The point is that varied moral values and practices are the products of varied and contingent circumstances in time and place, they are not really parts of the ultimate and benevolent universe. If morality is subjective then there is no good reason why a life of sharing, co-operation, altruism should be preferred to the life of possession, competition, and egoism. Without objective morality, there is no way of defining the terms of the good life or of confronting empirical reality with an ideal for which there are compelling arguments. Is the argument for the 'benevolence' of the universe a matter of faith incapable of intellectual demonstration? What are the intellectual proofs? If benevolence cannot be demonstrated, if there is no ultimate reality beyond empirical existence, then no good reasons can be given in support of an endeavour which enjoins us to sacrifice the limited and transitory pleasures of empirical reality in order to gain the greater reward of the ideal society. It is the problem of making the kingdom of 'heaven' intelligible and accessible. Religions can evade this difficulty since only with death is the truth or otherwise of the claim resolved. This escape clause is not available to political movements concerned with creating heaven on earth. 

24 THE REASON OF ANCIENT GREECE

It is sometimes claimed that just as ancient Greek is ‘dead’ as a language, so too ancient Greek philosophy is of little relevance in the modern world. It is certainly true that the politics and the ethics, like the physics and metaphysics of the likes of Plato and Aristotle, is at odds with modern conceptions at many points. But that is all the more reason to retrieve and revitalize their views. Human beings have not changed much over two thousands. For all of sophistication, it still looks like the vanity, greed, lust and stupidity just with mobile phones. Studying the ancient Greeks makes us more knowledgeable not just about past human beings but teaches us something about who we are now, and what we could be. Plato and Aristotle were mighty thinkers who wrote about the problems that confront human beings in every age. And they may well have produced better solutions.

Platonic sublime beauty and harmony and Aristotelian balance and flourishing are particularly appealing at a time when increasing numbers of people are deeply troubled by the nature of the modern world, not only those who have lost out materially in the global processes of production, investment and trade, but also those whose comfortable lifestyles have not bought peace of mind in the Global North. Many people feel that there is something awry in the system itself. The world does not seem to be on the right path. There is a growing awareness of and concern with the massive destruction that technological development has caused. Images of the Amazon rainforests being cut down and going up in smoke, the ice-caps melting in the Arctic, record droughts one year being followed by record floods the next, learning that the extinction of species is proceeding at a rate not seen for 65 million years, set off feelings of despair. Hearing climate scientists connect ecological destruction with human made global warming climate change in the very least puts a question mark against the notion of industrial ‘progress’. The notion of ‘progress’ implies movement from one stage to a better or higher or more advanced stage. The end point of the industrial revolution seems to be an ecological wasteland that destroys the natural basis for human life. Even more troubling in an immediate sense is the prospect of being destroyed by weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, biological, all of which were produced by the very scientific techniques which were supposed to issue in human enlightenment. Means of production have become means of destruction. The image of highly trained technicians, dressed in the clean white garb of laboratories and hospitals, working in concert to produce "weapons-grade" bacteria is nauseating. The greatest intellects have been reduced to means and are working to ends that they have not themselves set. Some direct their ire against science and the scientists. But science is never and can never be about ends. The responsibility for the misfiring of science lies somewhere else, however much we can lament the way that many scientists are content to be enlisted in a system that is palpably going wrong. And this is the point, something has gone wrong in a social system that is capable of producing, but not being able to control and know how to use, the awesome tools of modern science, technics and organisation. That something is alienation, the inversion of subject and object, the inversion of means and ends. Failure to tackle the problem at its source in alienative reasons means that the system will continue to attempt solutions by the very means that caused the problems. Where once ethics and politics sought to create a public life that corresponded to and enhanced the human ontology, now we seek solutions in human cloning. Where once we sought eudaimonia, happiness or flourishing as a quality of human faculties and capacities in their exercise, now we seek to understand the chemistry of the brain so as to produce a feeling of well-being through the taking of a happy pill. Not true happiness, of course. But where once Paideia and Bildung referred to a process of socialisation into public life, now all we require is a process of droning for the system.

To describe the spectacle of science and scientists being reduced to life-denying tools as nauseating is apt. In "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity," written in 1935, Edmund Husserl presented a clear message. "The European nations are sick. Europe itself, it is said, is in crisis" (Husserl 1970: 270). And Husserl was clear as to what had gone wrong: "The European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism" (1970: 290).


The reduction of nature to a machine and examined by a mathematically based science has generated the awesome technologies that powered the modern world, has enveloped us all in materialism. A highly productive economic system taps directly into natural inclinations, desires and wants but locks the human in the immediacy of the senses. In raising potentialities, mechanistic materialism locks the human gaze at the immediate level of the senses. This kind of mechanical, instrumental thinking has come to dominate not only all modes of human reasoning, taking the place of culture and ethics. As Ellul argued, technique is not a culture, a philosophy or a way of life. The face that we think it is constitutes the core of the modern crisis. Within alienative, exploitative relations that invert means and ends, science and technology cast a giant shadow that shrouds all other forms of human knowledge and inquiry. Most important, the domination of modern science and technology extinguishes the possibility of gaining knowledge of the "meaning" of human life itself. Science is being made to carry a weight that it cannot bear. Science stands on the wrong side of the fact/value, object/subject divide to answer the need for ‘meaning’. Science deals with the ‘how’ question and can say nothing about ‘why’. The ‘why’ question addresses "meaning" and this requires natural or ordinary language rather than mathematical or scientific articulation.

The temptation to abandon rationalism as such should be resisted. Postmodernism as a decadent liberalism is merely the latest instance of a common twentieth-century indulgence, the last thing that is needed in addressing the problems that face us. Postmodernists consider science like everything else to be a social construction and that ‘truth’ is in some way a made up notion. Perhaps the law of gravity should be tested as a social construction by taking a running jump from the top storey of a very tall building.
Most of all, we need to be rational about reason. Husserl was clear that the crisis was not caused by rationalism as such but a ‘misguided rationalism’, he denied that "the European crisis . . . [means] that rationality as such is evil" (Husserl 1970: 290). Rather, what is required is the reform of reason, to expand reason so that it could not only account for material bodies in motion, but also for the meaning of human life. This was what Husserl called "phenomenology," giving a ‘rational account’ (logos) of ‘appearances’ (phenomena).
What Husserl meant by phenomenology comes out in the critique of modern rationality with respect to Einstein:





In declaring that "the scientist docs not become a subject of investigation" (p. 295), Husserl is arguing that, modern science, in always speaking the language of mathematics, "objectifies" the world. Science understands ‘how’ material things work and can predict and thus manipulate their movements, but is silent on the ‘why’ of this manipulation. Science can say nothing about the unique "meaning" or "the vital life" that human beings, scientists included, actually experience. "No objective science can do justice to the very subjectivity which accomplishes science" (Husserl 1970: 295). 

The idea that science is itself dehumanizing was confronted and passionately rejected by Jacob Bronowski in The Ascent of Man. He took on the accusation that science reduces human beings to numbers by going to Auschwitz, where people were reduced to numbers in person, not by science, but by arrogance, ignorance and dogma. He quotes Oliver Cromwell, ‘I beseech you in the bowels of Christ, think again that you may be mistaken’. Any science worthy of the name thinks that it may be mistaken and tests for error, contrary evidence. It would be more accurate, then, to regard science as without ethical implication. The dehumanisation is inherent in the use of science, the wider relations and culture within it is set. Science gives the technician the potential to manipulate the natural world, but can know and say nothing about what human beings should do with that potential or what it is like for a human being actually to live in the world it brings about.

And here we come to the fundamental clash between the ancients and the moderns, making it clear why we need to recover some essential truths that have been forgotten. In discovering that the earth revolves around the sun, Copernicus turned the human world on its head. The Earth is not, as Aristotle thought and the Church expounded, the centre of the universe. As scientific fact this observation is incontrovertible. 

In The Unnatural Nature of Science (1992), the embryologist Lewis Wolpert argues that science is difficult because it is systematically counter-intuitive. Wolpert insists that science is an affront to common sense, not an extension of it. Richard Dawkins makes a good case for this point. ‘Newton's law that objects stay in motion unless positively stopped is counter-intuitive. So is Galileo's discovery that, when there is no air resistance, light objects fall at the same rate as heavy objects. So is the fact that solid matter, even a hard diamond, consists almost entirely of empty space’. (Dawkins 2006 ch 7).

All of this is true and all of this indicates the value and the power of science in its own sphere. It is one this replacing intuitive common sense with systematic research in science (Dawkins 2006 ch 10), it is something entirely different to replace the intuitive common sense of human beings in real life. Human beings do not live their lives as though the world is round, as though they are objects in motion – as though the sun is the centre of the universe. For human beings, the Earth is and always will be the centre of the human universe, the everyday world in which human beings live. Kant writes about the awe and wonder that the starry skies ‘above’ inspire him, connecting the above with the moral law within. To see the ‘starry skies above’ human beings must look upwards, out and away from ourselves. We say that ‘the sun is rising’ or ‘the sun is setting’, poetical descriptions of what we experience that are false from an astronomical perspective. Science is indeed counter-intuitive. Which is why science cannot be and can never be the basis of culture and civilisation, a way of life. Wittgenstein thought it possible to create a perfect language of perfect meaning, but he discovered that the air was too refined to breath and the surface was too icy to walk upon. It is the grit underfoot that makes it possible to walk. Ordinary language, like ordinary life, speaks against the Copernican revolution. 

The humility and modesty that is assigned to human beings as a result of the Copernican revolution should be properly assigned to science itself. Instead, there has been an overweening confidence that denies and denigrates essential constants of a humane way of life, ethics, religion, poetry, art, culture. Science, dealing with ‘how’ but silent on ‘why’, displays hubris when, in showing the humble and modest place that the human species and planet Earth have within the universe, assumes a superiority over other modes of human experience. Art, poetry, literature, religion, architecture, music etc all speak to human beings in ways that have at least as much meaning as science and it is arrogance, ignorance and dogma to assert one mode of knowledge and understanding as superior to others, denigrating and displacing others.

The purpose of Aristotle's physics is not just scientific but science that comes with an ethical component with respect to human life. Whether or not Aristotle’s science is accurate – he got much right and much that he got wrong took centuries to falsify – the purpose of his physics is to speak for ordinary life. Aristotle sought to articulate the phenomena and explain how the natural world appears from a human perspective and to the naked eye. This approach does not shut human beings and the question of ethics and meaning out of science. In On the Heavens Aristotle argues that the earth is the centre of the universe around which the stars move eternally in fixed circular orbits. From the perspective of modern science, the argument is false, and anyone who continues to hold it is a crank, like a flat-earther. But from a phenomenological perspective, the argument is more compelling. Aristotle gives a logos, a rational account, of how the world presents itself to earth-bound human beings. In contrast to the modern scientist, Aristotle is able to explain what the world means to us. For Aristotle, the scientist no less than the ordinary human being, is "a subject of investigation." 

What is not being questioned is the legitimacy of science as such, but how far the scientific method can be extended into ordinary life. So one can agree with Dawkins that science is counter-intuitive. We have known since Plato that the world is not as it appears to the senses. If nature is written in the language of mathematics, as Galileo argued, do we have to replace ordinary language with mathematics? 
We have been this way before. The natural philosophers were in the field before Socrates, before the moral and political philosophers. It was the overweening confidence that scientific advance had produced that motivated Socrates to pose the question of meaning.
Socrates famously never wrote a word. What we know of Socrates comes from Plato and others. For Socrates, philosophy was not merely about abstract reason and reasoning, it was a way of life, a everyday practice. Socrates knew well that reason is far from the whole of life. Reason highlights our ignorance. But after that, a good deal rests on character and intuition. 

The early Daoists saw religion as a 'knack' acquired by constant practice. Zhuangzi (c370-311 bce), one of the most important figures in the spiritual history of China, explained that it was no good trying to analyse religious teachings logically. He cites the carpenter Bian: 'When I work on a wheel, if I hit too softly, pleasant as this is, it doesn't make for a good wheel. If I hit it furiously, I get tired and the thing doesn't work! So not too soft, not too vigorous. I grasp it in my hand and hold it in my heart. I cannot express this by word of mouth, I just know it.'

People who acquired this knack discovered a transcendent dimension of life that was not simply an external reality 'out there' but was identical with the deepest level of their being. This reality, which they have called God, Dao, Brahman or Nirvana, has been a fact of human life. But it was impossible to explain what it was in terms of logos. (Armstrong 2009: ch 1).

Plato was also wary of writing. He suspected that, in the way it objectified philosophy, it could become an excuse not to live it. In the way that it tidied philosophy up, writing could become a means of concealing a meaning that can only be experienced. It is for this reason that Plato bans poets from his ideal city-state in the Republic. This may seem extreme, but poets were authority figures. The body of work from Hesiod to Homer was the dogmatic canon of the day which people remembered and recited. Plato saw the danger here of an appeal to the dogmatic instincts of citizens, instead of thinking they would use ready-made arguments.
Socrates was no ivory tower professor, but took philosophy to the people by meeting them on the streets or in the market place. He is drawn to others because it is only with others that people gain the best understanding of themselves. So for Socrates the key to wisdom is not just defining abstractions but self-understanding. In this, there is an appreciation that all human beings are philosophers, or are capable of becoming philosophers, in that all possess the capacity to reason. The first philosophers in the Socratic tradition did not expect their pupils necessarily to agree with them. Rather, they taught people to use their own reason, to think for themselves, develop ideas of their own. 

To understand Socrates’ achievement, we need to understand something of the historical context. The natural philosophers who came before Socrates had built a record of substantial and remarkably prescient scientific achievement. 

Parmenides realised that the moon reflects the light of the sun. Democritus postulated the basic units of nature as atoms existing in a void. Pythagoras had worked out that day and night were far better explained by the earth going round the sun, not vice versa. 

Socrates turned to philosophy having become disillusioned with the overweening claims made for science. As he moved to the aspects of life concerning human beings, meaning and morality, he found scientific explanation to be not merely incomplete but, humanly speaking, irrelevant. 

Socrates contemplated the limitations of scientific explanation whilst sat in prison awaiting death. If the body's chief aim is survival, as the scientists claimed, then Socrates’ sinews and bones should have been miles away. But the reason that Socrates was in prison had nothing to do with the physical processes of body or mind. Socrates was in prison for a reason that science does not begin to explain. The 'cause' of his predicament is a moral one. As a physical being, Socrates could have escaped and lived but, as a moral being, he decided that it was right to stay and die. 

Socrates thus separates moral causes from with physical conditions. When it came to matters of moral significance, science neither asked the right questions nor used the right tools. If it is meaning that you want, then it is moral philosophy you must study, a category of knowledge to which science has no access.

So Socratic philosophy did not stop at the point at which reason could go no further. Socratic philosophy embodies an ethos as well as the principles of an intellectual exercise; it is a practice that can embrace the whole of life as well as an approach that can engage the mind. 

Philosophy as the cultivation of a way of life seems so different to what is usually taken to be philosophy today, with the emphasis on the development of rational techniques, thought and intellectual know-how. In its Socratic origins, philosophy is a practice that seeks to shape the whole person, in both heart and mind. 

The natural philosophers who came before Socrates are certainly far more modern in their philosophical views than Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. Democritus intuited the possibility of a mathematically based science able to explain atomic motion. Democritus thought that the "soul" – as it was then understood - was merely the motion of tiny particles moving at the speed of fire, just as contemporary neuroscientists seek to explain consciousness by reducing it to the firings of neurons in the brain. If this is all that the ‘soul’ or consciousness is, why does anything matter? Why do human beings accept that consciousness is as consciousness does? Human beings arguing over ethics and politics may or may not be delusional, their principles being no more than the product of neurons firing in the brain. But it is the fact that they are arguing, thinking in Descartes sense, that gives it meaning and means that it matters. People arguing the relative merits of pop music and classical music, Beatles or Beethoven, Elvis or Beatles, Liverpool or Manchester United can be explained in terms of neuroscience but the merits or otherwise of the arguments and the actions cannot be. And it is the actions and the arguments that constitute human life, what they make out of the physical building blocks. The physical processes supply the bricks, human ethics, culture, thinking, meaning is the cement that builds the civilisation. Remove that meaning and reduce consciousness to neurons, and the world is unrecognisable. Reduce the world to what science says it is and it becomes inhabitable. Human beings can exist in it, but they cannot live in it, they cannot flourish in a world they cannot see themselves in. Which is the point that, regardless of the facts of astronomy, human beings are the centre of their own world. 

Modern science and the extension of the scientific method over ethics and politics is against Plato and Aristotle. But that doesn’t mean that Plato and Aristotle are ‘outmoded’. Plato and Aristotle are aware of the arguments against them and addressed them. It was not out of ignorance of science that they took the positions they did. In criticizing Democritus on this very issue, they are also criticizing a basic tenet of modern science. And in a modernity characterised by a ‘misguided rationalism’, Plato and Aristotle should be taken very seriously indeed.

In commenting on Einstein, Husserl uses the word "meaning." In making a distinction between ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, in confining science to the ‘how’ so as to establish the legitimacy, indeed the centrality to ordinary human beings in ordinary life, of ‘meaning’, we need to be clear what the word ‘meaning’ itself means.

It is important to recall exactly what this word itself means. It has at least two different senses: (1) ‘to have in the mind,’ "to intend," "to have a purpose," as in "I meant to do it;" (2) "to signify," ‘to serve to show, convey or indicate’, ‘signification’, ‘purport’, as in "the word 'science' means ‘knowledge reduced to a system; the facts pertaining to any department of mind and matter in their due connections’ (The University English Dictionary). 

Putting these two senses of the word together, the statement, "the meaning of life," implies that life has a purpose which can be signified or shown in ordinary language. And it is the possibility of this that the modern scientific view explicitly denies. From the perspective of modern scientific viewpoint, the way ordinary human beings, speaking ordinary language, experience their ordinary everyday life has no epistemological significance. It is in this sense that science is dehumanizing.

This essay addresses the problems of the modern world by going back to the philosophical views of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle on account of their profound appreciation and attempt to comprehend the meaning of human life.

The arguments of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle come from within and stay true to the geocentric, life as lived, perspective expressed by ordinary language, as opposed to the heliocentric perspective and mathematical language of the scientists. On point of fact, the scientists are right. But the world they describe exceeds human grasp. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are worthy of revival for the way that they bring science within the confines of human experience. At a time when science is busy reducing human mind and body to physiological processes whilst exalting the external universe, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle remind us about a good deal of what it means to be a human being and live a human life. As the burgeoning environmental crisis forces us to re-examine ourselves, our powers and our purposes, their guidance has never been more needed. 

Plato on justice and virtue
Plato sought the remedy for political ills in philosophy: ‘I was forced .. to the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers’ (Plato 1987:xvi). Plato’s Republic is an attempt to establish the conditions of good government through the integration of politics and philosophy. The subtitle, ‘Concerning Justice’, reveals Plato’s central concern to conceive the form that justice takes in the ideal state. Arguing that justice is the founding principle of the political community or state, Plato reveals the extent to which the unchecked pursuit of self-interest takes over and finally ruins public life in contemporary city-states. Those who quickly dismiss Plato as ‘authoritarian’ do not do justice to Plato’s critique of individualism and atomistic democracy.

By ‘Republic’ Plato means ‘constitution’, ‘state’ or ‘society’, an expansive ideal which encompasses the political and the social, the formal and the substantive. Within the ancient Greek ‘polis’, the problem of good government in the state and good government in the city were one and the same. 

Plato’s distinctive ‘rational’ conception of freedom emerges as he establishes the basic principle of inquiry early on in The Republic. Plato begins by asking what justice is. The question is both a moral and a political one, pertaining both to the individual and the community. To discover the true nature of political and social justice it is necessary to ‘first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less’ (9-45). Such an approach seeks an objective foundation for freedom. If god is not the measure of all things, as the Sophists claimed, then neither is man. Plato’s principle of inquiry holds that abstractions or forms are the measure of things human and that these determine an intellectual progression from the forms to their collective approximations and then to real individual. This approach establishes freedom as a collective project and explicitly repudiates individualism as capable of only a limited, narrow freedom. Aristotle criticised Plato’s holistic approach for elevating pure forms and abstractions over empirical individuals, but this misunderstands Plato’s approach. Whilst the argument concentrates upon justice in the individual, Plato argues that the question is best studied on the large scale. As Aristotle himself argued, man is a social animal. To understand what any individual is or could be, it is necessary to study environing social relations, associations and allegiances. Plato thus analyses justice in the community as a whole before proceeding to apply his conclusions to the individual.
Plato is enquiring into the basis of socio-political and moral obligation. Rejecting the conventional view of giving each individual his due as inadequate, Plato argues that the problem cannot be solved in the individual but must be studied ‘in larger letters’ in society as a whole. Plato proceeds to analyse the key elements of the human mind so as to argue that its well being, full development and happiness are secured by doing right and by not doing wrong.
 In the individual, justice consists in maintaining the proper balance between the three elements of the mind so as to ensure that each is ‘doing its own job’ (Plato 1987:145). Intellect, desire and ambition must all receive their due and proper fulfilment, being given their proper place in the good life. True morality depends upon each of the different elements being given due satisfaction, with no one coming to dominate at the expense of the others. 

 In society, justice consists in everyone fulfilling his or her proper function in the social order. This principle checks social disintegration, the evil that most concerned Plato. Social justice is achieved by each class in society coming to fulfil its proper function, not encroaching on the functions of the others. 

The most important aspect of Plato’s argument is the extent to which he affirms social justice as the most desirable goal to be pursued in the city, over and against material affluence and economic growth. Plato presents a long and closely reasoned argument to prove that the just are happier than the unjust. Plato proceeds from the idea of function to argue that the individual needs justice so that he is able to perform a particular function and hence achieve happiness. The just man is happy and the unjust is miserable: ‘injustice never pays better than justice’ (Plato Bk I 1987:41/2). Human beings achieve happiness by conforming to their nature as active beings. Plato confronts the argument that, since it is natural for individuals to pursue self-interest without regard to others, justice is simply a question of convenience. In this view, the purpose of morality is simply to regulate an amoral society of self-seeking individuals. If the sanctions of morality were removed, individual behaviour would be as self-interested as ever, suggesting that injustice pays more than justice (Plato Bk ii 1987:49/55).

To counter this argument, Plato identifies two underlying principles at the heart of society. In the first place, there is mutual need. Since individuals are not self-sufficient beings, they need to combine in society. In the second place, there is difference of aptitude. Each individual specialises in those things for which they have a particular aptitude. There is a need for the individual to specialise ‘on a single job for which he is naturally fitted’ (Bk ii 1987:59 60). Society regulated on these principles is a natural growth and individuals achieve happiness through exercising their capacities and fulfilling their nature.

 Since individual and society go together, justice possesses a fundamentally social dimension (Bk ii 1987:58). The origin of society stems from the fact that the individual is not self-sufficient but has many needs that require many relations to others for their satisfaction. The individualism that characterises the liberal conception of liberty is untenable from this perspective. Specialisation implies necessary interrelation. Since each is fitted to one type of work, individuals need to associate together so as to supply all with what each lacks. ‘The formation of a city is due .. to this fact, that we are not individually dependent, but have many wants .. and because each seeks the aid of others to supply his various requirements; we gather many associates and helpers into one dwelling-place, and give to this joint dwelling the name of city’. This results in a settlement which goes by the name of a ‘community’ or ‘state’ (Bk ii 1987:58).

Plato’s definition of justice is the origin of the ‘rational’ conception of freedom. Plato’s objective is to integrate short and long-range interests, the immediate and the long term, the individual good and the collective good in the service of the common good. Self-discipline is ‘a kind of order’ in which the better, rational element controls the weaker element, stretched beyond the individual ‘across the whole scale’ of the city-state (Plato Bk iv 1987:142 143). ‘It produces harmony between the strongest and the weakest and middle elements, whether you measure by the standard of intelligence, or of strength, or of numbers or money or the like’ (Bk iv 1987:143).

Since justice is the result of society being properly ordered, Plato’s Republic devotes substantial space to this ordering. Plato conceives society as a structured form of organic functionalism, ordering society according to a hierarchical division of functions – leadership, protection and labour – each belonging to their corresponding collectivities: rulers/guardians, auxiliaries, and metics. The members of each group are selected according to their natural capacities with respect to the three basic functions. Placing each individual according to their natural capacity realises the thoroughly harmonious and fully integrated state, a state which exhibits the four cardinal virtues or ‘qualities’ of wisdom, courage, discipline and justice (Bk iv 1987:138). Wisdom is the product of the knowledge of the Rulers whilst courage comes from the Auxiliaries. Discipline is the self-discipline that issues from the harmonious relationship between the three classes and their common agreement over ‘who ought to rule’. Justice is the realisation of the principle of functional specialisation through individuals doing the jobs for which they are fitted according to their natural aptitude, not interfering in areas for which they are not fitted.

Plato’s three classes are arranged according to an ascending hierarchy of functional purposes. The first class is the class of rulers, the Guardians, a governing elite whose function is to govern (Bk iii 412d). The Guardians ‘must always do what is best for the community’ and a close watch is kept upon them to ensure that this principle is adhered to (Bk iii 1987:119). The function of ruling is restricted to the wise. The second class is the class of auxiliaries, whose function it is ‘to assist the Rulers in the execution of their decisions’ (1987:121). The auxiliaries combine the functions of the civil service, the police and the army. The third class comprise all those engaging in economic activities, the farmers, manufacturers and traders. The function of this class is to secure the material needs of the community. The third class is kept under strict control and has no involvement in matters of government.

Plato’s argument, it will be noted, concerns good government. The public good comes before all else. The Guardian class serves the interest of the other classes and governs with the willing consent of the governed (1987:123 143). The knowledge of the Guardians ‘is exercised not on behalf of any particular interest but on behalf of the city as a whole’. This benefits the state ‘both in its internal and external relations’ (Bk iv 1987:139).

Plato makes no attempt to rest his argument upon the value of freedom. The implication is that the best regime for human beings will, by definition, be the one that realises true freedom. Freedom follows as a consequence of right principles and reasoning. Plato is establishing the foundations for his ideal state, his functional naturalism emerging as the organically free state of truly free human beings.

The Rulers and Auxiliaries are to live an austere life without private property and the family. The purpose of these requirements was to check the tendency for the public good to be sacrificed to the pursuit of personal interests. The end to be served is the happiness of the ‘whole community’ rather than ‘the particular happiness of a single class’ (Bk iv 1987:126).

The Guardians are concerned to secure the conditions for social unity, ensuring that extremes of wealth and poverty in the Third Class are avoided and that the state does not grow to become too large. The argument is pertinent in a contemporary world characterised by overscale cities that are riven by increasing polarities. For Plato, the Guardians ‘must at all costs’ prevent ‘wealth and poverty’ from ‘slipping unobserved into the state’. ‘One produces luxury and idleness and a desire for novelty, the other meanness and bad workmanship and a desire for revolution as well’ (Bk iv 1987:129).

The state should .. be allowed to grow so long as growth is compatible with unity, but no further. So we can add to the instructions we shall give our Guardians one to the effect that they are to avoid at all costs either making the state too small or relying on apparent size, but keep it adequate in scale and a unity.

Plato Bk iv 1987:131

Further, the Guardians must ensure that individuals may pass between classes according to merit and aptitude so that ‘the integrity and unity both of the individual and of the state will be preserved’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:131).

 Plato is now in a position to define justice. Plato’s ideal city is founded upon justice defined in terms of ‘giving to each his due’. From this perspective, justice ‘consists in minding your own business and not interfering with other people’, each individual doing ‘the job he was naturally most suited for’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:145).

I think that the quality left over, now that we have discussed discipline, courage and wisdom, must be what makes it possible for them to come into being in our state and preserves them by its continued presence when they have done so. And we agreed that it would be justice that was left over if we found the other three.

Plato Bk iv 1987:145

Since the qualities expressed by the community are those of the individuals composing it, Plato establishes a parallel between the state (society) and the individual. The argument proceeds from the three elements of each soul:

1)	reason – the faculty that calculates and decides;
2)	desire or appetite – instinctive craving;
3)	ambition, indignation, pugnacity.

Human beings realise themselves fully as human beings when the rational element of human nature controls the instinctive element (Bk iv 1987:149/55). Individuals are easily manipulated and managed at the level of desire and appetite and are too prone to identify their liberty at this level of immediacy. The result is that human beings limit their liberty well within its full potential. Plato’s argument points to the need for an ethico-institutional framework that enables human beings to access their rational faculty, demonstrating a greater capacity for reflective action, conscious determination and moral choice. This enables individuals to attain a richer freedom by realising the full range of human capacities, well beyond desire and appetite.
 Justice in the individual is the counterpart of justice in the state. The individual is wise on account of reason, courageous on account of spirit and disciplined in subordinating ‘spirit’ and appetite to reason. The individual is just on account of the harmony that results when all the three elements of the mind are fulfilled in performing their proper function. Since ‘the state was just when the three elements within it each minded their own business’, ‘each of us will be just and perform his proper function only if each part of him is performing its proper function’ (Bk iv 1987:159). 

The principles of the good city identified by Plato are scale, balance, form and proportion. Self-control or discipline in a city or in an individual results ‘when all these three elements are in friendly and harmonious agreement, when reason and its subordinates are all agreed that reason should rule and there is no civil war among them’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:160).
‘So the reason ought to rule, having the wisdom and foresight to act for the whole, and the spirit ought to obey and support it’.

When these two elements have been so brought up, and trained and educated to their proper function, they must be put in charge of appetite, which forms the greater part of each man’s make up and is naturally insatiable. They must prevent its taking its fill of the so-called physical pleasures, for otherwise it will get too large and strong to mind its own business and will try to subject and control the other elements, which it has no right to do, and so wreck the life of all of them.

Plato Bk iv 1987:159

This results in justice in the city and in the individual. Justice prevents the three elements from trespassing upon each other, keeping all three in tune, binding these elements ‘into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become fully one instead of many’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:161). Once reason is in control and just rule ‘looks after the common interests of all by reconciling them with each other’, human beings can realise their potentiality for the good.
Plato therefore defines justice in reciprocal terms, uniting the freedom, good and happiness of each with all and the freedom, good and happiness of all with each. Justice possesses an ineliminable social component that acknowledges that individuals live in relation with each other. Some pursuing private interest at the expense of others harms the common good of all, including that of those pursuing their private interests. The private self-seekers harm their own good when they harm the good of all. Each individual is part of the society of all. The moral is clear: reason must control desire.

Then on this reckoning .. can it possibly pay anyone to make money by doing wrong, if the result of his so doing is to enslave the best part of himself to the worst? .. if one ruthlessly enslaves the divinest part of oneself to the most godless and abominable, is it not a miserable piece of bribery?

Plato Bk ix 1987:355

Each individual should be under the control of wisdom. ‘That wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within; failing that it must be imposed from without, in order that, being under the same guidance, we may all be friends and equals’ (Bk ix 1987:356). The argument is important and concerns whether the ‘rational freedom’ that secures the good of each and all is imposed externally by legal-institutional compulsion or whether human beings, as rational natural beings, can internalise reason and supply the internal moral coordination of common affairs. The latter is the ideal; the former a self-educative process that leads human beings to reason. The ‘intention of the law’ is to have educated the best element within citizens so that they may be given their freedom (Bk ix 1987:356). This view envisages legal-institutional coercion giving way to rational self-regulation practised by each in reciprocal relation to all. The rational, ‘humaner’ part is to be set free so that individuals make the best of their natural gifts (Bk ix 1987:356/7). It cannot pay to be unjust if by acquiring more money and power the individual becomes a worse human being (Bk ix 1987:356/7).

Plato’s innovations in educational theory mark his proposed ideal city-state as unique. For Plato, the citizen was produced by proper education and activity. Plato took education out of the hands of the family and made it a public activity. The function of this education is ‘that training in virtue from childhood which makes a man eager to become the perfect citizen, knowing both how to rule justly and how to obey’. No cultural form evaded this training in virtue: music, dance, athletics were all scrutinized with a view to providing moral benefit. Plato was concerned to eliminate overexcitement of the passions and the exacerbation of individualism. The accent was upon group effort and harmony, all pulling together for the common good, involved a training of the will and the inculcation of self-discipline. In the long run, public life would benefit through the citizen learning to restrain his ego and regulate his life to harmonize with the needs and desire of all other citizens.
Plato identifies the inherent tendency of personal liberty to degenerate into personal license and selfishness. He also condemns democracy for its inherent tendency to mob rule, demagoguery, and anarchy. ‘A very good description of one who believes in liberty and equality’ is the comment on the definition of ‘democratic man’ as one who has ‘no order and restraint in his life’ and who ‘reckons his way of living  .. pleasant, free and happy’ (9-49).
The absence of compulsion to exercise or submit to authority in democracy undermines the ‘good environment’ that trains individuals in ‘good habits’. Democracy ‘doesn’t mind what the habits and background of its politicians are; provided they profess themselves the people’s friends, they are duly honoured’ (Bk viii 1987:314/5).

In Book viii, Plato identifies the chief characteristic of democracy as liberty, the idea that ‘every individual is free to do as he likes’ (Plato 1987:314). Though this gives society a variety and diversity, its effects can be diremptive. There is a weakening of the bonds of political and moral authority so that ‘the minds of the citizens become so sensitive that the least vestige of restraint is resented as intolerable’ (Plato 1987:322). Without this restraint, freedom ceases to be a common purpose and instead fractures into dissension. Society is no longer capable of generating the principle of cohesion from within itself. The struggle between the rich and the poor in a democracy issues in tyranny: ‘an excessive desire for liberty at the expense of everything else is what undermines democracy and leads to the demand for tyranny’ (Bk viii 1987:321). As liberty becomes licence ‘all discipline is swept away and madness usurps its place’ (Bk viii 1987:332).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy are heavily focused upon the lack of critical reflection upon the general and long term good that the democracy of an atomized mass of individuals implies, and which an extension of greater mediation by representative bodies could check. Popular control involved ‘committing the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude’ (Plato B ii). Against this, Plato affirms that politics is the ‘art of navigation’ requiring a captain (B vi 1987:222/3).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy refer to the need for sound judgement and leadership in navigating the ship of state. For Plato, the people are bad judges on many important political matters, lacking the necessary experience or expert knowledge concerning such vital issues as finance and foreign policy. Describing the demos as ‘a large and powerful animal’, Plato states that philosophy is ‘quite impossible’ among ‘the common people’ (Bk vi 1987:228). The people will make judgements based on impulse, sentiment and prejudice rather than reason. The popular leader is dependent upon the ability to please the crowd, selling the people a package that conforms to their prejudices but which does not necessarily imply good policy (Plato 1987:222 228). This results in popular leaders who are as bereft of true knowledge as the people whom they lead.

For Plato, the only hope for realising the rule of reason is for philosophers to become rulers exercising political power.





It is easy, and wrong, to accuse Plato of an authoritarian-elitist purpose here. The educative process that Plato proposes has the end of extending reason to all so that the educative apparatus would no longer be required. The key word in the above passage is ‘humanity’, more correctly translated as the human race or the human species. Which means that the point Plato makes with regard to the rule of reason applies to all human beings, regardless of whatever or whoever they are. To argue that all human beings are capable of realising the best of their human nature is a lofty ideal and stands as a much more democratic notion than those who reduce democracy to monadic wants, desires and opinions. Plato sought to assert reason over instinct and desire, ranking physical pleasures low and seeking to restrain potentially unruly appetites and instincts. In this respect, Plato’s philosopher-ruler may be interpreted not as an institution or person presiding over the ruled than the fusion of politics and philosophy through the self-rule of all as rational beings. Politics is to become philosophical and express ideals of truth and good. Philosophy is to become political, worldly, and lose its abstract nature. Reason is to rule the world for the common good of each and all. 

Plato introduces his theory of forms, ideals or patterns that have a real existence independent of human minds. These yield knowledge by referring to a realm of reality beyond the sensible world of which full knowledge was not possible (Bk v 1987:206/220). ‘The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power’ (Bk vi 1987:248). Plato makes use of the simile of the cave to portray a society of individuals who mistake appearance for reality. The prisoners of the cave, their necks fastened so that they cannot move their heads, see only the shadows that the fire throws onto the wall. They naturally believe these shadows to be real (Bk vii 1987:256/61). The moral is that truth is the result of reflection, insight and experience that is beyond the immediacy of most people living in ordinary life. Much of what most people accept as truth as given by their everyday experience is in fact false, mere illusion (Bk vii 1987:263).

It would be easy to convict Plato of elitism in this argument, since the claim is that there is a deeper reality which, at first, is accessible only by a few (Popper Open Society). It should be emphasised, however, that the end that Plato has in view is that truth is to be made available to all so that all can see reality as it is. Popper convicts Plato of the very thing that Plato is concerned to challenge, the idea that truth is the preserve of the few who cast shadows on the world to keep the many chained to illusion, their ability to project images via control of the fire giving them the power to rule over the many. And above all, Plato’s explicit purpose is to challenge the exploitative and manipulative approaches to politics. Truth rather than power and wealth is the end that Plato pursues.













The way that the word ‘authoritarian’ is banded around points to loose thinking with a very political motivation. The neo-liberalism of the past three decades is obsessed with unravelling all manner of social ties and unions and allegiances as evidence of a ‘collectivism’ which equates with socialism and hence with the big, centralised state. Popper’s condemnation of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx as 'totalitarian' thinkers is instructive in that it points to the distinction between the 'rational’ position - with its positive conception of government - and the individualist liberal position - with its negative conception of politics. One side claims to represent true freedom as against the limited freedom or unfreedom of the other side, and vice versa.

Barnes criticises Aristotle's 'state' for being 'highly authoritarian' in its concern to 'regulate' and 'determine’ individual lives in the most intricate detail (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:23). Barnes objects to Aristotle's argument that 'in matters that belong to the public, training must be the public concern’, all citizens being regarded 'as belonging to the state, for each is a part of the state'  (Aristotle P VIII.i 1981:452). For Barnes, Aristotle's view that individuals are political animals comes with the corollary that private interests may be subordinated to the public good (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:23/4). Barnes identifies Aristotle's error as lying in assigning 'a positive function to the State, supposing that its goal is the promotion of the good life' whereas 'lovers of liberty will prefer to assign a negative function to the State and to regard it rather as a defence and a protection against Evil' (Barnes 1982:82/3).

Against Barnes' individualist and neutralist liberalism, Aristotle affirmed a positive conception of politics as creative self-realisation. Certainly, the 'rational’ argument does imply public life as an educative process which, as Aristotle puts it, 'trains' individuals to a good they do not naturally or spontaneously see. This can have repressive implications as an educational dictatorship. But this is not inherent in the Greek idea of Padaia or the German notion of Bildung at all, which are concerned with public education to bring individuals out of private interest to experience a greater freedom in public association.

Relating the individual to supra-individual organisms may seem dangerous but, properly understood, Aristotle's theory is neither as 'abhorrent' nor as 'bizarre' as Barnes suggests (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:24). Indeed, Barnes is accusing Aristotle of the very criticism that Aristotle, wrongly, made of Plato. In defending 'the democratic ideal' of 'doing whatever you want', Barnes asserts the individualist liberal position against Aristotle's identification of this individualism with the universal constraint  of  licence  (P  1981:59/60  332  373/5). Aristotle's view recognises the contextual and communal basis of individual freedom, the very things that one does not find in individualist liberalism (Clark 1975:103/4). Barnes’s criticisms of Aristotle’s ‘highly authoritarian’ politics presupposes a separation of the state from civil society which simply does not apply in Aristotle. Liberal critics fail to properly distinguish the 'polis' from the 'state'. Unlike the modern concept of the state, Aristotle's concept of the polis is not identical to political organisation but denotes the organised community in all its aspects, comprising the smaller associations as necessary to human well-being. Aristotle's 'state’ is no abstract entity like the modern liberal state but the supreme natural association rooted in the smaller natural associations, each formed 'with a view to some good purpose’. Aristotle’s 'state', therefore, is the supreme association of all associations and 'will aim the highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods' (P I.i 1981:54; Edel 1982:319). [8]

Ironically, the liberal criticisms of Aristotle savour a great deal of the criticisms that Aristotle himself made of Plato. Aristotle and Plato both reject an individualism which fails to acknowledge the primary role played by the polis in securing the good life. But in explicitly repudiating any idea of society as a super-individual organic unit, Aristotle accuses Plato of ignoring the necessary role played by the various particular social groupings in human well-being. Criticising what he saw as Plato's 'extreme unity', Aristotle argues that there must be diversity in membership and functions (P 1981:103/126).

 Aristotle's account of how individuals group together in different kinds of association within the polis, from household to village to city or state, is concerned to demonstrate how smaller groupings promote the natural aims of the participating individuals and generate an appreciation of wider relations within the polis as a whole (P 1981 I.ii; Evans 1987:157/8; Edel 1982:319/20). The privileging of the individual against social units, the autonomous liberal self distinct from the larger social units, is incomprehensible in Aristotle's account of freedom. The criticisms of individualist liberalism can be turned back on the critics. Deprived of social context and connection, individual freedom is necessarily of a limited kind. 

Of course, the either individual or society antithesis is a product of an individualist liberalism which reflects the taxonomy of the modern state-civil society dualism. But to the ‘rational’ thinkers, individual and society go together as two sides of the same coin. Aristotle's society is not a super-individual organism. Rather, the free individual is at once self-determining and social. 'Man is by nature a political animal' who can be free and self-realising as a substance only within the greater substance of the polis (P I.ii 1981:59). 'Common interest' brings individuals together in a political association 'in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually' (P Ill.vi 1981:187). In the best society, freedom and sociality are reconciled. Community is natural for individuals (Clark 1975:110 101/2).

Aristotle: the association of friends
For Aristotle restricts citizenship to the virtuous minority of the population, even though the egalitarianism that Aristotle defines in terms of civic friendship is something that carries over into Marx's notion of a classless society (Miller 1989:203 204). For Aristotle, citizenship, as active participation in the state, should be restricted to those who are superior in goodness and wealth (P IV.xii 1981:270/2).

First and foremost, the Greeks gave the world philosophy. The classical Greeks were a people who, although not very numerous, not very powerful, not very well organised, ‘had a totally new conception of what human life was for, and showed for the first time what the human mind was for’ (Kitto 1951:1). The Greek philosophers asked an apparently but deceptively simple question that has proved of enduring significance and which the world stops asking at its peril: ‘What is the proper way for human beings to live?’ How that question is answered – indeed whether the question is even asked at all – determines the kind of society in which one lives.

Both Plato and Aristotle identify politics with a concern with the good life for human beings. Before going into the specific philosophical conceptions, this section examines the polis as an historical institution with a view to defining a public life that is constituted by a plurality of communities and identities and is empowered from below. 

Politics and philosophy were born in the agora, the citizen assembly and market place in Athens (Heller 1984; Doyle 1963:ch 2). ‘Most modern political ideals – such … as justice, liberty, constitutional government and respect for the law – or at least the definitions of them, began with the reflection of Greek thinkers about the institutions of the city state’ (Sabine 1937:3). 

Finley presents the Athenian polis offers an historical example of an expansive public life that may serve as a model for emancipatory urban governance in the modern world. The polis was founded upon a ‘sovereign assembly .. open to every citizen’ and convened at least 40 times a year. The polis made a virtue of its amateurish principle. The fact that it was managed by a rotating council of 500, with the chair selected by lot and sitting for just one day, checked the bureaucratic principle. The extensive use of selection of lot throughout the institutions of governance indicated the high value placed upon self hood as something obtained through participation. Free individuals possess politike techne, the skill and techniques of the statesman, the ‘art of political judgement’ (Finley 1973:18). 

These political arrangements reflect a philosophical anthropology. The classical conception defines humanity as a social and cooperative species, possessed of philia (friendship) and dike (justice). This points to public life as a solidaristic conception in which each and all unite for purposes of individuation. Human beings are by nature inclined to live in a polis. These characteristics of citizenships imply a controlled self-hood, a ‘self-control’ that makes community life possible (Finley 1973:29/30).
Importantly, the polis made justice integral to its mode of life. ‘It was the common assumption of the Greeks that the polis took its origin in the desire for justice. Individuals are lawless, but the polis will see to it that wrongs are redressed. But not only by an elaborate machinery of state-justice, for such a machine could not be operated except by individuals, who may be as unjust as the original wrongdoer. The injured party will be sure of obtaining justice only if he can declare his wrongs to the whole polis. The word therefore now means ‘people’ in actual distinction from the ‘state’ (Kitto 1957:72). 
The pursuit of justice becomes a question of making available a social identity that connects public and private interest. This social identity was available in the city-state. The city-state is a quite distinct institution from the modern state and is crucial in envisaging a smaller scale public sphere located in everyday social activities. The all-important political unit in classical Greece, the polis was more on the scale of a modern medium sized town than the modern nation state or metropolis (Jones 1964; Davies 1978; Mayo 1960: ch 2). The size of the city-state was kept in check in numbers and in area deliberately so that citizens could meet within its centre and engage in meaningful political activity (Doyle 1963:25).

In Aristotle’s conception, the original polis was a self-sufficient and self-governing group of villages, in a narrow and closed region lying around an urban centre. The poleis were mostly very small. When Aristotle wrote there was probably no town in the classical world with a population of more than about 150,000. In all likelihood, there were not more than half a dozen with a population of more than – 50,000 (Hall 1998:35).

If the polis was less than a state in the modern sense of the term, it was also something more than a city. The polis had an urban centre but also embraced the surrounding agricultural land. It consisted of farmers, craftsmen and sailors, and many individuals would combine a couple or more of these roles (Bowra 1957:9; Chamoux 1965:291). When Marx speculated that in the future communist society the individual could assume a number of roles rather be restricted to one specialised task imposed by the division of labour, he was adopting the position of the Greek polis.

The obvious question is that, if Athens really was so successful and really did achieve so much in all areas, why did it not presume to conquer and lead the city-states in a unified Greek state. The question would have struck the Athenian – and other Greeks – as illogical. The polis is what was integral to the identity of each individual and nothing beyond the polis, no amount of riches or power, could have the remotest significance with respect to that sense of self-identity. As Kitto put it, ‘if the Greek was not within a day’s walk of his political centre, then his life was something less than the life of a real man’ (Kitto 1951:121).

Every Greek knew the polis: ‘there it was, complete, before his eyes. He could see the fields which gave it sustenance .. he could see how agriculture, trade and industry dovetailed into one another.. The entire life of the polis, and the relation between the parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things’ (Kitto 1951:73).

Kitto defines the polis as a ‘community’ since ‘its affairs are the affairs of all’ (Kitto 1957:71). In the polis, every Greek understood the functions of other Greeks: ‘he could see how agriculture, trade and industry dovetailed into one another; he knew the frontiers, where they were strong and where weak .. The entire life of the polis, and the relation between its parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things’ (Kitto 1957:73).


The polis conception of scale is rational in that it is premised upon self-consciousness as the distinctive attribute of the human species. Human beings engage in rational action, are teleological and reflexive beings, projecting ends and reflecting upon their actualisation. Reflexivity is built into human action. Praxis is rational. The human habitat is to be evaluated according to whether it promotes the good life, realising human potentialities, expanding rather than inhibiting the growth of human capacities.
A human habitus is premised upon human scale and is, on that account, a public life in the classical conception. A habitat that is beyond human comprehension and control is unjust according to these premises. For reason of size and quantity, its centralisation and concentration modern society is overscale and hence inhuman. The exclusivity of its political and economic functions denies citizens the opportunity to participate in the determination of the forces and decisions affecting collective life. Denied the opportunity to participate in public life, individuals lose not only their citizenship but also their sense of self-identity.
The physical form of the polis emphasised public space with temples, stadia, the agora (combined market place and public forum) and theatres. This everyday public life made possible an everyday public life in which all could participate. The accent was upon association and interaction. Appropriate scale facilitates public comprehension. The question is not, however, settled by establishing human proportions. Beyond scale, there remains the ethical question of the just and the good. A mode of life qualifies as ‘good’ to the extent that it achieves material sufficiency and reflexivity in an ethical community founded on justice, participation and mutual justice. This emphasises the importance of the polis.

The polis embraces much more than the institutional make up and is both the community of citizens and their collective sense of community. There is no equivalent word for polis in the modern world. For Kitto, the usual translation ‘city-state’ may be the nearest we can get but is still a bad translation since the polis was not much like a city and was much more than a state (Kitto 1957:64). The Athenian would not have understood the difficulty of translating polis and how inadequate the term city-state is. To the Athenian, city and state are inextricably linked as one and the same. And to complicate the issue even further, the Athenians did not conceive the city-state in institutional or geographical terms, as a set of institutions or as a definite territory. The polis was the people, it is as simple and as complex as that. There is an important distinction to be drawn between the polis and the state. This distinction makes it possible to separate public life from the institutional machinery of the state and locate it in an autonomous self-governing urban realm. Kitto uses the term polis rather than city-state so as to describe the reality of a self-governing community. 

The polis establishes the social context within which individuals fully realise their spiritual, moral and intellectual capacities (Kitto 1957:78). They realise these essential capacities only in relation to each other. The polis is therefore a holistic and moral framework. The polis ‘is so much more than a form of political organisation. The polis was a living community, based on kinship, real or assumed – a kind extended family, turning as much as possible of life into family life..’ (Kitto 1957:78). The Athenians conceived the polis as a mode of life fostering a sense of community, as a communal modus vivendi. The polis is an integral part of the realisation of the good life, is a dimension of it. ‘The Greeks thought of the polis as an active, formative thing, training the minds and characters of the citizens; we think of it as a piece of machinery for the production of safety and convenience. The training in virtue, which the medieval state left to the Church, and the polis made its own concern, the modern state leaves to God knows what’ (Kitto 1957:75).

At the heart of the polis was a moral purpose based upon a philosophical anthropology. The polis was a physical place, true, but more than geography and space it was a collectivity composed of citizens (Chamoux 1965:309; Hansen 1991:62).. ‘it is the men that are the Polis’ (Ehrenberg 1965:88 quoting Thucydides). The Athenian city-state was not the republic of Athens in its institutional form but the Athenians as a people: the Athenians as citizens were the city-state; the city-state had no independent significance but was embodied in the person and idea of demos, the people.

Aristotle restricts citizenship to the virtuous minority, the ‘middle people’ who are superior in goodness and in wealth (P 1981:181 180/3 267 270/2).. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s conception of citizenship entails a notion of civic friendship that implies an egalitarianism which can carry over into the radical idea of a classless society of equals (Miller 1989:203 204). Aristotle’s argument offers a principle that, radicalised as a universal principle, demands an inclusive, participatory public based on the continuous and active involvement of all as citizens.





The question is how to ensure that all get a share of happiness. ‘Property too must belong to these people; it is essential that the citizens should have ample subsistence; and these are citizens. The mechanical element has no part in the state nor has any other class that is not productive of virtue’ (Aristotle P 1981:416).

Aristotle argues that whilst ‘property should up to a point be held in common, the general principle should be that of private ownership. Responsibility for looking after property, if distributed over many individuals, will not lead to mutual recriminations; on the contrary, with every man busy with his own, there will be increased effort all round. 'All things in common among friends' the saying goes, and it is the personal virtue of individuals that ensure their common use’. 

 Aristotle is arguing for a system of private ownership and common use. It is a view which presupposes a society of virtuous citizens whose close ties and relations enable them to see and work for the common good. ‘Each man has his own possessions, part of which he makes available for his friends' use, part he uses in common with others…. Clearly then it is better for property to remain in private hands; but we should make the use of it communal. It is a particular duty of a lawgiver to see that citizens are disposed to do this’ (Politics II v). 

Aristotle asks what is the ‘best constitution’ and what is the 'best life’ for individuals: ‘a way of living in which as many as possible can join and, second, a constitution within the compass of the greatest number of states’. Arguing that ‘virtue is a mean, and that the happy life is a life without hindrance in its accordance with virtue, then the best life must be the middle life, consisting in a mean which is open to men of every kind to attain. And the same principles must be applicable to the virtue or badness of constitutions and states. For the constitution of a state is in a sense the way it lives’. Aristotle advocates ‘moderation and a middle position’ as the best. Concerned to avoid extremes of riches and poverty, Aristotle argues that the middling condition ‘is most easily obedient to reason, and following reason is just what is difficult both for the exceedingly rich, handsome, strong and well-born, and for their opposites, the extremely poor, the weak, and those grossly deprived  of honour. The former incline more to arrogance and crime on a large scale, the latter are more than averagely prone to wicked ways and petty crime’.

 It follows that no viable state can be built upon extremes of riches and poverty. Those who have a ‘superabundance of good fortune, strength, riches, friends, and so forth, neither wish to submit to rule nor understand how to do so’. Those who are greatly deficient in these qualities are ‘too subservient’. Aristotle is concerned with his definition of a citizen as one who is capable of ruling and of being ruled in turn. Those with excessive riches do not how to be ruled in any way and will not accept being ruled; at the other extreme the poor not only ‘do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled as a slave’. ‘The result is a state not of free men but of slaves and masters, the former full of envy, the latter of contempt. Nothing could be farther removed from friendship or from partnership in a state’. ‘The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal, a condition found chiefly among the middle people… It is the middle citizens in a state who are the most secure: they neither covet, like the poor, the possessions of others, nor do others covet theirs as the poor covet those of the rich’. (Politics IV).

Aristotle: Licence And Liberty
Liberty they say when they mean licence, castigated Aristotle. Where individuals ‘live intemperately, enjoying every licence and indulging in every luxury’ the inevitable result ‘is that esteem is given to wealth’ .. ‘a common state of affairs in military and warlike races’ (Bk 2)

“The final association, formed of several villages, is the state. For all practical purposes the process is now complete; self-sufficiency has been reached, and while the state came about as a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure the good life. Therefore every state exists by nature, as the earlier associations too were natural. This association is the end of those others, and nature is itself an end; for whatever is the end-product of the coming into existence of any object, that is what we call its nature - of a man, for instance, or a horse or a household. Moreover the aim and the end is perfection; and self-sufficiency is both end and perfection."

“It follows that the state belongs to the class of objects which exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. Any one who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman — he is like the war-mad man condemned in Homer's words as 'having no family, no law, no home'; for he who is such by nature is mad on war: he is a non-cooperator like an isolated piece in a game of draughts”.

Autarkcia means 'political and/or economic independence'. Aristotle uses the word in a more expansive sense, embracing opportunities to live the 'good' life according to the human virtues.


Aristotle is concerned to properly define liberty so that it is distinguished from licence. In reconciling the freedom of each and all so as to enhance overall freedom, Aristotle rejects the two definitions of democracy - the 'sovereignty of the majority’ and 'liberty' as 'doing what one wants' - as 'bad'. 'Just' is equated with what is equal, and the decision of the majority as to what is equal is regarded as sovereign; and liberty is seen in terms of doing what one wants. So in such a democracy each lives as he likes and for his 'fancy of the moment', as Euripides says’. Aristotle defends ‘living according to the constitution’ as ‘self-preservation’ or ‘salvation’ rather than, as it is for those who mistake liberty for licence, 'slavery' (P V.ix 1981:332; Politics trans Barker 1958:1310a). Aristotle follows Plato in identifying excessive personal liberty with license, claiming that such liberty ensures a large body of support for demagogues (1981:373/5).
Personal freedom as the freedom of the individual against the state - the 'negative' liberal conception - is not the peculiar product of the modern world. Aristotle explicitly acknowledges the existence of such a conception - 'to live as you like' - and argues against it: 'from it has come the ideal of 'not being ruled', not by anyone at all if possible, or at least only in alternation. This [to be ruled by alternation]  is a contribution towards that liberty which is based on equality' (VI.ii 1981:362/3).
The same people who mistake licence for liberty will no doubt see this democratisation of decadence as an extension of freedom. It isn’t. It is its narrowing, a constraining of human possibilities to the lowest rungs of wants and desires. And it progressively eats away at its own basis. Such an economic system rests on fragile foundations.

This is a ‘failure properly to define liberty’. Aristotle's concept of the polis as 'expressing the needs of the individual on a high plane' (Edel 1982:319) leads him to a view of the polis as rationally constraining self-seeking individuals so as to secure the common good. Aristotle thus rejects democratic freedom as leading to the licence of individualism 'divorced from law and justice' (I.ii 1981:59/60). Aristotle’s 'positive’ conception of politics implies an associative framework which expand rather than inhibits individual freedom. Aristotle argues that ‘there is a natural impulse towards this kind of association; and the first man to construct a state deserves credit for conferring very great benefits. For as man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development, so he is worst of all when divorced from law and justice’ (1.ii). Arguing that ‘injustice armed is hardest to deal’, Aristotle concludes that ‘man without virtue is the most savage, the most unrighteous, and the worst in regard to sexual licence and gluttony’. Hence Alasdair MacIntyre’s pessimism in After Virtue, a book title which defines the modern predicament. For Aristotle, ethics and politics are one and the same question implied by the social nature of human beings. ‘The virtue of justice is a feature of a state; for justice is the arrangement of the political association, and a sense of justice decides what is just’ (1.ii).

Aristotle argues for a functional conception of citizenship in the manner of Plato: ‘we say a citizen is a member of an association, just as a sailor is; and each member of the crew has his different function and a name to fit it - rower, helmsman, look-out, and the rest. Clearly the most exact description of each individual will be a special description of his virtue; but equally there will also be a general description that will fit them all, because there is a task in which they all play a part - the safe conduct of the voyage; for each member of the crew aims at securing that. Similarly the task of all the citizens, however different they may be, is the stability of the association, that is, the constitution. Therefore the virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution’ (P 179).

25 CITIZENS AND ARTIFICIAL SOCIETY 

Citizens Of The World

The Artificial People Of Hobbes
In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes identifies the as amongst the most salient characteristics of human nature competition, pride and the desire for glory. From these assumptions of individuals in the state of nature, Hobbes builds his model of human society as a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism, an endless conflict over resources: "If any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies." Egoistic desire, competition and the enmity that ensues can be reigned in only by the existence of a "Power to keep them all in awe." The state is therefore a Leviathan, a collective power more capable and bigger than any individual's natural inclinations. Without this power,

there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war which can be prevented by the Leviathan, the state that would restrain the antisocial behaviour of individuals so as to make civilised life possible. By using their reason to join together and agree to create an artificial person, the state, human beings could impose upon themselves the virtues of restraint and cooperation that, as egoistic individuals, they lack in a state of nature.

Hobbes’ justification for a powerful state resting on a social contract has been criticised for its anachronism. Hobbes has read back into the state of nature the egoism, conflict and enmity of the emerging bourgeois society of his day. The state of nature is therefore market society as the domain of homo economicus. The basic point remains, however, that in the absence of a common interest and in the inability of egoistic individuals to supply themselves with this common interest, an artificial external force, the state, has to intervene and impose the common peace upon warring individuals. This begs the question as to what happens when the bigger beasts in the state of war encroach upon government and capture it for its own private purposes. It implies that once the state of war has invaded the sphere of government and assumed the power of the Leviathan, the state monster, life may well become nasty, brutish and short.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was also concerned with the implications of Hobbes’ view that individuals were unsociable, restless and insatiable beings subject to infinite want. Rousseau was much more impressed with sociality as an educative process in which individuals could learn the value of "enough." If individuals could learn to use their reason and come to control their instincts and impulses, they would realise their higher selves. Once reason is in control, human beings would be truly free, no longer driven by their desires and wants. This process of realising reason in association is the foundation of freedom, precisely the opposite of those who argue that the competition of individual egos issues in the general good. Rousseau proceeded to point out that the "artificial" individuals of modern bourgeois society possessed precisely those key traits which Hobbes thought characterised individuals in the state of nature, particularly a restless desire to expand power. Hobbes’ argument that in a competitive society, the individual had to keep expanding power or risk losing power meant that ‘artificial’ individuals could never have enough. Capitalist relations turned individuals into insatiable ‘artificial’ creatures cut off from the humanising ties of various institutions that situated the individual within a society.

26 ROUSSEAU AND THE COMMON GOOD

For Rousseau, the legitimacy of political authority depends upon individuals preserving and expanding their liberty by joining with others in association. In moving from the primitive state to the social state, individuals must associate so as to organise their supra-individual forces through an arrangement which secures both the self-interest and the freedom of each individual. Individuals:





Rousseau's view of individual freedom is associative and social, connecting the 'rational’ nature of human beings with common control securing individual freedom. Rousseau is concerned that political association should 'defend   and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate', so that 'each, while uniting himself  with  all,   may  still  obey himself alone,  and remain as  free  as before' (I.VI  1973:174). 

Such a view commits Rousseau to a democratic community of active citizens (Thomson 1969:98; Plamenatz 1963:433/7; Broome 1963:56/60; Colletti 1972:183/5), affirming a developmental and educative conception of politics in which the individual learns to take into account the public concerns of others (Rousseau II.iv 1973:186; Pateman 1970:24/5).

Critics nevertheless highlight the totalitarian and homogenising potential of Rousseau's politics of THE common good based upon the universal identity of citizens under the state (Taylor 1992:6). What is required, therefore, is an approach that integrates  the  claims  of  both  universality  and particularity,  an approach that recognises that human identity is created reciprocally or dialogically through relations with others (Taylor 1992:7).

Rousseau makes great progress towards this ideal. Sovereignty, as the exercise of the general will, 'can never be alienated', and the sovereign, as collective being, 'cannot be represented' by anything other than itself (II.i 1973:182 III.xv 1973:239/242). To alienate liberty is to renounce moral and human status (I. IV 1973:170; Jennings 1994:119). Rousseau reaches his conclusion from premises which respect the freedom of each individual member of the 'great association' (Broome 1963:64/5). The citizen and the sovereign are not abstracted from each other: 'the Sovereign .. cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause' (Il.iv 1973:186). Political obligation is secured through the reciprocal act and relation upon which political society is based. Rousseau makes decisive progress towards the integral conception by resting collective authority upon the emancipatory interaction and reciprocity of individuals. Rousseau thus unites each with all and all with each in arguing that 'the undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves'. As a result, 'there is not a man who does not think of "each" as meaning him, and consider him in voting for all' (Il.iv 1973:187).

Thus, from the very nature of the compact, every act of Sovereignty, i.e. every authentic act of the general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally; so that the Sovereign recognises only the body of the nation, and draws no distinctions between those of whom it is made up.. So long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort, they obey no one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of the Sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what  point  the  latter  can enter  into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each.

Rousseau SC II.iv 1973:188

The problem is that Rousseau's associationalism fits the contours of the public-private dualism characterising liberal modernity. The principle of reciprocity uniting the freedom of each and all is asserted at the level of the political community of the state, vitiating Rousseau's attempt to realise an associative freedom which embeds a genuine reciprocity in practical life. In Rousseau’s social contract, individuals interact within the sphere of the common good only at the level of the state.

Institutions, organizations and associations and not least governments setting the overall moral and political framework are essential features of a civilised society since they help to socialize individuals, creating common goals and a shared ethos. The connection between reason and freedom is based on the notion of human beings as social and rational animals. Human beings achieve more when acting in concert than when acting as solitary individuals. The value of teamworking is known to every business leader and manager and yet the ideologues of the free market are concerned to search and destroy any social form or practice that hint at collectivism, and hence the slippery slop to socialism, the state and serfdom. Lawlessness begins at the top and these ideologues, with their fundamental premise of the ‘anarchy’ of the market are lacking the moral and political responsibility that comes with government and public policy. The kinds of citizenship available depends on the institutional and social fabric. Once these have been overrun or destroyed by those who conceive unrestrained appetites as individual liberty, civilised society does not last long.

This leaves us unanchored and adrift. Plato and Aristotle offer timeless truths concerning human nature as social and rational and this philosophical anthropology is a solid foundation on which to build. But politics itself can only ever proceed from the here and the now, not from human nature as some ahistorical ideal but as manifested in existing institutions. A social movement to contest the self-regulating market with a vision of internal social self-regulation proceeds from existing society.  

This means looking at what markets are and what their proper functions are and where they are properly located. The modern market economy emerged hand in hand with the modern centralised state, the pair of them suppressing other forms of social control, governance and economic activity. There are always alternative ways of controlling, valuing and using the basic materials required first to give and sustain life, and to enable life to flourish – to live well. Many of these alternatives can be found in the history books. Capitalism is no more ‘natural’ than any of the other transitory, social forms in the past. Whatever these forms may be in the future, one thing can be certain, those do manage to thrive will have worked out how to manage planetary resources and utilize nature’s "free" capital in ways that are sustainable, just and equitable. To the extent that this is achieved, future generations will owe a debt of gratitude to political philosophers who outlined the contours of the politics of the public realm, politicians and activists who resisted capital’s attempts to encroach on the natural and the human world, and to ecologists who advocated more balanced and harmonious ways of valuing and sharing the world. As a result, we may yet once more be able to refer to the ‘common weal’ in the social world and "the commons" in the natural world.
The common good is, slowly but surely, coming to be remembered as a more equitable, just and peaceful way to govern the world. One world, one human humanity, our common future. The view savours a little of Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura, human beings as a part of God/Nature as one interchangeable substance.

27 SPINOZA
Aristotle’s notion of ‘flourishing’ savours a little of Spinoza’s conatus. A conatus is a mode's essence (or degree of power) once the mode has begun to exist. Spinoza's account of the conative aspect of human beings rests on two important propositions of Part Three. 'Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours (conatus) to persevere in its being’. Our most fundamental desire, and indeed our essence, is the endeavour (conatus) or power to persist in existence. Spinoza's theory of conatus is of universal application; all things, and not just human beings, manifest this endeavour.' 

Thus conatus is the affirmation of essence in a mode's existence. The notion implies that freedom, flourishing, the assertion of power or energy involves activity in relation to circumstances as against passivity. 

The vision of a healthy, sane sense of self and personhood is rooted in a philosophical anthropology which originates in the ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle, but which reappears as the autonomous, active, creative and productive human being in the works of Vico, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Marx. 

For Spinoza, freedom depends upon adhering to clear and distinct ideas. Human beings are free in so far as they have a clear and distinct idea of the causes of their own physical and mental states. 

The origins of human unfreedom are emotions of desire, hate and love with respect to particular things, being attached to and affected by particular things and persons. These desires, loves and hates arise by the association of ideas through inadequate ideas of the true causes of our pleasures and pains. Spinoza therefore affirms knowledge over ignorance as the key to human freedom. Adequate ideas giving adequate knowledge of causes necessarily involves a more complete knowledge of Nature as a whole. In acquiring more adequate knowledge of Nature, human beings conceive themselves as parts of Nature, in the process coming to cease to desire, love and hate particular things, hence ceasing to be attached to and affected by the particular things and persons around us. 

The free and wise human being therefore feels morally and emotionally neutral towards the particular things and persons around him. The free and the wise understanding that they are what they are and understands why they cannot be otherwise, and hence does not ignorantly see them as the causes of personal pleasures and pains. The free and wise person is the true origin of his or her own pleasures; these are generated spontaneously, as the consciousness of his or her own free activity and are not the effects of external causes. Mind and body are interconnected. The greater the real activity and vitality of the body, the greater the real activity and vitality of the mind and vice versa. Since pleasure is the reflexion of the activity and vitality of the whole person, a person who is functioning freely and is uninhibited by external causes is necessarily in a state of pleasure (laetitia). Hence, for Spinoza, the aim of the free and wise person will be 'bene agere ac laetari — 'to act well and to rejoice.' Repudiating ascetic virtues of self-sacrifice and self-denial as unnatural, Spinoza focuses upon activity and vitality of mind and body to argue that 'there cannot be too much joy: it is always good: but melancholy is always bad" (Ethics Pt. IV. Prop. XLII). 

 Pain and the emotions associated with pain (hatred, envy, fear etc.) indicate weakness and lack of freedom; they are evidence of some inhibition of activity and vitality by external causes. For Spinoza, particular pleasures in the narrow sense (titillatio) may be excessive in that they upset the balance and well-being of the whole organism. Spinoza defines the true pleasure of the free and intelligent person in terms of conscious well-being and enjoyed activity. To act well is fully to enjoy oneself, and fully to enjoy oneself is to act well.

Spinoza reworks the old notions of vice and virtue in physiological and psychological sense. Virtue is health and sanity whereas the old religious standbys of suffering, guilt, and remorse are revealed to be morbid symptoms of inadequate ideas and ignorance. It follows that anything which furthers knowledge and intelligence expands power and freedom is necessarily good for the individual and is to be pursued in the interests of self-preservation. The converse is also true. Anything which inhibits obstructs the development of knowledge and intelligence is self-destructive and is bad in inhibiting the freedom and vitality of the individual. 

The free individual is the active, productive being conscious of being the creator of circumstances. The world of necessity is a self-made social world and hence for that reason can be consciously governed as a human product. Spinoza distinguished between active and passive emotions. The active emotions (fortitude and generosity) originate in the individual, and they are accompanied by adequate ideas. Passive emotions rule over human beings; the passive human being is the slave of passions, and these are connected with inadequate ideas.

The argument employs the opposition between activity and passivity as the central concepts for the understanding of freedom. And the activity vs passivity opposition also pertains to the Platonic distinction between knowledge (nous) and opinion (doxa). Passivity is associated with inadequate ideas, ideas which fall short of reason and knowledge. In a passive state, human beings are slaves of circumstances and are capable only of opinion. Politics currently practised is a world of opinion. Activity is associated with adequate ideas, the world of knowledge, human beings understanding themselves as the self-conscious creators of the social world. 

This connection between  knowledge and freedom and flourishing is something that presupposes an active relation to the world, but an open rather than an aggressive relation, one which bases true knowledge on the relatedness of all things. Goethe wrote well here: 'Man knows himself only inasmuch as he knows the world. He knows the world only within himself, and he is aware of himself only within the world. Each new object, truly recognized, opens up a new organ within ourselves.' 

Spinoza’s conatus means ‘striving’. It is a striving proportionate to a being’s essence. Only that striving, that active relation, satisfies the essential human need to make sense of existence. The active human being is free and productive, united to others and at peace with the world.

This philosophy has political implications. The personal rivalries and polarities concerning belief and opinion foster social and political instability and impinge upon the independence and detachment which the free and wise person requires for the development of knowledge and intelligence. The free and wise person therefore has an interest in the creation and maintenance of a peaceful social order. By overcoming desires, loves and hates attached to particular things and persons, human beings are able to avoid the conflicts which obstruct the pursuit of knowledge and intelligence. The happiness of the free and wise person is achieved by the free exercise understanding and is essentially cooperative rather than competitive; it requires only mutual peacefulness and respect for law and order on the part of each and all. Far from being competitive, the free individual has a positive interest in promoting the happiness and intellectual emancipation of all other individuals. To the extent that the individuals composing society are governed by passive emotions, conflicts of interest between individuals arise and these must obstruct the free person in his or her pursuit of self-preservation in life and self-advancement in knowledge. It follows that ‘Whatever helps to maintain the common society of men, whatever brings it about that men live together in peace and agreement, is useful, and, on the other hand, what produces discord in the state, is bad' (Ethics Pt. IV. Prop. XL). The free and wise person will also be the ‘happy’ person, in Spinoza’s sense of ‘joy’ and Aristotle’s sense of ‘flourishing’. The free and wise person comes to appreciate the meaning of Plato’s argument that 'virtue is its own reward'.





In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that ‘It is precisely in knowing its limits that philosophy exists. This notion of limits is important. ‘I had to deny knowledge in order to make way for faith’. For Kant, human beings do not see the world as it is, but as it appears to be. This is a critical point. Certain aspects of reality are internal rather than external, that is, they are present in the conceptual apparatus of the human mind rather than in the world outside. A table appears to be a particular colour on account of the particular constitution of  human being’s visual apparatus. A species with a different visual apparatus, that could, for instance, process a wider range of light waves (infrared, ultraviolet) would see the colour of that particular table differently.

And what applies to colour applies also to other aspects of reality which Kant called ‘categories’ of experience, such as space, time, cause and effect. These categories are innate, part of the conceptual apparatus of human beings, and determine how human beings experience the world. Without these innate categories, human experience would be an inchoate jumble. The world human beings experience is a human world constituted by innate categories.

But whilst this philosophy emphasises the creative constitutive human power full of reality making possibilities, Kant is careful to emphasise limits. The innate categories impose order on chaos but also impose limits on experience, determining what human beings can know. Human beings can seek causal explanations regarding everyday experience - Who put that table there? What made that noise? But there are questions to which causal explanations cannot be applied, human free will, the origin of the universe, and so on. The answers to such questions can often result in antinomy, possibilities which, though equally rational and plausible are nevertheless mutually exclusive. For instance, it seems equally plausible that human beings possess free choice and that every human act has a determined cause. Similarly, the views that the universe at one time didn't exist or that it has always existed and always will exist (Aristotle’s eternalism) seem equally implausible.
For Kant, such antinomies suggest there are limits to reason which prevent us from ever fully understanding certain things. This is the basis of Kant's transcendental idealism. Whilst human beings can only ever experience their own innate perceptions through categories of experience (idealism), there is a reality that exists beyond (transcends) these categories.
Although his philosophy is difficult, Kant repays serious study. Kant shows how human beings are creators of their own reality, and therefore possess a creative, constitutive power, a demiurge, that is independent of some external source. At the same time, Kant firmly establishes the power and possibilities of reason upon the limits of reason. Kant is clear that it is only in knowing the limits of reason that one can appreciate its possibilities. Those intoxicated with power are prone to ignore those limits, realising not the freedom pursued but its opposite. 

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant negotiates a path beyond the conflict of knowledge and belief, reason and empiricism and achieves an intellectually sublime synthesis of ethical and cognitive perspectives. For Kant, the knowledge of the external world of 'phenomena' comes from the experience of the senses as made intelligible and organised by the categories of human reason. The world of ‘things-in-themselves’ is beyond human experience and is inaccessible to human reason. There can therefore be no transcendence here. The world of 'practical reason' or morality, however, is radically different. Human beings are co-creators and co-legislators of this moral world, the world of ‘noumena’, and partake of a real world as distinct from a merely 'phenomenal' world. 

Whereas once either revelation (religion) and nature (science) had been the fountain-head of morality, Kant makes human reason the source of being able to understand good and evil, to prescribe right conduct through the ‘categorical imperative’ and to author the universal. The moral law of reason enjoins human beings to live in accordance with the ‘categorical imperative’. The categorical imperative affirms the fundamental equality of rational moral agents, arguing that human beings be treated as 'ends in themselves'. True freedom is achieved if, in moral conduct, human beings follow the law of reason only, in contradistinction to natural inclinations and without regard to practical consequences. This is the moral and rational foundation which enables culture and civilization to flourish and enables  human beings to forward to a future of 'perpetual peace'. 

Kant’s philosophy transfigures the ideals of transcendence into the ethico-rational freedom of citizens who live as co-legislators in a moral world of their own making. Without any recourse to supernaturalism, Kant’s ethico-rational freedom transcends the world of empirical reality through the power of human reason, rising above the limitations of a world beset by antagonism, desire and natural inclinations. 

Kant’s ethico-rational freedom encompasses Plato’s sublime morality, the righteous, the poor in spirit, the Gospel love thy neighbour as thyself, the Protestant emphasis on good works, and it does so without any need to have recourse to such elitist or selective notions as Platonic guardians, the ‘chosen people’, the elect, or, reaching into the century after Kant, ‘the party’. Kant achieves this by emphasising the creative power of human reason within each and all, conceiving human beings as co-authors of their moral existence and co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends. In impressing its sign upon empirical reality, reason expands the sphere of human freedom. In establishing the limits of reality within the confines of reason and nature, Kant actually opened up the possibility of the most expansive moral and rational freedom, a 'kingdom of ends' which is realised in the three dimensions of nature, society and the mind. Kant’s normative philosophy presents an ideal of human association as a realm of ends composed of autonomous individuals who are co-legislators of their freedom as rational natural beings.

At the heart of Kant’s normative philosophy is the moral requirement to transform society in order to realise the summum bonum, the highest good: 'The moral law .. determines for us ..a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom' (CJ 1951:30). Human beings, therefore, have a duty to promote the highest good: 'We are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the  summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law' (CJ 1951:304).

The way that the end of the highest good as a moral society enjoins individuals to promote the happiness of each other implies a social ethics. Rather than confine moral efforts to the private realm, Kant's view expresses a social demand oriented towards realising an ideal, the ideal of the perfect state and of international peace (Van Der Linden 1985:4 5). This social ethics concerned with promoting the highest good is also expressed in the way that the categorical imperative entails ideal co-legislative institutions in which human beings treat each other as ends. The end of the categorical imperative is the harmony of free and rational wills.





This idea establishes Kant's ethics as concerned with the public life of human beings who, as social and rational beings, realise their nature in association with each other. The moral law, as defined in the categorical imperative, grounds the pursuit of the perfect civil constitution and perpetual peace, leading to the highest good of the moral community, as a social duty. 
For Kant, the central aspect of the human predicament concerns how human beings are able to transcend their natural inclinations that keep them chained to natural necessity by ascending to their higher rational nature. Resolving this question entails humanity moving beyond the limitations of egoism and individual self-interest to realise the greater good that is attained from acting in common. Kant’s philosophy therefore involves a distinction between culture, as constituted in the sphere of reason, and nature. Reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world from which it is separated (Rumdell 1989:14). Morality remains outside the empirical limitations of the temporal sphere as a point towards which human beings aspire. Kant's morality is formal or transcendental in the sense that it seeks a ground for right not by means of an extrapolation from the empirical properties of human beings but in the critique of the rational mind (1965 B.473-480). Universality requires that freedom be grounded in something that transcends empirically limited inclinations, the will. Moral values cannot be drawn from nature and must inhabit some supersensible, 'ideal', realm. Only in relation to this 'noumenal' realm could individuals become moral beings (1965 B.334/6 498ff 1956 50ff).

Freedom is the capacity to act independently of natural causality and against natural 'inclinations', the desires and impulses elicited in the human psyche through objects (1965 B.561f; cf. 1956:72 118f 161). Kant’s rational will is thus free from any ground of determination in nature (Taylor 1975:368/9). A free act is morally significant in being exempt from 'blind  causality' in both physical and psychological senses (1965 B.826f; 1956:95).

Moral principles which are logically independent of experience can be justified only if human beings are understood to be not merely phenomenal beings, subject to causal necessity, but also noumenal beings who are free. Morality is possible only if the will is free to act. The concept of freedom is wholly a priori and forms part of a coherent system of 'ideas of reason' (1965 B.390-396), a rationally constructed standard not found in experience but according to which empirical actions can be judged (1965 B.370ff). This system of ideas is constructed by the systematic application of reason through a faculty shared 'by all human beings itself and is 'objective’ in that human beings can agree about its nature and resolve disputes by reference to it.

Freedom is the capacity of reason to initiate action, lawfully, apart from inclination and hence independently of ‘blind’ natural causality (1965 B.46 50 B.566ff). With the moral law as a 'fact of reason' (e.g. FMM), Kantian autonomy is thus defined as the idea of freedom as the causality of reason in accordance with the moral law, a 'necessary' concept which human beings must construct on account of knowledge of the moral law (1965 B.476 585f; 1956:21-29 32).
The general moral law is the 'categorical imperative', the objective principle of morality, categorically enjoining individuals to act in accordance with morality. As distinct from an hypothetical imperative, which indicates the means which must be willed or employed relative to the realisation of some further end (GMM 1991:79), an imperative is categorical when expressed as an unconditional demand that possesses its own validity. This yields a universal principle for all rational beings, and valid and necessary principles for every volition.
Hence the categorical imperative in The Formula of Universal Law: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' (GMM 1991:84). This formulation applies to all so that everyone acts only on maxims that can be willed to become universal laws (Van Der Linden 1985:20). Once maxims are submitted to the test of universality, the pursuit of private ends no longer issues in conflict but in harmony, the individual agent respecting the categorical imperative through respect for the moral law in abstraction from objects. Kant's harmony of free and rational wills is, therefore, more than a framework for the individual pursuit of private ends, in which any claim to achieving universal happiness can only be realised indirectly. The end of the moral community affirms that individual members directly contribute to the happiness of each other, so long as this meets the test of universality (DV 1964). Not the individual alone but all individuals together make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted. In submitting their maxims to the test of universality, individual agents create a moral community. It follows that in the moral world each person is reciprocally end and means (CJ 1951:222).
The ethic of ends puts 'flesh on the bones’ of the first formulation by indicating what kind of maxims could be willed as universal laws; human beings not using themselves or others as means to subjective ends implies a view of what right actions are. The view that the individual ought not be subject to another will implies that the individual should be considered as his/her own law-giver. Thus, whilst the: realm of means is equated with the world of natural things, the realm of ends is equated with that of pure, self-determined intelligences. The rational being legislates universally by all maxims of its will so as to judge itself and its actions from this perspective. This concept leads directly to the Formula of the End in Itself: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:91). It is significant that Kant refers not to 'persons' in particular but to 'humanity’ as a whole. In addressing the universal humanity in each individual, how humanity can and ought to be, Kant's ethics are social. This ‘humanity’ is the final end of the individual, the highest good as the conception of the moral community applied in order to transform the human condition. The duties to oneself are at the same time duties to all: 'To destroy the subject of morality in one’s person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, so far as this is in one's power; and yet morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose of oneself as a mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's own person (homo noumenon), which was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation (DV 1964:85).

Treating humanity in oneself and in others as an end in itself is to act according to only those maxims which can become universal laws or laws of nature. The Formula of Autonomy establishes that 'the will is .. not merely subject to the law but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)’ (GMM 1991:93). In acting out of respect for the moral law, the moral agent wills himself/herself and others as legislative selves (noumenal selves) and as co-legislators in a moral order of universal cooperation. (GMM 1991:98/9; Van Der Linden 1985:30). To treat people as ends in themselves respects the demand that individual agents should create a society of legislators concerned to promote each other's ends. Thus the formulation demands that the moral agent act always so that each will through its maxims could regard itself at the same time as 'making universal law' (GMM 1991:94). 
This is a conception of a community of rational beings under law, constituting their selfhood in relation with the moral individuality of all others. The fundamental worth individuals seek for themselves from other subjects they also acknowledge in other subjects (Cassirer 1981:248/9). This concept of every rational being 'as one who must regard himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his will' leads to the 'closely connected' concept of the realm of ends (GMM 1991:95): 'every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends' (GMM 1991:100). This realm is defined as 'a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws .... Since these laws are directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only an Ideal)' (GMM 1991:95). This establishes an ideal of humanity as it ought to be, a realm in which moral agents respect each other as legislators and as ends in themselves: 'A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head [sovereign], when as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other' (GMM 1991:95).

In the realm of ends each individual upholds and promotes the conditions of autonomy. By making the moral law their own and, individual agents also make their end the moral community in which each furthers the ends of the other, thus realising the highest good (Van Der Linden 1985:32/3 38). This community, then, is composed not of monadic legislators lacking relation and interaction, but of colegislators.

Kant's ethics are democratic in affirming every person as competent to make universally legislative decisions. Each member treating all others as moral beings requires liberty (every individual is able to decide for themselves); equality (every individual equally has the power to make choices and decisions); and fraternity (every individual is a member of a moral community) (Raphael 1981:57; Norman 1983:102/3).

Kant's main concern is to argue that only actions which are done 'from duty' possess moral worth and exhibit a good will (GMM 1991:62/5 1956:84 87/8 DV 1964:50 52/3 R 1960:25). To act 'from duty' is to act out of respect for the moral law, rather than from inclination or from expectation of desirable consequences (GMM 1991:66). The view that the moral worth of an action resides in its consequences reduces the good will to being an efficient cause of good action rather than as an end in itself.

It is morally significant whether an act is done from duty or from inclination since for Kant it is only in actions done from duty that individuals exercise their freedom, their capacity to act as autonomous beings independent of and superior to the natural or sensible world (1956:89/90). It is not enough that action should accord with duty, it must be done for 'the sake of duty'. Otherwise the accordance is merely contingent and spurious because, though the unmoral ground may indeed now and then produce lawful actions, more often it brings forth unlawful ones (GMM 1991:63ff).

For Hegel, Kant’s pure motive of duty can never produce the good since it is abstracted from everything that comprises a real life, from desires, interests, and needs. The good needs to be made an integral part of everyday life in connection with the empirical desires and self-satisfaction of individuals. Hegel's conception follows Aristotle's conception of a virtue as an intelligent disposition to behave in certain ways and act for certain reasons, to feel pleasure or pain at certain things (PR parao150R Aristotle NE 1065al2 1106bl5-30). Hegel considers Aristotelian virtue to transcend Kant's dualism of duty and inclination. ‘Aristotle determines the concept of virtue more precisely by distinguishing a rational aspect of the soul from an irrational one; in the latter nous [reason] is only dynamei [potentially] - sensations, inclinations, passions, emotions apply to it. In the rational side, understanding, wisdom, reflectiveness, cognizance all have their place. But they do not constitute virtue, which consists only in the unity of the rational with the irrational side. We call it virtue when the passions (inclinations) are so related to reason that they do what reason commands' (HP 2 1968:204).

Whereas for Aristotle reason had to persuade desire as to what it should want, for Kant, a truly moral act is performed out of respect for the moral law, without regard to inclinations. For Kant, reason is immanent in the mind of the autonomous moral agent and is unrelated to external objects. The problem is that if reason is noumenally structured, the empirical realm is left free from moral significance. Whereas Aristotle  could make  the  polis crucial  to  individual  self-realisation as the  essential field of human interaction, Kant's approach assumes a set of rational ideas inherent in the human mind from which the state as the prime political object derives. Hegel thus  charges  Kantian  ethics  with  being  an  'empty formalism' which is incapable of generating an 'immanent doctrine of duties' (PR para 135R). Kant's pure motive of duty becomes a  'preaching'  of 'duty for duty's sake' providing no content or direction of action (PR para 135R). 

Hegel's criticism is valid only if attention remains fixed upon the Formula of Universal Law, focusing upon the categorical imperative's universality in terms of its form. Kant's morality is indeed formal, but it is not empty in the sense of sheer consistency and noncontradiction. Kant is not indifferent to ends. Kant's standard of universalisation is tied to the ethic of ends which imposes the duty upon each to treat all others with the respect they expect to receive in return. This ethic has practical implications, ruling out institutions and practices which treat human beings as means to external ends and leading to the 'realm of ends' composed of free and equal members, a moral community of autonomous, self-legislating agents. The imperative to treat humanity as an end and never as a means therefore puts some 'nonheteronomous teleological flesh' upon 'the bare bones of universality' (Riley 1982:49).

Set alongside Aristotelian notions of the richly endowed happy individual, the Kantian self may appear to be socially, culturally and historically deracinated, 'thin as a needle' (Murdoch 1985:53). But it is simply not true to argue that the Kantian self lacks moral and affective ties to others and is subjected to the empty ethic of duty for duty's sake. Kant was as interested as Aristotle was in developing the right kind of moral personality. The difference is that Kant's good character possesses a democratic character in being open to anyone, regardless of gifts of intelligence, beauty, wealth or good luck. Kant realises that universal principle alone, at a formal level, cannot ensure morality and therefore ties it to an ethic of ends which treats all individuals as beings endowed with dignity by virtue of their humanity, their capacity for moral action. Kant's ethic taught respect for the rational moral element in each individual and is 'built to preserve its own self-respect and that of others, neither demanding nor enduring servility' (Shklar 1984:233).

Kant does possess an intersubjective dimension. For Kant, the capacity to universalise the principles of actions is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the morality of these actions. Principles are only moral when tied to objective ends, specifically the injunction to treat human beings as ends rather than means. The conception of rational agency in the universal Formula is thin when considered in itself, which is why Kant connected it to an ethic of objective ends and a moral community. Without this teleology, Kant states, morality would be 'destroyed'.

Kant departs from the classical conception of happiness as an intrinsic component of the highest good. Kant recognises the extent to which the modern principle of subjectivity has subverted the overarching ethical framework of the good, severing the necessary connection between individual happiness and the universal good in the classical conception. As a result, the notion of the good is subjectivised, becoming the product of individual desire and preference, in opposition to the individual good of others and the common good of all. To deal with this situation, Kant's ethics demote happiness from being the first principle of practical philosophy: 'it is the moral disposition  which  conditions  and  makes  possible  the participation in happiness, and not  conversely the prospect  of happiness that makes possible  the  moral disposition' (1965 B.841). Happiness and the good are no longer directly connected but require the mediation of moral virtue. The rational value of happiness - the 'complete good' - now depends upon the possession of moral virtue and is made the condition of the worthiness to be happy through moral  conduct  or  goodwill (GMM 1991:59 1965 3.B37-B38 B.341).

In  the  first  instance,  Kant  identifies happiness with the well being of a finite rational being (GMM 1959:61), its total and lasting advantage through the satisfaction of natural desires or inclinations. Kant goes further in arguing that happiness is an 'idea' in which 'all inclinations are combined into a sum total’ (GMM 1991:64), an 'absolute whole or maximum of well-being' (FMM 1959:35). 'Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires' (1965: B.834). Kant subordinates the hedonistic view that objects of desire are willed for the pleasure they  may  bring  (Prac  1956:20)  to  'contentment  in fulfilling  a  purpose  ..  determined  by  reason  alone, acknowledging the 'highest practical function' of reason to be the establishment of a good will (GMM 1991:62). 'Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it, alone constitutes the supreme good of that world wherein, in accordance with the command of a pure but practical reason, we are under obligation to place ourselves' (1965 B.342).
The reality of this systematic unity of ends occurs in the intelligible - hence moral - world rather than in the sensible world (1965 B.842). This 'leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature (just as the former unity is in accordance with universal and necessary laws of morality), and thus unites the practical with the speculative reason' (1965 B.843). The world must be in harmony with that moral employment of reason founded on the idea of the supreme good (1955 B.844).

Kant thus develops a concept of happiness as the harmony of ends. Happiness, as free and rational activity, is more than self-preservation, instinctual gratification, and pleasure, but consists of knowledge, insight and creativity (Van Der Linden 1985:70/1). The actions of a being having will must be determined by reason rather than instinct (GMM 1991:60/111). To this end, natural inclinations are to be 'tamed': 'instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into a harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness' (R 1960:51). Happiness is the unification of 'all the ends which are prescribed by our desires' (1965:632).

The basis of the conflict between Kant and Hegel lies in their different conceptions of objective ends. Hegel's more Aristotelian teleology makes the ends of moral action a condition in the world, making actions instrumental to some good yet to be achieved. For Kant, this denies the moral status of action since the end is not extrinsic to action but is part of the 'rational nature’ of human beings, as ends capable of shaping and pursuing ends (Kant DV 1971:45/6 51). Whereas Kant considered the moral will to be part of the 'rational nature' of human beings, hence prior to actions, Hegel made it part of historical development, attached to  commitments in the objective world  of political and legal institutions (PR para 75A).

Which isn’t to argue that Kant lacks an ideal that is yet to be achieved, far from it. The realm of ends is a vision of a possible world in which all individuals really are the pure moral agents following the moral law which reason asserts they ought to be (GMM 1991:95/6). The question is how the ideal can be realised through human action. The problem is that if freedom remains the unsituated concept it is in Kant's conception, it cannot be pursued let alone realised in the empirical or sensible realm. Freedom is confined in an impotent noumenal sphere. 

Kant's moral law, as self-legislated, asserts the rationality, freedom and equality of all and is applicable to each and all as noumenal persons. Kant offers an ideal aiming to emancipate individuals from the phenomenal world of causal laws. In contradistinction to legislation in the actual world, members always heed moral legislation in the realm of ends. Since each member is both legislator and the subject of the laws, giving the moral law and obeying it, all are equal.

The realm of ends is thus an ideal human community composed of free and equal members (Kant 1965: B.372), a goal of future society, a concept of future life (1965: B.836f). Kant offers the realm of ends as an idea of reason which is practically necessary if there is to be moral action (1965o8.372). In the sensible realm, its counterpart is progress towards communal autonomy, the 'real object of our willing' (Kant 1956:121f).
As an ideal, the realm of ends exists as a criterion by which to critically evaluate the existing political order. This has radical, future oriented possibilities as an ideal civil constitution in which coercion has been replaced by moral reason. Discussing Plato's idea of the perfect city, Kant envisages:





Kant affirms a conception of human flourishing and potentiality in repudiating the thesis that makes corrupt human nature responsible for imperfect political institutions. Identifying the cause of imperfection with 'the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws' (Pure 1965:312), Kant explains corrupt human nature by imperfect institutions which ought, therefore, to be transformed and placed on a moral basis.

This means realising the perfect constitution as part of the duty to realise the highest good. Kant describes this ideal constitution as 'a necessary idea which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws'. The 'the rightfulness of the Idea’ brings ‘the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype' (1965 B.373-374).

Happiness deriving from the moral perfection of humanity does not imply an unmediated existence proceeding through 'inner' conviction but is set within the collective framework of a perfect civil constitution and its laws. Kant's 'concept of freedom' is the essential core of Kant's ethics concerning the possibility of the categorical imperative, the 'keystone of the whole edifice of pure reason' (1965 B.7 394n; 1956:3). 

The implications are radical. Political and social institutions which deny the lawmaking autonomy of individuals may be criticised and transformed from the perspective of the ideal. Since heteronomy, determination by external laws, whether one’s natural inclinations or the arbitrary will of others, is the norm in existing society, autonomy, being governed rationally by self-legislated laws, is a goal still to be achieved (Van Der Linden 1985:32). Marx's critique exposes the heteronomous character of capitalist society in order to realise the autonomous moral community. Within capitalism, the ends of some are preferred or downgraded to those of others. Marx's conception of communism as 'an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (CM 1973:87) is in a direct line of descent from the ideal constitution as promising a self-regulating society.

However, whilst the concept of the republic of ends can critically expose the failings of actual society, there is a need to show how this society can be brought into accordance with the ideal. Blocking Kant's ideal is the gap between the realm of ends and the empirical world. Kant states that the ideal constitution has been formulated in abstraction from certain 'hindrances' (1965 B.374). What Kant is referring to here becomes clear in the second Critique. Firstly, sensory nature is external to the individual so that even the legislation of reason, the determination of human will by the moral law, may not altar its course (Kant 1956:15 21). Knowledge of the course of nature is crucial in overcoming this hindrance. Secondly, there is internal nature, the inclinations individuals possess through natural causality (1956:20ff).
The problem lies in the way that Kant sets reason over nature. A more material account of the ideal is available. The fact that the actual purposiveness and inclinations of individuals within the empirical world are present within any meaningful interaction makes it possible to conceive reason as truly interactive, situated and social.

Marx saw Kant's highest good as the province of religious hope rather than practical politics: 'Kant was satisfied with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result, and he transferred the realisation of this good will, the harmony between it and the needs and impulses of individuals, to the world beyond' (GI 1999:97). This implies that Kant's highest good exists only in abstraction, like Plato’s World of Being. But Kant's moral law projects an abstract and 'empty' ideal only by detaching this desirable end from the moral community of co-legislators who seek to enhance one another's ends. Kant's highest good rests upon 'a moral kingdom of purposes., viz., the existence of rational beings under moral laws' (CJ 1951:295). 

Kant's highest good is an empty ideal or religious only to the extent that it is not grounded in the categorical imperative as a social ethics and moral praxis (Van Der Linden 1985:78/9). The categorical imperative demands that individuals seek the moral kingdom in which each enhances the ends of all. All obey the moral law and cooperate in the promotion of universal happiness. 
Marx himself is vulnerable to the criticism that he has not only underestimated the power of morality and culture in realising the highest good, with the participation of all as rational beings, not just those with material futurity and structural power, he has also denigrated the transcendental perspective which has inspired human beings to constantly raise their sights above the temporal or empirical realm for a world better than that immediately given. The creative power that is assigned to ideals, morality and culture is a strength that Kantian transcendental idealism has over perspectives which narrow praxis down to things, tools, instruments, interests.

Marx has identified the crucial question as being how to relate the ‘good will’ in the ideal noumenal realm to the needs and impulses of individuals in the empirical world. The task that the ideal of the realm of ends sets for each individual, as a member of a group of rational beings, is to establish society according to the moral law. This is the idea of the 'moral world', the world as it 'ought to be', as revealed by the 'necessary laws of morality' (B.836). This is 'so .. far thought .. as a mere idea' since an account of its conditions in the sensible world of experience is lacking. Nevertheless, it is at the same time 'a practical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea' (1965 B.836). The idea of a moral world, therefore, has 'objective reality', not as referring to an object of an intelligible intuition 'but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment' (B.836). This achieves the idea of a 'corpus mysticum of rational beings' 'so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other' (B.836). The ethical state is thus based on the moral law and the moral purpose that that law engenders. This association uniting rational individuals would be possible if pure morality was expanded so that it were freely accepted by all. 

Peace And Freedom Under Law
Kant is not silent on the institutional, political and practical requirements of realising the good in the real world. Kant identifies the perfect constitution as the republican state, realising the social as against unsocial character of human beings through the rule of law, and guaranteeing the greatest possible freedom for each consistent with all. Government facilitates the development of the moral disposition to a direct respect for the law by placing a barrier against the outbreak of unlawful inclinations (PP Reiss 1991:121n). In assuring each individual that all individuals will follow the concept of law, government represents a 'great step' 'towards morality ..towards a state where the concept of duty is recognised for its own sake, irrespective of any possible gain in return’ (PP Reiss 1991:121n). Here, Kant emphasises again that true morality is built on a duty that is emphatically distinguished from interest, gain, from class or sectional implication. 

 By guaranteeing equal external freedom for each individual, the rule of law fosters a climate favourable to moral autonomy and is preparatory for the final end of creation, the moral community in which the command of law is internalised as the product of moral motives rather than of self-interest and coercion, gain and power. Internal discipline replaces external discipline. At this stage, political peace is freely and spontaneously affirmed by human agents as morally autonomous beings. In this community, agents do not merely leave each other free to pursue private ends but come actively to promote each other's ends (Van Der Linden 1985:188).

The principal aim of Kant's political philosophy is to establish 'the way to peace', converting class, difference and diversity into order, identity and unity (Saner 1973:3 4). With the realisation of the republican constitution within each nation, the dream of 'perpetual peace' becomes a realistic possibility (PP 1991:99/100 114).

Kant argues that 'the sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, as far as men can work toward it, only through the establishment and spread of a society in accordance with and for the sake of the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race' (R 1949:404). It follows from this that 'the species of rational beings is objectively, through the idea of reason, destined for a social goal, namely, the promotion of the highest good as a social good' (1949:407).

The central problem in Kant's politics is to discover the principles upon which unity is founded to ensure the greatest possible freedom of each and all (Saner 1973:215). The law transforms the license in which the freedom of all individuals cancels itself out in mutual conflict into a freedom of each coexisting with the freedom of all. This image of freedom achieved through legal process pervades the Critique of Pure Reason and is central to Kant's 'architectonic' (1965 B.860).

This collectively universal will is a collective force for the regulation of supra-individual forces, public law under a sovereign authority (Reiss 1991:26). This is an expansion rather than an infringement of individual liberty since individuals obey only that law to which they have agreed (Reiss 1991:11). Kant's conception of the moral life is based upon the capacity of individuals to universalise and hence give their moral principles the force of law. Freedom and lawfulness, far from being antithetical as in an individualist liberal conception of liberty, are integral to each other. Freedom is not the absence of necessity but the moral recognition of necessity in the shape of relationships of obligation with others. Since human beings do not just obey law but make it, necessity is put on a moral basis.

In the absence of this legal process, reason is in the state of nature and asserts its claims only through war, disputes ending only in a temporary armistice. In contrast, a legal order ensures an eternal peace through the recognised methods of legal action. This limits individual freedom so that it may be consistent with the freedom of all and hence with the common good of all (1965 B.779/80). Kant unites the freedom of each individual and all individuals through the reciprocity of legal obligations. All individuals are equal before and subject to the one universal law. The rules of the lawful state are reciprocal in being equally and mutually obligatory for all individuals (Saner 1973:30/1).

In the Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784), Kant seeks to ground hope for moral progress in the historical process, seeking to inspire moral action to bring about the realisation of progressive political ends, the perfect state and peace. In the Idea, human culture evolves out of the chaotic state of nature. From within the chaotic appearance of the human world, Kant discerns a slow but steady evolution of culture (KGS 8:17).
It is the purpose of Nature that human natural capacities be fully developed, not in any individual alone but in the human race as a whole. It is Nature’s intention that human beings use their natural capacities to work out their independent way of securing human well-being. The cunning of nature suffices for this task, operating through mechanisms of self-interest to compel human beings to institute 'a law-governed social order' (UH 1991:44). 
Kant endows the individual with an 'unsocial sociability' in which drives towards associationalism - the inclination to 'live in society' - and individualisation - the tendency to 'live as an individual' - conflict (UH 1991:44). The political problem is to recognise and reconcile the legitimate claims of both facts. 'Unsocial sociability’ compels human beings to prepare for the replacement of a natural order of conflicting particular wills by the universal will of a legal order: 'a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles' (UH 1991:44/5). Identifying the 'highest purpose of nature’ as 'the development of all natural capacities', Kant predicates human growth and development upon the interplay of the natural inclinations of asociability and the moral inclinations of sociability (UH 1991:45). Out of this clash of antagonistic forces, the individual seeks a form of association which has 'the greatest freedom' which has specific limits so that 'it can coexist with the freedom of others' (UH 1991:45).
The development of human capacities to the full requires the creation of a social order with the greatest possible freedom. The social order which enables the greatest possible freedom is a perfectly just constitution in which mutual opposition between its members is made consistent with freedom and justice. The highest problem that nature assigns to the human race is to design a just civic constitution. This civic constitution establishes a commonwealth in which the destructive passions of natural freedom are tamed for the good by civic union. 

However, this commonwealth of individuals can only be achieved by securing peace and harmony among all the nations. For the same antagonism that sets individuals against each other in society also establishes hostile relations between the nations. The ultimate purpose of Nature is to lead humankind from the state of individual rivalry to the state of social harmony, and from the state of national rivalry to the state of international harmony. Peace and harmony reigns between individuals in society and between sovereign states in the international domain. 

The development of the pragmatic capacity for social control involves a high human cost but nevertheless makes it possible to replace discord with concord, leading to a 'civil society which can administer justice universally' (UH 1991:45). To guarantee 'freedom under external laws' requires an 'irresistible force' since members of this 'perfectly just civil constitution' are related to each other in antagonistic fashion (UH 1991:46).

Kant expands on this theme in Perpetual Peace (1795). Here he argues Nature has used the device of war for the evolution of humankind. The state of nature is a state of war. Humankind begins in this condition and scatters itself to the ends of the Earth by ceaseless war. In turn, this war produces the legal order on three levels: civil law, the law of nations, and the law of world citizenship (KGS 8:365). Kant claims that these legal orders are the work of Nature. By placing different groups of people close to each other in antagonistic relations, Nature compels them to form states for their defence, to submit to public laws, to create political order. The political order which is most fitting for the rights of individuals is the republican constitution. The creation of this republican constitution as a universal power overcoming selfish inclinations 'is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race' (UH 1991:46). Whilst many claim that a republic would have to be a race of angels, Kant comments, Nature makes it possible for humankind to organize the state in such a way that the selfish inclinations of a ‘race of devils’ is contained by their mutual opposition (KGS 8:366). 

An unconscious natural teleology is at work in this. Human beings, as children of Nature, are born with the natural instinct for selfishness, and this leads them into the state of war. However, this war drives human beings to develop the intelligence that Nature has also endowed them with. Eventually, human beings become sufficiently intelligent to leave the state of war by building a civil society to enable the orderly exercise of their freedom, thus creating the foundation for the flowering of culture. However, a civil peace and freedom that is established within  the confines of a single state is vulnerable to the predation of competing states in a condition of international war. Therefore, according to Kant’s natural teleology, humankind will extend the peaceful union of warring individuals in the social sphere to a peaceful union of warring states in the international sphere. This development is initiated by Nature and Nature’s endowment. Human history is therefore the work of Nature. Humankind is a product of nature, and is endowed with the power to realize the highest good.

This republican or civil constitution acknowledges freedom as a collective project which connects the individual with essential universal powers and potentialities beyond an immediate, individual, direct response to circumstances. Kant proceeds from Rousseau’s distinction between liberty and license. For Kant, although the individual, as a rational being, 'desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all', 'he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can' and 'abuses his freedom in relation to others' and therefore 'requires a master to break his self will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free'. But since this 'master' can be found only the human species, and hence 'will also be an animal who needs a master' (JH 1991:46), the realisation of the perfect constitution will be the last problem to be solved. Its solution requires 'a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience tested in many affairs of the world, and above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience’ (UH Reiss 1991:47). This makes it clear that Kant's 'master' is not an external agency but the rational nature within human beings themselves. Mastery is a self-mastery achieved through the moral law, through the autonomous citizen living under the perfect constitution obeying a law that is self-made and self-imposed.

The greater liberty of 'rational freedom' achieved through an inner mastery and not just an institutional constraint is suggested by Kant's reference to the realisation in the historical process of a 'hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely' (UH 1991:50). To this end, nature guides human inclinations over time to the rational end of a 'just civil constitution' as the final condition for the self-development of the natural faculties of human beings (UH 1991:45). Kant, having separated the individual and the species, with reason capable of being fully realised only in the latter (Kant UH 1991:42), comes to recognise that nature is moral after all. Kant’s target is not nature as such but natural inclinations and impulses which chain rational human beings to the empirical world of necessity and immediacy. But reason too is a natural endowment which human beings can use to realise moral freedom as a rational natural end. In achieving this end, the 'pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole' (UH 1991:44/5). The pathologically enforced coordination of society is superseded by an internal moral coordination through the process of culture.

In bringing the hidden plan of nature to light, the philosopher grounds the hope of progress in the perfect  state  and  peace, thus stimulating the moral  action concerned  to  realise these ends. The role of the philosopher is to 'formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own'  (UH 1991:42). In other words, reason inspires the moral impulse and informs practice leading to the perfect constitution and perpetual peace. This hope is not Utopian since nature pushes humanity towards the good; through the plan of nature, philosophy can have its belief in a millennium (UH 1991:50). The intelligent action of human beings thus hastens the fulfilment of human destiny on earth (UH 1991:52/3). Thus a philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civic union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself (UH 1991:51).
Though Kant argues that the union of states is the 'halfway mark’ in human development (UH 1991:49), it is only in the Critique of Judgment that he argues that culture, comprising the legal order and peace between states (highest political good), is the ultimate end of nature and prepares the ground for the moral community of co-legislators (highest moral good) as the final and of creation. Whilst the mechanisms of self-interest are sufficient to achieve the highest political good as a preparatory step toward the highest moral good, the latter can only be achieved by moral praxis under the good will (Van Der Linden 1985:134). 

Natural Teleology And Human Praxis
In the Appendix to the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant seeks to identify the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole. He finds this ultimate purpose in the realization of the highest good as presented in his moral theory. Human beings have a special role in realising this highest good by virtue of their rationality and morality. The highest good can only be realized by human beings as rational and moral beings, which means that humankind is the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole (C3 427). In the second Critique, Kant argued that the highest good could be fully realized only in the eternal world of noumena. In the Appendix, he is now arguing that the realisation of the highest good is the ultimate purpose of nature. Kant thus conceives humankind as Nature’s children developing under the guidance and protection of nature’s providence.
Kant's view that the moral society is something that humanity ought to realise makes his philosophy both praxis- and future-oriented. Kant's primacy of pure practical reason affirms the view that the world is created by human praxis (Goldmann 1971:57). Van Der Linden thus states that Kant's social ethics affirms that '(empirical) humanity, in order to express its humanity (rational/moral nature), must produce humanity (the moral order)' (Van Der Linden 1985:13).

Of particular importance is Kant's appraisal of moral enthusiasm and the capacity for social learning and control within humanity. The end of the perfect state and the union of all such states in perpetual peace is rooted in the full development of the rational predispositions of the human species. The 'technological predisposition' for manipulating things entails the increasing mastery of nature to satisfy human needs. The 'pragmatic predisposition' involves the increasing social, political and cultural power to organize and employ human beings to realize specific purposes and accustom human beings to rule-governed behaviour. The 'moral predisposition' to treat oneself and others according to 'the principle of freedom under laws' affirms that human beings come to obey juridical laws on account of autonomous motives and a concern to promote the ends of others, so long as these ends are consistent with the universal law. Progress is the moral disposition implies that human agents fulfil the duty to promote the highest good, earning to pursue just institutions in greater numbers (A 1974:183).

According to Kant, humanity is a link like other animals in the chain of natural desires for happiness. What makes human beings unique is the ability and will to set their own goals. By virtue of this ability and will, human beings hold the title of lord of nature. As such, human beings must transcend subjection to nature's purposes, and pursue their own independent purpose. This purpose enjoins humanity to create and sustain culture above and beyond nature (C3 431).

Culture has two elements, through which the capacity to determine ends evolves in history. The ‘culture of discipline’ increases the tendency for human beings to submit to the demands of the moral law, coming to consult the voice of duty more and more. In the first Critique, Kant defined practical freedom as 'the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses' (A534/B562). The culture of discipline realises this practical freedom. Kant is developing Rousseau's argument that only by subjugating natural instincts and appetites, thus transcending the domain of nature, do human beings become truly human. This process implies the 'ethicisation of human nature' in which duty comes to lose its compulsory character arid instead be guided by moral feelings like indignation, enthusiasm, solidarity, dignity (Van Der Linden 1985:173). 

Kant’s 'culture of discipline' is akin to Plato’s ‘culture of virtue’ as laid out in the Republic. For Plato, human beings become divine by transforming their beastly passions into virtues. The idea of establishing the domain of culture over the domain of nature therefore takes up Plato’s concern with the means of establishing the ideal city or state. The culture of discipline concerns the liberation of the will from the tyranny of desires and other natural chains, which shackle human beings to natural inclinations and prevent them from pursuing independent goals. For Kant, the ‘culture of discipline’ will enable humanity to establish their sovereignty over natural impulses and appetites and create a culture which makes it possible to institute a civil society for the liberty and equality of all citizens. This civil society takes human beings out of the state of nature, transcending the despotism of natural inclinations in which the unconstrained freedom of each individual to pursue natural appetites and impulses serves to destroy the freedom of all individuals. For Kant, the final purpose of creation is civil society, established by the force of reason, coming to extend throughout and rule the whole world (C3 435).

It follows that the ultimate purpose of nature for humanity is to develop the culture of discipline. However, this is not a case of asserting culture against nature, since the culture of discipline is the development of natural endowment enabling humanity to transcend Nature in the same manner as children reach maturity in becoming independent of their mothers. This is Kant’s natural teleology, humanity as the grown up children of Mother Nature.


The ‘culture of skill’ refers to the increasing capacity to manipulate the natural and social environment and involves conflict associated with material factors such as class, exploitation and division of labour (Van Der Linden 1985:137/138). The majority of human beings have had to submit to 'hard work' in order to produce 'the necessities of life .. for the convenience and leisure of others who work at the less necessary elements of culture, science and art' (CJ 1951:282). For Kant, the progress of culture overcomes class conflict through a 'civil community' guaranteeing freedom and equality for all as citizens. Only in this, the perfect state, 'can the greatest development of natural capacities take place' (CJ 1951:282). Kant’s conception of praxis highlights the potential of the increasing rational capacity to control the natural and social environment in order to overcome conflict rooted in material scarcity and the autonomy of social mechanisms and institutions from human control.

For Kant, the purpose of the mastery of nature is culture, and the purpose of culture, in turn, is to realise the highest political good as a preparatory stage leading to the moral community. (Van Der Linden 1985:141). The external freedom guaranteed by political peace in and between perfect states creates conditions for autonomous action and diminishes the forces which encourage immoral acts. 

Kant's moral praxis rests not on a religious hope but on the rational hope for progress, affirming that the future is something open, to be created by rational human agents. 





The very things which define human beings as rational beings - knowledge, insight, happiness, virtue - are given by nature as endowments and potentialities for human beings to live up to (Van Der Linden 1985:102/3). Kant, therefore, conceives history as a process of human self-creation. Culture, as 'what nature can supply to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose' (CJ 1951:281), prepares the way for the moral society.
Kant's highest good as projecting an ideal community of colegislators shows the extent to which Kant's philosophy is future oriented and affirms a moral praxis. Human beings have a duty to change the world to realise a moral ideal. Kant advocated caution in politics, believing it  'foolhardy'  and  even 'punishable'  to  oppose  an existing  constitution with 'political constitutions which meet the requirements of reason’ (CF Reiss ed. 1991:188). The perfect constitution and perpetual peace will be attained and maintained by rational moral action, not physical and material force. Kant nevertheless praised the French Revolution for arousing moral enthusiasm within 'all spectators' deriving from 'a moral disposition within the human race' (CF Reiss ed 1991:182). Humanity has the 'disposition and capacity' to effect  social  change autonomously, 'to be' the cause of its own advance toward the better' (1963:142). The prospect of the evolution of a condition  of  natural  right  in  the  relation  of  the individual to the state and of individual states to each other is founded upon this moral disposition, 'the right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit', the 'enthusiasm with which men embrace the cause of goodness'. The enthusiasm of the spectators shows that 'true enthusiasm is always directed exclusively towards the ideal, particularly towards that which is purely moral (such as the concept of right), and it cannot be coupled with selfish interests' (CF Reiss ad 1991:183). As the enthusiasm of the spectators rather than of the Revolutionaries, it was an objective rather than a subjective concern with advancing humanity toward the highest good embodied in political institutions (Van Der Linden 1985:60).

The moral enthusiasm of spectators show that voluntary cooperation and reciprocity is more than a philosophical dream (Van Der Linden 1985:61 64). Kant affirms here the power of example and association in motivating and sustaining moral action. The 'moral disposition’ within the people possesses a tendency towards the moral society and for humanity as it ought to be, stimulating action toward the realisation of this ideal. Indicating that a moral cause is operative in humanity, events like the French Revolution reveal a capacity far the better in human nature and society which no philosopher or politician could discern from the course of things and which alone unites nature and freedom in accordance with the inner principles of right in humankind (Cassirer 1981:407). In the same manner, political events, campaigns, grassroots movements and organisations reveal the contours of a possible ideal future, give hope and inspire efforts leading to its attainment. Prefiguration in this sense is a Kantian view of the innate moral disposition of human beings.

Republican Constitution
For Kant, the philosophical problem of politics is how to convert lawless conflict into a moral ideal of peace (Saner 1973:310 313). The struggle for the rule of law persists until the realisation of the ideal of the republican state ensuring the greatest possible freedom for all. The chaos that conflict between the freedom of the individual and all others produces can be avoided only with the imposition of a lawful framework regulating individuals in a universally binding manner. This ensures that the free actions of one individual 'can be reconciled with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law', individuals remaining free to pursue private ends within the constraint of external freedom as defined by the 'Universal Principle of Right': 'Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right' (MM 1991:133).

This is an application of Kant's universal principle of morality to politics. In Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that political  philosophy  must  begin  from  the  a  priori awareness of the moral law as opposed to principles of (empirical) advantage, which would  issue  in  the rationalisation of unjust acts (PP 1991:93ff). The 'First Definitive Article'  restates  two  formulations  of  the Categorical Imperative to produce an a priori starting point. The 'objective' formulation, that human beings act in accordance with practical laws valid for all, is given political form in the principle that all members of society are equally subject to a 'common legislation' (PP 1991:99). The 'subjective' formulation, that human beings treat each other as ends and never as means, respecting everyone's capacity to legislate for themselves, takes political form in the principle of the 'freedom of all members of a society' (PP Reiss 1991:99). These principles lead to the idea of the moral agent as 'citizen of a transcendental world' (PP 1991:99), employing the moral law to establish a possible 'republican' constitution in the empirical world, structuring a 'civil society'. In this context, the realm of ends is a 'respublica noumenon' (CF 1991:187), appropriate to a 'race of angels' (PP 1991:112); civil society 'is a 'respublica phenomenon' which applies not to a moral idea of human beings but to a world of experience, to, in the worst possible case, a 'nation of devils' (PP 1991:112).

In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the intelligible and the natural), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. The problem with this is that the principle of society and its laws cannot be freedom, which can never be empirically realised, but coercion, its legality forcing individuals prudentially what they ought to do morally (PP 1991:112/3 117). Coercion is inherent in the constitutional framework of civil society, nature compelling individuals to enter into a social contract to satisfy their inclination and protect their persons (PP 1991:97n 98n 99n). This coercive legality is necessary since individuals are inclined to pursue individual advantage at the expense of the moral law. However, this necessity of coercion  to  subordinate  natural inclinations to legally instituted motives, voiding them (PP 1991:108/114 120/ln), diverges markedly from the ideal community promised by the realm of ends and the civil constitution. Freedom as the capacity to legislate for oneself remains a predicate of the individual as noumenon. 
There is a strain in Kant's political thought which is sceptical of democracy, restricting the right to vote to individuals who qualify as active citizens, self-employed males i.e. the individual who is 'his own master' through owning 'same sort of property .. that supports him' (Saw 1974:63/4; CJ 1951:79). The argument has radical implications which Kant did not pursue. In being dependent on another's will through not owning the instruments and products of labour, the labourer cannot have the right to participate (CJ 1951:79). If the labourer is to acquire the attribute of citizenship fitting to a rational being, it follows that the economic structure of society must be transformed so as to abolish social dependence. Kant, however, himself limits his comments to the possibility that the passive citizen may rise to become an active citizen through 'talent, industry and luck’ (Saw 1974:60). Further, Kant repudiates the directly democratic implications of the social contract in favour of a republican state in which popular sovereignty is exercised through representatives chosen in free elections (Saw 1974:64). Yet, as Marx's critique of abstract political representation shows, representatives of the people are not independent of particular interests and do not necessarily legislate in the universal interest, even though legislative activity proceeds within a constitutional framework that embodies the universal principle. Kant's republican ideal could not serve the universal interest without an actively democratic input, an active as well as a passive suffrage, a commission or a recall system uniting electors and deputies. What Marx's critique would show most of all is the impossibility of a public realm under capitalism. Capitalism privatises and depoliticises the public realm by making common affairs the province of the private realm (Levine 1984:133/4). The realisation of the political ideal of Kant's republican state and Hegel's ethical state requires the abolition of the state-civil society dualism so that the public sphere is invested with democratic and material content, ensuring that the universal interest legislated through the public sphere reflects the will of all.

The most that Kant will concede to this radical project is a formal or legal equality which 'is quite consistent with the greatest inequality' in social life. Kant accepts the corollary that whilst persons are 'equal subjects before the law', if 'the welfare of one person is greatly dependent on the will of another (the poor depending on the rich), one must obey .. when the other commands' (Saw 1974:59/60). Such dependence contradicts the principle of active citizenship and, hence, blocks the full realisation of the republican ideal. 

Marx was to demand the transformation of the mechanisms generating the socio-economic inequality which prevented civic independence, thus making political  participation available to all as active citizens. Kant's claims that the republican state guarantees the most extensive liberty for each and all, establishes the conditions of autonomy, and prepares the grounds for the moral community can only be made good with the abolition of capitalism (Van Der Linden 1985:201 202).

Kant's 'rational freedom' is a lawful freedom that restrains individual appetite and inclination in order to reach the higher good for all. In this conception, 'right is the restriction of each individual's freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else' and law is the general coercive rule which achieves this general union (TP 1991:73). Kant's thought compares and contrasts with Rousseau, particularly the principle of self-assumed obligation and the idea of law as an educative process that forces people to be free. Though what Kant calls 'lawful freedom' is based on the right of the individual 'to obey no law other than that to which he has given his consent' (MM 1991:139), this 'state of lawful dependence' created by the legislative will of its members does not imply democracy. Individuals must demonstrate a 'fitness to vote’ by being an independent and active member of the commonwealth (MM 1991:139). Since all 'are not equally qualified within this constitution to possess the right to vote', not all 'have a right to influence or organise the state itself as active members, or to co-operate in introducing particular laws' (MM 1991:140). In insisting that positive laws not be at variance with the natural laws of freedom, Kant does at least allow the equality of all 'to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one' (MM 1991:140). This would equip the individual to influence and organise the state as an active member. 

The notion of ‘fitness to vote’ is of a piece with Kant’s attempt to transcend natural inclinations for a higher good. Those who are unfitted are in a condition of material dependence and would tend to vote according to self-interest as given within the necessity of the empirical world. The votes of individuals pursuing their own interests and desires would reflect a passive condition of material dependency, not an active consideration of moral good in the commonwealth. The translation of the popular will into public policy would therefore reflect not a rational and moral will concerned with the common good of all but a congeries of individual inclinations, interests and desires.

Kant, however, argues for a superior authority 'to rule autocratically' so as to control individual passions and improve the ethical disposition of humanity (CF 1991:184 187). Kant refers to his ideal of a self-legislating sovereign people as a 'Platonic ideal', existing as an 'eternal norm but for which there is no object adequately existent in experience (CF 1991:187). He offers the 'republican constitution' as the only means by which the respublica noumenon could be applied, according to the laws of freedom through an example in experience (respublica phenomenon) (CF 1991:187). The 'republican constitution' represents Kant's attempt to combine the ideal of the self-legislating sovereign people with the existent sovereign ruler. 

For Kant, however, justice as universal can only be realised through a legal coercion exercised according to universal principle. Kant's political order is, therefore, a 'coercive order’ (Ladd 1965:xviii) in which legality is 'the decisive principle' (Reiss in Reiss ed 1991:21/22). 

Nevertheless, Kant's morality of duty, institutionalised as a 'lawful freedom', does not provide a solution to the problem of order. Rather, in conceding the phenomenal world of natural inclination to self-interest, Kant's ethics degenerate into a formalistic morality designed not to overcome self-interest but constrain it within the capitalist structures of private property and the minimal state.

Of all the 'rational' thinkers, Kant expresses most clearly the dualistic character of law as rational and law as positive (Norrie ed 1991:ch3; Wood 1990:70/1), of law as embodying the rational will of individuals and of law as controlling the egoistic will of individuals. Law involves both a concept of right and a concept of regulation, split between a possible freedom and an actual necessity. Hegel would come to attempt a synthesis by the rational elucidation of the universal within the particular. Law thus emerges in Hegel as a moment in the movement of the rational within the social (Norrie 1991:ch4).

As the application of principles of right to experience, Kant's principles of politics are normative. Indeed, he argues that politics should be normative. Right .. 'ought never to be adapted to politics, but politics ought always to be adapted to right' (Reiss ed 1991:21). Thus Kant affirms that there can be no conflict of politics, as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right: 'all politics must bend the knee before right' (PP 1991:125).





The success of Kant’s project depends upon the extent to which culture and nature can be integrated through reason. Without this integration it is not possible to establish the basis of freedom in the empirical world, a world of bondage subjecting individuals to alien forms. In so far as the ideal is locked up in a normative realm abstracted from the real world, the real state will be unable to proceed beyond Kant's minimal assumption of intelligent devils, an assumption which corresponds to a market society based upon antagonism and egoism in human relations (Lukacs 1991:72 73). The empirical facts of class division and the autonomy-denying universal antagonism of the ‘war of all against all’ means that the coercion that Kant wrote of in the 'respublica phenomenon’ is necessarily the basis of legality, against which the reconciling power of reason is impotent (Marx OJQ EW 1975:221). Marx showed that Kant's vision of the harmonious community of noumenal beings - the 'respublica noumenon' - is a material and historical possibility only through the abolition of class and the alienating division of labour which generate coercion in human relationships. 

By placing all empirical phenomena outside the bounds of reason, Kant's framework is dualistic. As the product of pure reason, emancipating individuals from natural inclinations, Kant's freedom under law possesses an external character apart from individuals in their real lives. Kant separates moral society from the world of experience, treating individuals as rational beings as distinct from natural beings (Krieger 1972:101/2). This comes at a price. As Hegel argued, 'although practical reason postulates the identity of idea and reality, the latter remains strictly opposed and external to reason' (NL 1975:59/60 72).  Since the 'true' moral nature of human beings is identified by Kant with a self distinct  from  the  empirical  self, individuals have to value the rational aspect of identity whilst denying that the natural world of needs, wants, and desires could possess any rationality.  For Kant,  the individual is moral only in being able to abstract from the  contingent  influences  and  determinations  of  the natural and social world, coming to act according to a moral law established by pure practical reason in a noumenal realm. 'Empirical principles are always unfitted to serve as a ground for moral laws. The universality with which these laws should hold for all rational beings without exception - the unconditioned practical necessity which they thus impose - falls away if their basis is taken from the special constitution of human nature or from the accidental circumstances in which it is placed (GMM 1991:103). Kant delivers an impressive list of charges to prove that personal happiness is the 'most objectionable' principle, singling out the fact that it 'bases morality on sensuous motives' as the greatest vice (GMM 1991:103).

Kant praises Plato for demonstrating that ideas originate in reason rather than in the empirical world: 'nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circumscribed' (Pure 1965:313). The human being as a 'creature' can never attain such a level of moral disposition as holiness since 'he can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law, which has an entirely different source' (Prac 1956:86).

In the Groundwork, Kant turned morality and Nature against each other. The categorical imperative is conceived as a stern command for the triumph of morality over the forces of natural inclination. There is nothing absolutely good other than the morally good will. (GMM 394). Human beings, as moral agents, are the maltreated stepchildren of a heartless Nature. The absolute value of morality thus received protection by being enclosed in the innermost sanctuary of rational beings. In the Groundwork, the natural world is at best coldly indifferent and at worst cruelly hostile to the supersensible moral ideals. Material forces are governed by mechanical laws and are therefore blind and indifferent to moral values. In constituting human nature, they produce natural inclinations that have the perpetual propensity to flout moral laws. The natural world thus works to prevent human beings realizing their transcendent aspirations. The fact that human beings have such aspirations makes the human species a misfit pitted against nature. Kant contemplated this troubled condition of humanity in the natural world in terms of the gap between the sensible and the supersensible worlds. This was the gap that also filled Kant with awe and wonder, the starry skies above and the moral law within.

Since the possibility of morality depends upon abstraction from the empirical world, the noumenal realm beyond the phenomenal world 'is certainly only an ideal'. Individuals enter this realm only to the extent to which they abstract from their social situation. The categorical imperative can enjoin that individuals act as though they are legislating members of a 'kingdom of ends' only 'if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends' (GMM 1991:95). 

It is difficult to understand how the moral legislation produced in this noumenal realm could apply in the phenomenal realm. Kant himself realises that by denying the situational character of the world of experience he reduces the force of his argument. A kingdom of ends could exist if the maxims which the categorical imperative prescribes for all rational beings were universally followed. The problem is that 'if a rational being were himself to follow such a maxim strictly, he cannot count on everybody else being faithful to it on this ground' (Kant GMM 1991:100). Because a realm of ends, in which every individual acts as a rational being, cannot be guaranteed, legal force must intervene. Kant's view imposes a dualism between the independence of the individual as a rational subject and the subordination of the individual as an empirical being to an external authority (Reiss in Reiss ed 1991:20; Norman 1983:96 98). Individuals must learn to identify happiness with the subordination of their lower nature to the necessity of the moral law in order to realise their higher nature. For the workings of the Categorical Imperative enables individuals to discover 'right' and 'wrong' independently of their inclinations, impulses and desires.

Kant's morality of self-denial, instituting the obedience of the 'lower', i.e. empirical, to the 'higher', i.e.  rational  self,  is  based  upon  the  categorical distinction  between  reason  and  nature. This division of the individual between the phenomenal natural world as a determined order of natural necessity and the noumenal world of moral freedom risks fragmenting human experience and subjecting the individual to a ceaseless struggle  between  the  command  of  duty  and  natural inclinations. The failure to bridge this gap  between  the  noumenal  and the phenomenal (Maclntyre 1967:197/8; Wolff 1973:ch2) results in the autonomy of law, morality and politics within liberal society (Murphy  1970; Arendt 1982). This has implications which turn against both reason and nature. As Weber's rationalisation thesis  shows,  the  distinction between reason and nature fits a capitalist modernity in which individuals have been made instrumental to purposes and processes which are external to them. The  'rational' project of substituting morality for coercion in human affairs thus ends in a lawful state administering a coercive civil society which inhibits the human ontology and subjects external nature to an instrumental rationality detached from ends.

The basis of Kant’s predicament is the separation of reason from nature and the ensuing primacy of reason over nature. On Kant's premises, certain aspects of the internal nature of human beings are in external relation to the moral law. It can, however, be overcome by human beings transcending their natural inclinations for their rational and moral will which is not only just as natural but, in line of descent from Plato, the better part of human nature. In the recent surge of interest in ‘the body’, Kant has been criticised for his heavy emphasis upon individuals freeing themselves from the sensuous human desires which are considered to be an integral part of human nature. (see Seidler). This misses Kant’s point that these ‘sensuous desires’ serve to shackle human beings to natural necessity within and without, chaining them to an empirical world of wants, impulses and inclinations. In Verdi’s Brindisi from La Traviata, all the guests sing of their love of ‘passionate hedonism’ with the line ‘all that is not pleasure is senseless’. The point is that the rational tradition to which Kant belongs affirms a greater freedom beyond the senses in terms of the fulfilment and flourishing of the whole nature of human being. His point is that freedom will only be achieved through the realisation of the human capacity for autonomy and independence as given by rational and moral will. The capacity of the market economy to manacle individuals to necessity in their empirical existence by manipulating their ‘sensuous desires’ is one of the most striking features of the modern world. It is this shackling of human beings by their own natural inclinations that Kant sought to overcome.


But if ‘sensuous desires’ are essential aspects of human nature, then a more promising strategy may be to acknowledge this fact and see them as socially and historically mediated, thus attempting to unite inclinations and moral reason. Hegel's success in conceiving the possibility of moralising human nature becomes in Marx a project of moralising the whole socio-relational fabric of society, resolving Kant's antithesis between inclinations and the moral law. We are back here to Aristotle’s reason educating desire.

Kant's Moralitat as an inner or private dimension, posed in and of itself, has to be contextualised in connection to the public world. Whereas Kant emphasised categorical duty over against human inclination, Hegel sought to bridge the gap between finite phenomenal and infinite noumenal realms so that duty was integral to the empirical lives of individuals (Dallmayr 1993:32 33).

Kant's thought, nevertheless, contains radical possibilities which serve to test Hegel's claim that Sittlichkeit embodies the 'ought' within the 'is'. Kant's motto of enlightenment - 'have the courage to use your own understanding!’ (WE 1991:54) - celebrates the departure of human beings from all forms of tutelage, affirming a conception of autonomy which delegitimizes all social and political institutions that are not the product of free will. Such a notion justifies liberation from all contexts or situations which are oppressive of human freedom (Yack 1986:89/133; cf Rose 1984; Lukacs 1971:108/9). This is not a repudiation of institutional mediation as such. On the contrary, Kant sought to realise freedom within the constraint of law, not against it as in Fichte's 'self-sufficiency and independence outside of everything' (Fichte 1982:15). It simply emphasises that Kant’s morality repudiates all dehumanising, alienating and oppressive conditions and institutions as the denial of the essential humanity, and dignity of human beings. In which case, Marx himself emerges as a Kantian in affirming the 'categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being' (CHPR:I 1975:251). 

This begs the question of how reflective judgement mediates between the worlds of phenomena and noumena. The question involves the two-way transition, the upward transition from phenomena to noumena, which concerns the recognition of moral law; and the downward transition from noumena to phenomena, which concerns the realization of moral law. In answering the question of how aesthetic judgement makes these two transitions one has to recognise that Kant had two aesthetic theories, aesthetic formalism and aesthetic Platonism. In aesthetic formalism, reflective judgements are made by the subjective feeling that the free interplay of imagination and understanding provoke. Since this free interplay involves no supersensible world, there is no need for mediation. In Kant’s aesthetic Platonism, there is a need for mediation since the ultimate foundation of all aesthetic judgements is the Idea of Beauty, and this belongs to the noumenal world. The Idea of Beauty is transcendent and abstract and is not therefore readily applicable to the phenomenal world, leaving a gap between phenomena and noumena. Bridging this gap requires aesthetic Ideas constructed by imagination and understanding, thus articulating the transcendent Idea of Beauty in terms of sensible imagery. This is what artistic genius and its inspiration does. In Platonic terms, this is the descent of Ideas from Heaven to the natural world. In Kantian terms, immanent aesthetic Ideas perform the mediation between phenomena and noumena. With natural beauty as the expression of aesthetic Ideas, this mediatory transition is made by both human beings and nature.

The two-way mediation in teleological judgements works thus. For Kant, natural purpose is a supersensible Idea that cannot be found in the blind mechanism of nature (C3 377). Human beings make the upward transition for recognizing the Idea and the downward transition for realizing the Idea in the natural world. But this mediation is made by both human beings and natural teleology. On the highest level, there may be only one Idea of natural purpose. For Plato, there is only one Idea of Life (Timaeus (39e). However, every species has its own Idea of natural purpose and is governed in accordance with it. On this level, the multiplicity of teleological Ideas corresponds to the multiplicity of aesthetic Ideas. The various particular Ideas of natural purpose are generated by the articulation and specification of the one transcendent Idea of Life. In naming the objects of natural beauty, Kant often refers to living beings such as flowers, birds, and crustaceans. This implies the conclusion that the power of life includes the power of beauty. Thus Nature conjoins the Ideas of Life and Beauty and brings them from the supersensible to the sensible world. This descent of Ideas is engineered by the technique of Nature. Nature working like an artist (C3 390). Nature’s two-way mediation between phenomena and noumema proceeds thus: Nature creates living beings in the phenomenal world by bringing down the supersensible Ideas, and one species amongst those living beings have the intelligence to apprehend the noumenal world. The moral and aesthetic life of human beings is a link in the creative cycle of natural teleology which Kant calls the Providence of Mother Nature in his Idea of a Universal History.

For Kant, Newton was the master of natural world and Rousseau was the master of the moral world. But neither could bridge the vast chasm between phenomena and noumena. Kant locates the solution for this, the key problem in his philosophy, in Nature. Nature is the original matrix for realizing the supersensible Ideas in the sensible world, even before the birth of humanity; the moral and political development of humanity is shaped under the auspices of Nature’s eternal providence. His acceptance of the mechanistic conception of nature had prevented Kant from grasping this cosmic truth. By acknowledging Nature as the living force, resolves his ultimate philosophical problem and bridges the chasm between noumena and phenomena. Kant’s solution savours a great deal of Plato's conception of the natural world in the Timaeus, where the Demiurge, the spirit of the natural world (the World-Soul), creates all things in accordance with the eternal Ideas.

Moral and political philosophy began with Socrates and the stand he took against the overweening claims to knowledge on the part of natural philosophers who studied nature with no regard to human beings. Plato continued thus spiritual quest, connecting the fight against the amoral forces of nature with the fight against the immoral forces of human beings. In the Gorgias, Callicles, the avowed champion of amoral naturalism and immoral humanism, is confronted by Socrates’ argument that that one could be virtuous even in a totally immoral world and that one's soul could never be harmed by the immoral acts of others. In the Phaedo and the Symposium Plato finds a safe haven for the virtuous soul in the intelligible world of Ideas. In this world, the soul was safe from the immorality of the phenomenal world. However, the safe haven of the intelligible world could never provide a living community for moral individuals. In the Republic, Plato set out the principles of the ideal state as a moral community which provides for the moral life of individuals. Recognising the difficulty of realising a just society in an amoral and irrational world, Plato laid out his conception of a rational and orderly universe in the Timaeus – which Plato presents as the cosmological foundation for his ideal state of the Republic and for the city of Magnesia proposed in the Laws.

Kant reaffirms the Platonic conception of the rational order of Nature in his Ideological conception of natural order. Kant is continuing Plato's quest for a suitable natural order for the realization of eternal ideals. In this quest, Kant revitalises the Platonic conception of Nature as the mother of all creation. If Kant’s conception of the noumena and the categorical imperative retained the Christian legacy, then this conception of Mother Nature taps into the old nature religions and looks forward to the attempts to locate the place of human beings within Nature. Certainly, the conception was a key figure in Goethe’s Faust, where Nature manifests her inexhaustible creative power as the Earth Spirit, the Eternal Mothers, and the Eternal Feminine. The idea inspired the supernatural naturalism of Romantic philosophers and poets. Along with the conception of immanent Ideas, this natural teleology is one of Kant's most enduring achievements and is likely to become even more relevant in the coming years as human beings deal with the task of making their peace with Nature.

In the middle of the third Critique. Here, Kant abandons the formalist programme and propound his revolutionary notion of immanent Ideas. The descent of transcendent Ideas from Platonic Heaven to the natural world fundamentally alters Kant's conception of Nature. In the first Critique and in the Groundwork, Kant conceived Nature as a chaotic world of subjective impressions and natural inclinations, a world so unruly that Kant claimed that it was the ultimate source of all radical evil in human nature (R 19). This chaotic natural world could assume a rational order only through the a priori natural laws that human understanding comes to impose on empirical impressions; the world of natural inclinations could only be controlled by imposing moral laws. However, the descent of transcendent Ideas from the Platonic world of Being releases Nature from the shackles of humanly imposed moral and natural laws since Nature is able to operate with the power of its own immanent Ideas. This opens up a conception of Mother Nature as the Eternal Feminine who has the inexhaustible power to procreate and sustain her countless children. Kant’s vision is larger than this in arguing that human beings, Nature’s children, are equipped with natural endowments that enable them to transcend their natural state and create their cultural world. thus realizing Nature’s immanent Ideas. This is Kant's transcendent naturalism.

29 HEGEL’S SYSTEM OF THE ETHICAL LIFE

This section examines Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit as an organised intermediation which affirms a communal, reciprocal and associative form of public life. With Sittlichkeit, Hegel discovered a form in which reason could be actualised in the empirical realm of politics in both its normal and cognitive aspects. Hegel thus furnished the institutional basis of the 'rational’ alternative to liberal individualist conceptions of freedom. 

The notion of the green polity as a civil public based on a federation of groups and a welter of intermediary associations is informed by Hegel’s political philosophy. Hegel formulates the state as the universal interest of all, the embodiment of right and the institutional expression of the connection between reason and freedom. The state is  'the power of reason actualising itself as will' (PR 1942:279). In the state, 'the rational  freedom of the will explicates itself’ (FA 1975:1:137). 

Hegel avoids the abstract individualism which afflicts rights-based liberal institutions by locating the individual within the 'objective ethical order' (PR para 144), the 'ethical substance' which relates particular individuals to each other (PR para 145). Ethical life incorporates the principle of subjectivity contained in liberal notions of individual freedom but is more concrete in situating the self within a living social order of related selves.

Hegel’s state serves to canalise the legitimate particular interests of individuals to the attainment of the universal good of all, overcoming self-interest in its immediacy for a greater good in the longer range. For Hegel, 'the essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well-being' (PR 1942:280): 'its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the particular interest of individuals' (PR 1942:161). Hegel therefore establishes the relation between the particular and the universal by connecting the individual and the state through a whole range of intermediary bodies. The unity between each and all is a mediated relationship which takes the individual beyond immediate self-interest to a greater, richer set of goods in common with other individuals. The ‘particular groups’ of the family and civil society are crucial institutions since membership of and participation in such groups allows the individual to enter into the universal realm of the state in an 'objective way' (PR paras 308R 158 166 182 207 209/229 242). Hegel exposes the isolated individual of liberalism as an empty abstraction apart from ethical life. The individual only acquires 'a content and a living actuality’ when 'filled with particularity', and only attains universality in becoming 'a member of a corporation, a society etc' (PR para 308). The Anglo-American liberal tradition continually misreads Hegel by reading any authority above the individual as an infringement on individual liberty. In this, the liberal tradition is constrained by its own state-civil society separation, with the state merely as a neutral instrument which leaves individuals to pursue freedom as they see fit. This principle of subjectivity is a limited freedom for Hegel. By connecting the state and civil society via intermediary associations, Hegel finds a way of connecting the particular and the general interest without denying the legitimate claims of either. Citizens 'know the state as their substance' in maintaining the 'title, authority and welfare' of 'their particular spheres of interest' (PR para 289R). The participation of the individual in affairs of common concern in civil society, as a member of corporations, associations etc., offers an ethical integration and practical education (Bildung) which goes beyond the 'selfish' interests of isolated individuals (PR para 253R). In such a way, the particular interests of individuals pass naturally into the universal life of the state (PR paras 197 201 256). Far from Hegel’s state possessing interests of its own which are asserted over against real individuals, the state is constituted by the particular interests of individuals acting in concert as a common body politic.

These social institutions are 'the pillars of public freedom since in them particular freedom is realised and rational'; they furnish the foundations of 'the citizens trust in .. and sentiment towards’ the state (PR 1942:281 163). The state therefore embodies and expresses the universal interest through an organised interaction between individual freedom and valid authority through collective bodies.

Hegel's state establishes an organic unity of the individual and collective so that no part and no member is an end or a means superior or subordinate to another part or member (WH 1975:112/95). As against normative constructions of the ideal society which haunt political philosophy and radical politics – in writing Utopia Thomas More wrote the last word first – Hegel's ethical  state is an actual institution. The view of this paper is that Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is the most cogent and intellectually structured theory of the political architectonics of individual freedom and a powerful resource for anyone who is serious about building political institutions that work in the real world. Hegel’s unity of the universal and the subjective will in the 'actually existing realised moral life' (PH 1956:38) and is the  highest  actualisation  of individual  freedom  (PR  para  257). 
Much of the attention in discussions of Hegel fall on the state, as though Hegel's state can be detached from the system of the ethical life, Sittlichkeit. Of critical importance are the intermediary associations which give individuals a form of public life and which invest the state with social content. 
In Hegel, patterns of social interaction between individuals obtain moral significance through a structured system of social roles and civil associations (Avineri 1972:84). In an atomistic society of market relations, individuals have only an egoistic identity and are confined within the sphere of self-interest. One can propose a moral good and make an appeal to altruism, but there is no good reason for these individuals to choose altruism over egoism. The social identity connecting the good of the individual with the good of all is simply not available. Hegel makes that social identity available in the way that individuals are socially integrated in an organised dynamic, expanding individual freedom by making the ethical life available to all (Hegel PS 1979:256/212; Wood 1990:25/30 200 201/2 219; Houlgate 1991:100/5 116/22). A genuine individuality offers a greater and richer range of human fulfilment beyond self-interest. This is achieved when the individual possesses a genuine social identity (PR paras 207 253) and fulfils a determinate social function (PR para 252R). And this individuality is possible only when it is socially structured within a functioning social order (PR para 253R).

Hegel’s Sittlichkeit raises individuals out of their private life of egoistic need by connecting them to politics via their functional purpose in the operation of the rational social order. The individual becomes an active part of society through his/her own industry, skill, a notion which suggests the possibility for an associative democratic public.
Hegel's recognition of the need for mediating institutions against atomistic conceptions of individual liberty offers an alternative to the undifferentiated and unmediated democracy of the modern representative state (Avineri in Miller ed 1991:199/200), Hegel proposes an organised intermediation as a genuine mode of participation as against the abstract and passive systems of representation offered by the liberal state (Kainz 1996:148). Hegel abolishes the split between the state and civil society, a split which is reproduced and reinforced by elections and proposes instead the mediation of corporate blocs.

The circles of association in civil society are already communities. To picture these communities as once more breaking up into a mere conglomeration of individuals as soon as they enter the field of politics, i.e. the field of the highest concrete universality, is eo ipso to hold civil and political life apart from one another and as it were to hang the latter in the air, because its basis could then only be the abstract individuality of caprice and opinion, and hence it would be grounded on chance, and not what is .. stable and justified.

PR paras 258 303

Hegel's state as 'an organism’ transcends the particularistic, self-seeking interests of individuals confined within the sphere of the private economy, what Hegel calls the system of needs (PR 1942:282). Through membership of and participation in the various intermediary bodies of civil society, the individual develops interests beyond the immediate level to finally proceed to the universal level. This entails a conception of representation that is actively and directly democratic. In contrast to the passive and indirect system of representation within the abstract (individualist liberal) state, Hegel proposes an organised pattern of interaction between individuals in society operating through a system of functional representation. Deputies are chosen not by an agglomeration 'dispersed into atomic units' as is the case with the passive suffrage of the liberal state but through an 'articulated system' comprising civil associations. The right to choose deputies is not 'a single, recurrent action for the electors' but is entrusted to 'local communities .. and other duly constituted associations'. Hegel thus replaces the passive electorate of the modern representative state with the active and organised citizen body. The close connection between the estates and the constitution of the whole means that a 'free attitude' on the part of both electors and deputies is only possible if the rights of individuals and particular local communities and interests are 'safeguarded by the free establishment of civic authorities and self-administering bodies' (NL para 153; PR para 308).

Hegel's critique of representative democracy is, therefore, a critique of the undifferentiated suffrage as feeding the divorce between private and public life, separating individuals from government, universal interest and the common good of all (Avineri 1972:162; Dallmayr 1993:152). To such isolated individuals, government as such is the problem. But rather than collapse into the world of immediacy and spontaneity, a world of pure egoism, true freedom as the freedom of each and all requires the reconstruction of public life so as to overcome the dualism of government and governed. The 'atomistic spirit' of the modern representative state’s undifferentiated suffrage divides politics between an active elite of professional politicians on the one hand and a passive mass concerned only with private interests in civil society on the other (NL para 121). In seeking reciprocity between rulers and ruled, Hegel firmly repudiated the idea that the representative body should represent individuals as individuals (PR 308R; Smith 1991:129). Hegel argued in favour of the estates and their legislative role. He condemns the 'prevalent idea' that members of society participate in this function 'as individuals, either by electing representatives or delegates or else by directly casting their vote' (Hegel in Dallmayr 1993:152) as an 'atomistic and abstract point of view' which disappears at the level of the family and civil society in which individuals are members of general groups. Since the state is also a general group, 'no one of its elements should appear as an unorganised multitude', as a 'formless mass' (PR 1942:198; Dallmayr 1993:152).

The rejection of the conception of the demos as an undifferentiated, amorphous and atomised mass of individuals makes it possible to envisage democracy as an active, organised mode of life exercised through a welter of intermediary powers (Dallmayr 1993:253; Meister 1990:120  177;  Kedourie  1995:142/3). What most concerned Hegel about representative democracy was the idea of an amorphous or atomized mass of individuals lacking connection to each other and lacking integration within a well-balanced constitutional structure. Hegel’s ethical relations or bonds of Sittlichkeit organised on various levels of society are sustained by a richly layered fabric of intermediary institutions, associations and offices with a variety of powers and competences relating particular and universal, centre and periphery, individuals and representatives. Crisscrossed by multiple identities, Hegel’s system of functional representation is a public regimen, an associative mode of life and experience for individuals that is irreducible, quite above the ‘anarchistic’ power struggles of particularist interests and impulses. Hegel therefore offers a way of revaluing public bonds and reversing the encroachment of private economic interests upon public life. 

What has been called the ‘corporatisation of public business’ (McDermott 1992), the private appropriation of collective concerns of health, education, utilities etc by big business, has been underway for more than a couple of decades. Against this, Hegel offers a genuine ‘corporatisation’, with corporations organised in the service of the public good within the state.

Benjamin Barber has coined the term "thin democracy" to describe the way that the contemporary state is subservient to individual rights and privileges and is held together only by a minimal set of abstractly formal rules. Against this, Barber proposes ‘strong democracy’, a way of strengthening democratic engagement through a broad range of local and regional institutions - neighborhood assemblies, social organisations, town meetings, civic unions, community trusts, cooperatives, and such like – whilst still guaranteeing the protection of individual rights. ‘My argument is that strong democracy is the only fully legitimate form of politics; as such, it constitutes the condition for the survival of all that is most dear to us in the Western liberal tradition." (Barber 1984: xvi. On the decline and colonization of the public sphere cf. also Arendt 1958; Sennett 1978; Habermas 1989; and Habermas 1987: 332-373.)

Barber’s ‘strong democracy’ savours more than a little of Hegel’s political philosophy in seeking to locate the individual within a shared public life. Hegel’s point is that individual freedom is a public responsibility that requires more than egoistic interests and impulses and wants, that implies organised intermediation between civil society and the state.

One of the most important features of Hegel's mediated suffrage is the recognition of problems of scale and quantity in the modern world. Old notions of polis democracy, face-to-face meetings, are nowhere near adequate given the size of modern states and communities and organisations (Avineri  1972:105  107/8  161  162/3  164/8;  Dallmayr 1993:133). But, articulated through  the internal communities constituting the state, Hegel can still break down complexity into comprehensible and controllable units to envisage an active democratic mobilisation from below. In rejecting an organisation 'directed  from  above’ Hegel argues that: 'it is extremely important that the masses should be organised, because only then do they constitute a power or a force; otherwise they are merely an aggregate, a collection of scattered atoms. Legitimate power is to be found only when the particular spheres are organised' (PR para 290A).

The achievement of Hegel's differentiated suffrage is to have extended the rights of civil liberty in civil society which individuals exercise and assert against each other as competitors for scarce resources to citizen rights of public participation which individuals exercise in concert. In this manner, Hegel achieves a balance between direct and representative democracy. 

Hegel’s conception of the 'democratic corporation' comprises churches, municipal and regional governments, and other civil institutions which mediate between the citizen and the state (MacGregor 1998:132). Hegel's state does not impose an abstract universality from the outside but is internally related to civil society. Universality or communitas thus grows organically from within civil society itself (Avineri  1988:171). 

Hegel's  concern  to  integrate  the intermediate  institutions of civil  society  within a comprehensive  legal  framework embodying the universal offers the basis of an expansive public sphere which challenges the monopoly of public life within the abstract liberal state.

More than most modern political philosophers, Hegel appreciated the democratic nature of the medieval institutions that ushered in modern civilisation. 'Representation is so deeply interwoven with the essence of the feudal constitution . . . that we may call it the silliest of notions to suppose it an invention of the most recent times.' Hegel's corporation bears comparison with the feudal guild, an organization which expressed the democratic ethos of 'mutuality and solidarity'. and which embodied ‘common will and consent' - i.e. the notions of exchange and contract.  

Hegel's conception of the democratic corporation develops an associative conception of politics.

Politics is the art of associating . . . persons with a view to establish​ing, nourishing and preserving social life together. Hence they are called sumbiotike (cohabiters). The first proposition of politics, therefore, is consociatio; in this the cohabiters ... by an explicit or tacit pact, undertake mutual obligation to one another to communicate to each other those things that are useful and necessary for the maintenance and sharing of social life . . . These [cohabiters] are, therefore, mutual helpers who, joined and associated together by a contractual bond, shared those of their resources which are helpful for the commodious conduct of the life of the spirit and body; they are sharers, participants in a communion.

Hegel considers the guild structure of the late feudal era to be 'the high tide of civil life; enjoyment lay in what was communal and people did not amuse themselves for themselves but in the community'. In contemporary market society, the process of atomization has rendered the communal spirit of the feudal age redundant. 'Now this [communal] spirit is undermined, so that people are ashamed of their class, are unwilling to be seen as members of it, and take pride in themselves alone.' That said, given that human beings are, as Aristotle argued, social animals, the associative impulse and communal spirit will live on beyond the particular forms of time and place. Atomisation and individualism operate against the grain of human life. Every contemporary society can show a welter of co-operatives, trade unions, business groupings, learned societies, professional associations and not-for-profit organizations. 

Hegel's vision of the structured relationship between the state and the corporation implies an institutional arrangement in which corporate organizations mediate between the individual and the administrative bodies of government.

In Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought, Antony Black argues that Hegel's organic concept of the corporation sought 'to give guild values and aspirations a central place in political theory'. Hegel is rare among modern political philosophers to have 'acknowledged that solidarity and exchange - the poles around which the values of guild and civil society, respectively, rotate - are not antithetical but complement each other. Hegel’s achievement is to have proposed an institutional framework which could weave solidarity and exchange together in a thickly textured and complex structure. 

Black criticises the way that the work-group ethic has been replaced by 'the values of market exchange' in contemporary market society. 'The problem is that today all those groups which in real life bind people together in so many ways are regarded as optional, based on taste or convenience.' 

In the manner of Hegel, Black affirms the virtues of a community of labour. 

Working together or sharing a craft creates a specific type of relationship. It forges bonds of a unique kind, less intense and pervasive than those of personal love or friendship, but truly human bonds none the less. It is an end in itself. Its merits may be sung but not listed. This does not mean that the work group is an absolute, any more than the nation-state: it can go wrong. But as a category of social life, it has its own unique and irreplaceable place in human affairs. (Black, Guilds and Civil Society, pp.202, 237, 241.)

In the neo-liberal assault upon government intervention and regulation in the name of liberated the ‘free market’ from the ‘dead hand’ of the state, vast swathes of mutual solidarity, communal networks, solidaristic ties have been swept away. The intention is plain. To leave the individual as nothing more than an atom on the competitive market. Neo-liberals 'are committed to the view that political life, like economic life, is (or ought to be) a matter of individual freedom and initiative . . . Accordingly, a laissez-faire or free-market society is the key objective along with a "minimal state".' (Held 1996:253-4.) The talk of the ‘free market’ is, of course, nonsense. The main beneficiaries of this destruction of public life are the transnational corporations as they proceed to 'privatize' as much of public business as they can - health, transportation, communications, and education. Genuine public space is diminishing and the whole notion of public interest is being reconfigured into a private spatial dimension where individuals are conceived simply as mobile, circulating consumers. (Hermer 1997:192.) The situation is not dissimilar to the destruction of feudal society with the rise of industrialism, protested by conservatives like Carlyle and socialists like Marx. All of which makes Hegel's diagnoses and prognoses concerning the individualistic economic model curiously timely (MacGregor 1998 ch 6). 

The atomistic principle - that each individual fends merely for himself and does not bother about a communal [end], the principle of leaving it to each and every one whether one wishes to join a certain class, not examining a person's suitability from a political point of view since after all (as we are told by those who favor this principle) someone whose work fails to find any favor will shift to another line of business - such a principle abandons the individual to contingency. 

Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, §121, p.218.) 

For Hegel, community and the common good, as constituted by social classes, estates and corporations, offers a richer freedom, more expansive of human capacities, than that yielded by individual self-interest. In joining a particular group and participating as a member, the individual recognises a communal purpose and spirit greater than the self. (MacGregor 1998 ch 6). 

Houlgate echoes Hegel in arguing 'that an economy based entirely on self-interested pursuit of profit will end up preventing large numbers of people from enjoying such freedom and welfare'.

The social nature of human beings, the need for the society of others as a moral and psychological imperative, will ultimately cause a human revolution against the isolating principle of individualism. The ugly inhumanism of the neo-liberal assault on all that connects human beings together is certain to generate a reaction. But to be more than a ‘rabble’, the people need structure and organisation. That is precisely what Hegel’s democratic corporation rooted in the associational space of civil society offers. 

Allen W. Wood writes that,





The advantage of Hegel’s corporation is that it forms the basis of a working, functional polity. In an age when radical politics lacks constructive models of the alternative society, Hegel is as good a place to start as anywhere.
 Hegel envisages a work environment in which an esprit de corps develops. Sharing 'the same vocation, [the same] concerns and interests', members develop a communal point of view. Hegel describes the corporation as a 'second family' which provides stable resources and employment for its members. Workers are protected against poverty and the instability of work relations. Membership of the corporation brings social recognition and respect, diminishing the need for individuals to make a public display of wealth: 'wealth in fulfilling the duty it owes to association, loses the ability to provoke arrogance in its possessor and envy in others; rectitude also receives the true recognition and honour which are due it'. (Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §252, p.271.)

Presenting Hegel as 'the representative theorist of civil society' (Arato  1991:301), Arato  argues  that  Hegel offers a conception of the public sphere which transcends its classical republican origins. Hegel’s public sphere is not confined to a single level but is multilayered: 'a series of levels have key roles to play, including the public rights of private persons, the publicity of legal processes, the public life of the corporation, and finally the interaction between public opinion  and  the  public deliberation  of  the  legislature'  (Arato  1991:318). The way that Hegel locates public life in the associational space of civil society is broad conception capable of embracing social movements in an 'open ended public  space'  forged  by  a  'democratic  social  bond' (Dallmayr 1991).

30 COMMUNITARIANISM
Certain liberal theorists have perceived the inadequacies of the individualist conception of freedom by and have sought to make explicit  'the full theory of the good latent within liberal  practice’  (Galston 1982:627). The liberal communitarian position develops  a  richer,  more  historically and  socially sensitive form of liberalism than that which is based upon individual liberty ‘free’ from constitutive ties. The conditions of individual liberty require more than the protection of the individual against the interference of others. Further, liberty amounts to much more than the individual being free to pursue the good as s/he sees  fit. Rather liberty as autonomy involves  a  certain  quality  of  life  for  a  whole community. Rights, therefore, cease to be legal entitlements that the individual holds against others and instead become 'fundamental components in the way of life of a community' committed to certain  forms  of  human  flourishing  for  all  (Finnis 1980:222). This implies a conception of the good life.





For Finnis, the primary bond of society is a 'shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community' (Finnis 1980:220). The character of these goods is not open to historical contingency but are defined according to a set of characteristics which distinguish the human species. In this conception, ends are not open but are determined in relation to the nature of being. Essential human potentialities and their realisation point in the direction of a certain mode of life. This universal human nature gives the world a certain moral order so that the plurality of goods pursued by individuals may be compatible. Communitarians therefore affirm a conception of the good which establishes the unity of the freedom of each individual with all individuals. Thus Raz's argument is predicated on:





The point is that the core liberal value of individual autonomy cannot be realised with a liberal framework but only within a communal context. Autonomy presupposes constitutive ties with others in a social context. This requires that universality is invested not in a false institutional community, the state, raised above the real lives and relations of individuals but in a public life as a normative democratic community based on a genuine plurality of identities. Given that the modern process of differentiation results in individuals adopting different, even contradictory modes of reasoning in different contexts, the identities and loyalties of individuals are multiplied through membership of different groups. In the context of the public-private divide, such a situation means that no overarching ethical code can integrate human life, in all its diversity, into one scheme of values. 

Raz acknowledges that autonomy presupposes a competitive pluralism which issues in a number of difficult, conflicting, choices: "whatever a person does he would irreparably damage one of the projects or relationships which he pursued or which shape his life' (Raz 1986:366). For Raz, the morally good person tolerates the existence of such a dilemma in society as crucial to autonomy. 

Raz’s attempt to conceive a pluralistic conception of autonomy within the good involves a distinction between 'personal well-being’ and 'self-interest'. Raz identifies moral goals attaining 'worthwhile' options integral to human well-being as generally compatible, in a way that merely self-interested goals are not. The 'self-interest' of natural inclination can be subordinated to a more 'worthwhile' goal leading to happiness. Raz identifies self-interest with insatiable and non-diminishing biological requirements. In contrast, personal well being is satiable and diminishing in being oriented towards the achievement of goals independent of biological requirements. This orientation is capable of achieving happiness (Raz 1986:ch 9 295/9). 

The conception of ‘rational freedom’ affirms the greater freedom available to individuals as a result of identifying their individual goals with a broader moral and social framework. An individualist freedom is abstract and subjective, cut off from the more expansive range of possibilities available to a genuine community of individuals practising a reciprocal freedom. The notion of a 'higher' good does not devalue the broad range of material activities integral to human self-realisation but recognises ascending levels of human possibility contained in the nature of being, from the basic level of instinct, desire, impulse and inclination up to knowledge, reason and wisdom at the highest level of excellence or virtue. What Maslow called self-actualisation can be connected to the Aristotelian notion of flourishing. By filling the empirical world with moral content through the realisation of the creative human essence, the split between egoism and altruism is overcome, reconciling rational good and natural inclinations, personal well-being and self-interest, thus avoiding an overly moralistic assertion of 'higher', more 'worthwhile', notions  over against 'lower' inclinations and impulses. The concern is with the realisation of the human ontology not to continue fighting the war within the divided self.

Raz, in rejecting neutralist and individualist liberalism, certainly has an important part of the truth. Autonomy is not a subjective creation but requires a community within which it may flourish in relation to others.

The activities individuals pursue in defining themselves as individuals are shaped by interrelationships with others within a particular social context. Community supplies the social forms making the conditions for autonomy and its exercise - inseparable from each other - possible.

From the perspective of individualist liberalism, such a view inhibits the choice which is a key characteristic of individual freedom. Raz concludes that 'for those who live in an autonomy-supporting environment there is no choice but to be autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such a society' (Raz 1986:391). In other words, a society of individual choice produces not freedom but a mutual cancellation in which the freedom of each cancels the freedom of others, so a greater social coordination creates the conditions that enhance freedom, even if there is less actual choosing on the part of individuals. Combining public and private identity to make the good society possible, the community of ends is realised by putting human relationships on a 'rational' as against an instrumental basis.

As Raz puts the point, once social forms 'enshrine sound moral conceptions'





Reciprocity is built into social relationships so that, in acting in pursuit of a private good, the individual also achieves the public good directly rather than coincidentally. Finnis sums up the communitarian position by arguing that the primary bond of society is a 'shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community' (1980:154).

Michael Walzer attempts to delineate a nonabsolutist approach to morality through the character and purpose of society: 'Human society is a distributive community ... We come together to share, divide and exchange’. It follows that distributive justice is the moral problem that human societies must face (Walzer 1983:3). On this premise, Walzer defines his central thesis concerning the pluralistic nature of principles of justice - different social goods are to be distributed according to different principles and by different procedures (1983:6). Whether distributions are to be considered just or unjust is determined relative to the socially created meanings of the goods at stake (1983:9). Societies are characterised by different spheres of justice which must be kept separate from one another: 'Good fences make just societies' (1983:319).

Crucial to Walzer's argument is the notion of justice as 'rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life’ (1983:314). [11] Walzer's view corresponds with that of Finnis concerning the shared understanding of individual and communal good. Walzer defines philosophy in terms of the attempt 'to interpret to one's fellow citizens the world of meanings we share', arguing that the meaning we share to be an egalitarian society. Such a notion is implicit in our concepts and categories (Walzer 1983:xiv 320). The aim of this political egalitarianism is to achieve 'a society free from domination' (1983:xiii). Thus Walzer advocates a 'complex equality' that renders domination impossible; spheres are autonomous, with no one sphere dominant (1983:19/20).





Habermas – system world and lifeworld

The basis of a viable, functioning social order is the lifeworld. 'Lifeworld' (Lebenswelt) is the key methodological term defining the substratum in which social and economic structures interpenetrate with human action and consciousness. The lifeworld is the 'background consensus of everyday life', the store of knowledge that is passed from one generation to the next. The lifeworld is the context-forming horizon for the interaction between social action through culture, ethics and consciousness on the one hand and social structures on the other (Pusey 1993:59). For Jurgen Habermas, the lifeworld 'stands behind the back of each participant in communication' and is 'so unproblematic that we are simply incapable of making ourselves conscious of this or that part of it at will' (Habermas 1981:4/31).


Habermas draws a distinction between 'socially integrated action contexts' and ‘system integrated contexts’. 'Socially integrated action contexts' refer to self-organising public spheres in the lifeworld in which actions are coordinated through an intersubjective consensus about norms, values and ends. In 'system integrated contexts' actions are coordinated through the functional interlacing of the steering 'media' of money and power (TCA 2 1989:189/92 202 338/40; Giddens 1987:232/3).

Habermas seeks to maintain this distinction and identifies the problems of the modern world with the tendency of the system world to encroach on the lifeworld. Habermas’ concern is to confine instrumental rationality to its proper sphere in the system world. Rather than build an integral public world through absorbing steering media of money and administrative power into the lifeworld, Habermas seeks to balance discursive and non-discursive modes of coordination. Habermas argues for the necessity of a system world in which the steering media of money and administrative power coordinate human action on non-discursive grounds. For Habermas, a substantively rational society is achieved by strengthening the lifeworld so that the communicative interaction of free and equal individuals may generate a rational consensus (TCA 1 1991:69f 339; 2 1989:126/7 187 352/3). These structures are grounded in the lifeworld, 'as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognised' (TCA 1 1991:69/70).

















31 CRITICAL ISSUES AND CONSTRUCTIVE MODELS

The Imperatives Of The Present
A new spectre has emerged which haunts not only Europe but the planet as a whole. Has humankind a future? The identification of a problem that has been evolving over time and which promises doom and disaster in the indeterminate future is seldom accompanied by a change in behaviour aimed at remedying the situations which caused it. For all the scientific evidence that has pointed to a looming ecological disaster, governments are too locked into the immediate concerns of business and electorates to offer much more than pious words and limited policies. What is required is a reasoned mobilization of intelligence and resources to identify problems and deliver sustainable solutions. Instead, we get the habitual patterns of rational madness proceeding within the very system causing the problems. This is not a failure of knowledge but of political practice, imagination and will. The problems contained in the environmental crisis can be identified, analysed, and then responded to at the level of policy and practice.

There comes a point when well done is better than well said. The urgency of the crisis is such that there is no time for the wastefulness of repetitive talk. The evidence is there for those who wish to know, There is no time to be wasted in futile debates with the wilfully ignorant. A coalition of the willing needs to be formed amongst the doers.

In part this is a breaking of new ground, but in many respects it is a recapturing of old ground.

What unites the coalition for change is a critical approach to a world grown fat, lazy and arrogant. The approach recovers the Aristotelian sense of politics as a concern with the quality of human life and its dimensionality. It opposes a world reduced to quantity. This grounds politics in an essential humanism. More precisely, Aristotle identifies the goal of the state as the good life, what Aristotle calls eudaimonia, happiness, which is the goal of individuals. The individual is a zoon politikon, a social animal who can individuate himself or herself only by developing a politikon bion, the public life which is the natural association that is necessary for a truly human life. 

As a social and a rational animal, sympathy and reason are civilising values which are the marks of a common concern. Sympathy affirms the moral solidarity of humankind but is confronted by the paradox of a global interdependence that severs ties within community. Capitalism is a rationalistic desolidarisation that separates individuals from each other in a market society even as it integrates the word institutionally. In the process of being joined together an impacted globe, human beings lose the freedom to choose and act. A type of determinism pervades globalisation as a mode of experience, an economic determinism compounded by overarching institutions, technological imperatives and threats of ecological disaster. A powerlessness in face of these vast impersonal powers and processes fosters a sense of hopelessness and even cynicism that blinds us to the way forward. This paper is written from within a philosophical tradition that affirms the connection between reason and freedom. That connection is being increasingly questioned by the sense that it is scientific knowledge and technical ingenuity that has led the human species to the brink of ecological destruction. This feeling is misguided and is based on a misdiagnosis of the problem. The problem is not reason but its irrational incarnation within specific institutions and social relations. Jacob Bronowski met this criticism head on, vehemently rejecting the idea that science, in reducing the world and its people to numbers, is responsible for the Holocaust that killed many members of his family. This is tragically false he opined in The Ascent of Man. Not science but ignorance, arrogance and dogma bring us to ruination. The irrational use of reason is precisely this ignorance, arrogance and dogma. The elevation of means to the status of ends is not reason, the use of technology in the service of corporate capitalism is not reason, the application of scientific knowledge in perfecting the means of mass destruction is not reason. The task is to unravel the processes which has led reason to take irrational form.

Many of the features of the contemporary crisis are long standing issues of modernity - the scale and speed of change, the gap that has opened up between technical skill and moral comprehension, the bureaucratisation of the world. And the new social movements are representing the attempts of social actors to counter the modern malaise.
The sensed irrelevance of conventional politics is accompanied with a demand for its radical reconstruction.
Whether from defiance of the facts or from a an awareness of other potential modes of experience, social actors around the world are resisting the 'profound' cynicism, pessimism, and feeling of inevitable fate that has overtaken many in the ruins of past hopes. In face of the environmental crisis, pessimism and cynicism are no more tenable positions than the self-deluding promises of business as usual. 

Both hope and despair can be misplaced. Keeping a balanced, sane perspective is not about wishing the best or fearing the worst but retaining a confidence in science, in 'enlightenment', in reason. Part of a cognitive praxis is recognition that knowledge of the world is a condition of having made it. The attitude is one of contribution, mobilization and construction: what must people do create a liveable and humane world? There are no easy answers to that question. That world is not available to voters at any general election. Instead, one has to find the seeds of a new world rising in the world outside of the conventional political sphere, with all of its misplaced ideals and frustrated expectations. There is a practical radicalism afoot which evinces a hard realism about the forces ranged against the new world — economic determinism, bureaucratic control, a technology indifferent to human ends, a deteriorating planet. Implicit in these social and environmental movements is a vision of a truly humanistic and naturalistic world. Practical visions, ideas and aims backed by the force of example, are essential to avoid the cynicism which is the downside of idealism. The true ‘measure of man’ is not the quantity of humanity’s achievements but the quality of humanity’s imagination and intellect. When human beings retain a sense of possibility, the achievements that follow have the mark of magnificence; when visions have narrowed to no more than the present enlarged into the future, life becomes narrow and mean. The world is currently ruled by an idolatry of means, but the seeds of vision of the new world are everywhere present and emergent.

Identifying the Critical Issues
This essay on Green party politics has set political practicalities and realities within a broader perspective concerned with science, philosophy and ethics. The rationale is that ‘Green politics’ is not just politics but is motivated by certain concerns, principles and goals. These are fundamental. Politics is not merely instrumental, it is the organisation of means to go somewhere, achieve something. So ideals and values matter. Politics is about giving them a critical purchase and effect within a given reality. 

 The purpose of this inquiry is to examine the distinctiveness of Green politics as a ‘new politics’, whether that ‘new politics’ is endemic in a changing society, of which the Greens are an organisational expression, or an idealised vision of the future society which the Greens are attempting to lead society to. A ‘new’ politics implies a ‘new’ type of party organisation, yet Greens have to participate within the terms of the old politics. The ambiguous position of the Greens lies in having to create the new politics in context of the political systems they seek to change, necessitating a degree of adaptation to that system so as to win the electoral support crucial to influencing debates and policy outcomes. These questions need to be set within the context of the broad question of civilisation, for the realisation of Green ideals implies nothing less than a transition to a new social order, a low carbon world beyond systemic imperatives of accumulation and material power. The problematic of change and continuity is at the heart of this question.

Although this essay is primarily concerned with the character of and prospects for Green party politics, the overall perspective sees this politics as the means to a greater, long term end. It is apparent that Green politics is neither transitory nor ephemeral but has common roots, shared values and goals and congruent modes of thought, action and organisation in different times and places. In other words, this is a phenomenon which is produced on the terrain of capitalist modernity and modernisation and represents a specific way by which people are attempting to address the challenges and possibilities of that civilisation.

With these observations in mind, the line of inquiry will focus on certain key questions. Political change and continuity within and maybe beyond modernity sets Green politics in a broader perspective in order to define a 'new' politics which is capable of mounting an effective challenge to the materialist agenda of the ‘old’ politics, whether the right concerned with economic growth (that slippery euphemism for capital accumulation) or the left concerned with redistribution.

The notion of ‘new’ suggests a contrast between materialism and post-materialism, with Greens promoting 'quality of life' issues, including environmental concerns, alongside the more usual economic questions. The question here is whether this requires the formation of a political party, a mode of organisation which is appropriate to the old materialist order. The danger is the reduction of the ecological perspective to an environmentalism akin to the health and hygiene reforms of the nineteenth century, which the main parties are better equipped to prosecute. Such issues raise the bigger question concerning the extent to which Green political parties truly express the potential for social change or whether they serve to canalise that potential into the sterile channels of the old politics.

The effectiveness of any political organisation depends on internal structures, procedures, values, leadership. Whether the party is conservative or radical, old or new, these factors all contribute to the overall resources and capabilities of any political organisation. It is a sign of political maturity when newcomers come to accept this fact. Movements can deny it, since their role is to organise and exert pressure on the constituted political sphere from without; political parties look to influence, formulate and implement policy from within.

To this extent, there is a dialectical interplay between the ideals held by movements and activists motivated by principles and values and the realities imposed upon parties within the existing political system. There is no avoiding this ground between ideal and reality if one wishes to have a political influence and change the world. Those who keep their ideals pure in abstraction need to bear in mind that the world is populated mainly by people who want action on issues of common concern. They do not entertain or tolerate for long political movements that are not political effective. This debate seems to be over with clear acknowledgement that The Green Party is a political party. The clash between 'realists' and 'fundamentalists' has run its course. In large part it was a clash concerning how to practice the non-hierarchial, decentralised and highly participatory politics of the future ecological society within an existing political system. Political effectiveness necessities a series of compromises within an established political system which is more concerned with the status quo than with for new beginnings and alternative societies. But Green politics is more than internal party organisation. Party structures are institutional means to political ends. Here, political effectiveness can only determined within the political system itself, in terms of increasing membership, winning electoral support and seats, communicating the distinctive message and even gaining a degree of influence over public policy.

The political party operates within a broader political environment, and this comes with constraints with respect to spreading the message, building a core support, adhering to principles whilst negotiating with political rivals. For all of the commitment to cooperation and coalition, all parties are vote winning machines operating within the nexus of political competition. The ambitions of any political party are facilitated or constrained by the rules of engagement, opportunity structures, procedures and conventions within the political system. 

In other words, there are endogenous and exogenous factors which determine the effectiveness of a political party. The endogenous factor concerns internal party organisation, its structures and procedures, political style, ideological discourse and programmatic content. The Green claim to novelty here has tended to overemphasise this factor, committing Greens to attempt the impossible and build a genuinely "bottom up', non-hierarchic and participatory party organisation within a political system in which results require more monological forms. Of course, once the decision is taken to develop a political focus, ideals are made to confront hard political realities. The focus on internal party organisation has tended to take attention from the whole point of Green politics – intervention in politics to change society in a certain direction.

Despite its pitfalls, there is no avoiding the political sphere. Kropotkin’s case for the anarchist society practising mutual aid is as compelling a vision as it ever was. But human powers and society’s problems are now of such scale that appropriate institutions capable of effective action are required. 


That is the case for building a political party out of a social movement. Social movements are effective in mobilising pressure on governments from outside of the political sphere, but to directly influence, formulate and implement public policy, a political party is required. It follows that a political party should be judged as a political party, by what is expected of a party in terms of its political effectiveness, support, seats, influence. Once the political party has entered the political arena, their success or failure is not solely dependent on external political forces but on the conscious strategies of their politicians in relation to the electorate. (Thomas Poguntke, "New Politics and Party Systems: The Emergence of a "New Type of Party"? West European Politics, 10 (1) 1987, at p.86. Herbert Kitschelt, "The Green Phenomenon in Western Party Systems", in Sheldon Kamieniecki (ed) "Environmental Politics in the International Arena. Movements, Parties, Organisations and Policy" (Albany, N.Y. 1993)









The reaction against green ideas and politics is a product of both the success of the environmental movement and its failure. The more Green ideas and issues become a matter of public concern, and are translated into practical effect and public policy, the more the reaction against the ethics and the science of ecology will find a ‘popular’ audience. The resistance to change fits easily with the anti-interventionist, deregulationist politics of neo-liberal ‘free’ marketers. The reaction is to be expected. Having come this far, it is most important not to lose nerve. As Gandhi wrote, first they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight and then you win. It is a time for cool heads and a continued commitment to the ethical imperative and to scientific reason. The paradigm shift that ecological politics is effecting all over the world will continue and will offer an alternative to neo-liberal globalisation.

The lessons learnt from the emails fiasco at East Anglia, as well as the way that certain mistakes are reported in certain sections of the press, is that the reaction against environmentalism the world over is a measure of how far the movement has come and how close it is to effecting a real global transformation. The very successes of environmentalism marks environmentalists out as a threat to vested interests and power elites in politics and business. The more successful environmentalism becomes, the more it will be targeted as a threat, the greater the reaction will be. There is a need to anticipate this reaction and be prepared for it, organisationally and psychologically. Failure to do so means, paradoxically enough, that as the resource wars that many ecologists have long warned of break out, the more politics retreats from possible alternative futures to the old issues of control and scarcity and necessity. As more and more people fight over less and less resources, the margin for an alternative politics will be diminished. There are already conflicts over fish stocks, wood supplies, water, metals, minerals, energy, oil and cars. As these conflicts intensify, a politics of fear and necessity will replace a politics of hope and possibility. So, a green politics needs to be proactive rather than reactive.


The reaction against Green ideas and politics and against climate science has to be seen in a positive light. To the Delphic inscription ‘know thyself’ can be added ‘know thy enemy’. By learning the right lessons, the environmental movement can embark on the next stage with a much better self-awareness and a greater clarity in terms of means and ends and their interpenetration. The reaction must force the environmental movement as a whole, from the science to the politics, to reevaluate itself and understand that it will not be allowed to propagate its politics and ideas unchallenged by those who have money and power invested in the status quo.

In the long run, truth will out. But, as Keynes said, in the long run we are all dead. We need a vision of a viable ecological social order, the outlines of a polity and an economy that functions and commands support and consent. In The Economics of a Feasible Socialism, the economist Alec Nove defined ‘feasible’ in terms of being realisable within a generation or two. Ideas detached from realities and detached from possibilities function well as regulative ideals but too easily set impossibly high standards. Politics need not drift away into a fantasy world. N Scott Arnold, in Marx’s Radical Critique, employs what he calls the ‘alternative institutions requirement’ as a technical threshold which all radical critics must meet in demanding social and political change. A viable model of a social and political order must be proposed which, in the least, does not suffer the defects of the social order being criticised and replaced.

An encouraging line of argument comes from Keynes himself. The world, ultimately, is shaped more by ideas than by interests. 





The ‘gradual encroachment of ideas’ is the key line. It is important to hold, at all times, what Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza called ‘clear and distinct ideas’. Retain that commitment to knowledge, and the world of prejudice and interest and error and opinion will fall away.

Back in 1991, in the aftermath of the fall of what was once called ‘actually existing socialism’, Jurgen Habermas lamented the absence of 'constructive models' within marxism (Habermas 1991; Habermas in MacGregor 1998:143). For Habermas this meant that the philosophical foundations of marxism needed to be reworked. At this stage, the ethical and scientific and organisational foundations of the ecology ‘movement’ – is there one? – need not so much to be reworked as clarified and made coherent. The reaction against the science of climate change showed the extent to which the ideas and politics of ecology are exposed and not strongly rooted. And this shows the danger of a concentration upon the politics of parties, state institutions and elections. This treats people as individuals as voters, as taxpayers, not as active citizens participating in the constitutive, creative praxis that alone brings about the ecological society of the future.


32 TASKS AND PRINCIPLES

Tasks Facing The Greens
Anyone involved in environmentalism, from the scientists to the public officials to members of The Green Party itself must also face up to some painful realities. It is easy to get absorbed in the politics and the ideology of ecology as a movement when becoming increasingly distanced from the ethics and the science of ecology, indeed from the people who are supposed to be running the future eco-communities and eco-cities. Change, real change, is more than institutional, it is cultural, social and psychological and moral. It is a self-change on the part of the people. At some point, people need to be addressed as more than voters and taxpayers, at a level beyond the politics of opinion, prejudice, party division. Absorbed in this ‘old’ politics, many ‘Greens’ come to be corrupted by the very system that they claimed to be changing.
 To prepare for the next stage, there is a need to address three clear areas.
1.	The Green Party has to either recover, rediscover or renew its roots in ecology as a science and as an organic principle of practice.
2.	The Green Party has to broaden out to work closely with other groups. This is more than working with other political parties. A coalition politics is the future and The Green Party should be prepared to cooperate on issues of common concern. The point is broader and deeper than this and looks to ground politics at the institutional and policy making level in the communal and associational space of civil society.
3.	The Green Party needs to connect criticism of the status quo with a vision of an alternative, feasible future society, putting forward solutions to every problem identified. As problems mount up, there is a danger of fatigue and exhaustion as people are overcome with a sense of hopelessness and despair. The Green Party needs to attract people with a positive alternative coherent vision of the future ecological society, showing how people have a role in bringing that vision about.
 
The Green Party must rediscover its roots, and continually reinvigorate itself from these roots in the wider scientific and social community, because that is where the strength and the ideas will come from and that, ultimately, is where they will be brought into effect. Many people argue that the future of the environmental movement lies not with those practising politics within the institutional level of the nation state, but in the activist movements outside the sphere of ‘official’ politics. If one defines ‘public life’ in the Hellenic sense of Aristotle’s Politics, as politikon bion, as the shared sphere of human reciprocity, solidarity and interaction, then there is a way of keeping both wings together, channelling the energies of activism into practical effect as public policy on a global scale. Certainly, all of the Green parties of the world need always to be reanalysing their agenda so as to ensure that means and ends complement rather than contradict each other. 

Failure to involve sufficient numbers of people in the politics of transformation risks a politics that is hollowed out, easily falling prey to vested interests through lack of popular support and social power and structural capacity.

The most successful Green parties achieve some leverage in public office but only at the expense of losing viable ‘Green’ political ideas that are distinctive and can restructure power by appealing to the people. The price of electoral success is to render Green politics anodyne, diluted, silent on real problems: the global power and reach of the transnational corporations wield over our production, investment, employment, quality of life, mass media, elections, legislature, law etc.

The reaction against climate change science will hopefully make ecologists and environmentalists both inside politics and outside more aware of the forces which are working to block change. Many scientists seemed genuinely surprised by the strength of the reaction and by the biased nature of the media coverage. Honest scientific mistakes were misreported to portray scientists as politically motivated. The solution is not to have scientists entering the lists and putting deniers in their place, as the likes of Prof Brian Cox and Prince Charles have urged. This is indeed to reduce the science to politics, something which has the paradoxical result of dignifying scientific illiterates and ignoramuses with a voice they do not merit. The scientific case remains solid and it has achieved this position by keeping out of the political bear pit. 

But the whole furore did show how fragile the hold of ecological ideas and practices is in wider society. Polarising the debate into the simplistic contours of black and white, it was remarkable how many people were receptive to the message of the deniers. That is the real worry for The Green Party.
This argument will not be won by science and scientists alone, and maybe not even mainly by science. Citing scientists and scientific evidence will not suffice. Those open to such persuasion will already tend towards Green politics in the first place. Green politics needs to be informed by ecological science but it cannot use the science as a substitute politics and ethics.

Basic Principles Of Green Social Theory
Perhaps the best place to start is with a statement of the basic principles of green social theory. It is these principles that one would expect a Green Party to express and embody in some way.

1.	Affirming the unity of social and environmental justice as part of the process of abolishing the separation between 'society' and 'environment'. This involves extending environment from the natural world to the human, built environment, the world of human praxis.
2.	Conceiving human beings as a species of natural being, with particular species-specific needs and characteristics.
3.	Valuing of the biological embodiedness and ecological embeddedness of human beings and human society.
4.	Working within natural limits, internal and external, both with respect to the particular needs and dependent character of 'human nature' and to the fact that natural resources are finite.
5.	Goes beyond the rejection of 'economic growth' to connect this growth with the systemic process of capital accumulation underlying notions of 'development', 'modernisation' and progress.
6.	Considers the treatment of the environment to be a moral issue, and not merely or simply a 'technical' or 'economic' one. This embraces claims that the nonhuman world has intrinsic value and the idea of animal rights.
7.	That an ecological sustainable world is about living rather than development and involves prescriptive aspects in terms of restructuring social, economic and political institutions.
8.	Affirms an ecological interconnectedness and interdependence which transcends national boundaries, as expressed in the slogan 'Act locally, think globally'.
9.	Expands the time-frame to include concern for future generations. This futurity makes sense of the slogan ‘neither left nor right but in front’. Or forwards. Or in future.
10.	Is critical of the use and manipulation of scientific knowledge on the basis of a firm commitment to science. Green principles are based on ecology as a science, but also incorporates discoveries in other natural sciences such as biology and physics.
11.	Possesses a spiritual dimension connecting each and all forms of life in an interdependent whole.

The New Holistic Paradigm
This paper seeks to define the key characteristics of a new holistic paradigm of qualitative growth. This situates the green polity and the green economy in a historical and philosophical context as the authentic form of human society in rational control of its interchange with nature. There is a need to establish the principles of this new paradigm and show how they are embodied in productive activity. This involves delineating the forms of production, consumption, and organization appropriate to a new stage of human development. 

Although this is a work of theory, it is also intended to be of practical significance in suggesting how principles can be translated into practice through cognitive praxis and ecological praxis. Although wide ranging in taking a perspective on civilisation building, the work is far from exhaustive. The main purpose has been to identify key arguments, outline the contours of the future society and suggest the best ways of moving from here to there with the active support, consent and contribution of the largest numbers of people.


Green Principles And Institutional Requirements
Let us take a closer look at some of the old Green slogans:
‘neither left nor right but in front’
‘new politics’
‘the anti-party party’
‘act locally, think globally’

These slogans, dating back to the first successes of Der Grunen, have been challenged, criticised, rejected and reworked on account of their supposed political naivety. They suggest a social movement of activists innocent of politics, capable of opposing public policy but incapable of framing one.

In examining The Green Party and green politics, the assumption is that there is a commitment to properly political action, an engagement in the political terrain of the existing public domain. This may seem obvious but is not so. There is a very strong strand of radical opinion, both left and right which, in repudiating existing politics as practised, ‘big government’, ‘reformism’, actually lacks any politics beyond slogans and stances. The politics of protest, betrayal and defeat seems a permanent condition for those congenitally incapable of appreciating that revolution is a process not of destruction and rejection but of construction and affirmation. So the argument begins by spelling out what political action and organisation entails.

A naively apolitical or an anti-political stance are display a certain institutional pessimism. That is, upholding some Edenic world free of power and corruption, they reject the optimistic idea the development of governing institutions within a viable public life creates ever-widening possibilities for human self-actualisation, individually and collectively. Whether one writes of ‘counter-publics’ or a counter-culture, this radicalism disables itself in that it can propose no way of embodying its protest. In seeing institutional thinking and institution building as an obstacle in the way of the development of the human potential, such apolitical and anti-political thinking can reject a given order but cannot build an alternative. Instead, it is locked in a permanent protest, continually fighting an oppression that is assumed to be an artefact and hence by definition corrupt and corrupting. This politics of permanent protest invites irrelevance and defeat. For many years, The Green Party gained some mileage out of the slogans ‘new politics’ and the ‘anti-party party’. Politics is politics and a party is a party, however different from the parties and politics of others. The argument in this paper affirms an explicitly political position and as such expresses a strong interest in institution building. This presumes that the green politics of The Green Party is more than pressure, protest and publicity and envisages the structures and forms of a feasible Green polity, comprising government and economy. That is, there is a long term objective that orients political action. 
Despite the often extreme rhetoric of the anti-political radicals, the protest is permanent precisely because of political innocence. No viable institutional alternative is proposed and no means or agency of transition to a future state is envisaged. There is a vague belief that existing institutions survive only because those subject to them have yet to appreciate their corrupt and iniquitous nature. Expose that nature and the people withdraw their consent. There is truth in the view that all institutions rest to a large extent upon the acquiescence by the people who are subject to them. Tacit or otherwise, government proceeds with the consent of the governed. It follows from this that can emancipate themselves from the repressive tentacles of iniquitous institutions by withdrawing their consent and rejecting their assumptions. Then what?

From the start, an argument which concerns serious politics, politics as building and governing a viable social order – one that actually works – should insist on strict criteria.

The first is what may be called the ‘alternative institutions requirement’ (N Scott Arnold).
Since the radical critic argues that the problems of the social order are rooted in the workings of its basic institutions, it follows that solution to these problems is possible by abolishing existing institutions. Marx’s notion of abolition as Aufhebung gives a sophisticated angle on this question of problem resolution, involving as it does preserving and raising up to a higher level possibilities immanent in the existing order. In other words, the radical has material to work with in that any possible future exists already in the present as potentiality.

A radical critique should be able to give an account of the alternative institutions that will replace or should replace existing institutions. Further, a radical critique should have to explain why these institutions do not exhibit the same systemic problems as the institutions of existing society and which motivated the critique in the first place. 

As N Scott Arnold argues the point: ‘The radical critic needs to specify a set of alternative social institu​tions that he believes should and/or will replace the existing ones. This specification must meet the following conditions:

a.	These institutions meet the conditions for a good or just society insofar as the latter are specified by the theory or partial theory called for in (ii). Or, more weakly, it must be shown that these alternative institutions at least do not have the problems that face existing institutions identified in (i). 
b.	A plausible description/explanation of how the institutions will function can be given. 
c.	These institutions can persist as stable social forms. Or, more weakly, there is some reason lo believe that they are stable.

Let us call this the Alternative Institutions requirement. (Arnold 1991 ch 1). 
Existing institutions may well have all of the problems identified by critics. But a viable social order, one that functions, is no mean feat and is not to be transformed without clear thinking about a viable alternative. Wishful thinking is a menace in politics. Problems denied at the ideological level have a habit of returning in an even more repressive reality.

Which brings the argument to a second requirement, any alternative proposed must be ‘feasible’. 

Alec Nove in The Economics of Feasible Socialism sought to bring socialism out of the clouds – and divisions – of political utopia and into practical reality. His definition of ‘feasible’ is useful in concentrating minds and getting them to focus on what can be achieved in the short to medium range. It is the easiest thing in the world to evade present realities by means of thought. In the end, though, escaping into a future to come is no less a political cheat than invoking the lost Edenic paradise. The human race can never go back, but it can go forwards. But only if it builds that future.

‘The word 'socialism' is apt to produce strong feelings, of enthusiasm, cynicism, hostility. It is the road to a future just society, or to serfdom. It is the next stage of an ineluctable historical process, or a tragic aberration, a cul-de-sac, into which the deluded masses are drawn by power-hungry agitator-intellectuals… Let me make it clear that my object is not propagandist, in either direction. It is to explore what could be a workable, feasible sort of socialism, which might be achieved within the lifetime of a child already conceived (Nove 1983 Preface).

Noting that the basic assumptions of liberal capitalism are ceasing to be true, Nove made the not unreasonable point that a definition of a socialism that is feasible is required, a socialism that could work with reasonable effectiveness (since a socialism that does not function can be of little help to anyone). (Nove 1983 ch 1). 

These issues are ones of practicalities. Real society functions according to real institutions and practices - marriage, law, the economy, the state are not merely good or bad ideas to be changed by thinking differently. A counter-culture can destroy but to survive and thrive it will need to construct around certain constants present in every civilisation. 

 Although the stated objective of many radical critics is to create a 'revolutionary' counterculture capable of bringing down an existing order, in crucial respects this is a protest rather than a serious politics. Indeed, the ritual of protesting against existing power is a tacit acknowledgement of its inability to properly contest with that power. Instead of presenting itself as an alternative to existing institutions, critics present demands to power in the hope or expectation that these supposedly corrupt and iniquitous institutions of the current social order will change course. The institutional pessimism feeds into the politics of protest, with critics marching and protesting but unable to replace the power they oppose. Lacking politics, lacking institutional awareness, the critics are enclosed within a tacit acceptance of the alienation they protest, rehearsing their defeat and disillusion as they march and demand. 

And in defeat, innocence is preserved. There are too many vested interests to allow universal principles to prevail. Particular interests have captured the public realm, a damning indictment that confirms the rejection of politics and confines critics within the cul-de-sac of lost hope. The claims may well be true, but leave the question of how public life and policy is to be constituted begging. This means wrestling with power and interests for the definition and scope of the public realm and the public good. It means politics. A purist scenario which seeks to preserve universal principles and aspirations from the dangers and seductions of politics has simply departed the public arena, abandoned the struggle. To engage in politics is to accept and be aware of the ever present threat that universal principles and aspirations are always open to incorporation by the state as another special interest. There are plenty who see Green politics as the green wing of the very techno-urban industrial system driving ecological destruction. Rather than merely lament the continuing inability to transcend a given social order, abandoning the possibility, know what politics is, understand that there is something frustrating and even deeply alienating about a practice that requires participants to compromise the ideals for which they fight, avoid debilitating disillusion by not having any illusions about politics in the first place. That’s the nature of the beast and there is no going round it. 

Institutional pessimism comes with the corollary of expectation of the inevitable defeat of radicalism as an inescapable consequence of avoiding both incorporation and assimilation. Fighting the status quo on its own terrain and radicals change themselves rather than the world. 

These are the main scenarios of protest and defeat within radical discourse and they amount to a political innocence as the price of avoiding incorporation and assimilation. The trick is to engage in politics in order to make progress towards the realisation of universal principles and this is accomplished by broadening the base and tapping into the human roots below that feed politics above. Keeping politics grounded means basing action and organisation on a renewed capacity for associational solidarity. A movement that self-consciously keeps its moral integrity by keeping apart from politics abandoned all pretence of building lasting institutions, at best offering a short-term outlet for the expression of social frustrations and at worst seeking solace in utopian hopes. Neither approach offers an institutional alternative. Rejecting institutions as such as necessarily corrupting makes it impossible to envisage any scenario in which power and principle can be embodied. In such a way, radical politics collapses into an inveterate conservatism. 

It is time to abandon the mythologies of an anti-political politics and escape the nihilistic cycle of protest and defeat which is ever swinging between hope and betrayal until its powerlessness resolves itself in cynicism and despair.

Hegel the conservative takes his revenge against the left-Hegelian radicals. In The Philosophy of Right, in his conception of the system of the ethical life or Sittlichkeit, in the idea of the corporation as a form of functional representation, Hegel engaged in precisely the kind of institution building which alone gives expression to the universal idea. There is a need to recognise that ‘new politics’ is a politics and that to be ‘anti-party’ is not to be an ‘anti-politics’ and is not to be against political organisation as such. Otherwise, a supposedly radical position is merely protest in anticipation of defeat, a politics of subjectivity with no place to go beyond its own subjectivism. This institutional naivety and political innocence is the pathology of leftist thought, a permanent protest rather than a serious politics, inviting defeat. 
 In focusing on the importance of institution building the intention to outline the framework for the embodiment and expression of self-realization, not to deny it. This explicitly contests the view that institutional mediation renders self-realisation impossible, conceiving institutions as a means of enhancing self-realization rather than inhibiting it. Repudiating institutions as such as necessarily corrupting, the politics of subjectivity necessarily implies a return to unmediated experience, individuals apparently independent, all pure ego outside of institutional frameworks. The argument back follows Aristotle’s recognition that the human individual is a zoon politkon, a social animal that achieves self-realisation only in relation, organised relation, to other individuals in an organised public life, a public life that involves overarching connections, reciprocal relations, morality and institutions of government, law, custom etc. Human beings achieve freedom within that context. Outside of that context there is nothing but atomistic individuals cancelling each others projects. Life is nasty, brutish and short.
Failure to engage in political alternatives means that radicalism very easily slides over into its conservatism, from a complete repudiation of existing institutions to an acquiescence in a current alienation. Rejecting the world of politics as a corruption of universal principle but unable to propose an alternative out of a rejection of institutions as an alienating mediation, the radical continues to live within it. The politics of radical rejection and the politics of ultimate reconciliation are actually flip sides of the same coin. The radical rejects politics and institutions as corrupt but the rejected world carries on regardless. 

The end of political innocence requires that universal principle be considered a Kantian regulative ideal motivating action or an Hegelian ideal that one can identify within real immanent potentialities. The progressive unfolding of this idea requires political engagement and action, a changed world. A mature approach abandons the politics of protest and defeat, hope and betrayal, rejection and reconciliation that ties thought and action to the existing order. A genuinely transformative politics is grounded in the forces and agencies through which the social world is changing itself. As Marx tried to make clear, real revolutionary change has to proceed from within the world that was being transformed. ‘Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen.’ (Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire).

 In criticising institutions as an alienating objectification, radicals fail to distinguish legitimate criticism of the way that specific institutions no longer operate as they once did or ought to do from a general criticism. The result is that specific deficiencies are turned into deficiencies of institutions as such, replacing an alienating objectification with an equally alienating subjectification. Cf. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness.  

Having established the legitimacy of politics and the necessity of institution building, the discussion can now make sense of The Green Party as the ‘anti-party party’ proposing a ‘new politics’. Those who still reject politics and institutions as a corrupt world in which self-realisation is blocked by mediation need read no further. The argument proposes the necessity of institutional mediation as a condition of human self-realisation and examines the basis of a green politics worthy of the names ‘green’ and ‘politics’.


Neither Left Nor Right But In Front
The appeal of a Green ‘new politics’ in a negative sense is not difficult to understand. Most western liberal democracies are marked by a growing popular frustration with and even rejection of party political, electoral politics. Either side of the ‘debate’ inflate the most marginal of differences to give the impression of real alternatives whereas in fact people view the parties as being all the same. The established political parties in every nation employ tricks and techniques derived from advertisement campaigns to win popular support by exploiting the innate human desire for the good life, selling ineffectual, outdated old-paradigm solutions to contemporary problems in the name of the better society. Against this ‘consumer democracy’, the marketing of snake oil, all empty rhetoric and short term fixes, the promise of the Greens to introduce new-paradigm thinking into electoral politics makes them a breath of fresh air. The question is can they deliver on this promise and deliver a genuine rejuvenation of politics that encompasses a long-term vision of sustainability and the quality of life within a viable and coherent programme.
The Greens have been accused of attempting the real cause of social and economic problems in a transnational corporate capitalism and its global dynamic of private accumulation. ‘Industrialism’ is a euphemism that neutralises the political implications of the more precise ‘capitalism’. But there is more to the ‘neither left nor right’ claim than evasion. The first law of ecology is the law of integrated systems, a law which calls for interactive cooperation from all parts within the whole. What matters here is that these parts possess an emancipatory interest and functional capacity to go forwards and constitute the future social order. The traditional left-right divide has become a stalemate that serves to trap thought and action within old and stale grooves. With history comes a lot of scores to be settled. Past battles continue to be fought, blocking the creative and innovative thought, action and organisation that serves to build the future within  a sustainable framework incorporating holistic insights and ecological imperatives. 
That is the ‘new’ and ‘in front’ or forwards aspect of Green politics, seeking to transcend established divisions by emphasis upon building a sound framework of sustainable living.

‘Neither left nor right’ is also open to the accusation of evasiveness in another sense, failing to distinguish between social groups and classes to discern those concerned to preserve the status quo and those concerned with social transformation. Of course, ecology is a universal interest that embraces all life forms and should have a general appeal to all humankind. But, as Marx long ago recognised, whilst all ought to have an interest in human emancipation in general, there are dominant sections of every society who are comfortable in their alienation. Not all social interests, classes, groups and forces possess emancipatory potential. motivation and capacity, however much a universal ethic applies to all.

The classic statement of rising and falling classes, revolutionary and conservative classes, is Marx in The Manifesto of the Communist Party.

‘Hitherto, every form of society has been based … on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society. 

The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labour. Wage labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat \ are equally inevitable. (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973).

 Adam Schaff defines alienation as 'such a relation between a human agent and the product of his activity in which that product, having acquired a socially objective existence and being situated in a given social system, functions not only autonomously (i.e., independently of the intentions of his maker) but, under specified conditions, even against the wishes and intentions of his maker, and sometimes endangers his interests or his very existence' (Adam Schaff, 'Alienation as a Social and Philosophical Problem', Social Praxis (1975) Vol.III p. 11).

There is a need to distinguish alienation in this critical sense from Durkheim’s notion of anomie.  'Anomie concentrates on barriers to the orderly functioning of society; alienation on barriers to the productive growth of individuals' (John Horton, 'The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A Problem in the Ideology of Sociology', British joumal of Sociology, Vol.XV (1964): (p.286).

As Gajo Petrovic argues (Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983 Tom Bottomore, Ed.), alienation from oneself should be regarded not so much as alienation from a factual or normative sense of human nature but as 'alienation from historically created human possibilities, especially from the human capacity for freedom and creativity" (p.13).

This begs the question of social agency, which classes and groups are instrumental in the creation of this historically engendered social alienation and which classes and groups possess the structural capacity to fully realise the human potential for freedom and creativity.
For Adam Schaff, class is the most basic unit in a class-divided society. An individual may transcend his or her class, but not class society and class division altogether. Class society must therefore be studied from a class perspective. Just as Marx argued that there is a class comfortable in the general alienation and a class with ‘radical chains’ – the proletariat – so Schaff argues that there are two major classes, the 'rising' revolutionary class and the 'falling' conservative class. A universal ethic – human emancipation in general, the ecology of sustainable living – may appeal to individuals in the ‘falling’ conservative class, but not to that class as a class. Indeed, as the objective trends in society continue to go against the latter, it has a vested interest in (consciously or unconsciously) denying their existence, misinterpreting their ideas, concealing unpleasant truths, impugning motives etc. The knowledge any emergent movement for social and political change offers is systematically corrupted by 'conservative deformations'. The misrepresentation of the science of ecology, of climate change and global warming, the impugning of the motivations of those involved, the denigration of the science as not real science but politics, has all the classic traits of ‘conservative deformation’. 

In Hard Times, the economist Bob Sutcliffe wrote of the difficulties which lead capitalist leaders to espouse militantly reactionary ideologies and policies on many questions to escape the revolutionary implications of class struggle. ‘Militarism, patriotism, racism and sexism are all in this way growing like maggots in the rotting flesh of capitalism’. That was written back in 1983. Now we can add climate change denial (in no way do these characters merit the honourable title of sceptic  - any scientist worthy of the name is a sceptic following an argument according to empirical, rational and logical control). The likes of Prince Charles and Brian Cox have called upon scientists to continually rebut every piece of nonsense and misinformation churned out by deniers. There are dangers here. Apart from dragging scientists away from serious work, it also risks being drawn into a war of attrition which exhausts energies. It also risks the loss of arguably the greatest asset, the science itself, by the appearance of having a political agenda. It also risks dignifying the deniers with a voice in the debate – for reasons of balance – which their ‘science’ does not merit. It takes the fight onto the ugly, decaying, maggot infested terrain of the declining class.

The ‘rising’ class has nothing to fear from social change, and is therefore free from these deformations and delusions. Indeed, since its material and other interests are promoted by social transformation, it has every reason to engage in an objective and rigorous investigation of society. In Marxist terms, the working class have the epistemological insight and structural capacity to see through and break through capitalist relations. As Schaff puts the point, 'If you wish to attain objective truth ... then consciously adopt class and party positions which are in accord with the interests of the proletariat' (Adam  Schaft, History and Truth (Pergamon Press, London, 1976),p. 246; see also pp. 234ff). 

More generally, the ‘rising’ class is cognitively enabled and materially equipped to constitute the new social order. The ‘ascending’ point of view offers the fullest and richest perspective on existing society and represents the cognitively optimum position. 

There is an epistemological inequality between the ‘rising’ and the ‘falling’ class, the former being epistemologically privileged and 'higher' in that its standpoint is capable of yielding the truth. Lucio Colletti points to 'two realities' within capitalism, the one that appears on the surface and one that lies deeper (Lucio Colletti, 'Marxism: Science or Revolution?' in Robin Blackburn(ed.) Ideology in Social Science (Fontana, London, 1972), pp. 375ff). The capitalist perspective sees only the  surface. The capitalist buys labour just as he buys raw material, and is incapable of seeing the profound difference between the two. And the wage relation seems fair to the capitalist since the worker is not forced to sell his labour. The reality of exploitation is only perceived from the proletarian point of view. The worker knows that the sale of labour is not a matter of free choice, and knows that more value is produced than is returned in wages, that therefore labour sustains capitalism. The exploitative character of capitalism is therefore visible from the point of view of the worker but not from the point of view of the capitalist. Colletti therefore concludes that Marxism 'is the analysis of reality from the view point of the working class'.
A brief and general sketch like this cannot do justice to the complexity of this issue, whether or not Marxism privileges one class at the expense of other social groups and interests, the anti-democratic implications of notions epistemological and structural capacity. The concern is a limited one, to distil a general line of emancipatory interest and intent within a given society and identify the grounds upon which any social futurity is based.
A class understanding relates conflicts within society and between interests and groups to materially available directions of development rather than just to general ideas or to humanity in general. ‘Neither left nor right’ can be interpreted to mean everything and nothing and thus lacks a critical, cutting edge able to withstand contact with the interstices of class society. Class in Marx’s usage is employed to determine which groups possess material futurity and structural capacity to remake society in their own emancipatory interest. Where, one needs to ask, are the clusters of alternative society-making potential?
To refer to clusters in the plural rather than class in the particular is to acknowledge that there is something awry in the old Marxist nostrums. This was what Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy was all about. For some time now it has been apparent that socialism has lost the historical guarantees it once claimed and that the socialist future is not written into the historical process as an objective necessity. As EP Thompson wrote, 'The project of Socialism is guaranteed BY NOTHING -certainly not by "Science", or by "Marxism—Leninism" — but can find its own guarantees only by reason and through and upon choice of values. . . . And it is here that the silence of Marx and most Marxisms is so loud as to be deafening" (E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, London, Merlin, 1978, p. 362).

'The various mechanisms on which Marxists, more or less loosely basing themselves on Marx's analysis, have relied for the replacement of capitalism by socialism are not working: neither in the developed countries, nor in most of the "third world" - itself a concept whose looseness is now obvious…Capitalist society is at present in global crisis, but few can believe that its probable, or even in the short term, its possible, outcome in any country will be socialism. On what then, other than blind will or an act of faith in historical inevitability, are we to base our hopes? But Marxists have never been blind voluntarists, nor have they ever based themselves on historical inevitability or philosophical generalisation in the abstract. They have always sought to identify specific conjunctures and situations, which would dig capitalism's grave' (E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Some Reflections on The Break-up of Britain', New Left Review, 105, Sept./Oct. 1977, pp. 15-16. S. Rowbotham, 'The Women's Movement and Organising for Socialism', in Beyond the Fragments, London, Merlin, 1980, p. 48.)

Well, the gravediggers were supposed to be the proletariat. Barrington Moore wrote something pertinent in this respect:

The chief basis of radicalism (in modernizing countries) has been the peasants and the smaller artisans in the towns. .. .the wellsprings of human freedom lie not where Marx saw them, in the aspirations of classes about to take power, but perhaps even more in the dying wail of a class over whom the wave of progress is about to roll.

Barrington Moore, Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966, p. 505.

Marxist politics spent over a century involved in chercher le proletariat. Well, western political thought in general has ever been haunted by the ghost of the citizen. Perhaps the whole approach is misguided, endlessly searching for revolutionary agents whereas such an agency will appear only in the process of social transformation itself. The key point is that the future, the ‘in front’ of the slogan, has to be made, rather than rising like the sun, and made during the revolution, not before as a condition or after as a consequence. If the slogan of ‘neither left nor right’ captures the cross class appeal of a politics in the universal interest, those old questions of the politics of transformation remain - 'Who makes the future?', 'how?' and 'when?' These are questions which are integral to what the ‘in front’ looks like.

The slogan ‘neither left nor right’ implies a general ‘all humankind’ appeal that founders against a social reality structured and divided according to material interests and classes. An emancipatory politics seeks to hegemonize certain social groups rather others according to the place each occupies within the status quo. The ‘given' place situation of the social group, whether this makes it revolutionary or conservative, is of relevance to the radical project. If the executives of the transnational corporations have no material interests independent of their politically articulation, then there is no reason at all why socialists shouldn’t seek to enlist them to the cause of revolutionary socialism and no reason why Greens shouldn’t try to recruit them in the fight against ecological destruction caused by economic growth. The fact that neither socialists nor greens do this is precisely because the connection between material interests and political allegiances is known and understood. It may be possible to win individuals over to a general emancipatory politics, but not a specific class or group as such.

The question of how one identifies material interests, how one interprets them and what weight one allots to them is of critical importance in practical politics. A bland universal appeal to all on account of a universal ethic seems to invite a shallow, eclectic, opportunistic politics, in which the message is tailored to whatever social groups seem most amenable at the time. There would be no good reason why the struggle against capitalism should not be spearheaded by capitalists. There is good reason, of course, once one identifies the class basis of exploitative relations. Labour is the value producing force that can autonomize itself from capital; capital is the value appropriating force that cannot autonomize itself from labour. What distinguishes an agency or group as emancipatory is its social location within the process of production making it feasibly capable of taking it over. The identification of such an agency in terms of its material futurity and structural capacity is another condition of the feasibility of a political ideal.

The questions of ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘when’ have particular relevance with respect to Green politics. The Greens provide a channel for activism in a wide variety of forms. No wonder, then, that it could present itself as the ‘anti-party party’. Do ‘the Greens’ possess sufficient identity as to form a party? Are they one of the ‘new social movements’ or an umbrella for nsm’s? A loose coalition of activists? And are ‘the Greens’ social ecologists or deep ecologists, biocentrists or ecofeminists? The slogan "We are neither left nor right, we are in the front" was coined by the German Die Grunen. The German Green Party represented a synthesis of ecology, alternative and social justice movements, the peace movement, feminism and other social movements. The four pillars of The Greens' platform comprise ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence. 

Rejecting left and right and conceiving themselves as the ‘anti-party party’, the German Greens sought a ‘new politics’ that sought to transcend the conventional party political split between liberals/socialists and conservatives. Popular discontent with the old politics and views that ‘they are all the same’ indicates the increasing sterility and nullity of the left/right division and confirms the Green concern to seek not just a new government but a new way of politics. 

This ‘new politics’ seeks to tap the human roots that feed politics, a grassroots politics that empowers citizens and envisages an extension of public spaces for citizen interaction and decision making, decentralized, autonomous regions which make wide use of referenda, rotation of office holders, and town meetings. 

The emphasis on new models of democracy make it clear that ecology is not just considered as a science but has social and political and moral dimensions. Ecology is a public issue and Green thinkers and movements have provided sophisticated analyses of the causal connections between environmental problems - toxic wastes, acid deposition, nuclear reactors, and water pollution – and social and economic processes (Porritt 1984).
The 'neither left nor right' claim is meant to convey the truth that ‘Green’ concerns are not the conventional party political ones. This is made clear by analysing what constitutes the ‘in front’. The environment is the guiding principle of Green politics:

1.	Respect for nature and life forms.
2.	Respect for non-human life forms – which may be expressed in terms of vegetarianism or veganism or animal liberation.
3.	A commitment to living lightly on the earth - avoiding those technologies such as planes or cars which damage the planet, seeking alternative technologies.
4.	Scepticism as to the claims of science and technology, particularly with respect to the links with business, government and the military.
5.	A commitment to living simply and a rejection of consumerism.

All of these values can be incorporated into lifestyles and thus return ethics to its original Greek meaning of ethos, a practice and a way of life. They can all be expressed as a green politics as a coherent response to looming ecological disaster. A Green politics is ‘in front’ in demanding a wholly new ethic in which aggressive, exploitative humankind abandons its destructive practices and acknowledges its dependence on Nature. From this visionary perspective the old-style political discourse between Left and Right is revealed to be a conflict between alternate approaches to the exploitation of Nature and natural resources. With the evidence of growing environmental crisis now conclusive, what matters now is for human beings, as a species, to regulate the interchange with Nature so as to live in harmony with our surroundings - the entire biosphere, that is, and not just the built environment. 
This harmonious relationship is a requirement if we are to ever have an ‘in front’, a ‘forwards’, a future.

A ‘new politics’ is not necessarily an evasion of old issues of class, exploitation and justice but a recognition that addressing climate change and global warming, pollution, world famine, the destruction of the rainforests, and the myriad other environmental problems confronting the world requires solutions that go further than reforming the industrial system by conventional political means. The environmental crisis is systemic rather than accidental and requires fundamental action rather than piecemeal reform.

Even if it was possible to prevent the occurrence of environmental disasters whilst at the same time ensuring the protection of all the habitats and life-support systems currently under threat, the systemic nature of economic growth, relating to the central dynamic of capital accumulation, means that even with the successful achievement of reform the problem of the progressive diminution of finite resources and the progressive destruction of the environment will be continuing without check. The destruction of the Earth’s life support system is an issue beyond left and right but it isn’t an issue beyond politics. There are classes and groups whose material interests are served by this environmental destruction. They owe no responsibility and feel no responsibility to others, whether in existing global society or future generations. To these people, there is no ‘in front’ or ‘forwards’. And left unchecked they will ensure that there is no future. The Earth's non-renewable resources (oil, minerals etc.) are being used up at an exponential rate at the same time that its renewable resources (clean water, forests and fertile soil) are being poisoned, polluted and destroyed, a trend which if not reversed will bring a predictable collapse of the system. The particular environmental issues are therefore fought as part of a broader, more systemic concern.
The roots of Green politics, as a movement before it cohered as a party, are manifold. There is a question of how precious the Greens should be. As a 'new social movement', Green politics can exhibit a certain sensitivity with respect to its distinct identity, insisting on its 'newness' and 'authenticity'. Thus Porritt argues that 'For an ecologist, the debate between the protagonists of capitalism and communism is about as uplifting as the dialogue between Tweedledum and Tweedledee' (1984: 44). To which one may add that not only is the old left-right debate pretty uninspiring for everybody else, it now seems sterile and exhausted. The lesson to learn here is not that left and right are really the same or are either side of the same industrialist-materialist coin but that capitalism proved capable of absorbing, assimilating and deradicalising its supposed socialist enemy. The left long ago gave up the ghost. Marx’s proletariat proved more than happy to become contented consumers rather than socialist revolutionaries. Reform from above staved off revolution from below, with a capitalism modified by social policies and regulatory practices curbing the edges of the ‘free’ market. And this brings us to another aspect of Green preciousness with regard to identity, the concern that existing parties and politics steals their ideas and proposals and assimilates them to the very system destroying the environment. Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue but there comes a danger that people will mistake the business as usual of light green reformism that preserves the system intact for the real thing. 
Thus the Green Parties are right to insist and keep insisting on a completely new type of politics. But this comes with the corollary that the more successful the party is within the conventional political sphere, the more its ‘new’ politics will be exposed to criticism, ridicule and rejection. Being neither left nor right risks being well in front of political debate, comment and the electorate. At this point, Green politics must hold its nerve and risk a temporary loss of ground for greater gains in the longer run. If the evidence of growing environmental problems is right – and how many hundreds of thousands of scientific papers, articles and publications support this evidence – then the case for a ‘new’ ecological politics will keep returning to the political agenda. The greatest danger is to proceed too quickly, intoxicated by electoral successes at all levels, and become part of the very conventional political arena that is collapsing along with the economic system it supports. The trick is to engage in practical politics, fighting elections, winning seats and proposing legislation, whilst remaining committed to being the vanguard of the future post-industrial society (Milbrath, 1984) and the ‘new’ green politics of the twentieth first century (Sessions, 1995). The danger is that political success as a party draws Green politics further within the old politics in its period of dissolution, increasingly losing sight of the ‘new’ and the ‘in front’. 

This is the price paid for engaging in politics. Early green discourse was characterised by broad-brush strokes at the level of principle and wishful thinking with little attention given to how these fine words and sentiments translated into practical policy. That kind of general statement of ideals characterises any new social actor that lacks access to the policy-making process, does not seek political power and hence does not need to develop detailed policies, outline programmes, cost budgets or do any of the things that come with politics. But any movement or party that is serious about social change so that its ideals are translated into the real has at some point to address political realities. It is a precarious business, for with the possibilities come the dangers. 

No matter how electorally successful and popular they are, Green parties themselves are not enough to develop a ‘new politics’. It is easy enough to reject the bureaucracy and compromise of conventional politics at the level of principle outside of the political arena. The hard part is avoiding these pressures once the party is a participant within the conventional political arena. It is easy to win support from those who agree at the level of principle. The trick is to keep that support whilst trying to draw wider support at the level of practical policy. To repeat fidelity to one’s principles is no defence against electoral and institutional pressures which compel compromise and conservativism. Old or new, politics is politics.

Green politics can learn from Marxism here. In criticising Marx for lacking an adequate political theory of socialism and communism,  Tony Polan describes Marx’s politics as a gigantic gamble that, given a whole number of unrealistic assumptions that Marx made about the absence of class and conflict and necessity and freedom we would be well advised not to make. Marx was, at best, sketchy about institutional structures. With a general statement of principles which insisted that the new political apparatus would be open, transparent, accessible to all, and assuming that the end of class and class exploitation, serious conflict and scarcity would end, Marx reduced political institutions to one undifferentiated type comprising a complex of organisations with no separation of power. This is most certainly a ‘new’ politics in that it bears little or no relation to any functional political society. It seems to replace politics with administration, inviting bureaucratisation in the way that the path is cleared for power to congeal in hierarchical form. That this was not Marx’s intention only serves to prove Marx’s intellectual innocence by proving his political naivety. Marx presumes the conquest of natural necessity and the self-conscious mastery of the self-created social necessity. This is a society beyond alienation. But is this non-alienated society also beyond further creativity, creative differences, arguments over the use of resources, choices, disagreements? A transformed human nature, yes, a fulfilled one too, but an end to human nature also? History has long since exposed the essential innocence of a model that requires an end to conflicts, an end to necessity, an end to economics as the science of scarcity, an end to exploitation and injustice and the social contradictions that follow, an end to inadequate ideas, to egoistic impulses, to simply human emotions and motivations. It demands, as Polan argued, an end of politics (Polan, 1984:129-30).

 In the Theories of Surplus Value, Marx criticises David Ricardo’s book for its 'faulty architectonics' (TSV, vol. II, 169). For Marx, the discovery of truth is a matter of a correct method of investigation leading to a well-structured and well-presented theory. The 'faulty architectonics' of a theory is 'not accidental, rather it is the result of... and . . . expresses the scientific deficiencies of the method of investigation itself’. 

This conception of architectonics indicates that, for Marx, a true theory is compelled on account of its 'deep insight' to develop an elegant conceptual structure. It seems that Marx, then, adhered to the Platonic trinity of the true, the good and the beautiful and affirmed the rationalist belief in the harmony of truth, goodness (as human freedom) and beauty.

As an end of history, the marxist vision amounts to the realisation of the philosophical ideal within the real. It is not so much Plato’s Philosopher Ruler as the rule of philosophy, Spinoza’s free humanity governing itself with adequate ideas, or Descartes’ ‘clear and distinct ideas’. That is a philosophical vision and will be realised when humanity finally does evolve the long term strategic thinking capacity that joins all together for the common good. It is not politics and to engage in politics on these assumptions is to invite not human emancipation in general but its total enslavement as institutions, laws and bureaucracies intervene to compensate for a failing moral conversion.

One thing is certain, no politics and no possibilities at all for a legal and institutional intervention to ensure the basis for sustainable living on the earth. The deep ecologists simply lack a politics and are completely naked against the forces of global capital holding the planet and its people and its life forms to ransom. On this level, one may as well trust Gaia herself to knock the human species into a shape more appropriately fitted to its environment. The only thing is, that it is difficult to see the hundreds of millions whose lives will be affected and even destroyed being so philosophical in face of the inevitable. 

The only other option in this apolitical or anti-political stance is an eco-monasticism. Alasdair MacIntyre at the end of his great book on the collapse of morality in modern  society, After Virtue, opines that the barbarians are already ruling over us, the fact that we don’t know this amounting to our predicament and that we are waiting for a new St Benedict. Well, the desert fathers and the monastic movement saved civilisation once, rebuilding it anew on stronger foundations that lasted more than a thousand years. Capitalism has been as busy dissipating this moral capital as it has been in wasting natural resources. 

The controversy over leadership is instructive. The commitment to a ‘new’ politics made Greens sceptical of the concept of leadership. The problem was that this gave the party an uncertain identity amongst an electorate still used to an old politics. Was the acceptance of the concept of leadership a sign of the drift to compromise and conservatism or a recognition of the necessity of politics? Whether one can resist the ‘old’ politics and keep a commitment to the ‘new’ politics depends upon the extent to which Green politics can ensure the correspondence of means and ends. If Green parties are the institutional means by which to achieve a Green society, they should act and function in a specifically Green fashion, actively and directly democratic, beyond the dualism of rulers and ruled, decentralised. The means are the ends in the process of becoming. The problem is that this ‘new politics’ simply doesn’t work within the terrain of the ‘old politics’ and leaves Green parties unprepared for the pressures that election campaigns and parliamentary procedures put on any party. Worse, the victory of ‘realists’ over ‘fundamentalists’ positively invites the situation whereby Green parties, like socialist parties before them, succumb to 'the iron law of oligarchy', controlled by a small active elite of officials directing a passive membership. It works if a party wishes to be successful within the ‘old’ politics. But what price that success when the old politics as such is failing?

Rather than campaigning for social transformation, the active leaders become obsessed with winning more seats and gaining more influence within the system. Policies motivated by principle are increasingly rejected as too ‘radical’ for electoral appeal and because compromise is the best way to get things done in Parliament. Once the strength and the basis of the ‘new politics’, extra-parliamentary activity is either neglected or considered as a dangerous distraction. Those active in building the new society within the shell of the old are neglected in favour of attempts to win the passive support of individuals in the mass electorate.

Michels in his Political Parties charts the process in which party leadership fossilizes into a self-protecting and self-preserving clique, concentrating activity and initiative at the top whilst deradicalising the base. Parties as organisations need full-time staff who, in time, form themselves into a 'political class' which is able to keep control through access to the lines of communication both within a party and the political system and external media. In time, ‘the party’ develops interests independent of the principles for which the party was formed and the party leadership see their role as defending ‘the party’ rather than dissolving it into the new political society:


When faced with a threat to their authority or office from within the organization, the leaders will become extremely aggressive and will not hesitate to undermine many democratic rights. To lose command of their organization is to lose that which makes them important individuals, and hence they are strongly motivated to preserve their position even if it requires using repressive methods. They legitimize such behaviour by pointing out that a mass organization is inevitably an organization maintaining itself by its struggle with powerful and evil opponents. Therefore all efforts to introduce factionalism into the organization, to challenge the appropriateness of party or organization policy, result in aid and comfort to its enemies. Serious criticism of the leadership is thus denned as treachery to the organization itself.

Before long, the party of the ‘new’ politics is colluding with the forces it once opposed whilst ignoring the basis of its own support and identity.

The ability to ensure the interdependence of means and ends eluded socialist parties of all kinds. The question is how to participate successfully on the terrain of an existing politics whilst preparing to go forward to a different political order. How to ensure that the means are effective on one terrain whilst growing into another. The way that Green politics fractured between ‘realists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ shows the extent to which Green parties are extremely vulnerable on this point. The former are easily absorbed into the ‘old’ politics, the latter are lost in the cul-de-sac of an anti-politics. 

Accepting the necessity of politics means addressing issues of incorporation and assimilation. This is a serious problem for Green parties. Form without content is a head without a body. At some point, presuming continued political success, The Green Party will need to demonstrate the social power behind policies and principles. As a ‘new’ politics, Green politics is outside the terms of conventional political coverage and discourse. This is its strength, its point, but it is also vulnerable spot without the content to back it up. Political opponents and commentators will obvious target those areas that make The Green Party distinctive from other parties - decentralization, peace, commitment to the redistribution of wealth in the name of justice and inequality, any number of proposals for taxation, regulation, government intervention, projects for renewable energy. The weight of the conventional wisdom of conventional politics will compel any party, top heavy as a result of political ‘realism’ to remove the radical edges in order to gain influence within the system. But if The Green Party reaches the situation where it barely mentions or leaves out distinctive Green proposals as difficult to sell to the electorate, hasn’t it already abandoned any claim to newness and instead opted for a shallow environmentalism which is incapable of addressing the social and economic roots of the environmental crisis? The Green Party becomes merely the green wing of the techno-urban industrial system driving us on to ecological disaster. 

After having raised hopes of a ‘new’ politics, the necessity of parliamentary compromise and electoral appeal succeed only in bringing despair to activists and cynicism to voters. If the ‘old’ politics is failing owing to its symbiotic relation to a global economic system in crisis, any political 'success' of Green parties at the expense of Green principles and policies actually makes Greens something of a Trojan horse. By compromising with the system, the Greens actually canalize energies and efforts for the ecological society into sterile and destructive channels, allowing the system to pretend that it is taking steps towards ecological responsibility whilst giving full vent to the destruction rooted in exploitative economics and social and environmental injustice. 

Acting politically whilst resisting the ‘iron law’ is extremely difficult, but not impossible. Acknowledging the necessity of politics means also shedding any illusions about the nature of political power. Green parties need to back up their principles and policies with a sound understanding of the processes and pressures of politics. But it means more than this. ‘Realism’ ought not be used as a euphemism for compromise. Once principles are abandoned for electoral success and political appeal, then the game is lost. Learn a lesson from ‘parliamentary socialism’. Back in 1961 Ralph Miliband exposed the ‘parliamentary socialism’ of the Labour Party as the politics of futility. He bemoaned the way that the Labour Party is ‘the most dogmatic—not about socialism, but about the parliamentary system’. ‘The leaders of the Labour Party have always rejected any kind of political action (such as industrial action for political purposes) which fell, or which appeared to them to fall, outside the framework and conventions of the parliamentary system’ (Miliband 1987:13 Parliamentary Socialism 1987 Merlin Press). 
The clue to the failure of the Labour Party is contained in the reference to the party’s detachment from and opposition to the political action which is outside of the framework and conventions of the old politics. The Green Party originated as a social movement and should always be looking to strengthen its social roots as a condition of empowering and rejuvenating itself. That social base is the content to the political form.

What’s the point of principle without power, asked Tony Blair. He won three elections and proved that power without principle is itself not only pointless but utterly dispiriting. The strength of any politics is its principles. There is no point in being elected at the expense of one’s principles. And when these principles concern a ‘new’ society, as Green principles do with alternative forms of energy, decision making, economic activity etc., they will be vulnerable on account of their very difference. People are attached to the familiar, whether they like it or not. In the main, they opt for the known over the unknown. Any radical party is vulnerable to the logic of electoral politics.
The problem with realism is that it doesn’t work. To abandon crucial principles in order to win extra votes is immoral and is utterly unrealistic as a long term politics. The old phrase ‘easy come, easy go’ applies to passive support as passing trade. What is left is a disillusioned former support. This kind of politics is a demoralisation in a literal sense.
Here, one hears the words of James Lovelock talking about rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. It gives people something to do before the ship goes down. Plato compared politics to steering a ship safely. In 1969, Lewis Mumford wrote to social critic Roderick Seidenberg: "I think, in view of all that has happened the last half century, that it is likely the ship will sink."

Well, crisis is opportunity and expressions of pessimism are often motivated by the hope that enough will heed the warning and prove the prophecies of doom wrong. 

How? The trick is to navigate a route past the twin reefs of realism and fundamentalism. The problem will be found to originate in the inability to keep form and content together. Keeping principles and politics together is a question of ensuring correspondence of means and ends. The form of the Greens as a political party requires a constant replenishment from the base. The content of Green politics lies in the origins of the Green Party as a social movement. This social movement not only forms the content of the Green Party in the present but the social potential and institutional capacity for the Green polity of the future, the functioning forms of the associative civic public of the ecological society, 

Holistic politics
A Green party, no matter how much it confirms to actively democratic forms which challenge the model of conventional party politics, has a role to play in Green politics as one part of a greater whole. Real change cannot be brought about by purely instrumental, institutional and technical means; there are no technical fixes and there are no parliamentary fixes. This respects the basic ecological principle of interdependence and interconnectedness. Green politics is expansive and operates in a holistic way — building feasible alternatives through practical action whilst fighting election campaigns at the same time. By contesting elections, Greens are able to promote ecological ideas and extend the reach of ecological principles in the wider public, drawing not only a greater electoral support but increasing numbers into practical projects making the alternative society. With the spread of Green ideas, support for Green politics will increase at elections but even more important involvement in practical social and economic projects will increase, encouraging participants to vote Green. Those involved in projects for ecological renewal and transformation, however local and small scale, will be more likely to vote for a Green ‘new’ politics which offers an alternative to the politics of capitalism and economic growth. This is to set in motion a progressive cycle in which elections and practical action reinforce each other, spreading principles and empowering people. The electoral appeal 'Vote for us’ followed by any promise always leaves a party in an exposed position in that it invites passive support by giving the impression of power and initiative at the top. The conventional political sphere lacks this power and initiative and is caught within the constraints of political institutions and financial and economic imperatives. This particularly affects a radical politics aiming at change. The strength of such politics is its active support, its social roots and bases. Passive electoral appeal and support invites a demonstration of impotence, defeat and disillusionment. The greatest victory at elections lies in being able to address large numbers of people about the ecological crisis and encouraging them to make an active contribution to any number of practical ecological, community or social projects and campaigns. In other words, electoral politics is a way of promoting the extra-parliamentary action which forms the social and political content of the Green movement as a whole. By engaging in politics to encourage activism so that voters come to act as citizens involved in politics in civil society, Greens can escape the ‘iron law’ and avoid the all too typical fate of radical parties, emptied of their best ideas and robbed of their support.

There’s a first time for everything. A biocentric civilisation nowhere exists. This is the end in view, a wholly new way in which human beings regulate their interchange with nature, as part of nature. The scale of the looming ecological crisis – let alone political, economic and moral implosion – makes this task an imperative. If Green parties are not involved in attaining this end, the question is just what are they in politics for? And why anyone with an ecological awareness should be involved with them, let alone giving them support.

The controversy over political leadership indicates the extent of the challenge of a ‘new’ politics. There is a Taoist principle of leadership in which leaders merely guide and cajole in a passive, almost invisible sense and when human liberation is achieved the people say they did it themselves. Green leadership like the Green Party is, ultimately, self-dissolving in that the hallmark of the ecological society is that people lead themselves, govern their own affairs in common agreement. Whatever the conventions of parliamentary politics and electoral campaigns, the end of Green politics is the self-organizing, self-governing society in which individuals determine their purposes within the reciprocal relations of community, as against being controlled by external economic imperatives and hierarchical institutional structures. Self-organization is therefore both the ends and the means of Green politics, not only a characteristic of the ecological society but also a condition of its realisation. The means are the ends in the process of becoming. The ends do not justify the means; the means shape the ends. 'We had better aim not at seizing power but at eroding, undermining, democratizing, decentralizing and distributing.'(Dave Dellinger).

The hostile criticism of the press, political media and the traditional parties is predictable and should be anticipated. Greens should not compromise key principles as a response but affirm them all the more. Not only will this emphasise distinctiveness, it will serve the purpose of communicating a strong green message to the grassroots level. It is at this level, ultimately, that the success or otherwise of green politics will be determined, not TV and radio politics shows, not newspaper editorials. 

Practical action outside conventional channels is vital. Contesting elections is only one part of a green politics and getting the message across is as important in these elections as is their winning. A green politics is characterised by a social and communal activism and should be involved in building networks for organic producers, supporting city gardens and city farms, promoting local produce, creating community trusts, housing trusts, LETS schemes, ethical investment trusts and so on. All of which gives people a practical demonstration that positive change is possible and invests everyday society with social and political significance. In changing circumstances, people change themselves. In building the ecological society, people develop an ecological sensibility. Local campaigns, outings, festivals are a way of living ethics and politics and knitting activists together, creating social bonds and new solidarities. Organic producer networks, co-operative production and consumption, green fairs will all make politics more dynamic and relevant through activism. As against the passive individualistic support of electoral politics, where voters as individuals give support in expectation of some promise of future reward, a communal and ecological activism rewards activists with a tangible result and reward. Greens need to ground politics in personal and collective action transforming communities from below.

The activism and dynamism from within civil society is crucial to ensure Green politicians and parties stay Green. Top level politics requires a support network as the ultimate check against compromise on and retreat from green principles. Local councils, national parliaments and senates are exhausting as much as corrupting in what is required of its participants. There are institutional mechanisms to ensure rejuvenation (rotation in various forms, the interchange of representative and helper for instance). A diffusion of power and initiative is crucial since a top-heavy politics is easily separated from its support and contained. It is not a question of rejecting organization but finding new ways of organizing. 

Act locally, think globally
The slogan ‘act locally, think globally captures the ecological value of the interdependence of the parts within the whole. It captures the commitment to both local communalism and internationalism so that decentralisation and diffusion of power avoids parochialism and insularity. It affirms the possibility of acting small whilst thinking big. In fact, what matters is not size, small and large, but scale, appropriateness and competence. There is no such thing as ecologism in one country or national ecologism. A long lasting, sustainable economics and a better quality of life has to address the globalisation of trade, production and investment and all manner of other relations. 

An essential part of this is the commitment to scale, building societies and systems to human dimension and proportion. Only in appropriately sized, self-reliant communities foster the trust relations that build a sense of loyalty and participation, engender solidarities and reciprocities that enable the free and full development of individual potential. And with the globalisation of economic relations alongside the ICT revolution, localism and communalism can develop other regarding and outward looking orientations that avoid parochialism and insularity.

And this sense of loyalty to and participation in the local environment is an integral part of building a sense of the planet, participating in its laws and rhythms as a Gaian species. 

'Act locally, think globally' captures well the sensibility and society that Green politics is attempting to achieve. The approach savours a great deal of the old organic principle of subsidiarity, a core principle of Catholic and medieval social and political thought but which can also be seen in Hegel’s system of the ethical life, Sittlichkeit, the political philosophy of TH Green, Guild Socialism and elsewhere in the myriad attempts to build and empower intermediary associations between the centralised state and the atomised individuals of civil society. It could even be interpreted in terms of Marx’s critique of ‘alien power’ (Thomas 1995), with social power alienated to the state and capital being practically reappropriated and reorganised as a social power (Marx EW OJQ). 

The advantage of subsidiarity is that it proposes a way of taking effective action at the appropriate level of competence and avoids the dangers of a decentralisation that dissolves power downwards to levels which are incapable of acting in face of greater, more than local, problems. According to the principle of subsidiarity, power is located at its most appropriate level of competence so that nothing is done at a higher level that can be done at a lower level. It is a diffusion of power that enables individuals to become citizens and exercise personal responsibility in relation to each other in affairs of common concern. Individuals cease to be mere voters and taxpayers and instead are encouraged to assume the ultimate responsibility for things rather than blame external forces, parties and politicians, ‘the system', acting rather than voting someone or something else into office to do things on their behalf. Without this appropriate scaling and restructuring of power and resources, principles of greater self-reliance are merely pious words. The electoral system of representative democracy encourages individuals to see themselves as voters rather than citizens, acting out of self-interest and giving passive support to someone else. This undermines the element of participation in politics and undermines the sense of politics as a collective project in which each joins with others in pursuit of a common purpose or goal. The danger for Green parties is that they become so heavily involved in the electoral politics of representative democracy that they themselves also lose the participatory and solidaristic elements of a genuine citizen democracy. Traditional representative politics needs to be buttressed by a more participatory form of politics. ‘We are looking for a common power, a power to be used by all and shared by all’ (Petra Kelly, Green Line, no. 70, 1989, p. 14). And that entails a ‘new’ conception of politics as more than parties, parliaments and elections; and it means a new conception of power and its connection to human creativity and knowledge. 

Back in the 1990s Jeremy Rifkin wrote a book called Biosphere Politics and this title captures well the expansive nature of the local-global interconnection in politics. The biggest global issue of all pertains to the planet. The transition to a transnational capital system has created a supra-national economy populated by increasingly impotent national governments. For economic reasons alone a supra-national institutional and legal framework is required. The ecological crisis makes this imperative. An effective biospheric politics involves a new ecological way of conceiving space and requires a conception of governance beyond political borders.

The spatial map of the nation-state is based on outdated notions of capturing and controlling expanding markets. The global reach and private priorities of the transnational corporations have eliminated spatial boundaries and undermined the power of the state. Rather than expanding markets, the world is one single market of global commons. Old systems of governance cannot compete with the TNCs for control here, which effectively leaves business unregulated and irresponsible in exploiting the planet’s resources for private ends. Biosphere politics requires a new spatial map in which governing institutions which connect the local level of geographical lines of regional ecosystems with the global level of the biosphere.

‘Because biospheric politics is based on sustainable economic development, rather than ever-accelerating production, the ecosystem rather than the market dictates the spatial limits of political rule. Equally important, as biospheric consciousness is global and rooted in an organismic worldview, new international political institutions will need to be created to oversee and protect the entire biosphere of the planet (Rifkin 1991 BP 38).

The local-global interconnection thus extends from the ecosystem to the biosphere in a sustainable living. The destruction of the biosphere as a result of human technics is a challenge for human civilization to find arrangements which are fitted to the environment. Green politics is involved in creating a new way of life, aiming at a biocentric civilisation comprising new political institutions at both the local and global level, bioregions divided into ecoregions, georegions, and morpharegions.
Act locally, think globally therefore involves not merely a decentralisation but a fitting of governance to scale.
Green politics seeks to replace the centralisation and giantism of industrial societies with a decentralisation resting on non-hierarchical principles. The principle of decentralisation is influenced by Fritz Schumacher's Small is Beautiful'. Schumacher’s argument was that industrial society had become so large and complex that individual human beings no longer mattered. Perhaps the word ‘small’ in the title is misleading. Really, the book is an argument for humanly scaled political and economic institutions so that direct control gave individuals opportunities to participate effectively and exercise autonomy. Appropriate technologies are designed to serve the needs of properly scaled communities, thus giving human beings control over processes of production from the local level upwards. 

Green politics seek to apply the 'grass-roots' principle throughout all political and economic institutions as the basis for an active democracy. The way that decisions are made matters as much as the outcomes of decision making. All decisions should be taken at the most appropriate level, starting from the lowest. Der Grunen made directness a key principle of ‘basic democracy’, with 'replaceability at any time so as to make organisation and policy transparent to everyone and to counter the dissociation of individuals from their base' (pggp, p. 7).

Which begs the question as to what unit of self-governance corresponds to appropriate size and scale. Garden cities, eco-communities, villages, parishes which are self-contained in terms of economic, social and cultural activities, surrounded by an agricultural hinterland. 

How many people? How are numbers regulated and kept within limits. Schumacher writes of a city with a maximum population of 500,000 and governed by something like a local council. Bookchin is similar to Kropotkin in arguing for something of the size of the pre-industrial city (Bookchin, 1989; Kropotkin, 1955). 

Perhaps the whole approach is misconceived, apart from its manipulative overtones. Plato himself fixed the number of citizens of the ideal city at just over 5,000. Aristotle criticised the approach by arguing that the problem is not one of quantity in number but quality of internal relationships.

The most promising line of argument, since the end in view is a biocentric civilisation, concerns the bio-region as a geographic region large and diverse enough to meet all the needs of the human community it contains. Here again, numbers have been proposed, with Kirkpatrick Sale arguing that a typical bio-region would contain between 5,000 and 10,000 individuals (Dobson 1990).


The consistent thread that runs through green politics is that of the self-reliant community of co-operatives or self-employed craftsmen in which all public affairs are undertaken in face-to-face community meetings. As such, it locates itself in a tradition of active democracy that goes back to the Athenian polis and also comprises the medieval communes and city-states, the township democracy of early New England, the Paris Commune of 1871 and the workers’ councils of the early twentieth century (Tokar, 1987; Bookchin, 1989). 

The idea of municipal confederalism is completely out of kilter with the reality of politics in modern liberal democracies, but is this really a criticism? It all depends on just how deep the commitment is to a ‘new’ politics? The speed with which Der Grunen went from the active, participatory and anti-hierarchical principles of ‘basic democracy’ to sharing political power in coalition government is enough to suggest at least a tension, if not a flagrant contradiction. The tendency is for Green parties to begin as principled grass-roots decentralisers and then, with each political success, become more like the traditional political machines in becoming more centralised and hierarchical in structure (Kemp and Wall, 1990; Parkin, 1989). There is in this tendency a tacit admission that Green principles are utopian and cannot survive in the interstices of real world politics. Jonathon Porritt condemned the Green Party for 'living in a world of fantasy', engaging in politics whilst rejecting the concept of political leadership (Guardian, 22 March 1991). In September 1991 the 'realos' won over the ‘fundis’ as the British Green Party gave itself a more centralised structure with two spokespersons. In April 1991 the German Green Party abandoned the principle of the rotation of posts, causing a breakaway, the Ecological Left/Alternative List in May 1991. 

So perhaps, all along, the problem lay with the utopian claims to a ‘new’ politics in the first place. A Green politics that claims a lineage going back to Athens and including all manner of communes and guilds and city-states and town meetings isn’t a ‘new’ politics at all, just a particular way of conducting politics. 

The diversity of forms with which Green politics expresses itself indicates not so much confusion as the extent to which environmental issues are capable of expression in a variety of social settings - from local campaigns to transnational corporations and from community initiatives to government programmes. This variety itself expresses the wide ranging scope of environmental issues, from matters of ozone depletion, global warming and pollution which affect all to questions of factory pollution, road construction or urban quality of life at a local level.

Whilst it is difficult to locate each action on the global/local link continuum, that link does highlight the underlying commonality to these issues in 'the challenge of sustainability'. The challenge of sustainability is as much social as it is technical or environmental and, being so, involves a recognition of the necessity of politics. Sustainable living requires that human beings form a new social compact, human beings coming together organize their common life in such a way that is indeed 'sustainable'. 

The concept of 'sustainability' needs to be defined with respect to power and knowledge. A major part of this concerns the relationship of human being – ontology – with the environment, the built environment made by human beings and the natural world, pertaining to ways of 'living with' and 'knowing' the environment.  

Those coming from an ecological perspective are well placed to intervene in the debates concerning the effects of economic globalisation. A crucial aspect of that intervention concerns the principles and practices by which global dynamics proceed in a way that ensures economic, social and environmental well-being. Often the phrase 'sustainable development' is used to denote these principles and practices but a better phrase is ‘sustainable living’ since technical and instrumental character of the developmental aspect is tempered by notions of health and happiness.


The question of economic globalisation involves an examination of the state and existing political institutions. It means asking questions about politics, democracy and citizenship. Much of the debate involves the location of power, upwards, downwards or both according to appropriate scale. Globalisation implies a supra-national perspective in which power is invested in structures and processes of global governance and government to ensure the effectiveness of policies for 'the greater good'. At the same time, power can be devolved to sub-national systems of decision-making to ensure the vigour and vitality of the parts. Above all, it is necessary to avoid fracturing the case for appropriate scale into a stark choice between either the supra-state level or the sub-state level (Wapner 1995). It is not an either/or question but a question of appropriate scale, power residing at the level at which it is most effective, responsible and accountable. Both supra-statists and sub-statists agree that existing state systems are implicated in the current environmental crisis but disagree as to whether power should be transferred up or down the spatial scale in the necessary reorganisation of political life.

How about power goes both up and down the spatial scale so that it is appropriately located along the local-global continuum. It is a question of how power is best deployed. The advantage of act locally, think globally encapsulates the extensive spatial scale in a world where all manner of human relations have become transnational beyond the old legal and political boundaries. In this context, ‘small is beautiful’ highlights possibilities in only one aspect. Indeed, there is a danger that decentralisation can render power ineffective, with the result that global problems continue unabated. Ecologists should appreciate this point most of all with respect to the threat to the global commons as a consequence of processes of development and economic globalisation. The attempt by national governments to agree an agenda for sustainable development, results routinely fall short of targets. What this suggests is an 'implementation deficit' (Crowley 1999) as a result of scales of governance inadequate to the problem. The failure of strategies of sustainable development to check ecological destruction, social dislocation and economic crisis indicates an institutional framework of politics which lacks effective control and is incapable of addressing issues at their level. 

A Green politics as the politics of constructive social change needs to view conventional politics as one aspect of a more expansive conception of political activity. Indeed, a politics of change is effective only when buttressed by activity and organisation outside the conventional political arena. Democracy in its fundamental form is the active rule of the people, and thus concerns how people live and control their lives in relation to each other. What this means in the sense of extensive public spaces cannot be determined given the infinite number of ways in which people can express their power from the microstructures of everyday life to formal electoral politics.

It is a mistake to disregard politics in the conventional parliamentary arena as an ‘old’ politics. For all of its many flaws, it still commands widespread allegiance and remains the public face of politics. A movement that is serious about politics needs a profile in this arena. That said, there are pressures and conventions of traditional politics which militate against any radical politics that relocates its challenge from the wider social sphere to the narrow official sphere. It is by revaluing the sense of social movement, in the more pluralistic, more expansive sense of community organising and civic activism that Green politics will thrive as a force for social change.

The global nature of economic and ecological problems ensures the continued relevance of Green politics, organised around a consistent set of principles. Green politics, organised around a universal interest and ethic of sustainable living, is a global phenomenon that will remain as an ecologically sound alternative available within the global integration of trade, production and investment. It is an alternative which keeps a sense of the local and the global as connected according to a continuum in contrast to an economic globalisation which imposes economic imperatives on localities and communities from the outside and from above.

Green politics as a movement is expansive and outer looking, proceeding from the local in accordance with principles of decentralization and grassroots democracy, making wider connection by means of alliances and coalitions, to take shape at the national and the international level. The local level is therefore integrated within a complex of global community and citizen-based networks, ICT enabled and disseminating information and resources concerning ecology around the world. Somewhere on this continuum, practical activity can connect up with the efforts of campaigning groups like Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, and any number of animal welfare groups. All of which is a part of creating an ecological sensibility.

The slogan 'Think Globally, Act Locally' captures the best way to proceed. Green politics, as party and movement, expands from and is powered by the grassroots, proceeding within global networks which disseminate information concerning local developments and integrating local activities within a global vision. The end is to organise contact between local organizations within emerging global networks so as to ensure effective cooperation for the formulation of Green principles into Green policies and the implementation of these policies on the global arena.

By focusing on political activity at the local level, Greens politics demonstrates the power of people to change both their environment and themselves as part of the same process. This is an ecological praxis, engendering the ecological sensibility and the grass-roots basis for a fundamental social transformation. Whilst problems of ecology, economics, war etc are global in their scale, involvement in practical projects creating alternatives in food, shelter and other basic needs up to and including real community control and economic cooperation all offer forms of local activity with global implications and consequences. 

An ecological sensibility offers an ethical and psychological framework to connect the particular projects of local issue-oriented work together. Thus, the arms industry fuels war and militarization, distorts regional employment and investment patterns, and produces massive quantities of toxic wastes. Campaigns against the arms industry can be resisted as a threat to jobs and investment and need address worker security and community control, connecting these local interests to broader questions concerning the nature of economic and technological change, involving specific proposals of how such facilities can be converted to peaceful civilian uses. Large development projects are sold on the employment and investment they bring, blunting campaigns against the destruction of farmland, wildlife habitats, green spaces and communities. A Green campaign integrates these concerns whilst showing how development destroys the local economy by centralizing control in the hands of global players outside of the community.
 Electoral campaigns are a vehicle for bringing ecological ideas to a broader public. Campaigning for election can attract a media attention for Greens not normally available and give an opportunity for Greens to reach a greater cross-section of the public. An increasing number of Green candidates are being elected at various levels, but more important than this is publicising certain issues and reshaping public discourse. At a time when the parameters of political debate are being narrowed within terms acceptable to business elites, principled Green electioneering serves to maintain a public focus for issues of environmental protection, social welfare and health, democratic control and human rights and liberation, in the very least reminding and hopefully shaming erstwhile labour and social democratic parties of commitments they have shed in order to demonstrate their fitness to govern to financial and business elites. When such positions attract popular support, the major parties must take note. Win or lose, a Green politics shows the possibility of an alternative.
Electoral politics comes with dangers, however. Having an 'audience' for Green ideas is not the same thing as intellectual, moral and psychological commitment, conviction or even acceptance. This deeper cultural transformation comes with practical participation in activities that transform society from below, not passive consent for promises to be delivered from above via the conventional political arena. Electoral campaigns should complement local and community grass-roots activities, not replace them. 

 Media campaigns sustained by well-funded think tanks notwithstanding, environmental problems have not only not gone away, but are intensifying. So much so, that predictions of ecological disaster are not required. The impact of ecological crisis is felt in the here and now – adverse and extreme weather conditions, increasingly violent storms, disappearing rainforests, the hole in the ozone layer, global warming, losses of biodiversity. Every single problem backed by such a wealth of scientific evidence that the question is what psychological and institutional processes are at work to prevent governments and peoples taking the required action (Requiem for a Species). 

One of the most important aspects of a Green politics is to widen horizons whilst emphasizing the various levels at which ecological principles cease to be an abstraction and instead become a lived reality for people in their communities and workplaces. This realises ethics in the original Greek sense of ethos, a practice or way of life, bringing psychological senses of security, dignity, purpose, fulfilment, conviviality, identity, service to others, trust, belonging, solidarity. There is a need to organise public life so that each has a social role and identity in relation to people and place. 

The end of environmental security is served by action which checks and reverses the trends which are destroying the planet’s ecosystem. This means redefining development so as to practise sustainable living. And it means engaging in politics so as to transform conventional political theory and practice according to the incorporation of ecological insights. 

Take growing resource conflicts— water or pollution. The confrontational mode of conventional politics exacerbates such conflicts whilst failing to address the root cause. An ecologically informed politics would relate human linear logic to Nature's circular or cyclical logic, along the lines of Lovelock’s cybernetic Gaia hypothesis.

The phrase charity begins at home comes with the corollary that it doesn’t end there and the same applies to environmental sustainability. It extends on an unbroken chain from local concerns up to the global biosphere. The argument recognises that what matters most to human beings and what motivates their concern and efforts the most are things that are closer to home. The key is to connect this specific focus within a broader connection of time and space, life far off on the horizon. 

Gwyn Prins Global Security Institute has the stated aims of Stewardship, Sustainability and Survival. Stewardship, sustainability and survival are not principles that can be embraced in piecemeal fashion. There can be no ecology in one country. Environmental goals can only be achieved on a supra-national basis through cooperation between national governments. And this switch from confrontational to cooperative modes in politics will help us to avoid a future of more and more conflict over fewer and fewer resources. 

Existing institutions are not adequate to the task of dealing with the long term future of life on earth. They are tailored to short term thinking that addresses individuals at the level of self-interest and are designed to engage in conflict over resources. Given that the threats to the environment develop, they are difficult to recognize and easy to ignore or deny. The reactions of existing political institutions, even under favourable circumstances, are likely to be out of date and hence inadequate to the task. The danger point will have been passed before the electorate start waking political institutions up and demanding action. Political institutions need to develop and embody a long term strategic thinking capacity that responds in timely fashion to indicators and warnings concerning the environmental problems, resource disputes, climate difficulties. Ultimately, the success of this strategic capacity depends on being located within a co​ordinated international framework. The precautionary principle speaks of 'late lessons from early warnings, cataloguing a series of situations like fisheries, asbestos, chemical contamination of the Great Lakes and BSE where early warnings were ignored — to our later cost.' This requires a political and institutional framework that is able to respond to scientific findings, withstanding pressure from vested interests and lobby groups to formulate appropriate policy options.

The challenge is to bridge the gap a reactive current politics which responds to crises as they occur and a proactive approach to anticipated ecological problems. The problem with long term climate change is that the most effective action is required long before its tangible effects are apparent enough to cause the electorate to demand or accept necessary actions. An effective political framework needs to connect short and long range thinking and perspectives so that long-term eventualities cease to be abstractions by being embedded in current realities — through specific programmes dealing with energy, through market instruments and incentives to promote energy efficiency, through improvements to public facilities, and so on. People seem to be motivated or satisfied when they can see that action and effort produces tangible benefits, when they can see the result of their labours. The advantage of practical projects and programmes is that they can deliver short-term benefits to the local economy and to people's immediate quality of life whilst being mindful of long term ecological eventualities. Ecological issues thus cease to be abstractions on the horizon by being incorporated into practical activities. 

A new slogan might be relevant in this context: 'Act today, think tomorrow.' There are some scientists who are proceeding on the basis that it is already too late and that existing political institutions will not change. The only thing to do is ensure good quality research to aid decision making when ecological catastrophe finally strikes.

It seems that short-term thinking is hard wired into the electorate, its representatives in the traditional parties and the political system locked into the systemic imperatives of the global economy. Either we wait for disaster and hope this brings the world to its senses – conflictual politics within a context of resource scarcity does not augur well – or we find a way of addressing long term threats by developing policies and projects which deliver short term benefits. This is part of evolving the long term strategic thinking capacity that James Lovelock says is required for the next phase of human history. Short term self-interest is the bedrock of the individualist politics and economics of modern society. There is no doubting the popularity of this individualism. The problem with egoism is that it addresses human beings at the lowest rung of human potentiality – desires, wants, impulses. For all of the talk of freedom and democracy, institutions and systems tailored to short term self-interest manacle individuals to a level that falls far short of a more expansive, richer set of human possibilities. 

The solution is to develop institutions and practices as a learning mechanism so that individuals are able to ascend the levels of cognition and potentiality, extending sociality in time and space through reciprocal relations and mutual obligations of citizenship to realise a greater range of human attributes. With respect to ecology, short-term self-interest is set within a long-term framework of stewardship that develops the wisdom, courage, and restraint to deal with the fundamental realities of sustainable living on a finite planet. 

Developing a vision of how this can be achieved requires new levels of openness and creativity in politics, absorbing all the scientific, moral and philosophical resources that are available and incorporating them into an ecological praxis focused on stewardship, sustainability and survival. 

This book explores the relation of ecology and politics. It recognises the electoral successes of Green parties and affirms the necessity of politics; however it notes the continuing marginality of the world's various green parties within traditional political arenas and asks whether this is such a bad thing. Given that traditional parties which once commanded upwards of 50% of the vote are themselves in decline, Green parties could be guilty of overrating the importance of electoral success and underestimating the educative function of getting the Green message across. 

On various levels - critiques of conflictual models of settling political disputes, the roots of the current crisis in the mastery of nature (Latour 1993), ecology cannot be inserted into the existing institutional framework without ceasing to be ecology by losing the connection with nature. Ecology requires to be understood as an alternative to the modern techno-industrial order, a new way of regulating all the objects of human and non-human collective life.3

Since its inception, the green movement has made the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics. Closer analysis exposes uncertainty and confusion. A ‘new politics’ is not an anti-politics, but a new form of politics. A ‘new’ form that addresses the ‘old’ issues of class, justice, allocation and distribution of resources, economics, poverty and draws upon a tradition that dates back to Athenian democracy. Accepting this as politics helps remove some of the uncertainty in the eco-movement with respect to ideals and their realisation. 

The biggest uncertainty of all concerns whether Greens are ecologists or environmentalists. As ecologists, they would be committed to an alternative civilisation; as environmentalists they would seek the integration of eco-concerns into people's everyday life via rules, regulations, institutional intervention and government policy. This is not an alternative civilisation but the environmental reform of the present one, akin to the health, sanitation, hygiene and town and country acts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Green parties thus disappear as other political parties, governments and citizens add another layer of behaviour and regulation to their everyday concerns. (Lascoumes 1994). But is this progressive normalisation of eco-activity success or failure? A reduction to environmentalism identifies The Green Party as the green wing of the very techno-urban industrial system which is destroying the planet’s biosphere. 
The alternative is to see ecology as implying a new civilisation, a new way of regulating the human interchange with nature on the assumption that all things are interdependent, that humankind and nature are one and the same thing and that the political imperative now is to govern a single system of nature and of society so as to prevent moral, economic and ecological disaster. 

This 'globalisation' of the ecological perspective as a new biocentric civilisation is a political and social ecology rather than a deep ecology. As such, it reforms but does not replace the traditional domain of political action, which continues as the common ground of numerous practical activities and campaigns forming the public imaginary (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).

Nature and society as one single system does not imply the submersion of politics and of society into nature. This would be the end of politics, lacking in popular appeal and plausibility. The ‘nature’ of this deep ecology is an abstraction which transcends the ordinary horizons of citizens. For, as the Gaia hypothesis makes clear (Lovelock 1979) and as deep ecologists acknowledge, this Nature is not human, and the human species is only one amongst many, of no greater importance than the others within the whole. As a science, one can admire its disinterested purity. It is, however, lacking in political sense and plausibility; human beings have a vested interest in human concerns. And they have a view, a perspective, a notion which leads to an attachment to democracy. There is a temptation to eco-dictatorship, an enlightened or benevolent despotism, in the notion of a single substance called Nature whose laws and properties are accessible only to scientists. The infinitely complex architecture of this Nature as a totality would be those with specialists, whose expertise and knowledge raises them above common humanity, the demos (Lafaye and Thevenot 1993). 

There is a real problem here. This is Plato’s old question of the relation of philosophy and politics. If one accepts the ancient Greek distinction between knowledge (nous) and opinion (doxa) – and it is difficult to see how any scientist, ecologist or otherwise, cannot respect that division – then it comes with the corollary that there is a hierarchy of enlightenment in which the views of those who know count for more than the views of those who don’t. Opinion is not of the same merit as knowledge. Those who criticise this for its anti-democratic implications, such as Popper, who finds a totalitarian impulse in Plato’s allegory of the cave, ignore that the business of everyday life operates according to this principle. A person with toothache consults a dentist rather than a bookmaker, a person with a hernia visits a doctor rather than a car mechanic. If you want to know about time and space, the views of Stephen Hawking are more relevant than those of Ant and Dec. And if anyone with a serious concern in ecology is still in doubt about the importance of the knowledge-opinion distinction, consider that the most vociferous critics of climate science include such luminaries as Peter Hitchens, Anne Widdecombe, Melanie Phillips, Alan Titchmarsh, Neil Hamilton, Carol McGiffen from Loose Women, and Richard Madeley. If democracy means that the views of each and all count for the same, then hundreds of thousands of scientific papers, articles and publications are on the same level as the opinions of those above. Either we have knowledge and can gain knowledge or we can’t. If we can, then it follows that knowledge is of a higher quality than opinion. Which means that those with the knowledge have a greater weight than those who don’t.

The only way to avoid a dictatorship of specialists and experts whilst affirming the knowledge-opinion distinction is create a societal and institutional learning mechanism which can guide individuals to higher levels in the learning continuum.

Historical experience does not favour Plato’s Philosopher Ruler. The rule of specialists and experts lacks legitimacy in being detached from the ordinary rank and file of citizens. 
Affirming Nature as an all-embracing totality which subsumes the human species along with all other life forms diminishes humanity in two ways, by affirming an entity which has priority over humankind and by privileging a technocracy of knowledge over ordinary human beings capable only of opinion (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).
The result is that (deep) ecology becomes inflated as an end beyond political controversy and debate, handing power to specialists and experts outside of the world of politics and who minister to a natural unity which no longer has the political domain as its concern (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).

Practical experience does not encourage faith in this perspective. All government proceeds with the consent of the governed. A detached scientific elite will not have this consent.
There is a paradox in ecology as politics. Ecologists want ecology to be at the heart of political action without being absorbed and assimilated in an existing political system and its priorities. How to avoid marginalisation without falling victim to integration?
There are a number of formulae which address the paradox: 'think globally, act locally', integrated management, sustainable development, etc. 

Green politics should not be judged by electoral results. Rather, electoral support is one part of a whole which integrates different facets within a general movement that ends up embracing the whole planet. The commitment to small causes derives from the certain knowledge of wider connections so that eventually the movement assumes responsibility for all the big issues. (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).
Ecology thus comes to address itself to the whole task of political life. Yet Green parties across the world seem to be able to command little more than 5 per cent of the votes, 10-15 per cent tops. To command a greater electoral presence seems to require more compromise on principle and a greater mirroring of the conventional politics that Greens were supposed to replace. The Green Party has to find a way of overcoming the marginalisation of green principles whilst avoiding the integration of green parties. What makes it likely that green politics is not a passing trend is the ubiquitous and growing nature of the environmental crisis.
In large part the confusion and the difficulty lies in the attempt to marry the world of knowledge and the world of opinion, science and politics. Green politics is an attempt to incorporate the insights of ecology into political practice and public policy. Failure to give permanent expression and organisation to practical campaigns and projects, Green politics makes little inroads into the mass electorate, making practical action politically effective and ensuring enduring and consistent political viability. (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).

The key challenge is to reorganise political society on the basis of reciprocal relations that connect the small community within an international context. The slogan 'act locally - think globally’ captures the need for cooperative endeavour and international responsibility. International cooperation is more easily stated as an ideal than achieved in the real. 

Greens in the past tried to talk past the global political economy, arguing that the problems of class exploitations are insignificant by comparison with humankind as a whole exploiting nature (Alsopp 1972 P93). The two forms of exploitation are linked, the case for social justice and environmental justice is the same.

Claims like 'The old-fashioned politics of class conflict are grinding to a halt. The politics of life start here' and ‘We’re all in it together’ (the Ecology Party 1983 p20) reveal a dangerous political naivety, suggesting an inability to get to the social and economic roots of environmental crisis and, worse, inviting repressive and reactionary policies as a result of addressing problems of resources, consumption, population etc in abstraction from social relations. 

Murray Bookchin claims that 'environmentalism is merely a technocratic attempt to contain ecological disruption within the framework of capitalism' (i.e. it is merely technocentric). The social ecology he espouses argues for the 'non-hierarchical nature of ecosystems and the importance of ecological diversity for stability'. This points to not only a ‘new’ politics but a new civilisation, a non-hierarchical and diverse society as the prerequisite to an ecologically harmonious human-nature relationship. 

These criticisms expose the limitations of a technologically-oriented form of ecology as environmentalism, assimilating ecological necessities to conditions of exploitation. In other words, whilst capitalism is destructive of the planet’s ecology, it can assimilate the potential threat to the system by defining them as environmental problems. 

The critique of environmentalism should make us sceptical of the politics of Green parties who emphasise a pluralistic approach of reform through Parliament. Far from being the new politics of life, this is the well-trodden ground of parliamentary socialism.
The truth in the ecological prognostications of the Greens needs to be complemented by a more sophisticated social analysis. 
The strength of the Green position is the recognition that there has been a quantum leap in the environmental problems generated by modern industrialisation which calls for a fundamental rethinking in the way that human beings organise their affairs. To the charges of utopianism from the Marxist camp, Greens can point to a recognition that 'any possible future belongs to the realm of necessity and not that of freedom, and that every political theory and practice, including that of socialists, is confronted not with the problem of abundance but survival' (Ensenbergef 1974).
 
Rudolf Bahro locates the 'impulse to self-destruction' (Via an arms race and an ecology crisis) in industrial capitalism, an 'impulse' he finds in human nature itself. Thus 'so long as we continue to see class struggle as the key to the contemporary crisis we will only remain trapped in the very circle out of which it is imperative to break'. Bahro shifts the emphasis from capitalist forms of industrialisation to industrialisation as such. The impulse to exterminism lies in the very foundation of industrialisation. Transformation begins with the individual. 'We have to embark on a psychological revolution that starts with ourselves, and liberates our politics from the aggressive model of reactive class antagonism that only reinforces and accelerates exterminism'. Human beings must agree on means and ends 'in a common project capable of subordinating the opposing special interests of all those engaged in it to their own fundamental and long-term interests' (Bahro 1982).
It would take a number of volumes to give comprehensive coverage that does justice to the issues discussed. Instead the text concentrates on the connection between means and ends as an attempt to join theory and practice at the political level. It recognises the necessity of politics, even though the long term ideal is not just a new politics but a new civilisation. 





The notion of The Green Party as the ‘anti-party party’ is ‘an acknowledgement of the paradox of working within a party political system and having to organise activities as a party, while at the same time believing that such an organisation is largely antithetical to green thinking.’ (Dictionary of Green Ideas). The Green Party is thus self-dissolving in the manner of Marx’s dictatorship of the proletariat should have been self-dissolving. Instead the party became the state.

The rationale behind the ‘anti-party’ formulation is the same which supports Green politics as a ‘new’ politics beyond the divisions of left and right. Party derives from the Latin partire, meaning to divide. The system of political parties aiming to be elected to government stands condemned as divisive and competitive, exaggerating marginal differences whilst simplifying complicated issues in order to appeal to the worst and most selfish aspirations of the electorate. Such a system violates the ecological principle of integrated systems, with pretend divisions in public masking an agreement on fundamentals in private. Working within a party political and electoral system challenges Greens to make a fist of keeping means and ends united within the contradictory identity of being a ‘Green Party’. Ecology into Economics Won’t Go was the title of a book by S McBurney. There is some debate as to whether ecology and politics as such are compatible, let alone participation within the very political system which administers the ecologically destructive economics which is the target of McBurney’s book.
The paradox is that many people’s interest in the Greens begins at the level of principle, the protection of the environment, feminism, peace, animal rights, but these principles can tend to be diluted in order to widen electoral appeal. In other words, the very things which made the Greens stand out from conventional political parties can, in time, get lost in the yearly grind of electoral politics. So it is as well to give a reminder as to what it was and is that makes the Greens different. The Greens affirm the interdependence of all things, proposing an integrated approach to social, economic and ecological issues, which are interrelated in nature and connect all from the local to the global. The Greens address the alienation from nature as the cause of the 'spiritual impoverishment' of industrialized societies. The Greens put questions on the political agenda that none of the traditional parties could answer or wanted to. 
But appeal brings political success, which in turn involves Greens in some paradoxes. Principles take political shaped in the programmes of Green parties and stand better chance of being applied as the parties win seats in city councils, county assemblies, and state legislatures. The antiparty party, the political voice of various community and citizen movements, wins political office at various levels as a political party.
And the biggest appeal of this anti-party party was its origins in a variety of new social movements. The party grounded in a diverse movement, holding together a genuine coalition of ecologists and peace activists, holistic theorists and anti-nuclear-power activists, scientists and animal rights campaigners, feminists and Third World activists, value-conservatives and left wing socialists. ‘The party’ as a successful combination of various elements serves as a model of the future public life. 

Whether the party ever does develop into that future ecological society depends upon how successful the Greens operate on the terrain of the state and parliament so as to channel voters in the direction of community and civic activism rather than canalise the activist roots into sterile political channels. To turn a social movement into a political party is to empty Green politics of the embryonic political structure which it had within it. Can the Green Party pursue electoral success without dispossessing its principled members of its  original base. 

In electoral terms, the identity ‘Green’ can be a liability, with many perceiving the party to be a ‘single issue’ party. Aside from the argument that ecology is an ‘issue’ that embraces all life forms on Earth, the identification underestimates the complexity of inputs, arguments, and activities that comprise Green parties. The diversity of Green politics is impressive, with the party having its roots a number of political traditions, the student movement of the late 1960s and the campaigns against nuclear power, "citizens' initiatives" and movements. These essentially extra-parliamentary and anti-party origins caused resistance to proposals for political leadership, formal structures, electioneering and other aspects of conventional political parties. That issue has been settled, the ‘realos’ triumphing over the ‘fundis’.

The constitution of a Green movement as a party has thus been accompanied by serious misgivings. The real question is not really one of party structure and operation – devices such as "rotation" of members of parliament, limits on the proportion of their salary that MPs may retain for personal use, the direct accountability of the elected to the electors, and a prohibition on the holding of party offices by those who sit in parliament. Whilst these devices express the actively democratic convictions of the Greens and seek to avoid the creation of hierarchies of professional politicians that is the nature of the political beast. Effective political representation, intervention, influence and drafting and implementation of legislation does require ‘professional’ politicians. That is their job. More important than this is to ensure that representation in parliament and other legislative chambers is not the sole or even the main focus of Green politics, just its organised political profile at the level of ‘high politics’. The strength remains low politics at the base, the broader social movement with its practical projects, citizen initiatives, community campaigns, demonstrations, and grassroots activities.

Involvement in parliamentary institutions, coalitions and election campaigns gives a valuable publicity to Green politics but is itself the visible end of a diverse and diffuse spectrum that runs the whole breadth from organised politics to grassroots community and civic activism.

Rudolf Bahro puts the strongest case for Green fundamentalism. He rejects ‘realism’ as a series of compromises with the very political and economic system that is destroying the planet. For Bahro, the Green Realos are the dupes of a system that simply wants them to help pretend that the environmentally destructive impacts of the system are being addressed whilst preserving the destructive system intact. This merely extends the life of the ecologically destructive system whilst feeding the illusion that environmental issues are being addressed. Bahro denounces environmental reformism as "euthanasia as Green politics", as symbolized in the anti-pollution filters of the "eco-industrialists" and their "catalytic converters for the next boom in the car industry". 
"It is the time, not of reformists, but of a reformation, which has now commenced."
Strong words, which amount to the commitment to the building of a new civilisation. Bahro writes of "a change so deep that one must speak of a break with basic European patterns of behaviour", and "the building of a new psychology". Bahro argues that the fall of the Roman Empire is "the only event which can be compared in dimension with the present-day crisis of civilization". And he takes as his inspiration the communal monastic orders which emerged to found civilisation anew. These monastic orders, the Benedictines in particular, offer a model for our way forward.

Before one dismisses this ‘eco-monasticsm’ as hopelessly reactionary, its striking resemblance to the conclusions formed by moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre at the end of After Virtue are worth emphasising. Now MacIntyre too has been criticised as a nostalgic philosopher unable to identify alternative and progressive lines of development within modernity. That is to take Hegel’s ‘high road’ out of modernity. 

Bahro and MacIntyre clearly deny that possibility. MacIntyre looks to those examples of communality which have survived since medieval times to ground attempts to preserve human civilisation. Bahro looks to the creation of "zones liberated from the industrial system", the liberation of "surplus consciousness" and the "surplus energies" that human beings have not yet surrendered to the system. From this perspective, the Green promise is not redeemed in the accumulation of a greater share of votes and seats, but in slowly but surely accumulating a greater share of the popular consciousness, regardless of formal political allegiance. 

Before condemning Bahro for unrealistic politics, one should remember the success of the monastic orders in building a civilisation that lasted a thousand and more years. And one should also remember that the point of Green politics is to engender an ecological consciousness or sensibility within the broadest sections of the world’s population, regardless of race, colour, creed, nationality, ethnicity. Across this public, party loyalty is the least important and the most ephemeral. Unless one does think that The Green Party of any nation will win sufficient electoral support for a majority government. Given the way that national parliamentary institutions have been drained of real power in a globalised economic environment and given the general drift of support and attachment away from political parties, this really does amount to utopian thinking.

It is no longer possible to rely on the methods and institutions of a conventional parliamentary politics that has been disempowered in an era of globalised economic relations. At the same time, to work exclusively through extra-parliamentary channels directs Green politics into a cul-de-sac. A genuinely ‘new’ politics combines party and movement and functions both in parliament and outside it. This combination is captured by the idea of the ‘anti-party party’. The question is can the Greens keep those two aspects in play? It is about form and content. It is often claimed that voting is the choice between lesser evils. This is a definition that severs politics from its roots in the search for the good public life. A lesser evil is still an evil. In an era of increasing cynicism it is important that those who propose an alternative to offer a platform based on principled content rather than merely give voters another lesser evil to waste a vote on. The criticisms that established parties and political commentators direct at certain aspects of Green politics should be taken as evidence of the inability of the existing political culture to address fundamental questions of survival. Confidence in content easily outweighs the nervousness that results from shaping slogans and soundbites for uncertain and transitory electoral appeal. Undertaking a radical examination all the fundamental issues facing society gives a moral and intellectual force that withstands the triviality that typifies political debate. The only thing to insist on is to give examples of successful practice to buttress a statement of principle.

The social movements express demands for a peaceful and environment-conscious future or for community control or cooperative enterprise that, since outside of the pro-business agenda, are no longer expressed through the established party system. However, social movements which operate exclusively outside parliament suffer an implantation deficit. At best, they can bring pressure to bear upon the political process, but only as one more pressure or interest group amongst many. They would stand greater chance of translating their demands into public policy if the case could also be put in parliament. Despite understandable concerns to preserve autonomy from politics, particularly organised politics, to be politically effective the social movements, citizen campaigns need to find a place within the political system, a form of political engagement, given the fact that the conventional or official political sphere remains the principle arena which decides which issues figure on the political agenda and which commands the most public attention. There is an ecological imperative but there is also a political imperative for social, citizen and community movements to carve a political identity for themselves within the established arena. Which is not to abandon the social roots. On the contrary, political expression and representation is only effective if it is backed with social content, that is, if extra-parliamentary forces and local action groups continue to flourish in the associational space of civil society. Green politics requires that the party organisation at one end is in touch with and constantly nourished by the anti-party movement at the other end. The party is the unity and the movement is the diversity contained within. The party gives form to content, the content is the life force of the form. Green politics flourishes with grass-roots activism: citizen initiatives, community organisation, rank and file groups in the trade unions, alternative media, the peace movement and its members in the Green party.

The intention of The Green Party is not to become the environmental wing of the existing political system, becoming a mirror of the established parties. Alliance and coalition is not to help other parties maintain power and privilege but to work for practical policy and reforms.

Problems of environment, peace, society and the economy are of such a scale that their resolution is a matter of structural transformation that gets to root causes, not by crisis management and institutional adjustments. Politics is all about strategic compromise, working with others in order to achieve things that otherwise would not be achieved. Compromise for strategic purposes is not only acceptable but necessary given the diversity of agents and forces in the real world. At no point does strategic compromise imply compromise on fundamental principles concerning social and environmental justice, peace, sexual equality and the economy.

Green politics will have a future so long as the world faces the challenge of living in a sustainable way on the planet. The Green Party has no future if it attempts to win office and use government in the manner of the established parties. The history of ‘parliamentary ecologism’ has already been written. It is Ralph Miliband’s Parliamentary Socialism with different names. Coalition politics, networking with others, should be second nature to ecologists, and offers a way of ensuring that parliament represents the interests of all the people. Its origins as a social movement reveal The Green Party as a coalition. Given the symbiotic connection of the state and capital, parliaments have acted as the executive body for powerful interests.

Green politics seeks to ensure a form of political representation that is capable of responding to the demands of those who act and organise outside of parliament within communities. The Greens aim to democratize the political sphere, publicising issues outside of the stranglehold of business and finance, and presenting alternatives to the people. Green principles must be given political shape in the form of programmatic objectives, so that Greens engage in debate and discussion and face criticism armed with practicable alternatives. Backing principles with feasible projects and policies and connecting politics within parliament with politics in the everyday life world, Green parties should aim to inspire individuals to making an active contribution to the public life of their communities, thus shedding the hopelessness, despair, cynicism and apathy which conventional politics has brought them to.

The Green Party is half party and half social movement, the anti-party party that has one foot within the conventional political sphere and one foot in the real organisations and groups of the people as citizens. The learning process that begins in society proceeds to the political level and must be carried into effective public policy.

A political party is not end in itself, a state in miniature. When it becomes so, the distinctive principles for which it stands are replaced by what is functional for the status quo. All such parties adhere to a hierarchical structure fitted to the political system and making spontaneous, principled action impossible. All politically meaningful decisions are taken at the top only and principles exists in name only.


33 NEW POLITICS AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Hitting a moving target; explaining political change
Finding the relation and the rhythm of political continuity and change is the lodestar of the political universe, the key to explaining the meaning and course of political action. All such action is motivated by a concern with the good life, either resisting change to preserve the good or promoting change to realise the good. Change remains the critical problematic of moral and political philosophy, the elemental fact of political life which the greatest intellects have attempted to theorise in order to determine its momentum and shape its direction.

With the words ‘all that is solid melts into air’ Marx identified the key characteristic of modernity. The most salient characteristic of modernity is its endless modernisation. The most cursory glance at the contemporary world reveals that modern society is redolent with a whole range of changes at both micro and macro level - demographic movements, structural transformations, developments in political institutions, shifting party alignments and allegiances, and moral and cognitive metamorphoses in terms values, attitudes, expectations and lifestyles. It is easy enough to promote one’s politics in relation to the ubiquitous quality of 'change'. As Ralph Miliband noted with reference to Harold Wilson, ‘his most insistent and persuasive theme was the need for change, renewal, modernisation and reform’ (Miliband 1987:354). And that three decades before Tony Blair was elected with much the same rhetoric. The difficult part concerns the particularities of change. Change is inexorable but it is also variable as a quality. What kind of change, the usual modernisation, a piecemeal incrementalism or a turning point in history, a modest evolution or a spectacular revolution? 

Accepting that ‘change’ of some indeterminate form is underway in the body politic, the Greens are a manifestation of a new politics. But are they a cause or a consequence? The extensive ‘greening’ of business and politics is evidence of a phenomenon that is far greater than the political successes of Green parties. In other words, Green parties are part of a wider change, the ‘new politics’ which is underway in the heart of the modern social and economic fabric. As such, the Greens’ are the political aspect of a much wider transformation underway within modernity. As a movement, the Greens’ express many of the common impulses, mutual concerns and shared assumptions of this new politics. Herein lies its claims to political novelty. But potential is not actual and a tendency to turn certain particulars into a general as a result of wishful thinking induced a tendency to think that the laws of political gravity could be defied. That illusion has passed, and Green parties are now older and much wiser and still have managed to hold on to its ideals and ambitions. After three decades, that is no small achievement. That said, the history of socialism is a cautionary tale about assuming the existence of an inexorable radical force working consistently to alter the political fabric. The proletarian transformation of politics never came and history moved on. The lesson is that to turn potential into actual requires effective politics, leading and organisation relating ideals to effective policy and popular concerns. Greens parties are a consistent force persisting through the vagaries and vicissitudes of contemporary change within an unfolding political landscape in every advanced European society. The Greens’ are the organised political expression of a greater transformation underway in the contemporary political landscape.

There is certainly a growing disquiet as a result of a tension between industrialism and post-industrialism, a materialist ethic and a post-materialist ethic which challenges the ‘productionist politics' of existing policy agendas within governing institutions. This ‘productionist politics’ embodies the 'old' or conventional approach to politics. 

The distinction between 'old' and 'new’ shouldn’t be fetishised, especially given the extent to which these two political milieux continue to coexist and even to overlap. All societies are a mixture of the old and the new, much of the morality, the townscapes, institutions and laws of capitalism derive from medieval Europe. Similarly, all civilisations adapt and change in order to survive, adopting and absorbing the new and retaining what is valid and vital from the old. Certainly, the 'old' political parties are not averse to appropriating new agendas in an attempt to turn them to their own political ends. Similarly, the 'new’ parties have had to compromise their radical ethos in order to adapt to the conventional style of politics. Further, there is a conservative strain in some forms of ecologism as much as there is a progressive one. The juxtaposition between old and new as two mutually exclusive expressions of politics works in terms of ideal types but breaks down in the 'real world' where neither type wholly exists. 'Old' and 'new’ politics continue to coexist, as they have ever done. ‘Old’ and ‘new’ are not so much contradictory positions as competing ones. The 'old' politics here refers to the productionist agenda and its materialistic ethics. It is the dominant form of politics and has shown remarkable resilience through world wars and mass depression. The fact that the political parties who organised around productionism continue to command the greater share of the electoral support, to dominate government, and to shape the public policy process is not surprising when one considers that the electorate depend upon the processes of investment, production and employment and is therefore susceptible to the productionist agenda of the capital system. 

The 'new’ politics of the Greens’ challenges the productionist agenda, particularly its waste and profligacy in the face of potential ecological disaster. The problem is that people live in the present and do not yet directly face that future disaster nor live in the future ecological society. This means that the ‘new’ of the Greens’ is forever confronted by the tangible reality of the ‘old’ productionist politics. The challenge is to render the ‘new’ politics tangible in relation to popular concerns and so build sufficient momentum to challenge the old and replace it with the new society. Without that tangibility, Green parties will struggle to carve out an identity for themselves within the political landscape. There are plenty of reasons for this. The threat of impending ecological disaster is itself an unappealing message. People prefer not to believe something they do not like. Add the need to change lifestyles, worse, the need for taxation and government intervention, and people see little but certain sacrifices in the present for uncertain benefits in the future. A party of ideals also faces the problem of making organisational and moral compromises and accommodations which, although necessary to political effectiveness, could cause disillusion and disaffection amongst supporters. 

The Greens’ best hope of influencing public policy or even sharing governmental power lies in inducing supporters themselves to see the long term rewards of political organisation and effectiveness whilst adjusting political styles to reach agreement with traditional parties – or elements in them, whether their elites and grassroots activists - with whom common cause is possible and with whom their are shared goals.6

The Greens’ should be wary of a ‘catch all’ approach modelled on the traditional parties. The mass electorate which this approach was designed to catch shows all the signs of breaking up. There has been a steady decline in support for the ‘mass’ parties. No one person is any one thing any more and the clear divisions within the electorate are becoming more fluid. The result is a pronounced weakening in partisan loyalties and a degree of political dealignment. To conclude that this makes possible a political realignment through capturing the mass of floating voters to a new party is to misunderstand the breaking up of identities and loyalties. The voters are no longer a ‘mass’, other forms of political representation, action and socialisation are required, a genuinely ‘new’ mode of politics. 

What is the 'new' politics?
While the Green parties are presented as a ‘new’ force in politics, particularly in relation to their origins in the new social movements, there is disagreement as to their long term political significance with respect to outcomes, institutions, policy frameworks, patterns of partisanship and loyalty, the system of political competition, the connection between cultural change and political orientation, the mode of political engagement and participation, and the content of public policy. (For the most influential accounts of this debate, see C. Offe, "Konkurrenzpartei und Kollektive politisch Identital", in R. Roth (ed), "Parliamentarisches Ritual und politische Alternativen" (Frankfurt/Main, 1980) at pp.26-42; F. Muller-Rommel, "Partien neun Typs in Westeurope: Eine Vergleschende Analyse", Zeitschrift fur Parlamentsfragen 13 1982, at pp.369-90; ibid, "The Greens in the 1980s: Short term cyclical protest or indicator of transformation?" Political Studies 37  1989, at pp. 114- 22; F. Muller-Rommel, "New political movements and "New Polities' parties in Western Europe", in RJ. Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds), "Challenging the Political Order; New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies" (New York, 1990), at pp.209-31, alters the analytical focus from a new party type per se, to a new politics party; for a similar treatment, see T. Poguntke, "New Politics and party systems. The emergence of a new type of party?" West European Politics 10, 1987, at pp.368-92; and ibid, "The new politics dimension in European Green Parties", in F. Muller-Rommel (ed), "New politics in Western Europe" (London, 1989), at pp. 175-194; see also O. Niedermayer, "Die Europawahlen 1989: Eine International verleichende Analyse", Zeitgeist fur Parliamentsfragen 20, at pp.467-68), where he identifies what he regards as an increasingly successful new European party family which includes a spectrum of Green and left-liberation parties.).

In the very least, the Greens’ have presented a challenge to entrenched productionist agendas and the methods of conducting politics. The established procedures, conventions and practices of the 'old' productionist order of politics made sense when ‘modernisation’ delivered on social and economic goals so that ‘most of our people have never had it so good’. MacMillan was telling a truth that ‘most’ people knew to be true. This kind of politics has presided over and shaped expectations during an extensive modernising era, becoming part of the institutional and psychological fabric of modernity. 

The 'old' political order is characterised by a left-right cleavage around a productionist agenda which both wings accept. Political and party competition is conducted on the basis of competing socio-economic platforms and class division. This conventional politics is at its core an elitist political culture. Its principal agencies organising the ‘mass’ electorate are political parties. These are based on hierarchical structures with an active cabal of professional politicians managing the passive ‘mass’ of members and voters at the top. In a general and remote way, the traditional party succeeds in expressing the popular voice and the citizens’ right to participate. Restricting conflict to pragmatic and limited issues, the indirect and representative form of liberal democracy ensures that the fundamentals of the system are removed from political controversy. (M. Kuechler and R J. Dalton, on the other hand, in "New Social Movements and the Political Order: Inducing Change for Long-term Stability", in "Challenging the Political Order" (1990 ), at pp.277-300, and T. Poguntke, "Grun-ahemative Parteien: Erne neue farbe in weslichen parteien systemen", Zeitschrift fur parliaments gragen 18 1987, at pp.368-82, regard these new political forces as hybrid and movement parties. As does J. Raschke, "Krise der Grunen: Bilanz und Neubiginn" (Marburg, 1991). For a discussion of the behavioural aspects of the new poh'tics, see S. H. Barnes, M. Kaase et al, "Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies" (Beverley Hills, 1979); K Hildebrandt and RJ. Dalton, "Political change or sunshine politics?" in M. Kaase and K. von Beyme (eds), "Elections and parties: German Political Studies" Vol.3 (London, 1978); and J. Raschke, "Politik und Westwandel in westlichen Demokratien", Aus Politik und Zeirgeschichte 36 1985, at pp.22-39. See P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power", American Political Science Review 57 (1963), at pp.632-42; RA. Dahl, "Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition" (New Haven, Conn, 1971).

 This essentially puts politics on ice, with disagreements occurring over the means rather than the ends. With endless production and economic growth is taken for granted, the controversy concerns the distribution of resources and the redistribution of wealth. The result is a materialistic society whose success can be quantified in terms of commodities and whose moral core can be calculated by the amount of possessions. Long before the Greens’ there were critics of this possessive individualism who were concerned to argue that true human happiness depends more upon being than having (eg Erich Fromm). But possessive individualism and materialism has a couple of things going for it: it is simple, it is tangible, there is a shorter pay off between efforts and outcomes, and above all it is a vast system of the objective dependence of all upon measurable indices of economic growth and material development. It would be difficult to escape that objective dependency even if one wanted to. A ‘new’ politics needs to build its own dependencies, solidarities and loyalties.

The "new" politics challenges this productionist paradigm, on moral and psychological terms as well as ecological. Above and beyond disputes over means, the ‘new’ politics is concerned to place ends once more at the centre of the political and intellectual landscape. In terms of modes of thought, organisation and action, the ‘new’ politics rejects the behavioural and cognitive assumptions that underpin the 'old' politics, specifically the hierarchical, rigidly organised, formalistic, bureaucratised and elitist structures. 

The radical repudiation of the ‘old’ politics risked becoming so total as to amount to a rejection of politics as such. New social movements can prosecute issues so far and bring pressure to bear on the organised sphere of politics, but to enter that sphere and prosecute politics for themselves has meant compromise and accommodation – politics, old or new, is politics. The problems with an uncompromising stand on ideals is that it remains little more than principled rhetoric outside of political influence; to give ideals political effect, a wider salience and an extended constituency requires involvement in ‘real’ politics. This means not so much compromising certain ideals to get others realised as finding the ideal as an alternative futurity immanent in the unfolding lines of development of the present reality and working to actualise it. New social movements are essentially vehicles of popular protest which serves to organise and marshal discontent around certain issues and raise awareness. To give this protest a more permanent form on a greater range of issues requires involvement in elections and other forms of direct engagement within the conventional political sphere. This is the function of the political party.

The rationale behind the transition from social movement to political party is clear, to turn pressure on the outside to influence on the inside by engaging the political system without losing connection to the social and civic roots. The ambivalence with respect to the relation of formal political organisation - party identity, political leadership - to social roots is unavoidable. It’s all about costs and benefits, how much principle is traded for how much power and influence. What is the moral and intellectual price of involvement in conventional politics? The answer can only be evaluated if one asks another question, what is the moral and intellectual price of non-involvement in conventional politics? How many social movements, protests, demonstrations etc come and go with only the most indirect effects to show for all their efforts? The case for political organisation, engagement and involvement relates to ensuring that the new politics underway in the contemporary fabric is given permanent form. The trick is to engage the system on the inside whilst replenishing the roots on the outside, ensuring the congruence of means and ends. The practice of party politics does not necessarily mean compromising ideals or weakening the commitment to change. Perhaps Michels’ ‘iron law’ of politics only applies to ‘mass’ parties, something which the Greens’ are not likely ever to be. This brings advantages in keeping politicians closer to social roots and leading to a predisposition towards social and civic activism in the communities rather than broad electoral appeals. The practitioners of the 'new’ politics can thereby remain committed to bringing about a fundamental transformation in the social and political order. Ends and means coalesce in the way that Green quality of life and social ideals (peace, civil rights, anti-productionism, ecologism) are achieved through a new style of non-hierarchical, participatory politics. (See R Dalton, M. Kuechler and W. Burklin, "The challenge of new movements", in R Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds), "Challenging the Political Order" (Oxford, 1990), at pp.3-23. RJ. Dalton, op.cit (1988), at pp.81-82; see also K. Hildebrandt and R.J. Dalton, "The New Politics: Political Change and Sunshine Politics?" in M. Kaase and K. von Beyme (eds), op.cit (1978); K.L. Baker (et al), "Germany Transformed. Political Culture and the New Politics" (Cambridge, Mass, 1981).

How far do these political means become compromised by involvement in the structure of conventional politics? The ‘new’ politics is an open, democratic, participatory and citizen based politics, powered from below by the grassroots communities which are the social origins and political raison d'etre of the political party, their main source of political support and political legitimacy. 

This recognises transience to be a key feature of the social movements with respect to those spontaneous deeds or single issues (protests, demonstrations, boycotts) mobilized by social actors who have hitherto been outside of the conventional political process - students, the young, the elderly, women, ethnic minorities and all those socio-economic groups who are in one way or another separated from the production process. 

In short, the Greens’ represent a new type of politics and political party which is the institutional expression of a 'new’ politics which is unfolding in the fabric of capitalist modernity. The Greens’ are not the creators of this potential but one of its expressions. 

Political Change As Culture Shift
The most widespread explanation of the rise of the "new polities' concerns a change in the basic values within the contemporary culture. New value priorities bring about new patterns of political behaviour. This cognitive or political culture approach holds that once lower order goals associated with materialism are satisfied, there is a shift to higher order or post-materialist values. Thus "many political issues, such as economic security, law and order, and national defence, tap underlying sustenance and safety needs.... If a society can make significant progress in addressing these goals, then the public's attention can shift to higher-order values. These higher-order goals are reflected in the issues of individual freedom, self expression, and participation. These values are labelled as "post-material values".





 For Inglehart, the 'old' politics of materialistic security (economic growth, public order, national security and basic lifestyles) comes under threat from the post-materialistic values of social actors. Once security needs have been met, people have new experiences and develop new expectations and goals. The argument implies that the ‘old’ politics will remain relevant so long as needs for material security are not met, which explains its persistence. It also implies the self-defeating nature of capitalism at the cultural level in that the more the economic system satisfies the needs of the people, the more they will seek to move beyond lower order needs to higher order values. For Inglehart, the social actors and the new issues they promote offer a real threat to the existing political order. Rejecting the narrow agenda of the old politics, where political competition concerns the best ways of pursuing the materialist goals of economic growth and state power, the new post-materialism seeks to change the focus of political competition. Inglehart argues that a ‘silent revolution’ is underway in the social fabric of modern society, fomented by a generational shift "firmly anchored in the socialization processes of individual value orientations, and slowly growing by generational turnover". (R. Inglehart,(1990), at p.76.

 In such conditions, an entirely new politics can flourish. How far are we here from an Aristotelian politics of the good life?
Chandler and Siaroff identify point to a widespread disillusionment which forming a "particularly fertile terrain for protest politics". (William M. Chandler and Alan Siaroff, "Post Industrial Politics in Germany and the Origins of the Greens", Comparative Politics 18 1986, at p.304.)  The cycle of unrest thus represents "a new wave of protest potential (and) such trends, while generating a crisis atmosphere, may reflect the spread of political scepticism, even cynicism, that signifies a healthy basis for opposition politics". From this perspective, "the 'Green phenomenon' (and protest politics generally) not only may signify a crisis of legitimacy but also may reflect a gradual maturation of the democratic capacity to criticise".18   This points in the direction of a communicative community where the force of the better argument rules and politics is a learning mechanism in which knowledge triumphs over opinion and translates into public policy.

This is a novel situation to which a new language of politics is appropriate. The growing contrast between ‘old’ and ‘new’ is altering the meaning of what it is to be ‘left’ and ‘right’. The new post-materialists tend to be well educated 'social and cultural specialists' and tend towards the green movement. (F. Muller - Rommel, "Ecology Parties in Western Europe", West European Politics
5 (1) 1982 at pp.68-74 and ibid, "The Greens in Western Europe Similar but Different", International Political Science Review; vol 6 (4) 1985.)

 The "most striking finding" for Inglehart is the remarkable size of the potential green electorate. Inglehart adds a number of clauses and qualifications, noting that potential green support does not imply an imminent political breakthrough or that the greens were "about to become one of the major political forces in western Europe overnight".20 Inglehart interprets 'revolution' not to be the complete replacement of one social order by another, noting that change in a complex social order concerns broad trends comprising the normal adjustments, compromises and trade offs of politics. This sounds more like revolution as an ongoing social process, with many facets and actors, rather than as a one-off political event. 
Inglehart’s ‘realism’ leads him to address the resource constraints that hobble new social movements. The most important factor here is the reluctance to practise the kind of disciplined, strategically cautious, well organised politics necessary to canalise the spontaneous, potent social energy into political effective channels so as to give social activity an electoral pay off. Ultimately, political effectiveness is measured in terms of ability to influence government and shape public policy.
Without arguing that there is a universal and homogeneous phenomenon unfolding within the fabric of modernity the sense of 'real' change underway is tangible, something which is bound to impact on the political domain. (T. Poguntke "New Politics and Party Systems: The Emergence of a New Type of
Party?" West European Politics 10 1987, at p.87. H. Kitschelt, "The Green Phenomenon in Western Party Systems" in Sheldon Kamienieki (ed) "Environmental Politics in the International Arena. Movements, Parties, Organisations and Policy" (Albany NY, 1993) at p.95.

Whilst environmentalism is perceived to be on the ‘left’ in politics, there are certainly value-conservatives who are green. There can be no a priori  definition of ‘the green’; instead, the character of actual green movements is revealed by being located in the social structures from which they originate and which shape their political orientation. The conservative aspect of environmentalism is revealed in the anti-industrial, anti-productionist perspective of the privileged middle class. Thus, "under the aegis of environmentalism, America's upper-middle class has learned to suspect technological change, to look askance at economic growth, to place 'spiritual values' over 'material progress', and to start looking down on industry and commercial activity as something vulgar and distasteful. All of these, of course, are ancient, well tuned aristocratic attitudes. The quality of self interest in the environment movement is something which the press has found absolutely impossible to grasp. The understanding of environmentalism as a protection of entrenched privilege makes this "anti-everything" position perfectly understandable. People who have reached a certain level of affluence and privilege in society inevitably turn their efforts away from the accumulation of more wealth and privilege, and towards denying the same benefits to others."

One could refer to 'nimbyism' as a European version of this, but the real question is whether this merits being included under the banner of environmentalism. It really is a narrow self-interest and an extension of the material security. There is no rejection of the ‘old’ productivist paradigm here; this post-materialism is based on materialism at its grossest.

This is not the case with the value-conservatism that values conservation and nature preservation, which certainly is a part of the wider ecology movement. The point is that whilst the Green movement is typically associated with radical politics, there is no necessary identification with the ‘left’. Once could argue that alongside environmental justice, the commitment to social justice marks the Greens out as ‘left’ but this would be mistaken. Justice as a social virtue implying egalitarian structures goes all the way back to conservatives like Plato and Aristotle, and is at the heart of the Judaeo-Christian and Islamic tradition. The work of deep ecologists comes without any clear political commitment whilst the prevalence of pure green ideas in many social movements does indicate that green politics and ethics adheres to the first law of ecology, that of integrated systems, implying interactive cooperation, unity through diversity and the interdependence of parts within the whole. The Greens should try to live up to its claim of being neither ‘left’ nor ‘right’ and avoid being identified with one side of a very old political and ideological cleavage.
The social movement of which green politics is a part is a complex, dynamic and fluid mix of situational and structural factors that evade generalisation. For Savage, "Inglehart's post materialists are not a unified group marching to the beat of a single drummer. There are important factions within the post materialists that have their origins in the pre-industrial and industrial divisions existing in Europe that are reflected in ideological disagreement and political conflict. These traditional cleavages are responsible not only for intergenerational antagonisms but intra-generational hostility as well". There is a danger of taking the radical claims at face value, mistaking the self-image of the more political elements for the reality, and thereby cutting off the ‘new’ politics from many of its sources.
Taking account of a range of structural, situational, and institutional variables permits a more broadly focused account of the green movement, one which permits self-expression and self-identity from below rather than a politically imposed identity from above. Here, the values are mediated by many influences. From this perspective, the political appeal of Green parties is not to be attributed to the green message attracting the new post-material middle class. That is one part of the appeal, a part which is not capable of being universalised to other sections and classes within the nation and across nations. It also implies that the green movement is itself a form of sectional or class based selfishness, detached from productive activity and lacking any sense of economics. This is patently not true. In fine, post-materialist values are not the principal cause of change, just one element within a more complex equation involving a host of structural, situational and contingent factors. 
Values remain ethereal when lacking connection to the social and the political process. Structural media or networks give values that connection, provide them with conduits for social meaning and thus form the nexus that gives them their political relevance. It is this that explains why the value shift underway in the contemporary landscape takes expression as ecologism rather than some other form. Claus Offe makes the telling point that "the predominant need for self actualisation could equally well lead to new and unconventional, but entirely private lifestyle and consumption patterns, rather than to new politics". And in some instances it does translate into a lifestyle politics, beyond the politics of material security needs but with self-actualisation firmly focused on the self.

Structural models of change
As against a micro focus on value shifts and a cultural process which is the cumulative and aggregated outcome of individual transformations, a structural approach to change focuses on the macro dimension. The emphasis here is upon specific socio-economic organisations and institutional arrangements that mediate individual experience and impose collective patterns on behaviour on individuals. These structures shape behavioural responses and invest collective patterns with meaning and purpose. The potential for a new politics is insufficient to achieve fundamental change. Potential needs to be translated into effective action through the way that political leadership mobilises and employs available resources to good effect. This points to the availability of resources and structural factors.
This places the emphasis more on resources and deliberative action than didactive action and the manipulation of the message by elites. Kitschelt identifies the prospect for change, cultural propensity to radicalism, as the critical variable which determines whether the radical 'instinct' is actually operationalised. For "grievances and institutional change are endemic in most societies, but they are rarely translated into collective political action. Instead, the actors' skills and resources and the broader opportunity structures determine when individuals are able to engage in collective mobilisation. In particular, the choice of a specific vehicle of mobilisation, such as a political party, can be explained only in terms of actor's resources and opportunities". 

'Structuration' is a multivariate menu with a number of elements.

(a)	Catalysts that activate political discontent. A political climate conducive to radical change - or at least to the mood of discontent or unrest that must preface it - might be induced by merely contingent factors.
(b)	Institutional factors may either facilitate or inhibit new politics parties. This variable includes election systems, the formal rules of the political game (funding arrangements for instance), national political preferences and those cultural factors that shape the practice of politics: whether, for instance, the political regime favours an adversarial or a consociational or coalitional 'culture'. Of course, formal procedures (electoral rules) do help to condition these cultural propensities. But once in existence, these political preferences do, to a degree, take  on a life of their own. Finally, the constitutional format can have a considerable impact - direct and indirect - on the conduct of politics. The degree of centralisation or the extent that power is  devolved may raise or dampen political discontent, or channel it in a particular direction. 
(c) Structural factors. The social, economic and political arrangements beyond the institutional arrangements identified in (b) above, interact with these intermediate variables -opportunity structures, regime rules and resource factors - in ways that determine the broad tenor of political change in any particular society. Class structuration, new systems of production and political economy, globalisation patterns and notions of a 'post-industrial society covers the principal themes of this approach. 
The 'party' variable; the endogenous (organisational) and exogenous (systemic) elements In mediating between civil society and the state, a political party does more than passively conduct the range of social and ideological values originating within society. A political party serves as a form of political communication, socialisation and information, provide a focal point for the general concerns of citizens. In one form or another, these functions will continue within any political order, even in the context of a civic empowerment which expands new centres of interaction between government and civic publics. A political party or organisation therefore functions as an agent of change as much as of management and control. A political party becomes a change agent in concentrating societal transformations by canalising specific groups in the social structure and articulate social futurity in a distinct political position and disposition to act. A political party performs a fundamental articulation and aggregation function, being in part the institutional embodiment or reflection of the social context from where they originate. But this does not mean that they are passive conductors of social force. Rather, a political party performs an active role in fashioning a political identity and sensibility within the political arena, insofar as its possesses and deploys resources to certain ends rather than others. 

The Green party, then, mediates transformation. Its success depends upon the extent to which it taps into the new social movements and canalises its values, principles, demands into politically effective form. The purpose of giving political organisation to a range of social movement is to form an overall political identity that is capable of being effective in the field of conventional politics. The Green party succeeds to the extent that it presents itself as a plausible and effective vehicle for emerging ideas. It means being clear about what, exactly, is 'new’ about ecology as politics. This is more than an itinerary of members, activists and supporters; principles and programmes; potential for political realignment and dealignment in relation to other parties.

The purpose of the Green party is to apply their energies and mobilise their resources to the task of political and social change. The parameters of this activity are set by the circumstances, procedures and operation of the broad system of the existing political sphere and its relation to wider society. The critical question that Greens need to answer is whether the Green Party is conceived as a new party type concerned with fundamental social transformation enabling a new politics; or as another political party taking its place alongside the other 'mass' or 'catch-all' parties. The paradox is that with increasing impact and a higher political profile, Green parties are tempted to distance themselves from their ‘new’ principles and attempt to compete as a ‘mass’ party. This is a profound error. The new social and cultural dynamics of the modern age points to increasing plurality and diversity. A ‘mass’ politics survives more as a memory or an echo of past societies. It would be a bitter irony if Green parties, originating from new social movements, dilute their principles to catch a ‘mass’ electorate that does not exist. This would be to sacrifice social depth for an ineffective political width. The Greens need to ensure their uniqueness in their value preferences, organisational orientations, and in their overall disposition within politics. This is to see Green parties as an outgrowth of distinctive new social movements, attempting to give the increasing range of social activity a political identity. Some view the Greens as simply a species of a broader left-libertarian politics. Establishing the character of Green parties is not merely a matter of political classification. Identifying the specific impetus for the 'dynamic' and electoral appeal of the Green party reveals plenty about its orientation and character with respect to the political context.
The idea of ecology as politics presumes that the purpose of Green politics is to offer an effective and sustainable challenge to the established political and social order. It presumes political organisation and leadership to play an active role in bringing about the sustainable society of the future. This being so, the Green party faces some critical questions. Given the magnitude of the task – the creation of a low carbon economy and the sustainable society – the Green party is too poorly resourced and badly positioned to stand and act alone. It must engage in a coalition politics, not merely in relation to other parties, but in relation to various levels of government and to myriad social actors and movements. Green parties need to maintain a broad identity in order to appeal not to some bland ‘mass’ electorate but to the wide range of social actors. Playing the conventional political game according to the normal rules leaves Greens at a disadvantage on account of their numbers, inexperience, utopianism, factional disputes over both strategy and ideology, and ambivalence in being positioned somewhere between old and new. The trick is to retain the commitment to the 'new' politics without this becoming the cause of factional disputes at some abstracted political and ideological level. The radicals will remain recalcitrant in face of the necessary compromises of politics. At the level of conventional politics, the price of political 'newness' is paid in terms of a lack of institutional, procedural and electoral linkages. The solution is to shift the ground of ‘the political’ to the social and associational sphere outside of established power where a ‘new’ politics has greater natural linkages with emergent social power. Lack of linkage at the conventional political level  serves to marginalise Green parties at a time when the crisis of the old political agencies and the demand for real change means burgeoning opportunities for all kinds of alliances and ideological cohabitation.55 With their origin in new social movements and as advocates of a ‘new’ politics, the Greens possess the social and cultural resources and potential to influence outcomes. How Green parties represent the ‘new’ politics emerging on the social terrain depends on the extent to which they can carve an identity apart from the ‘old’ divisions of party politics which whilst linking the ‘new’ politics with broad sections of society. This is a coalition politics which is focused on practical efforts within society building sustainable communities, alliances with a range of social actors.
The political effectiveness and electoral appeal of the Green party depends upon how it conducts itself in the political arena. In claiming to be ‘new’, Green parties have a difficulty with the conventional hierarchical arrangements, the top-down structures and the professionalised politics of the political mainstream. The solution is to practise the ‘new’ politics in the associational space of civil society and therefore strengthen the social base of Green politics. The conventional political sphere is not the place for principled purity but for effective action influencing policy. At this level, adherence to ideals in abstraction from the forces for their realisation invites division and factionalism. Politics at this level is not about winning the argument but influencing policy and effecting change. This requires an unavoidable degree of compromise, adjustment and accommodation. The Green parties have long since recognised this political necessity. What they need to do now is re-establish their links in society and see their strength in social actors in civil society rather than in the number of passive voters they attract at elections. 
Failure to make these linkages above and below will consign Greens to a narrow niche status. The time for attempting to locate an unoccupied place on the conventional left-right spectrum is long over. It is an irrelevance to the extent that all politics at the conventional level requires compromise and accommodation for political influence and effect. What is required is a genuinely ‘Green politics’ that takes a wide view of ecologism so as to foster links and connections amongst an active society. Beneath and beyond the political and electoral sphere there is a wide range of social activity underway, involving people who are without political allegiance and are actually practising the ‘new’ politics. This ongoing practice generates opportunities upon which Green parties should focus in order to make the most of their limited resources. In contrast, these resources can be squandered through too great a focus upon the politics of electioneering. Targeting resources to build connections within the conventional political sphere and support movements outside can build and sustain pressure for change in a way that an electoral presence – losing far more elections than are won – cannot achieve,
The other principal element shaping political identity and character relates to 'exogenous' factors. Regardless of how resourceful, pragmatic, well led or adaptive, Green parties inhabit a competitive and organised political environment with its own logistics. This shapes the patterning of party politics and the character and outcomes of party competition. At this level, the potential for a 'new politics' is more or less constrained according to the specific configurations of party competition. Muller-Rommel's makes a telling point here that the Greens' "electoral success is not so much dependent upon the strength of new movements in a given country as upon the type of party system in which they operate". The implication of this is that electoral politics is an adjunct of the existing political system. The new social movements should have a much greater profile as change agents whose reality shaping and constituting praxis should be valued in terms of creating the new political society rather than as a potential ‘mass’ electorate from whom to catch votes.
Much depends on whether greening expresses genuine political novelty or is a long standing radical reaction to industrialism. As the latter, the Greens are connected to the ‘old’ left. 
Any discussion of political effectiveness concerns itself with the way that the Green party approaches the political order and manages to pursue its own agenda within a competitive sphere. This requires an audit of available resources and evaluate their application with respect to wider institutional and systemic constraints. An enduring problem here lies in the unavoidably ambiguous position of a party that is committed to bringing about a new politics on the terrain of the old. This means accepting, as a direct consequence of the decision to play electoral and parliamentary politics in the first place, the need to actually practise politics in terms of making those adjustments and compromises which, at the level of pure green principle, are unpalatable. That is, understand that this is politics, a sphere of interaction, discourse, opposition and agreement with others of a different political perspective but who are no less part of the scene. Ultimately, it reduces itself to the calculation of how much compromise to achieve so much in the short run without damaging support and legitimacy in the long run.  

New Politics but a new party type?
Whilst Green parties have emerged in many countries, they have become a significant force in national politics in only a few. Yet the Green message is pervasive and shifting policies in government and business. The assertion that the Greens merely reflect the post-materialism of the younger, better educated and new middle class professionals employed in the service and public welfare sectors cannot explain their longevity. Those young, well educated professionals of the late 60’s and 70’s are now old enough to have long seen Green politics become the ‘old’ politics. For decades, Greens have been dismissed by Marxists as a middle class politics appealing to well off groups who are detached from the material production and wealth generating occupations of modern capitalism in both spatial and cognitive terms. There is much that is wrong with a politics that reads off values and ideas from structural positions, not the least of which is why the proletarian transformation of politics promised by Marxists is continually stalled, despite the workers being cognitively and spatially connected to capitalist exploitation.
The ‘greens’ in society at large are a pretty eclectic mix of libertarians and communitarians, new leftists and value conservatives, community activists and alternativists, people of religious faith and people without, anarchists and socialists, scientists and ecologists. What unites these disparate forces is not interest but an underlying commitment to ecological values, sustainable living and an affective investment in future rather than short term goals. This is where green politics makes good its claim to be ‘new’, mobilising a range of social groups and actors according to a culture and a commitment that implicitly questions the very institutional fabric of market capitalist society. 
This also challenges the view that ideology is the central defining characteristic since "over the long term only parties based on ideology have succeeded in establishing themselves". Certainly, ideology can perform an important unifying function through supplying a broad set of precepts around which party members can cohere and with which its supporters can identify. But this relates to intellectual and organisational cohesion for political activists who are agreed on political preferences. This says nothing about the many more people outside of the party, outside of all organised political parties. Further, ideology can divide rather than unite, narrow down potential support and then degenerate into a source of contention. Endless discord and disputation over political principle and future direction excites the activists but puts off people in the outside world where the opportunities for real change are great. Internal disputes and factional rifts denote lack of political seriousness, damage effectiveness within the established political order and diminish electoral appeal. Those who are not converts to the green cause as a matter of principle – and the non-aligned and ‘apolitical’ always outnumber the members and activists of any political party – will be attracted not by fine points of principle and debate but by the demonstration of political effectiveness and seriousness, the ability to identify problems, propose solution, turn principle into policy, show evidence and examples. 
For a movement committed to sustainability, the way that many Green parties invest their scarce resources and limited energies is alarming. The most obvious case of negative resource mobilisation is  factionalism. This was the main problem back in the 70’s and 80’s and said little for a movement claiming to be beyond the old divisive politics. The issue was settled once political organisation and intervention was accepted and the fundamentalists left. The problem is that the realists have their own form of negative resource mobilisation – electoralism. For all of the wasteful disputes over principle, there is a generic green identity which gives green politics its point. Once this weakens as a result of too wide an appeal to the mass electorate, it is difficult to see much of what is left as green. This would justify the fundamentalists who fought to maintain the conception of the Greens as an entirely new type of politics defined by a novel participatory and anti-elitist political practice and supported by a 'new’ type of voter.60

Muller-Rommel argues that Green parties are ideological composites, containing both radical leftist and even conservative tendencies. There are three strands in Green politics: the red-green strand with radical leftist roots; a conservative strand linked to countryside and community; and the post-materialist strand. The 'new politics' perspective focuses upon the red-green and pure green tendencies as asserting post-materialist values including ecologism, but going further to embrace other radical social and political causes. 

The fact that Green parties cannot be neatly pigeonholed on the conventional left-right spectrum should be used as a strength enabling it to reach the broad sections of the community, affirming environmentalism as an issue that is of vital concern to all.

To the extent that the Greens address a new genre of issues, and appeal to new social groups outside of conventional politics, they are a 'new politics" phenomenon.
Green parties would seem to be clearly defined by the prominence they give to ecologism as such. The early products of the student and new social movements in the 1960’s tended to be left libertarians, with an agenda characterised by their rejection of the bureaucratic, hierarchical and conformist tendencies of modern society and "old" politics. Although they expressed environmental concerns, the parties of the new left were rather more focused on the 'exploitative' class character of capitalist societies than on the waste of resources and pollution of the environment. In this manner, their party programmes envisaged the public control of political decisions and economic policy; workers’ control and industrial 'stakeholding', profit sharing; world peace and international disarmament, and a decommissioning of domestic nuclear energy installations and the abandonment of such programmes of energy production. A commitment to environmental protection was a logical extension of their pursuit of an unproved quality of life over pure profit, but as an adjunct to the critique of capital and class exploitation. 

For Muller-Rommel, whilst the Green parties were formed after these new left parties and were unique in the centrality they gave to ecologism, there are substantial similarities in the attempt to create a new politics and a new society. This new politics affirms grassroots spontaneity and participation over disciplined procedures and political professionalism, hence the clash between old and new, realist and fundamentalist played out within the Green parties. Approaching the identity of the Greens this way suggests a raft of new left thinking that is available, particularly linking the exploitation of natural resources to class exploitation and capital. This means putting the post-materialist perspective in connection with the materialist perspective, emphasising participatory modes and equal rights alongside the productionist issues of the world of work, a commitment to alternative lifestyles that appeals to some amongst the new middle class alongside a strong egalitarianism.

(a)	The preference for direct over representative democracy should be tested. The evidence is not good. Affirming participatory politics as a virtue, many practised it as a vice. It is easy to criticise the authoritarian and bureaucratic state, and to reject hierarchy and leadership in party structures. The hard part is to practise participation without discord and dissension breaking out when all do not agree. Again the problem may be the wrong kind of politics in the wrong place. Participation should be linked to place and function within the social whole, not ideology and values at a political level abstracted from real life. This conceives politics as having a very similar network to citizen initiative groups at local, regional and national levels of the political system. 

The Greens As Left Libertarians
The label ‘new politics’ reveals little in itself and can be no more than a slogan that is empty of political content and designed only to appeal. Much of the strength of the Green parties depends on the linkage between 'old' questions of economic (re)distribution and the 'new’ politics of autonomy and democracy, something that sees green politics as part of a continuous process of development concerning long established political issues and cultural preferences – issues of race, gender, ethnicity, class, peace and civil rights as well as ecology. Here, the Greens are identified as 'left-libertarian'. The novelty here lies in keeping alive the unfinished business left over from the 1960s and 1970s concerning the socio-economic and political development of advanced societies. But care should be exercised in arguing that the greens must be located within a 'left libertarian versus a right wing authoritarian cleavage.80 In the first place, there is the error of defining the political values and positions of people according to their class and social position, in abstraction from their actual choices and preferences – which means that political outcomes is in some way predetermined and can be read from the political map. In the second place, there is a need to avoid an uncritical acceptance of right and left labels. The ‘right wing’ that the Greens as left wing are committed against is not an homogeneous entity. If one analyses the politics in depth, the real target is actually the economics behind the politics, the ‘apolitical’ free market economy whose depredations can antagonise value conservatives and communitarians every bit as much as the left wing. Further, many left libertarian positions fit lifestyles more appropriate to the market than to ecology.

The fact that Green politics are a contemporary expression of the deepseated and persistent anxieties over resource allocation, income distribution, power and energy, citizen autonomy versus the overbearing state, that have marked contemporary societies for decades indicates that the Greens are going to be a part of the calculus of modern politics for some time. 

That said, Kitschelt argues that Green parties must meet some strict conditions if they are to survive let alone succeed. They must reach out to strike political bargains with those adjacent radical parties with whom they have ideological programmatic affinities: "Green parties must see themselves not as a single issue parties but in terms of the broader competitive space in which the most promising position is one that combines support for ecology with left libertarian social and economic policies in order to attract significant shares of the electorate". Kitschelt therefore states that ecologism under certain competitive conditions has to settle for accommodating to these other left and socialist radicalisms. 

But there is a sense that this advice is utterly myopic in being too focused on the conventional political sphere independent of the economic sphere and the wider society. The globalisation of economic relations has emptied the national political sphere of much of its old content and power and has effectively denuded the space of the older left towards which the Greens are being told to turn. In this sense, the accommodation at the political level has to be much wider, embracing all those, from left to right, who are receptive to ecological ideas, and reaching out into society to engage with those engaging in civic and community organisation within what could form new public spaces.

Rudig endorses the idea of ecologism sui generis - of a distinct 'Green' cleavage that owes little to conventional leftist ideas; one that appeals to a Green rather than post-materialist or new politics constituency. The issues it shares with other radicalisms, for example, feminism and pacifism, possess as much an ecological as a leftist gloss. The evidence and endurance of a pronounced and persistent ecological profile in most Green parties, over if not against red-green preferences, indicates that the dangers of defining green politics with respect to narrowly focused and outmoded perspectives. Green politics is as green politics does and only correlates with post-material or left libertarian agendas in an accidental sense. 

Synopsis
It is clear that ‘Greens politics’ is not a homogeneous phenomenon and that no single political party can represent the ubiquity of an environmental issue that affects all people of all backgrounds. A Green party cannot be all things to all people at the abstracted political level, but the environment is an issue that gives content to the old ideal of the common good. This doesn’t mean that the Green party must be all things to all people. There is considerable evidence now to support the view that a cleavage pointing to a new politics is emerging. To some this amounts to the reorientation of the contemporary political agenda and to the realignment of party politics. To see a space opening up for the Green party here is to narrow one’s vision. The emergent opportunities contain potentialities for expanding the notion of the political, involving extensive public spaces and opportunities for participation, realigning not party politics but most of all reconfiguring the nature of the political. That said, the political fabric is usually more stable than changeable. At this political level, involving party competition and periodic elections, the success of the Greens is not determined by values or ideology or by environmental crises and fluctuating socio-economic cycles, but rather by those underlying structural circumstances that constrain and shape the politics and sociology of every advanced capitalist society. From this perspective, the competition between parties at the political level is only the surface level that does not touch the terrain of real politics.

In fine, the green party phenomenon is neither ephemeral nor transitory, but enduring. This does not imply a universal wave of change. It does imply a potential challenge to the established political order that could be actualised with the right combination of internal and external factors. The incongruity between the policies of the conventional parties and the preferences of new social groups and interests should be grist to the mill of green parties. This potential for political change needs to be actualised by appropriate political organisation and appeal, but it does indicate green politics as a feasible politics rather than a utopianism. This feasible politics exists to some degree in every advanced society as potential. The challenge is to identify a range of issues and engage wide sections of the public in a way that activates this potential. The great potential of the Green movement lies in its implicit challenge to the status quo. The movement represents the interests of all people concerned with every aspect of their environment as a lived and liveable space. This manifests itself in many areas, including pollution, the built environment, nuclear safety as well as with road and other infrastructural incursions into the natural habitat. The Greens express concerns that new technologies be judged according to their impact on health and lifestyles. They point out the damage that tourism does, the efficiencies of public over private transport as well as their benefits to the community in terms of bringing people together. They address issues of animal welfare, the frailty of the food chain, and criticise the rapacious character of globalised capitalism, with its enclosure of the oceans and the air, expropriation of farmers over the world and the corresponding loss of local culture and knowledge, its inbuilt structural unemployment, and endemic product and technology obsolescence. The Greens likewise condemn the treadmill of production and the culture of gross materialism, egoism and hedonism. The corporatisation and privatisation of public goods, marketisation as a permanent revolution, the insidious use of new technologies as a form of social control and surveillance undermining liberal freedoms. The length and diversity of the list of contemporary concerns, and the fact that Greens have relevant views on all these issues indicates something important. It emphasises that the scope of ecologism is as wide as society itself and is as universal as the environment. All things are interrelated, all parts interact within the whole. All these issues denote complex and multiple linkages that determine the environmental context of every developed polity. These issues are neither left nor right, they are issues that concern all life forms. This is the field of a genuine ecology as politics, not the conventional political sphere and its secondary divisions. Green parties have narrowed the focus to plough a distinct agenda. In order to expand, they must broaden their political appeal and established a viable electoral presence. What seems likely to be achieved in this sphere is very modest when judged against promises to revolutionise contemporary politics. A dose of realism is called for at this level. The British Labour has had one hundred years, a mass working class constituency and substantial, guaranteed funding from the trade union movement. For how many election wins and for how much political effect?

Whilst the Green parties are not going to go away, they are not going to become a main part of government. So it needs to explore other political opportunities to maximise its effectiveness. Here the increasingly interdependent global political economy raises new opportunities and issues as much as it generates new crises and dislocations. The structural dependence of the state upon the private economy systemically hobbles the willingness and the capacity of conventional political parties to address issues caused by the private economy but which are of common concern to people. Many of these issues established parties either do not want to or are simply incompetent to address. This gives the Greens a power to worry the established parties far more than their numbers should allow. Whilst the Greens may not command the votes of the conventional parties, they are free to raise the issues that people feel the main parties ignore. Further, the main parties are not insulated from the wider socio-economic dynamics and cultural shifts that brought the Greens to prominence in the first place. At some point, the conventional parties have to confront the issues and concerns of the new politics - the quality of life, for the continuing amenity value of the natural and built environment, the social tensions and psychological stress caused by 'progress', the cultural impact of rapid socio-economic change, and so on. 

At the same time, the Greens’ have to acknowledge some basic facts about class society:





A political party can be defined as "intermediaries between social change and political decision making in government structures".

Contemporary political discourse and practice is still obsessed with endless economic growth and still indulges the fantasy of material progress. It has to, given the dependence of the state upon the process of private accumulation. Ongoing economic dislocation and crisis, along with the fact that gross materialism has manifestly not brought peace and happiness, has meant a rising feeling of unease and ambivalence. If this carries on, then doubt creeps in. At this point, people become susceptible to new values and new ideas. The Greens represent the new positive dynamic at the heart of the body politic. In rejecting the old fake politics and false philosophy of materialism, Green parties have positioned themselves as leading harbingers of change. This establishes their right to be recognised as one of the principal agencies of transforming the political and social fabric. The Green party needs to hold on to its long term commitments, avoid dissipating its resources in too narrow a focus on electioneering and winning seats, and focus on mounting a challenge to failed political and economic order rather than seek a place within it.

34 ORGANISING FOR POLITICAL CHANGE

The Political Boundaries Of Change And The Changing Boundaries Of Politics
The boundaries of contemporary politics are changing in response to new cultural dynamics. The old political certainties and allegiances are shifting as a result of rising expectations and alternative values. The emergence in every advanced capitalism of parties and new social movements outside the sphere of conventional political sphere are evidence of a shift in the political culture. Within civil society there has been a rise of values and aspirations that challenge the established social order and cut the ground from under the established parties that reflect entrenched political traditions and social cleavages appropriate to a past society. The ‘old’ politics survives, but, caught between new social movements below and globalisation above, is being emptied of power. The ‘old’ politics no longer commands the respect it once did. Back in 1976 Jurgen Habermas wrote of Legitimation Crisis to describe how the state intervenes to manage the contradictory dynamics and crisis tendencies of the capital economy. The resources which the state draws on derive from the private system and are therefore finite. The state is the public face of capitalism. In intervening across the range of politics, society and culture to facilitate and organise accumulation, the state raises expectations it sooner or later cannot deliver. This results in a loss of legitimacy. At the same time the new politics, of which Green parties have been the principal, most persistent, most vocal political expression, shows no sign of going away. This does not mean that the new politics is about to subvert or overcome the old politics. This all depends on what may be called resource mobilisation – can the ‘new’ politics tap into the human roots that feed politics and give it a clear and coherent political expression that renders new aspirations and values effective? In the very least, the ‘new’ politics survives and exists as a potential aimed against the system. There is always a possibility that the turn against the established social order and conventional politics could gain a momentum of its own. Hence the influence that the Greens command that is way out of proportion of its political size. It also emphasises why the Greens should be careful with respect to their moral and intellectual resources, the very things that distinguish them from parties that have long since subordinated principle to systemic imperatives and ‘real’ politics. To abandon ecological ideas and values means that the Greens become just another party.
Any ‘new’ party committed to a ‘new’ politics is confronted by a daunting challenge. But it is possible to make some tentative suggestions as to how a ‘new’ politics might proceed in transforming politics and society. The most obvious measure of political impact within the polity is the role of Green parties in changing the shape of the party system that they seek to enter. This examines the extent to which the established parties persist or adapt in the face of new social and cultural challenges. Would it be considered a success or a failure if the values of Greens are incorporated by established parties, forcing a fundamental reconfiguration in the ‘old’ politics in order to encompass the challenge of the ‘new’? It would, of course, depend on the extent to which this reconfiguration is compatible with the sustainable economy or is merely the continuation of the old accumulative economy. But since hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue, even the attempt to incorporate Green ideas and values serves to normalise them, publicise and widen them. 
Changes in the electoral fortunes of ‘new’ parties are unreliable; they are mere snapshots that reveal nothing about the whole picture or the long term dynamics. They can indicate a mood in the short run and a trend over the long run. It can serve as a gauge of the coalitional potential of the system, and indicate the nuisance value of 'outsider’ parties in a homogenous parliamentary situation. Coalitional arrangements also offer an insight into existing patterns of dealignment and possibilities for future realignment within the party system. The variable ideological and political distance between parties is more than normal party competition but reflects, too, the underlying and enduring trends and cleavages in the social fabric. These provide the social basis for the partisan alignments that underlie the character and dynamic of electoral and party competition.

The persistence over the long run of the ‘new’ politics not only indicates their enduring quality, but also the degree of durability by the ‘old’ politics. Despite giving the impression of being at bay since the 1960’s, the ‘old’ parties are still the main protagonists in the political arena. They are increasingly under pressure to change their own organisational arrangements and procedures to accommodate emerging political preferences and expectations, but their survival shows how difficult it is for political newcomers to break into the scene system in the first place, and then challenge and change the established political order in the second. Real change tends to be long, slow and gradual. Often what people celebrate as ‘new’ has been in preparation over a long period of time. This means recognising the degree of persistence in any political system, even in attempting to highlight and develop potentials for change. It also means having a strategy that locates the ‘ideal’ society of the future within the trends, tendencies and lines of development of the ‘real’. Identify the contours of the future ecological society with real agencies for transformation and concentrate upon activating these.
 Within continuity there is always change. New uncertainties, alternative values and radical agendas coalesce to remove the ground from underneath routine and institutionalised patterns of political partisanship, challenging the conventional wisdom and revealing new possibilities to the people.
The identification of a 'change' under way and as becoming part of the fabric of the contemporary political scene requires an understanding of the social and cultural dynamics at work and their long term implications for the political order. The complacent assumptions of the ‘end of ideology’ in the 1960s and the ‘end of history’ with liberal capitalism in the 1990s are exposed as ideological, concealing fundamental shifts in a way that legitimises and dehistoricises the existing order. The assumption of this paradigm of 'stable' politics is that the social cleavages which emerged as result of the twin industrial and nation-state building revolutions from the eighteenth century forms the basis of an enduring system of party competition. (S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignment: an introduction", in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), "Party Systems and Voter Alignments" (New York, 1967), at p.67.
 The view is remarkable in the way that it uses an historical perspective to effectively end history with the triumph of capitalism. In the first place, the centralised national state confronted and overthrew the entrenched and privileged corporate elements of church or aristocracy. In the second place, the industrial revolutions that formed the counterpart of these political changes was characterised by a social cleavage between, on the one hand, established landed interests and a new industrial class; and, on the other, between these new capitalists and the working class. Capitalism replaced feudalism and then history ends. These twin revolutions shape the enduring patterns of party systems and 'froze’ them through the organisation of party organisations and mass electorates around these cleavages. The conclusion is that the electoral milieu is closed to 'new polities'. (R. Rose and D. Urwin, "Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems since 1945", Political Studies 18 1970, at pp.287-313.

This is a remarkable case of using history in order to deny history, as though long range change has come to an end at a particular time and place. This assumption of stability can no longer be maintained. The emphasis on ‘frozen’ cleavages has been upset by the emergence of new cleavages. (R. J. Dalton et al in R J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan and P.A Beck (eds), "Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?" (Princeton, 1984); see also S.C. Flanagan and RJ. Dalton, "Parties Under Stress: Realignment or Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Societies", West European Politics 7 (1) 1984, pp.7-23.

 There is now as much political volatility as there is political persistence, resulting in shifts in traditional patterns of electoral support and a new political map. Changes include the reconfiguration of class relations, particularly the decline of the manual working class and the rise of the new middle class; new economic patterns comprising the changing industrial structure, the relative decline of the primary sector and the expansion of the service and tertiary sectors; a secularised culture; changing spatial patterns, with the shift from ruralism to urbanism and the expansion of suburbia. Dalton and Flanagan focus on the decline in the traditional social class cleavage behind the old electoral partisanship. They are that "throughout the postwar period the dominant partisan cleavage in most western democracies distinguished between working class and bourgeois parties. Recently, however, there have been increasing signs that the dominant class cleavage may also be moving into eclipse .... the traditional middle class - working class cleavage is weakening". (S.C. Flanagan and R.J. Dalton, ibid (1984), at p. 10.) With this shift there is evidence of an emergent post-materialist culture which is able to alter the traditional divisions of party competition. (RJ. Dahon, S.C. Flanagan and P. Beck, "Political Forces and Partisan Change" in ibid (eds) "Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?" (Princeton, 1984), at pp.455-57). These developments have modified the degree of polarisation around class. What is striking here is that the demise of Communist parties and increasing impotence of the social democratic left and labour parties has not entailed a deradicalisation of the political culture. The weakening of socialist reformism is a consequence of a weakening of the advanced capitalism it is parasitic upon. But the travails of capitalism have been accompanied by a broad culture shift, with established policy agendas demarcating the 'old' politics having to respond to the politicisation of the gender and civil rights issues, the increasing priority of quality of life concerns and the growth of environmental politics. These new issues are promoted outside the old social cleavages and cannot be contained within the old aggregation and articulation functions of existing parties.

These shifts point to a political realignment, insofar as they present "a more meaningful and flexible outlet for the demands of younger generations than can be afforded by the relatively moribund parties of the past. Thus, the traditional political alternatives qua organisations are more vulnerable; affective attachments have declined, and patterns of political representation are in flux". (P. Mair, op.cit (1989), at p.253). In fine, fundamental transformations are underway within the social and hence the political fabric, transformations "in a pattern of political alignments which has more or less persisted since the beginning of mass democratic politics in western Europe. We are not just talking here about marginal change. Something much more fundamental is at stake. The problem is understanding what it actually means". (P. Mair, op.cit (1989), at p.254). One striking aspect of these transformations is the weakening of partisanship. Hence the concern with the obsession with attempting to locate the Greens on a traditional left-right spectrum that is weakening. The future would indicate a coalition politics in which alignment is based on the issues and the merits of the argument rather than interests served and sectional gains promoted. This coalition building should be grist to the mill of a green politics, practising the ecological principle of integrated systems and interactive cooperation. In the contemporary world "electoral alignments are weakening and party systems are experiencing increased fragmentation and electoral volatility. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the changes in all of these nations reflect more than short term oscillations in party fortunes. This decomposition of electoral alignments can be traced to shifts in the long term bases of partisan support, party identification and social cleavages. Virtually everywhere among the industrial democracies, the old order is changing". (R.J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan and P.A. Beck, in ibid (eds), (1984), at p.451).

The Greens have become an increasingly entrenched part of the political system whilst retaining the potential for further advance on the basis of a growing constituency for a new politics. Continuing environmental crisis and growing public concern as a result promise the possibility that the Greens become a permanent part of the system. Further advance depends on the extent to which Greens develop the preparedness and aptitude to grasp these opportunities politically, demonstrating a willingness to make the organisational changes and political compromises that are required of any political party wishing to make maximum advantage of its resources in the political game.
There are a number of critical variables that enhance or inhibit party development, and determine whether or not parties endure within the political landscape. (C. Hauss and D. Rayside, "The Development of New Parties in Western Democracies Since 1945", in L. Maisel and J. Cooper (eds), "Political Parties: Development and decay" (London, 1978) New parties usually emerge as a response to a perceived sense of crisis or a deep anxiety. The feeling that there is 'something wrong' with the world "need not entail anything as sweeping as divisions resulting from the industrial revolution or the Reformation.". (C. Hauss and D. Rayside, ibid (1978), at p.36)  But if the malaise is that deep seated, the potential for new politics is so great as to entail a fundamental social transformation. Issues play an important role in activating latent unrest, particularly if there is a widespread perception that the established parties are either unwilling or unable to give adequate expression to concerns which people want addressed. Again, this points to the need to make the most of moral and cultural resources when intervening at the political level. The issues which are perceived as ‘utopian’ at the conventional political level are often the neglected or marginalised issues and values that created the movement in distinction from established parties in the first place. At the same time, the values and issues as such are a necessary but insufficient cause of political rupture. These values and issues must be politicised so as to turn the social constituency behind the new politics into a wider electorate that is persuaded to abandon old partisanship loyalties in favour of the new politics. (C. Boggs, op.cit (1995), at chapters 4-6, on why Europe's established socialist
parties, with all of their advantages, have found difficulty in harnessing the
contemporary radical potential - a fact which puts the considerable task facing new parties looking to make an electoral breakthrough in its proper perspective.) 
 And so "to a great extent (new parties) are not masters of their own destiny. They cannot do well if there is no divisive issue to crystallise public opinion. They cannot do well, either, if the existing parties respond to the new discontented voters or if ties to these parties are strong enough to overcome that discontent. And they cannot do well if voters are convinced that support for a new party is tactically dangerous". (C. Hauss and D. Rayside, op.cit (1978), at pp.50-51).
In increasing their political and electoral profile, Greens need to remember to establish and maintain a strong base in community politics. Political systems which involve a deconcentration of power give opportunities to small parties with a local or regional presence the prospect of power sharing (particularly within proportional electoral systems). Participation in the political system legitimise and normalise the political role of the Greens in the eyes of their target electorate. A political presence in this way gives the Greens a political relevance, direct access to and influence over policy making, connection to the political class and even some influence over government. These attributes spell political effectiveness to the potential Green voter whilst spurring party activists on to further efforts and giving an incentive to continue to improve party structures and organisation. This marks the transition from being radicals remote from mainstream politics, all purity but no power, to becoming effective political players looking to give principle practical, reality transforming effect.
Whilst there are many exogenous factors beyond the immediate control of the Greens, there is plenty that is within their control. A critical factor here is the leadership function. A determinant of Green party success is how party leaders perform the strategic function in 'reading' the broad situation, responding to 'crises', coping with pressures, ‘applying’ principles in changing scenarios and contexts, 'adapting' the organisation to demands as they arise and so on. Political leadership is charged with the duty of effective organisational response. Whilst leadership cannot substitute for structural and social relevance, an effective organisational response including capable leadership will certainly cause those parties with some potential for success to maximise their chances, just as their absence will ensure that opportunities are squandered. For, as Hauss and Rayside see this situation, "a party can do well without a charismatic leader. It does need, however, at least a unified core of leaders committed to the idea of developing a new party which include most of those politicising the issue that made the party possible in the first place". (C. Hauss and D. Rayside, op.cit (1978), p.51).
The Greens have succeeded from developing from their origins as a movement with an uncertain political identity to becoming a recognisable political party. In the process, they have mobilised entirely new social groups and facilitated their entry into conventional politics. At this point they have the potential to represent a wholly new social cleavage at the political level. The normal discourse of mainstream party politics has been altered by the 'old' politics having to acknowledge some of the issues raised by the 'new’ politics, with political discourse having to broaden to reflect the new cleavages. The Greens represent a whole new political dimension, the possibilities of which have barely begun to be explored.

New parties but persistent?
If the Greens have been able to cope with a political agenda that continues to prioritize the economy over the environment, a bias strengthened by economic crisis, then they can certainly adjust to make the political compromises necessary to entrench and extend their position. For, in the long term perspective, time and events are on their side. The long standing fissures of modernity are more and more apparent, creating a legitimation crisis which conventional politics, brought up on the ever expanding economy, is ill equipped to deal with. The modern world is increasingly a malign environment, with respect to the natural world and the exploitation of its resources and with respect to ontological needs, humanity's deeper, non-material interests. There is a chasm opening up between those who put a higher value the economics of price and exchange and those who emphasise real ecological and economic values, those who measure progress according to the shallow materialism of consumption and possession and those who value natural and human needs and potentials. Long term transformations are not encouraging for the existing system. The relentless demography that will make the world a more densely populated place is putting intolerable pressures on resources. At the same time, the political system shows no signs of being able to control the predatory industries or to persuade a largely unreflective population so as to preserve diminishing resources, to generate less waste and pollution, to prevent those perennial disasters that recur so often now as to be considered endemic rather than accidental to the system. Far from going away, the issues and concerns that brought the Greens to prominence are become increasingly prominent. As they must. They are an integral part of the techno-urban industrial civilisation. Environmental disasters and crises, epidemics, global warming leading to climate change, nuclear waste, habitat destruction and resource depletion unfold exponentially in the biosphere, and have a dramatic and damaging impact on livelihoods and lifestyles, the politics promising a healthy ecosphere will become more relevant. At this point, Green politics will play a role in changing group expectations, shaping policy options and political agendas, moulding sustainable economic futures, and subverts the ideological discourse that has served to rationalise the irrational conduct of modem life. Despite endless economic expansion, the world is an altogether less happy and secure and a much more dangerous place. The Greens claim to be able to diagnose the problem and to have a solution.

The political relevance and purchase of the new politics will fluctuate in the short run in accordance with the vagaries of political life, but the ecological predicament is a permanent, even worsening, one, something that will ensure its priority status in relation to other problems and causes. In politics, it is often not what really matters but the perceptions of what really matters that set the agenda. There is a tendency for ecological issues to slip down the agenda in response to other issues which are more pressing in the immediate sense, recession, war, terrorism and international security, global shifts in economic power. The greatest advantage of the ‘old’ politics over the ‘new’ is the way that it addresses immediate concerns in the short range. Indeed one could characterise the shift from old to new politics as a transition from short term perspectives focused on issues of immediate concern to individuals to a long term strategic perspective focused on long term issues for the good of all. Put this way, the big political question is less determining a left or right political identity in competition with other parties than shifting focus beyond the immediate. Ecological issues are necessarily long term issues and will always in this sense be considered secondary to issues of immediate concern. The short term tendency to discount ecological concerns in the face of an assertive materialism must be confronted with a firm and ongoing commitment to the issues of sustainability and quality of life on which Green politics bases its political appeal. The danger lies in diluting that message for more short term appeal. Bennulf is surely correct to write that "environmental problems will be with us for the foreseeable future, meaning that ecology is not an issue that will disappear. It might go down but not away on the agenda. Thus, most likely, ecology will continue as a politicised issue in most countries. The environment, like taxes and defence cuts, will become an ingrained fixture of politics. Viewed in this way, the green breakthrough of the 1980s will be permanent. Ecological issues will be part of the politics of the future". (M. Bennulf, "Sweden - The rise and fall of Miljopartiet de grona", in D. Richardson and C. Rootes, op.cit (1994), at p. 181.) The trick is to align these long term issues with a short range practice, breaking up the one big goal to be achieved in the long run into a series of realisable short range goals of immediate tangible benefit. An ecological praxis.

Organising For Radical Change 
Some Strategic Considerations
Green politics is not only advanced by Green parties. There is an impressive assortment of green pressure groups promoting the cause of ecology at every level - from the local to the global context – and these offer are a more direct way of accessing the political process by campaigning for specific policy changes. (See the account by Hein-Anton van der Heijden, Ruud Koopmans, Marco G. Guigui in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, Supplement 2 Part two, 1992, pp. 1-40.). Pressure groups operate very differently from organised political activity, concentrating their resources and focusing their energies upon single issue causes. (See D. Rucht, "Environmental movement organisations in West Germany and France: Structure and inter-organisational relations", in P.G. Klandermans (ed), "Organizing for change: Social movement organisations in Europe and the US" (Greenwich CT, 1989); W. Rudig, "Peace and Ecology Movements in Western Europe", West European Politics 3(1) 1988, at pp.29-30; A. Jamieson, R. Eyerman and J. Cramer, "The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness: A Comparative Study of the Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands" (Edinburgh, 1991); and M. Finger and P. Sciarini, "Integrating new Politics into Old Politics: The Swiss Political Elite", West European Politics, 14(1) 1991,pp.98-112).  They are able to assemble alliances across conventional party divisions and appeal to people on the basis of the particular issues. People who perceive Green parties to be idealistic, utopian or inflexible will be more likely to be attracted to groups who can display effectiveness in promoting particular issues. (R. W. Cobb, J. K. Ross and M. H. Ross, "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process", American Political Science Review 70 1976, pp. 126-138; P. Leroy and   A.   de   Geest, "Environmental movement   and   environmental policy", (Antwerp/Amsterdam, 1985). There are, however, limitations to the single issue or lobbyist approach. Even the biggest and most broadly based Green lobby groups have to devote necessarily limited resources – not least time and energy - to specific and localised causes, failing to connect these causes with effective action at a system wide level. This reduces their impact and weakens the message. "If local movements reveal the shrinking capacity of normal politics, they nonetheless remain parochial, diffuse and ideologically unfocused. Loosely organised grassroots networks can win adherents and lay the foundations of community, but they lack the strategic direction and flexibility required for political effectiveness." (C. Boggs, op.cit (1995), at p.235.) Political organisation for effectiveness is the rationale by giving Green politics a party form.

The autonomy and spontaneity that characterises single issue groups has a superficial radical appeal but the idea that the fundamental transformation of the world can be achieved by a series of disjointed, uncoordinated incremental endeavours is naïve. Pressure group politics and grassroots movements are necessary but not sufficient conditions of change. At a time when the forces systematically undermining civilisation are thinking big, colonising the global environment, there is a tendency to think small. It is not about size, small or big, local or global, but the appropriate scale for effectiveness in the complex, pluralistic politics of advanced global societies. Local or grassroots energy is sine qua non in any strategy for fundamental transformation. But the process requires the effective deployment of a range of resources over a complex and global society. To be effective a Green politics requires a coherent strategy and an organised political agency to publicise and promote it. As Claus Offe argues "in their demands, new movements do not anticipate a lengthy process of transformation, gradual reform, or slow improvement, but an immediate and sudden change". (C. Offe, "Reflections on the Institutional Self-Transformation of Movement Politics: A Tentative Stage Model", in R.J. Dalton and M. Keuchler, op.cit (1990), p.238). A coherent strategy through an organised political agency gives this endeavour the requisite long term perspective. An inchoate and often sporadic range of pressure groups and campaigns duplicates effort, dissipates resources and fails to concentrate force. The value of the political party lies in aggregating diverse movements and pressure groups into an effective, overall strategy that is able to deliver a more lasting institutional and structural change. An inability to perform this collective function abdicates the cause of ecology to the mainstream parties who, firmly within the capital system, will deliver merely a cosmetic, instrumental, or short term interest. Creating a collective identity out of a range of social and environmental groups and campaigns is fraught with difficulty and controversy. “If grassroots struggles are diffuse and consumed with identity objectives, parties by definition are committed to winning power, to pursuing workable strategies and tactics. Movements jealously protect their own territories and identities against hierarchical and instrumental incursions of parties, however those parties may be ideologically defined. It follows that radical movements in particular will often resist the logic of electoral competition and interest group representation that is the hallmark of pluralist democratic politics. Such movements will prefer direct action over state governance, issue specificity over coalition building, and social protest over policy formation". (C. Boggs, op.cit (1995), at p.239.)

There is a difference between a movement orientation and a party perspective, and it can only be resolved by reconciling the two in such a way as to respect the legitimate claims of both in their own sphere. This reconciliation is a condition of making green politics an enduring and effective force or change. Ecologists should need no reminder of the seriousness of the environmental crisis. There is no time to be wasted through a lack of coordination and discipline. A narrow ‘movementism’ is pure self-indulgence that leads radicals into a cul-de-sac and leaves the world unchanged. Principled passion, energy and commitment counts for nothing if it is not properly focused, channelled and organisation. And this requires seeing the bigger picture, subordinating immediate perspectives for the long range and accepting discipline. 

There are dangers of going too far in the direction of pragmatism as a condition of getting things done. Some campaign and single issue groups can demonstrate real achievements in their involvement in normal politics. There is a  management style which is characterised by a narrow organisational rationality and goal achievement which neglects broader value and political concerns. Political success over the long run requires a more balanced perspective, and this is what the party agency delivers. For all of the specific achievements of the green lobby, Green parties have a distinctive role to play in advancing the cause of ecology. Green parties supplement, facilitate and enhance the work of the green lobby. They give ecological issues a more coherent and permanent political profile than is possible if political expression is simply the result of disparate single issue campaigns and pressure group activity. The purpose of the Green party is put the environment question on the political agenda in a clear and concise form, in terms that appeal to the electorate and in a way that indicates a feasible political programme. The party is designed to ensure that the environmental issue remains at the forefront of political debate, and thereby keeps it in the minds of key political elites and policy makers alike. Green Parties serve to aggregate environmental issues, prioritise them as circumstances and popular concerns demand, and establish the broader vision that links environmental issues with adjoining policy matters within the national, and increasingly, the global agenda. Green parties therefore fosters and builds the pervasive sense that the environment is a central policy concern, rather than a series of narrowly conceived single issues at the margins of public policy. In giving politics a 'green dimension', an overarching coherence in the policy making universe, Green parties inspire further effort and activism by giving a point and a focus to local energies. Maximising opportunities require maximising resources, and this means developing a political identity and instinct beyond a naive trust in the veracity of the cause and the purity of the principle. Such utopianism causes movements to punch well below their social weight and drives them to the political fringes. ‘Whatever happened to the popular front? He’s over there. Splitter!’

 At the political level, Greens have to have a realistic appraisal of their present possibilities. The 'catch-all' strategy of the established, mainstream parties is not only beyond their capabilities but is undesirable even if it could be achieved. The ‘mass’ electorates of the ‘mass parties’ is becoming increasingly fluid and disparate. The evidence seems to suggest not switching political allegiances but a demand for new forms of political expression. This could mean more decentralised politics at more levels of government, smaller parties and coalition government. As against the mass electorate pursued by the mainstream parties, the Greens must work to mark out a distinctive electoral territory for themselves. This means cultivating a distinctive appeal in terms of Green principles and thus consolidating an electoral niche based on new politics concerns; but above and beyond this it is imperative to extend the political reach so as to appeal to other groups, without thereby losing the faithful. This may not be as difficult as it sounds. Ecology is an all-embracing and all-pervasive subject, which means that there is an ecological perspective on all the issues of common concern – employment, health, education, social welfare, law and order, urban regeneration, peace. By developing and promoting coherent policies on all these issues, it should be possible to create a broad electoral base that will enhance the leverage of Green parties within the political system. This delicate calculus requires a degree of organisation, caution and pragmatism that is uncomfortable for those impatient for change. The problem that radicals must acknowledge is this, that to succeed in influencing and shaping the policy agenda, the Greens must attract support from outside the faithful. Presuming that Green politics is more than a one-off protest politics, political appeal depends upon seriousness of purpose. The electorate do not like to waste their votes, itself a severe handicap for minority parties in a first past the post system. They want to see their votes rewarded with a degree of political seriousness and influence and are not impressed by idle poses and gestures and grandstanding. 
The large membership of green interest groups and support for ecological causes reveals a substantial potential Green electorate. This contrasts with the much smaller turnout for Green parties at the polls. This means that Green political parties must accept that they are as political as they are Green. That is, they must supplement the activities of green interest and issue groups by giving an added political dimension, engaging with and showing influence within the established political system. Their purpose, in other words, is political. The cause of ecology as such can be promoted directly by the campaign and pressure groups. 

To effectively engage in real politics, Green parties must do certain things: 
a)	To carve out a distinctive constituency within the electorate for their environmental agenda. This issue of the environment must be connected with a range of adjacent issues and in alliance with other elements within the political system receptive to environmental issues.
b)	Green parties must be alive to the changing electoral and political climate in order to project possibilities for radical change. Along the way they must build alliances with those other elements and forces and even other parties which are responsive to environmental issues. The ‘new’ post-material issues that favour the Greens are certainly increasing, but the idea that they will displace the ‘old’ productionist issues by some cultural evolution is naive. In a capitalist economy upon which electorates and governments depend, there is no avoiding ‘old’ politics. Building an effective alliance for social transformation requires that this fact be incorporated in such a way that sees the cause of ecology as co-terminus with the fight against an exploitative economy, with issues of equality, justice, distribution of resources. 
c)	This comes to the crux of the matter. In the world of organised politics, strategy is shaped by the hard realities and circumstances of the here and now rather than preferences based on a priori principles. Greens may be more comfortable with a political discourse that is rooted in universal precepts rather than political division and calculation, but that would be to eschew the world that is for the world that ought to be. 
d)	As a ‘new’ politics challenging capitalism’s exploitation of the global ecology, Greens need to acknowledge similarities of their socio-economic critique with both the old and new left's class/exploitative analysis of the elemental dynamics of contemporary society.

In arguing that the Greens need to engage the left in a meaningful dialogue, one comes back time and again to the question of political novelty. The sustainable society requires a 'break' with capitalist modernity and hence with the ‘productionist’ paradigm that is deeply rooted in the cultural fabric of advanced societies as well as in the individual mindsets of their citizens. To argue that the Greens must accommodate themselves to perennial concerns with social justice, an equitable redistribution of social goods, civil rights, effective control of private and public corporatism, and so on, begs the question. Why should the Greens have to accommodate themselves to an ‘old’ left politics that has palpably failed to transform capitalism. To accept the modernity paradigm because it is so entrenched at the level of modalities and mentalities is to attach environmentalism to the list of social justice, equality, socialism which the ‘old’ left could not deliver whilst remaining within the ‘productionist’ paradigm. Whether as revolution or reform, the hegemonic socialist tradition has fallen far short of its promises at all levels. (M. Harrington, "Socialism: Past and Future" (New York, 1990). It could not deliver on its critique of capitalism. Too much pragmatism and too much accommodation, and the cause of ecology will go the same way. The value of Green politics lies in the way it can get the ‘old’ left to reject its narrow assumptions concerning the sources and direction of progressive change and reconstitute itself in a way that avoids being incorporated by capitalist modernity.

Ecologism and socialism share a commitment to a vision beyond capitalist modernity. There is a mutual concern with the impact of globalisation on the socio-economic fabric. In particular, globalisation has intensified the problems of massive, exploitative and potentially destructive force beyond social control which gave socialism its point and purpose in the first place. And this fact should be a lesson. Socialism has been beaten by failing to subject economic forces to effective political regulation. ‘Parliamentary socialism’ simply lacked the regulatory framework to deal with the forces unleashed by the multinational production, distribution and fiscal networks of contemporary capitalism. (Winifred Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder, "The logic of International Restructuring" (London, 1995), especially at chapters 6-8.) The fact that these global forces are destructive in both social and ecological terms implies an alliance between ecologism and socialism. But on the reformist terrain of capitalist modernity, ‘parliamentary ecologism’ will go the same way as ‘parliamentary socialism’. By pragmatism one assumes a politics that actually works to deliver on certain goals. The globalisation of economic relations has pushed private economic forces even further out of the reach of political control than when capitalist production proceeded mainly within national boundaries, and could be subject to forms of national political management (even here, parliamentary socialism could demonstrate very limited achievements set against its potential and its promises). Globalisation forces the issue of control on the agenda, challenging those multiple, integrated disempowerments that lie at the heart of the contemporary crisis – social breakdown, the moral malaise, the popularity and legitimacy of governments, financial and economic crisis and last but not least the environmental crisis. These crises are coalescing into one big crisis and continue to fuel the moral anxieties and exacerbate the discontents of many ordinary citizens. Without a positive resolution, these vexations will undoubtedly go to extremes, either apathy or atavism. Unresolved anxieties and tensions demonstrate the ineffectiveness of politics and undermine faith in the civic virtues and the abilities of governments to govern. (U. Beck, "Risk Society" (London, 1992). Which is why Green parties must hold their nerve and avoid a pragmatism that draws them too far inside a political system that is manifestly failing and in which people are losing faith. The best opportunity that the Greens have in demonstrating their relevance lies in their claim and capacity to resolve the persistent problems of economic security, ecological balance and social justice. 

Green prospects will grow the more they can demonstrate the relevance of ecologism to the whole range of social and political concerns, winning support beyond the Green faithful. The more the ecological crisis pervades the public consciousness, the more receptive those seeking solutions within the productionist paradigm are likely to become. 

Political parties are not static. Their success depends not on the unreflective adherence to original principles but upon the interplay of resources, practices and strategic calculations. (Angelo Panebianco, "Political Parties: Organisation and Power" (Cambridge, 1988). To prosper, Green parties must be responsive to the political and social environment and be prepared to adapt so as to make maximum use of the resources available to it. This is politics as a form of 'social learning', informing practice as well as being informed by it. (John Dunn, "Western Political Theory to the Face of the Future" (1993 edition), at Conclusion (1992), especially at pp. 134-137.) This ecological practice brings subject and object, knower and known together so that social learning and adjustment becomes more the ongoing redefinition of reality rather than the abandoning of ideals. As Zucker put it: "interpretations of reality are seen as being socially created and institutionalised (i.e. in political practice and the party's format, procedures and programmes), functioning as objective rules and determining the interpretation of new situations. These institutionalised interpretations define what is possible and alternative interpretations appear to be meaningless". (L. Zucker, "The role of tostitutionalrzation to cultural persistence", American
Sociological Review 42(4), at p.728.)

The Constraints Of Party Systems On Political Change
What is the place of Green parties' in the operation of the political system? 
Compromise does not mean the abandoning of principle. The task is to fit principle to politics as 'the art of the possible'. The possible is circumscribed in a number of ways, not least of which is public opinion and political commentary, neither of which is receptive to trying to work out what is meant by an anti-party party practising a ‘new’ politics. The days when the Greens were regarded as a protest vote and an electoral nuisance may well be going, but not quite yet. The Greens do not have the resources for a prolonged war of attrition and need to avoid an insular or exclusivist politics in favour of building political alliances with those receptive to ecological issues – and across the political mainstream, not just ‘the left’. A focus on the cause of ecology centres Green politics and takes precedence over political calculations in terms of electoral alliances and parliamentary accommodations. A broad rainbow alliance sounds fine but not at the price of a loss of distinctiveness. It may increase their political profile but it also has the demerit of opening the Greens to being judged by the company they keep. The universal appeal of ecologism has its greatest value as the centre ground of the future, the in front as opposed to the limitations of left and right.

The fundamentalist fear of Green politics being asset stripped of its principles has not been born out. ‘Realist’ political accommodation has not led to the demise of Green politics. The dangers of compromising principles as a condition of engaging in effective politics has been compensated by the positive political pay offs - the recognition of the Greens' as a serious political party capable of engaging the political system as something more than a protest. The lessons have been learned. Green parties are now led by people who understand that the failure to engage in conventional politics is an even bigger danger to survival than engagement. The worst that can happen with engagement is the complete sacrifice of principle for power and the continuation of the ecologically destructive system. Whether than happens remains to be seen. Non-engagement is certain to achieve the same end through an inflexible adherence to principle cutting Green politics off from all political influence. The relentless oppositionalism is a kind of permanent protest that wastes the energies of the activities and does not dent the system in the slightest. Much more profitable is a cautious engagement within the system. Social and cultural dynamics do seem to favour the ‘new’ politics. The Green parties are the product of new social movements which are the principal agencies precipitating the end of the age of large 'catch-all' parties". (H Kitschelt, "The Green Phenomenon to Western Party Systems", to S. Kamienieki (ed), "Environmental Politics to the International Arena. Movements,  Parties, Organisations and Policy" (New York, 1993), at pp. 103-108), There is every prospect then of a political realignment which emerges as an appropriate response to the unparalleled problems generated by late capitalist modernity.

The attempt to abandon party politics and the electoral route was defeated in the British Green Party’s 1996 conference with these words: "this party has a duty to speak loud and clear .... regardless of the amount of votes we receive". (The Guardian, 21.9.96.) In other words, Green politics comprises a number of political aspects and forms, including electioneering, but does not reduce to any of these elements as ends in themselves. In this way, fomenting political and social change is less about political calculation in working out ‘old’ and ‘new’ allies than participating in an altogether more complex, wide-ranging, expansive series of compromises involving those parts of the political establishment which are receptive to ecological issues and social actors outside of the conventional political sphere - with bargains constructed according to furthering the cause of ecology. 

The most likely formula for success is to combine compromise and caution at the political level with an emphasis on social action, to be involved in the building of the sustainable future within civil society at the same time as promoting the idea at the political level. To reach out to other parties whilst being the political focus of those who are energetic participants in the creation of the sustainable future is a strategy that combines political and social, short and long range goals. To do this requires a stable and effective party format as a means of channelling and focusing support and normalising ecological concerns within contemporary discourse and practice of politics. To advance the cause of ecology, Greens need to actively engage in politics and become fully involved in the practicalities of coalitional politics. Bennulf warns of asset stripping: "it might seem paradoxical, but if the Greens are too successful in promoting and politicizing the environmental question they may find themselves out-competed - on their own ground by other parties. Increased attention on environmental issues means higher electoral stakes for everybody, forcing all parties who want to stay alive to stake out their own green claim".  (M. Bennulf, op.cit (1994), at p. 181). Why, exactly, is the all-pervasiveness of the Green agenda a problem? ‘We are all Keynesians now’ it was once said. If – if – this represents a genuine ecologism, then doesn’t this count as a political success?

The Radical Predicament Revisited But Resolved?

The twin problems of economic and environmental crisis alone mean that the social conditions and economic circumstances in modern global capitalism are likely to embed rather than evict the Greens in the political landscape. The issues which led to the rise of Green politics have not only not gone away, they are intensifying. Therefore: "as long as ever-expanding bureaucracies impinge on individual self-determination, as long as the menace of nuclear annihilation is not banned, and as long as one environmental catastrophe is only upstaged by yet another -frequently worse - disaster, it seems likely that Green parties of various kinds are here to stay". (F. Muller-Rommel and T. Poguntke, "The Unharmonious Family: Green Parties to Western Europe", to E. Kolinsky (ed), op.cit (New York, 1989), at p.28). This is a minimalist, deterministic synopsis which simply gives the structural reason why contemporary society generates the problems for which Green politics proposes solutions. Green parties still have to be pro-active in mobilising public opinion in favour of these environmental solutions. Green parties represent the fundamental problems which are endemic to capitalist modernity, problems which have long been neglected by existing political parties for the very reason that they are inherent within the system of accumulation upon which the state sphere depends. There are no parliamentary solutions and political parties have not sought them since the ignominious demise of ‘parliamentary socialism’. The Green parties are the latest attempt by society to form a countermovement against extraneous power. The systemic problems will not go away until the system that generates them is abolished. Regardless of actual support in opinion polls, elections and mass mobilisation in campaigns, the Green parties represent the universal interest of all against a dehumanising system. (M. Kuechler and R.J. Dalton, "New Social Movements and the Political Order: Inducing Change for Long-term Stability?", in R.J. Dalton and M. Kuechler, op.cit (1990), atp.296.)
The Greens are a challenge to the existing political order. They have already had an influence on contemporary politics, reformulating the issue agenda, out of all proportion to the actual membership and voting numbers. (C. Offe, "Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Movements since
the Sixties", in C.S. Maier (ed), "Changing Boundaries of the Political" (Cambridge, 1987). This denotes moral and intellectual force as well as the force of example. So long as Greens can back proposals and policies with practical examples, there is no reason why they cannot continue to exert an influence in excess of their numbers. In the process, however, Greens have to work within the exigencies and constraints of practical politics. Those who believe in the logics of party organisation will detect an irresistible process of 'institutionalisation' involving deradicalisation. This could be presented more positively as the exchange of the political impossibilities of permanent protest for the opportunity to actually achieve certain goals through the adoption of party status and entrance into politics. This is to embrace a purposive and practical radicalism that actually engages the political order, as opposed to indulging in protest and polemic from the outside. Rather than demand change from others, at some point a movement that is politically serious organises and engages the political system. This comes with the corollary that those who would seriously pursue the goal of ecology as politics must accommodate itself to the system they operate within as much as challenge it. The party agency has been the key to resolving the radical predicament of being both ‘in’ and ‘against’ the system. It is the eternal paradox of any ‘new’ politics that, the more successful they are, the more they have to confront the dilemma of engaging the very system it is supposed to change. Something that could be done here is to contest the system on two fronts, from inside the political sphere and from within the prefigurative praxis of the social sphere. The fact remains that the process of 'party government' and electoral politics is the central organising principle of the liberal democratic politics, so much so that people tend to identify this form with politics as such. It follows that it is at this level, in addition to altering the discourse of politics, the values of modern society and social action, that any politics that is serious about change must make its case. This does not mean a kind of ‘parliamentary ecologism’, since it does not imply a neglect of extra-parliamentary activity, quite the contrary. It does mean recognising that "the form of party government is the dominant common trait of western European democracies. Parties are at the heart of the political process, and any significant change in the political order will affect the composition of the party system and/or the role and function of parties in general. The most direct challenge to the political order by the new movements, then, lies in the entry of movement parties into electoral competition". (M. Keuchler and R.J. Dalton, op.cit (1990), at p.297). It is this domination of party politics that explains why Green parties were formed in the first place – there is no other way of accessing the policy system and to concentrate resources where they can be most effective in shaping the public agenda. The pressing nature of the environmental crisis means that one of the most precious resources is time. If the purpose of Green politics is to change things for the better, then political disengagement is pure indulgence. The polity as a whole is bigger than any political party. All parties must in some way compromise their highest ideals and blunt their edge in order to negotiate common terms with others. The predicament facing those oriented towards change is that "the price for short term success in the political agenda, for being efficient and reliable in the eye of the larger public, is the alienation of significant parts of the movement".74 At some point spurs have to be earned. No one likes examinations, but sooner or later ability has to be tested. There is a continuum of calculation here. At one extreme is a single person maintaining the highest principle in isolation from all other people, with not one ounce of that highest principle evident in the rest of the world; on the other hand, there is the entire population of the world, with the highest principle so diluted as to be indiscernible. It is not a case of either/or since both positions imply the general absence of principle. It means finding a position on the continuum where enough of the highest principle has been extended to still remain meaningful. And that is the case for politics – to pursue ideas, values and principles in such a way as to be both achievable and meaningful. Reading Alec Nove’s The Economics of Feasible Socialism, one is struck by just how radical many of the feasible proposals are, even though Nove was dismissed at the time as a traitor to class politics. And this suggests a point about the radicals, by pitching their political ideal too high, they end up achieving far less than is possible. At some point, those interested in changing the world have to test themselves against realities, take their fate in their own hands, engage the system, build alliances to others within and without the system, and thereby connect the alternative agenda to processes and institutions and forces capable of delivering it.
Sufficient time has elapsed since the set-piece battles between the fundamentalists and the realists to form a tentative judgement. The Green parties have entered government and can demonstrate certain achievements. They are also taking seats at different levels of government. They have not won the levels of electoral support that their efforts merit. But the electorate is now fully conversant with environmental issues. The environment is no longer marginal on the political agenda, even though materialist concerns still dominate. The Greens have played a part in the slow greening of politics, presenting the issue with such clarity as to induce other parties to incorporate an environmental dimension and a green dimension into their own priorities. One can dismiss this as greenwash and a green rhetoric but the fact that parties feel the need to pay lip service to ecologically sound values is sign of progress, particularly given the well-funded, well-publicised green backlashes that persist. Perhaps the biggest indication of Green success is precisely the organised misinformation, vehemence and vitriol that has been directed towards the ecological issue. One can trust the political nostrils of the rich and powerful – they can spot a threat and an enemy a mile away. And they are gunning for ecology as politics.
Greens have played a significant role in shifting the character of political discourse, without yet rupturing the domination of materialist issues within the old politics. The ‘new’ politics is still a potential, which itself is an achievement. Principles have not been sold out and options exhausted. As my old history teacher Brother Victor repeatedly said, ‘there’s nothing inevitable in history’. Just because something happened doesn’t mean to say that it was bound to happen, that there weren’t other possibilities that could have played themselves out. One thing is sure, that if naïve, uncritical optimism is a dangerous indulgence, a fatalistic and cynical pessimism is a self-fulfilling prophecy of defeat. 
Certainly, "new, urgent environmental issues will come up again, but the roller coaster of ecological issues is difficult for Green parties to manage and it makes them dependent on outside forces beyond their control". (W. Rudig, op.cit October 1991, at p.30.). Institutional and systemic constraints finished off the first attempts to realise socialism and circumscribe the scope for ecological politics just as effectively. But this does not prevent a powerful response being launched by well organised and politically astute Greens, building alliances within the community at large as well as within government circles to overcome structural disadvantages or diminish their negative impact. And behind it all there is the ever present, ever growing environmental crisis which is not going to go away until it is addressed. That fact alone puts ecology on the political agenda and will suffice to keep the Greens in politics. Environmentalism is now high on the political agenda of the global political economy, with all nations and international organisations having to respond to the informed, insistent arguments of the ecologists. ("Word Bank bows to Green lobby", The Guardian, 27.9.93.)

The current evidence of global warming threatening ecologically devastating climatic change indicates that the environmental issue is on the agenda for the long term. 

There is a serious imbalance between the ecosphere and the technosphere.

Those who expect dramatic revolution are likely to be disappointed. Even if it happens, this is not what is required. The times call for a rational reconstruction and a considered use of resources for the good of all on the planet. This implies not drastic events and ruptures in the political order, but a gradual evolutionary process of adaptation, induced, no doubt, by ecology as politics, and ‘producing stability by way of change". (M. Kuechler and R.J. Dalton, op.cit (1990), at p.298.) That is a telling phrase. For all of the identification of Green politics with the left, that phrase is the essence of conservatism. It is the principle of a viable and functioning social order. And it confirms the Green identity as neither side of political division but affirming the more solid and stable ground of the centre.

In the long run, the combination of the ever present, ever rising environmental crisis, the growing ecological sensibility amongst wider sections of the public, and the established presence of Green parties that have addressed these issues most cogently for some time, whilst other parties have remained wedded to the old materialist paradigm, augurs well for Green politics. The success or otherwise of these parties is in their own hands, if they are able to mobilise the resources at their disposal – organisational, moral, social, intellectual – and take advantage of the favourable combination of circumstances that is emerging. The refusal to compromise, be pragmatic, build alliances and practice coalition politics, network, build influence by proving seriousness means reverting to political and ideological cul-de-sacs. Green parties have gone beyond being satisfied with occasional electoral success based on transitory protest voting. A failure to confront hard political realities by refusing to embrace the compromise that is the price of possible change, Green parties will fall far short of their electoral potential As Rudig has prescientiy observed: "To survive, Green parties have to build a stable electorate that identifies with the party and votes for it on a regular basis. The influence of salient environmental issues is particularly acute and unsettling if the Green electorate is volatile and does not identify more closely with the party.... Green party success and failure can be explained, to a large extent, by comparing the combination of environmental issues and conflicts with the resources available for Green parties. But Green parties also need to maintain organisational continuity". (W. Rudig, op.cit (October, 1991), at pp.30-31.)





35 GREEN POLITICS AND VISION

Radical Vision And Pragmatic Politics
There are three underlying assumptions to Green politics. One, that fundamental change is necessary, given the threat of climate change through global warming; two, that fundamental change is desirable, not only in terms of preserving the conditions of human geography and other life systems but also in realising visions of a good society that conforms to human ontology; three, that fundamental transformation is possible given institutional capacity, technological know-how, and economic interrelation. 
There is often some debate as to finding the right balance between a radical vision and a pragmatic politics. The question is one of discerning where and what to compromise in order to move forwards from and to the common ground. The challenge is to be politically effective without diluting the vision. Political effectiveness lies in drawing larger numbers of people within and building their ecological consciousness progressively so that they come to understand the degree of qualitative change which is necessary to preserve the basis of life on earth. That degree of fundamental change will not be possible without a large constituency and without an ecological consciousness. The cuts in resource use required are well beyond the capacity of existing industrial production and regulation. The predicament lies in achieving radical ends by pragmatic means.
The fact that many Green demands and ideas are being acted upon and absorbed into the political mainstream is a sign of success but also a challenge to move to the next stage. In the very least, we are witnessing the partial realisation of many of the Greens' most far-reaching demands. This success is a mere beginning and an encouragement to continue along these lines. There is a danger that gains may become conservative positions to defend rather than centres for further progress in the direction of the dissolution of military blocs; the withdrawal of nuclear weapons; the end of nuclear power; the inclusion of ecological considerations into urban planning and economic development; the diffusion of economic power; community empowerment; the protection of the integrity of local cultures. 
The Green Party needs to live up to its claim to think globally by absorbing issues like global warming, the greenhouse effect, deforestation, the poisoning of water tables etc into policy and practice. New thinking about the relationship of human civilisation to nature is given practical, institutional shape in the form of new political and economic structures.

The Green Party needs to retain its vision of a pacified existence beyond industrialism. Greens need to be in the forefront of evolving a vision of an ecological society. And they need to retain that commitment to an ideal. Even as they take their place within coalition governments managing a present, Green parties need to retain that vision of an alternative future. The danger is that politics gains a hold and a momentum of its own and the need to court electoral popularity and protect temporary political successes comes to outweigh the vision of a different future. Any number of books detail this tendency to inertia and conservatism in Green political organisation (Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe Michael O Neill 1997 Ashgate). The reason that such a political approach fails ultimately is that it is rooted in little more than opinion, resting upon the vagaries and interests of individual opinion as electors and taxpayers. The bottom up approach of building the associative civil public as against a top heavy concentration on the party is the only secure, long term basis for Green politics.

Despite tremendous internal struggles, particularly the inherent split between realists and fundamentalists, and despite the obvious ethical dilemmas and intellectual pains of political compromises, the various Green parties of the world remain the most articulate political expression of an alternative politics. The challenge is to canalise the deep-lying discontent with the current state of affairs with an ecological sensibility. The danger lies in being drawn, by electoral success, into the conventional political spectrum which is falling further and further into disrepute. In all four continents, individuals are acting and joining together to envision and create the foundations for a Green world, free of the constraints and imperatives of state, corporate, commercial, financial and military domination.

How to confront this domination without losing a base in place and people is the task confronting Green politics, forging centres of popular community resistance to alien power in all its forms. In every part of the world Green parties and environmental groups have been at the forefront of efforts to protect rainforests and soils, combat pollution and develop alternative technologies and economic policies, connecting ecological issues with a burgeoning community and cooperative movement, developing a powerful consciousness of the connections between political and personal changes. The world over, the Greens are committed to racial and sexual equality, political independence and nonviolence.

How does this impact on Britain? Can a new ecological politics take hold in Britain, where a temporary coalition has replaced the old two party interchange, but with no discernible departure from the same old politics? The problem with an electoral politics is that it is too bound up with the world of opinion – with all of the limitations of political discourse and exchange and media reporting – to really succeed in breaking through to a genuine appreciation of ecological issues. The opinion-shapers in politics, the press and the televisual media will narrow the parameters of ‘reasonable’ debate within an acceptance of egoistic, competitive values as the norm. Private greed continue to trump public good. To repeat, this discourse addresses people as taxpayers and voters and encourages them to identify themselves as such. That narrows the sphere of the political whereas a Green politics can flourish only with its expansion. That can come only by broadening the base and absorbing increasing numbers and groups into an active centre. As voters and taxpayers, individuals do not seek to change the world, only protect the comfortable life they have achieved for themselves within it. Such an approach is sceptical and even hostile towards grand public programmes for change. Green politics needs content within society to strengthen the political form.

The potential for forming this content exists. Accepting the vagaries of polling, there is ample evidence of increasing numbers in most countries coming to place a high priority upon the protection of the natural environment. All of the supposed primary interests of economic wealth, military security and other such national obsessions count for nothing if people lack air to breathe, water to drink and food to eat. Individuals from all backgrounds, class, race, creed, are changing their lifestyles, demanding changes in institutions, practices and policies and participate in Earth Day celebrations, with a view to bringing the built social and urban environment in line with a more respectful attitude towards the planet and all other species upon it.

The Green Party is right to practise a social ecology. Environmental justice and social justice are one and the same commitment within an interdependent whole. An increasing unity around environmental issues needs to be associated with a commitment to social justice and equity. For all of the repeated mantras concerning the failure, the collapse and the end of socialism, society remains sharply divided between rich and poor, haves and have-nots, between classes. It is now apparent – or ought to be apparent – that the prosperity and economic vitality of recent years has been a debt fuelled illusion, speculation, finance, consumption and has been accompanied by the entrenchment of new metropolarities within the global urban environment. As the walls came down in Eastern Europe, they were going up all over the western world as the rich – averse to spending their money for the public purpose – spend fortunes to form gated communities and gentrified neighbourhoods, purchasing holiday homes in the country or abroad. The divisions between left and right appear as a mere echo of a long departed politics as individuals use their money as votes and consumerism ravages what remains of the public life of the community (The City of Quartz Mike Davis 1990).

Many years ago the American sociologist C. Wright Mills proposed a ‘big split' between work and leisure. Mills’ point was that the work ethic has been replaced by the leisure ethic. When work and leisure compete, 'leisure wins hands down'. Mills is scathing of the deleterious effects of the leisure ethic: 'Each day men sell little pieces of themselves in order to try to buy them back each night and weekend with the coin of "fun"'. 

The point is that leisure does not provide the fulfilment which is denied in the work undertaken to earn the coin of fun. Consumption is no substitute for production and no compensation for alienated labour. The techniques of mass persuasion and manipulation have been employed to stupefy ‘the masses’ via the leisure industry with organized spectator sport, gambling, ‘movies’, radio and television. These leisure ‘activities’ offer stupefaction rather than fulfilment. Mass leisure activities 'astonish, excite and distract but they do not enlarge reason or feeling, or allow spontaneous dispositions to unfold creatively'. They create a fantasy world into which the masses escape in non-work hours, a world in which 'the amusement of hollow people rests on their own hollowness and does not fill it up'.

In the final analysis, individuals will only do what they enjoy doing. The best way to fight the allures of consumption is to recover that Aristotelian sense of public life. For Aristotle, the human being is a zoon politikon, a social-political animal who is capable of individuating himself/herself within a politikon bion, a public life. This entails an ethic of virtue and a notion of flourishing based on the realisation of human potentialities and exercise of human capacities. For Aristotle, you are what you repeatedly do. Again, it is a notion that points towards the notion of a citizen democracy composed of an active, informed citizenry. There is a principle of Vico’s New Science which holds that the condition of knowing something is to have made it – verum ipsum factum. To make the world, to know the world, to realise one’s potentialities and exercise one’s capacities in the process is precisely Plato’s point that virtue is its own reward. This is a far richer sense of human being than anything contained in the hollow world of consumerism, a citizen democracy of functional representation against a consumer democracy. An active civic public takes the place of a manipulated mass society. When production – what people actively do - and consumption – what people passively do – compete, consumption wins out. And it wins out over politics, private interest taking priority over public good. 

Whilst many people are seeking a pacified existence which heals the human relationship with the earth, connecting nature within with nature without, many others are using environmentalism as a rationalization for remaining part of the culture of exploitation and selfishness, giving self-interest the veneer of an ‘enlightened’ or even ‘green’ form of consumerism. Greenwash. The ecological way of life is captured and re-presented as yet another commodity to be bought and sold. How to break the hold of consumerism and the atomism and passivity and isolationism of a consumer culture is a major challenge. This is a privatism quite beyond politics, that depoliticises. Individuals confronted with their own isolation in an increasingly insecure and atomized society have abandoned notions of community, collective action and public life to pursue their own private fortunes. With this cult of selfishness comes a rejection of public purpose, known by the boo word of ‘big government’, and a rejection of redistributive, egalitarian policies in the name of social justice. The symbiosis of state and corporate capital has succeeded in suppressing citizen space and public life so that all that remains is a depoliticised space of atomised, ‘apolitical’ voters and taxpayers. All such people want to know about politics is that it costs them as little of their tax as possible. No appeal to reason and morality and science is possible at this level. Green politics needs a gamebreaker and a game changer. Green politics needs to form a coalition of the willing within society itself, addressing the best, the active, the informed and the intelligent and forming these into a coherent movement, in time drawing those who finally understand the hollowness of consumption and privatism into an expanding centre. Utopian? Read how increasing numbers of the best and the most intelligent within the Roman Empire abandoned posts and careers and rejected hollow materialism and power to form the new Christian civilisation. We are looking at a cultural, moral and psychological transformation as the only secure basis for long term sustainable living.

It is a time of seeking and a time of seeing. A new spiritual yearning is making its presence felt in large segments of our society. Many people are seeking a new ethical underpinning for their lives. The Oxford moral philosopher Toby Ord has made a commitment to practise his ethics and has committed a third of his lifetime’s earnings to charity. And there are signs that the world’s religions are becoming proactive on the implications of climate change and are relating ecology to a rebirth in spirituality.

The Green Party needs to tread carefully. As a political party, it has no choice but to participate in the political arena. It needs policies and it needs to contribute and be a player, or else risk being dismissed as a political lightweight, fit only for protest around single issues. But it needs to perform the delicate task of being in and against the political sphere as currently constituted. It would be ironic that as conventional politics becomes increasingly discredited, The Green Party, having proclaimed themselves the ‘anti-party party’, the party of a ‘new politics’, should become identified with the failures and hypocrisies of the ‘old politics’. The Green Party needs to have more social content and community content than individuals as taxpayers and voters afford.

There are lessons here from the fate of party political socialism. The more socialism came to abstracted from the social space which formed its premise and its promise, the more it abandoned its principles for a managerial politics that offered shallow, bureaucratic solutions to fundamental social problems. Individuals continually express a frustration with and even a contempt for the methods and institutions of conventional politics. A moral and political vacuum is opening up, one which the ideologists and opinion formers of press, radio and television fill up with their own highly loaded and manipulative populism. Listen to any radio/TV discussion, read any newspaper article on the science of climate change and despair. 


Despite the denigration of the science, the ecological crisis shows no signs of going away. The nature of the crisis is unprecedented. James Lovelock is reported to have said that the human race is too stupid to save itself. What he actually argued is that the human race has reached this far by maximising resources for itself in the short run, whereas what the human race needs now is to develop a long range strategic thinking capacity that secures the global commons for each and all. The human race has yet to evolve the long range strategic thought capacity required to secure the long term common good.

That is an issue of psychology, culture and evolution. This is a far reaching transformation which is well beyond the arena of conventional politics. It is far too late to expect a solution to emerge from within the conventional political spectrum. And it is probably futile to expect such a thing to emerge from within conventional politics in the first place. In his book Parliamentary Socialism, Ralph Miliband argues that the vision of realising socialism via parliament died in 1931. It took an awful long time for socialists to get the message. And that is the danger of the route of electoral politics. The party becomes so intoxicated with the successes and gains along the way that eventually the means displace the end and the party becomes hooked on the path rather than proceeding to journey’s end.
The danger is that The Green Party comes to abandon the possible recruits it may make to its ‘new politics’ to focus on maximisation its vote. The Green Party needs to keep its connection with the ecologically-minded individuals who are starting to express not just a new politics, but a new ethics based on a new ecological sensibility that can reawaken the life-affirming impulses captured by the Aristotelian notion of flourishing. 
A new planet centred moral sensibility which combines social and environmental justice and equity is being articulated in a variety of ways, from a broad range of sectors within society. Scientists, bioregionalists, ecofeminists, community organisers, cooperators, spiritual healers, earth-centred poets and any number of other people from all walks of life are articulating a vision which points to the evolution of new modes of thought, action and organisation relating people to place and planet.
For all their talk about democracy, community, and freedom, the global agenda of political and business elites seeks to limit individual rights and subject people’s lives to surveillance. The only ecology these elites are acting on is an ecology of fear. Police replaces polis as public life diminishes and individuals are marginalised into an atomised private sphere. At the same time of this global repression, the political and institutional constraints on corporations are relaxed. Freedom and repression go together. Economic activity can only be free to proceed without restriction if the rights of people in communities to live their own lives and protect themselves from the system's abuses are restricted from above and policed from below.

The Green movement is charged with renegotiating the local-global relation in a way that enhances freedom of individuals in communities and restructures power. These are the values that The Green Party exists to give an active political expression to. 

There are many diverse grassroots movements and groups in existence. Since the survival of the species is a universal issue, it follows that a Green politics must be committed to a universal ethic and seek to fit the various parts together in an integrated whole, discovering how ecological principles of interactive cooperation can inform a practise leading to the necessary social transformation. 

Of course, this is question begging and suggests a number of points.

1) The way to beat mass management and manipulation of private individuals from above is to create a dynamic content from below by forging the various ecological currents together to create an integrated whole that is greater than the sum of its interrelating individual parts. 
2) The Green Party embodies an ecological sensibility that transforms individuals’ lives and offers a means for people to associate together and work for social change.
3) In acting locally and thinking globally, the Greens’ need to demonstrate how local autonomy is both preserved and strengthened as Green values are embodied and articulated within expanded spaces of public expression on a regional, national and global scale.
4) The Green Party needs to be clear about not just the possibilities of participating within the conventional political arena but also the limitations. There is history here. Participation at this level is not new and illusory claims and expectations are soon followed by cynicism, despair and apathy. Achieve what can be achieved but keep affirming possibility beyond institutional constraints.
5) The Green Party must affirm an expansive notion of ‘the political’ which recognises the mutual relationship between personal, social and political changes.

Greens are to be found in many walks of like, working in many different arenas and using many different approaches. Unity in diversity is a key principle, how to achieve universality canalising and enhancing difference without suppressing it. Many individuals focus their activities on specific issues, many are active on local and regional issues. Yet in one way or another, no matter how particular and local, a great deal of these issues and concerns originate in the predations and excesses of the global corporate economy. Thinking globally means thinking big, and it means looking at new ways of constituting the universal. Acting locally in the community interest is shown to counter the social and ecological destruction concomitant with the materialistic order. 

There is plenty of material here to give content to the associative civic public, with social movements forming a counter-public to the conventional political arena and developing new modes of political expression and organisation such as community organizing, referendum campaigns, legal interventions, and direct nonviolent actions to contest ecologically and socially disruptive policies and projects.

This oppositional approach becomes constitutive of a new public life in its more reconstructive aspects. There is currently a plethora of experiments in cooperation and local democracy in areas of community living and politics and workplace organisation and all of which suggest potential for living alternatives to present modes of operation. These variety of efforts and activities include developing alternative technologies, founding cooperatives of all kinds, and raising ecological sensibility. 
For the Green Party to develop and grow it needs to strike roots in a genuine public life constituted by social and civic activism and see itself clearly as a part of a wider Green movement. This suggests the notion of integrated systems and interactive cooperation again, combining oppositional and reconstructive strategies, going beyond right and left to form a new expanded centre beyond division and polarity, connecting local and global, allowing all currents in their diversity and autonomy to feed, support and strengthen the centre.

Issue-based politics without the universal vision can be politically inhibiting and personally frustrating. Nothing succeeds like success. Broad alliance, common cause and most of all movement can draw people in. Many people may be discontented with the status quo, but lack the motivation to act because they see no alternative. Atomised and isolated, apathy and hopelessness follows and the world of manipulated opinion drowns the little shoots of truth and knowledge. Even where many involved in particular issues achieve success, they can be worn down by the emergence of new complications. Action needs to be taken at appropriate level. You are what you repeatedly do. People will do something that they enjoy. People will be soon exhausted by sermonising appeals and tough science. Get people acting – verum ipsum factum. They will go beyond the manipulated vagaries of opinion to know the world as their own creation. And that knowledge will be embodied in the associational civic public. 
The globalisation of economic relations is creating the technical and institutional conditions that makes it possible to live up to the old Green slogan ‘think globally, act locally’.
A more integrated world economy furnishes the foundation for a global ecology, with the erosion of nationalism, state power, reduced military conflict, and an increasing uniformity of conditions for people everywhere. The idea gives new life to the original idea of a socialist international based on an international proletariat which is in command of forces of production which have been universally developed.
Local impacts of the military-industrial complex, local urban-rural and ecological problems, local attempts to create alternatives satisfying basic needs of food distribution, shelter, water access upwards all offer a focus for local activities that carry a global message. Local action is a practical demonstration of the power of real people to really change things for the better. By highlighting action which proceeds primarily on the local level, Greens identify the grass roots basis for real change, giving new life to the old notion of praxis, change in circumstances as a change in consciousness, a self-change. 
Again, individuals joining and working together become change-agents, seeing themselves as makers of their own worlds, active, informed citizens converting their place and space from exchange value to use value.
The nature of locally oriented work is small scale and isolated; it can fail to ensure action proceeds to a more effective level. Local problems often have their origin outside of the locality, hence the need to connect local action with a global orientation. A Green sensibility should make the necessary connections and generate the capacity to link together specific issues. For instance, areas dependent upon arms industries can organise and campaign in defence of arms production in the interest of local employment and investment. Yet these local arms industries fuel the arms race, distort employment and investment patterns in a region, and often produce the largest quantities of toxic wastes. A clear example of where a global ecology perspective can infuse local action. Ultimately, capital is a global power, and in more than geography. An overall strategy integrating groups, organisation and groups is required to foster the ‘global’ consciousness required for genuine, long term solutions. In this specific instance, local action can be reoriented toward converting arms production to socially and ecologically sound uses, affirming community and worker control and transforming the nature of economic and technological change. Will the workers campaigning to protect employment in communities dependent on arms production be convinced? Any more than workers in the car industry, workers involved in any production perceived to be ecologically unsound? Alternative ecological industry and technology in the green collar economy has to be the key. Failure to persuade important sections of the working class leaves Green politics without a social and structural power.
There is a clear fracture here in that large sections of marxism’s exploited proletariat are quite comfortable in their exploitation, so long as employment and investment come their way. Far from being the gravediggers of capitalism, these sections of the working class seem to be the strongest defenders of the system and perceive The Greens’ as working against their material interests. The local action of these groups is a sectional and selfish action, not at all global and paying no regard to the universal ethic. It is a form of collective self-interest. A global ecology has to provide the universal mentality that encourages people to locate their particular interest in a wider ethic. And the key may be the presentation of a clear institutional and infrastructural alternative.

Large development projects often destroy green spaces and prime farmland, wildlife habitats and communities, while centralizing the control of a local economy and its technology and energy in fewer hands. Paradoxically, workers will happily forfeit community, control and democracy in return for employment. In practical terms, this is much more of a problem than media bias against climate science and ecological politics. 

The Green Party needs to take the fight to these areas, promoting local democracy, control and community by integrating development issues in the public interest. Again, the emphasis is on promoting use value over exchange value. By articulating the interconnections among campaigns and issues, highlighting the ecological aspects of local efforts and activities, and affirming a ‘global’ social and ecological vision which relates the parts to the whole, a Green politics is oriented towards transcending the limitations of local issue-oriented politics. Obviously very difficult, but we are talking about moving forwards to a new biocentric civilisation and such an ideal involves a change in values and practices, not a passive evolution.

Traditionally, coalitions of local organisations and interest groups are very narrowly defined. A number of organizations join together around a specific set of common concerns. The coalition's remit is limited to a lowest common denominator of what the different groups can agree upon. And with limited objectives satisfied, groups drop out of the coalition, lacking interest or motivation to pursue larger goals, maybe even disagreeing with further objectives.





ECOLOGY AS POLITICS - FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE

36 ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ECOLOGY AS POLITICS

Distinguishing between "deep" and "shallow" ecology (e.g. Naess 1973) and between "environmentalism" and "ecology" (Bookchin 1982), makes it possible to avoid incorporation into the conventional political sphere and the world of business and commerce. The accent here is not just on achievable reforms – which the world of state and business is capable of delivering without pressure – but also upon building new ways of living, both in terms of incorporating knowledge and in forging subnational and transnational alliances among social actors in civil society.

The division between environmentalism and ecology became a further division at the level of politics between ‘green business’, as business as usual, and social ecology. These divisions served to bifurcate what in origins had appeared to be a homogeneous movement of new politics. The fact that these two wings develop  alongside each other in responding to the same environmental problems and social opportunities encourages a belief that they are part of the one and the same movement. They are not the same, but are divergent positions, with competing theories and practices, within the same "globalizing" political economy. It is appropriate, therefore, to delineate a path leading from social movement to political effect which maximises the potential for a new society whilst resisting the dangers of incorporation.

Realising the potential for a new ecological modus vivendi which is immanent within capitalist modernity requires a new set of practices which affirm the co-construction of nature and culture through the practical reappropriation of the human powers alienated to the state and capital and the common control and comprehension of these powers as social powers. This creates the foundation for a renewal of public agency within public life and for popular identification with environmental and related public policies. (Szerszynski et al. 1996: 5)
It is this institutional and political question which is crucial in shaping the character of the environmental movement in its theory and practice, determining the extent to which science, technics, and societal knowledge-making sustains or subverts a given way of life. The mobilisation and organisation of social actors and their cultural resources involves a specific approach to scientific knowledge, technical innovation and new forms of knowledge-making. ‘Green business as usual’ is promoted through particular journals and conferences and networks of communication, and, with powerful sources of political and economic support, is capable of integrating science, technology and social knowledge within an environmentalism that expands rather than constrains an ecologically destructive economic system. The challenge to ecologists is to do precisely the same by developing a political dimension. By connecting the ecological praxis of social movements and actors as the cognitive praxis of political institutions, it is possible to develop a symbiotic, bridge-building approach to an environmental politics that proceeds from the bottom up through the knowledge making, reality constituting praxis of social actors.

Political And Electoral Objectives
What are the political objectives of The Green Party? Is the objective the creation of a Green political sphere? Or merely to green the existing political sphere? Any radical movement committed to fundamental social transformation has to be aware of the pitfalls of ‘electoralism’, the progressive dilution of principle for a realistic appraisal of a success redefined as an increased vote and an increased number of seats at council and national level.

As the environmental message becomes understood and accepted across broad sectors of society and as environmental awareness develops and Green ideas enter the mainstream, it becomes increasingly likely that Green politics becomes part of the political mainstream of electoral politics. The electoral successes of Green parties raise hopes that Greens can come to directly influence local and national policies from within the political mainstream. Green parties have been partners in coalition governments. There is nothing, in principle, wrong with this. A political party must, by definition, have a politics, a policy for change, a legislative impact and hence be more than a pressure group demanding action from others. But an honest appraisal of limitations and possibilities is called for to avoid the inevitable disillusion that follows misplaced hopes. All political careers end in failure goes the adage. Recognise this, acknowledge realistically possibilities and keep encouraging action outside the parliamentary sphere, in the real public life grounded in social practices and activities.

In many places, Green electoral efforts can demonstrate real practical achievement at the level of policy – addressing Issues of housing, urban regeneration, commercial development, pollution and waste disposal, developing strong positions on social, feminist and multicultural issues. There is no reason to see these efforts not continuing and these gains being reversed as Greens continue to bring these ideas to the electoral arena. 

At least as important as the direct practical influence within the mainstream political arena is the way that Green electoral campaigns can help foster an ecological sensibility within the general electorate, bringing ecological ideas to a wider audience. The danger of The Green Party being perceived as a single issue organisation is real and The Green Party has been right to emphasise ideas and policies on a range of social and economic issues. There is a potential danger here of losing distinctiveness and sounding like all the other parties, repeating ‘economy, health, education’ etc like a mantra. If The Green Party succumbs to the limited thinking of priorities – economics comes before ecology according to the conventional political wisdom – then they are failing to create the far reaching ecological awareness that rearranges priorities. The Green Party has to give a Green message. The best way may well be to focus on the conventional priorities of politics – health, education, ‘the economy’ – and infuse each area with ecological ideas and imperatives. Familiar ground, unfamiliar policies and ideas gets the message across. Either way, a Green politics rests on an ecological consciousness and sensibility. Learn lessons from ‘parliamentary socialism’. To keep diluting the message for further electoral success and at some point there is no message left. 

A Green electoral politics can attract substantial media attention and provide a national and international profile that gives meaning and point to ecological ideas. It enables Greens to address a greater cross-section of the public than would be possible with grass roots activism. And these efforts can reshape public debate and can have a tangible effect on public policies. This is no mean feat at a time when the terms of political debate have been narrowed to within parameters set by huge financial interests and corporate lobbies. The Green Party offers people who still believe in democracy a public focus for their concerns on issues of environmental protection, community life, popular control and human emancipation. When Green parties exist to demonstrate broad popular support for such causes, the effect on shifting the political agenda can be significant.

Green electoral politics is not without its limitations and its dangers. One returns here to Ralph Miliband’s cautionary lesson to parliamentary socialists, ‘the state does not determine, it is determined’. Ultimately, the political arena is subject to the imperatives and process of private capital accumulation. The Green Party can build an "electorate" for Green ideas. But to really transform political institutions it requires a social body, content and power. Green electoral politics can complement and even enhance more grass-roots efforts, but it can also undermine them by creating the illusion that real social change is the result of political choice at election time. The fate of the urban social movements in Spain points to the dangers of this political illusion. Within the totalitarian political shell of the Franco regime, urban activists built a new social state within the national state. These urban social movements formed the core of a self-governing civil society, As soon as Spain became a parliamentary democracy, many of the leading activists joined the national parties and local grass roots efforts withered. In the end, the Socialist Party became yet another neo-liberal party whose hands were tied by the imperatives of the global capital system. 

And there are opportunities to explore an alternative electoral politics, scaling political units down to human proportion, expanding public spaces, creating, face-to-face institutions and experiment with citizen legislatures to draw people into an expanding political mainstream. This is to explore possibilities of an alternative participatory dimension to the electoral approach to social change.
The notion of ‘greening’ the political sphere and electoral politics has a political rationale. The mainstream political arena offers little space for the active relationship between elected representatives and the grass-roots movements that form the main content of any participatory citizen democracy. The dominance of interests of money and power in the mass media serves to skew the terms of political discourse and reporting and narrows the character of political life. Any political party committed to fundamental change has to work many times harder to gain a voice at this level and over time the effort can start to tell and exhaustion set in. Becoming part of this world, elected Green representatives will find it difficult to relate to grass roots community work and activism.
The spread of Green ideas makes it more and more possible to give voice to principles which in the past may have been dismissed as utopian – a politics of scale and of decentralisation. The important thing is to keep the channels open to encourage the continual emergence of ideas from within both local environmental movements and from conventional political circles. Imitation is a form of flattery. Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue. Other parties will steal policies and principles. Good, if they make them work. Others will use Green ideas as a veneer covering an unecological policy. The fact that they feel the need to imitate and respect Green ideas is a kind of victory. Green ideas are becoming so strong that they cannot be ignored.

How to spot electoralists and careerists? Judge a person’s willingness to subordinate their personal ambitions to grassroots organisations and local alliances that are fully democratic, participatory and infused with an ecological awareness. With these conditions respected, The Green Party is a legitimate political expression of a broader and deeper ecological and social movement.

The uncertainties of Green electoral politics are compounded by the vagaries of the electoral system. Any party lacking strong social identity and class roots has to base its appeal on ethics and ideas. The problem here is that success or failure is decided by that amorphous, vacuous category ‘the floating voter’. These are supposedly ‘nonpolitical’ or ‘apolitical’. Actually, they are highly antipolitical, avowedly private individuals focused mainly upon self-interest and who reject all grand schemes of political transformation as more than likely bureaucratic and expensive. Green politics is often described as a ‘post-materialism’. The private idiocy of the floating voter is likely to perceive Greens as interventionist and regulatory, a high tax and spend party that interferes with the freedom of the private individual. No appeal to morality or reason – not even a species wide collective self-interest in survival – will win a single vote from these people. In electoral terms, numbers will always be against Green parties. Greens should compete on quality rather than quantity. The best, the most active, the most informed are the ones who can reshape politics from neighbourhood and community level upwards. Greens should form a coalition of the willing from below. Coalitions representing a fairly wide spectrum of people and ideas can participate in building the civic public life, in time expanding the numbers in the potential Green electorate by means of a Green citizenship.

It is claimed that parties win elections from the centre. Only centrist voices perceived to be ‘electable’. As a party dedicated to fundamental transformation to achieve an ecological way of life, The Green Party is bound to be placed at the extreme of the political spectrum. The Green Party needs to fight to reshape the centre and redefine the whole notion and nature of the centre. The centre ground in current politics is hollow, value free and anti-political. In electoral terms the effects are appalling, with political principles being sunk as parties and politicians seek a bland, depoliticised appeal via slogans, soundbites and images manufactured by and for television. That may be the centre ground but it is a centre denuded of politics and principle. As a result, the electoral system compels all politicians and parties to become alike, different brands of the same product. They do so because it wins or retains votes from the hollow centre.

To repeat, an ecological politics really is neither left nor right and really is a centre ground politics organised around principles of balance, harmony, proportion, scale, equity. But that centre has still to be created. This is the forwards of the Green slogan. Green politics raises new hopes for finding a way to engage the system from within whilst at the same time generating alternatives to it.

Greens need to pioneer new ways of addressing ‘mainstream’ voters without a) putting them off with a message perceived to be utopian and extreme; b) without compromising basic ecological principles. 

There are many reasons to doubt that this can be achieved by a purely electoral appeal from with the existing political system. The solution seems to be in creating that expanded centre.

The trick is to be both in and against the conventional political mainstream, becoming a Green politician without becoming like the other politicians. In The Prison Notebooks Antonio Gramsci defined the fundamental question of politics in these terms: ‘is it the intention that there should always be rulers and ruled, or is the objective to create the conditions in which this division is no longer necessary? In other words, is the initial premiss the perpetual division of the human race, or the belief that this division is only an historical fact, corresponding to certain conditions ?’


Green politics is committed to dissolving the dualism of state and civil society by creating an expanded civic public as the new centre ground. And this development will invest the civil sphere with political governing significance overcoming the division between leaders and led. The populist clamour against ‘big government’ will be called upon to live up to its name and make social self-government work. Grassroots activism and organisation will serve to raise people's capacities to change things and ultimately to run things. 
Green politicians as well as their supporters will need to serve as organizers and catalysts for grass roots activity rather than being just another set of representatives, packaged personalities selling principles as political brand and product. The abstracted political level needs to be continually reinvigorated by a dynamic base and this requires a decentralized approach in which a variety of grassroots organisations carry out a wide variety of ecological campaigns, educational projects and local community activism. Globally orientated parties need locally-focused organizations to furnish public life with a grass-roots base. The Green Party needs to work hard to prevent an electoralism that isolates its politics from its grass roots. With increased abstraction from the local and community and campaigning roots comes the familiar problems of an overly political approach – arguments and splits over strategy, ideology and conflicting political styles. Political isolation from active roots turns a party and its leadership in against itself as marginal differences are inflated into divisive struggle. When this stage is reached, the party really is over and it is best to build again from the still fresh roots that are more in tune with ecological issues.
In the very least, Green electoral campaigns can mobilize an ecological constituency that politicians of all parties need to pay attention to in the competition for votes. We are now well beyond this stage. Green parties are capable of keeping these votes for themselves and taking their place in the political mainstream. The question now is what role Green parties can play in forcing the political system to reform itself, opening up the mainstream to popular movements. But Greens are well placed to form a proactive, well defined constituency out of all types of ecologists who, with a political identity, can contest power and public purpose with the corporate and other elites who work surreptitiously to manipulate popular consent and manage society.

Those who think talk of the dissolution of the dualism of state and civil society and the creation of a Green political as an associative civil public is utopian need to consider the sobering theory of the ‘overloaded’ state. The theory has never gone away and seems now to have been given cuddly form in the shape of ‘the Big Society’. The basic theme of the ‘overloaded’ state is that the western world suffers from an ‘excess of democracy’. Too many sections of the population have come to have a voice in public decision-making and the state responds by making too many commitments and performing too many services. All the commitments of the state are financed from resources obtained in the private economy. To business, this is economically unsustainable. Further, people come to have rising expectations of the state, expectations which the state lacks the resources to meet, resulting in a decline in its authority. The theorists of the overloaded state perceive clearly the prospect of the revolution of rising expectations and propose a straightjacketed democracy, insulated public policy once more from popular claims and thus preventing the dictation of economic and foreign policy by powerful business interests from reaching public controversy. 

The Green Party positively values the threat that an active and informed citizenry poses to the dominance of elite interests and institutions over political life. It goes further. It channels citizen efforts and organisation into the creation of a public life worthy of the name. Democracy is more, much more, than counting votes. Individuals are more than voters, they are also citizens. Here, Green politics taps into the essential roots of politics, the desire for people to control their own lives. Democracy in this sense is a threat to those whose political purpose is to manage and manipulate consent so as to serve economic and political ends external to the democratic political sphere. The radical decentralist outlook of Green politics is oriented towards the creation of confederations of self-governing communities which ultimately withdraw from the system. Is The Green Party committed to this Green politics or is it simply the green wing of the system? No Green politics and no real democracy will ever be practised within this system. The associative civil public is the ecopolis, the Green polity.
A major hope for the creation of the ecopolis lies in the development of new community-based institutions and experiments in local democracy. Is it possible to incorporate town meeting models into a community politics, building from neighbourhood units upwards. Along with these political steps, there are the efforts to create local and cooperative economic alternatives. Such efforts do more than create a genuine counter-power to check the influence of established institutions; they go further to constitute a public life of their own. The successes of a few ‘eco-communities’ in various places can start to map the terrain of an ecological public life, encouraging others to experiment with ways to break the web of dependencies that keep people attached to a political and economic system which they are increasingly frustrated with. People will take their rising expectations from a system that is failing and will be more inclined to seek satisfaction in richer terms. By maintaining its ideals, The Green Party can play a role in ensuring that the search for alternatives evolve to an entirely new qualitative level.
In the short term, Green politics can serve as an important vehicle for renewing public activity at the local level. This is to associate the ecological critique of the current system with a vision of the future ecological society, inspiring efforts to develop an ecological sensibility and an ethic of local self-government. Greens in neighbouring communities can associate together to transform economic and social policies and practices on a wider scale. Direct action, face-to-face institutions and participatory democracy bring individuals out of private idiocy into citizen life, organised around real life community issues rather than ideological splits. Democracy will be achieved only when the individuals composing the demos are capable of exercising control. These political innovations can help individuals to gain control over basic economic and political decisions. Acting locally and thinking globally means beginning at the grass-roots level to establish open relationships with people in other places. Connecting the local and the global – the world in one city is at the same time the city in one world. A ‘new politics’ of neighborhood and community control and organisation, grounded in an ecological sensibility, offer a fundamental challenge to the forces of global elite control and systemic destruction all around us. This challenge is spread to all the far corners of the world by force of example. An ecological praxis in which ecological principles are incorporated into transformative activity and are in turn generated by it.

A Green politics which succeeds at both the level of community organizing and the electoral sphere makes the ecological transformation of society a genuine prospect. In combining social and ecological justice and equity with a commitment to active citizenship and participatory democracy, nonviolence and a thorough decentralization of political and economic power into expanded public spaces, provides a moral, political and institutional framework for addressing immediate concerns in such a way as to progress toward the ecological society of the future. 

A Green politics connects each with all within society and this society with nature. In the same way that society's relationship to nature is formed by its social, economic and political institutions, the structure of these institutions is formed by the character of people's relationships to each other within these institutions.

An ecological praxis does more than create the basis for an ecological constituency and for an ecopolis. Social and political change is also a self-change, people transforming themselves in the process of transforming their world. A Green polity and economy involves processes and activities within the built techno-urban environment which enable people to heal their own personal ties to the natural environment. If personal changes are incomplete without broader social change, so changes in the political structure and in social relations are also insufficient in themselves. An ecological praxis affirms the interdependence of social change and self change, being sensitive to complex interplay between the political, social and cultural spheres. As a Green politics – electoral, parliamentary or otherwise – strives to alter political institutions and social structures, a grassroots and community activism operates to establish the foundations of an earth-centred ethic, a personal practice of cooperation and new ways of articulating human intimacy with the natural world.

An ecological praxis affirming harmony between human nature within and nature without establishes a model for harmony within human communities at political, social and personal levels. The institutional transformation is therefore also a psychological, moral and cultural transformation. A Green politics establishes human diversity and human freedom as conditions of a healed relationship to nature.

A Green politics promises the transformation of ‘the political’. In a world where ‘politics’ and politicians are held in contempt, the Green approach offers a promise to invest the word with new meaning. Green politics articulates a new understanding of public life as a living space for individual self-actualisation in reciprocal relation to each other, a forum for enhancing the living interrelationships between individuals within self-governing eco-communities, something very notion from a ‘Green’ way of administering the institutions of the state and the economy.

An ecological sensibility entails the free and full expression of people's individuality within a community setting. This is Aristotle’s politikon bion, a public life which enables each individual to develop his/her individuality in relation to all other individuals. In other words, this politikon bion is an ecopolis; an ecological politics is firmly in the tradition of political philosophy. 

“Observation tells us that every state is an association, and that every association is formed with a view to some good purpose. I say 'good', because in all their actions all men do in fact aim at what they think good. Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good, that association which is the most sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods. This is the association which we call the state, the association which is 'political'. (koinonia politike: 'the association that takes the form of a polis (state)'.

Aristotle Politics Book I

‘The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before’.

Rousseau The Social Contract

The ideal civic constitution allows 'the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others'.

Kant Critique of Pure Reason

‘an association in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all’.
Marx The Manifesto of the Communist Party

Aristotle’s political community (koinonia politike) is 'the association that takes the form of a polis'. Rousseau’s association, Kant’s ideal civil constitution, Marx’s communism all affirm the interdependence of the freedom of each and the freedom of all. No one person is free unless all are free. Without these reciprocal relations between individuals, community ceases to be an association of each with all and instead becomes an atomistic society in which each pursues freedom independently of all other individuals. Individual freedom results in a collective unfreedom that actually inhibits both individual and community freedom. A society of self-cancelling wills and wants becomes a collective constraint which limit individual expression, a realm of coercive social union and enforced social roles. That traditional communities could be repressive is not denied. But Aristotle was correct to argue that man is a zoon politikon, a social-political animal capable of individuation only in relation to others in community. Many people are now experiencing the innate need for community that atomistic urban society leaves unsatisfied. Even the escape into the digital communities of electronic hyperreality expresses this innate social need which modern society denies. 

An ecological praxis leading to an associative civic public offers a renewed ethic of cooperative and communicative interaction between individuals, creating solidaristic ties of exchange and interchange between individuals. A public life informed by the ecological wisdom of unity-in-diversity, achieving self-reliance as interdependence rather than autonomy, freeing community life from the acquisitive pressures of contemporary neurotic culture can become a true vehicle for a universal emancipation.

An ecological consciousness affirms a deepened personal relationship with the natural world. The reawakened awareness of one’s place within the wholeness of nature serves to enhance one’s sense of personhood and enrich one's deepest personal relationships. In an acquisitive, materialistic culture, the concept of individuality entails a hostile, competitive relation to one’s fellow human beings. In John Ruskin’s famous quote, ‘There is no wealth but life’. This is a life-denying culture shaped by autonomy denying structures. An ecological sensibility affirms the possibility of making every aspect of personal life express a sense of connectedness with humanity in the social world and with the natural world also.

A Green politics offers the tools and techniques for recreating the ties between the political, social and personal spheres. A consensual approach to working together in groups values the unique contribution each can make to the creation of a genuine public. A Green politics is a genuine coalition politics based on trusting, cooperative relationships between individuals, creating the structures enabling individuals to work together. The goal of consensus entails a commitment to cooperative, peaceful methods for mediating conflicts and resolving problems and reaching solutions. Habermas’ communicative public community in which coercion is replaced by the force of reason and the better argument is actualised in this vision of a consensual coalition politics in the ecopolis. 


A confederal approach to social transformation which envisages broad changes as proceeding outwards from the local level values the constitutive creative praxis of individual community efforts. Beyond opinion forming, information flows, electoral appeals, ecology is fundamentally a praxis affirming the unity of social change and self-change. Every activity undertaken by each individual in one area is the germ of further transformation in another area, subverting the dominant culture of passivity and subservience and replacing it with activity and independence, generating new channels for cooperation and communication between individuals in community and between communities to the global level.

From Tensions To Regimes
In ideal-typical terms three cognitive regimes can be identified with respect to the emerging ecological culture. These cognitive regimes are grounded in different types of human agency, with distinctive forms of social action, constituencies and actor-networks. Each regime has its own distinctive form of knowledge-production and different "tacit" or embodied forms of knowledge that are mobilized. 
 
Cognitive regimes of sustainable development
	Residual	Dominant	Emerging
Type of agency	local/national	transnational	synthetic




Each regime has its own types of institutional, or organizational, "learning," and each has different reasons for pursuing its agenda. With respect to public engagement, each regime has different conceptions of agency and social action. Different normative and motivational systems involve a different processual logic. Each regime is involved in mobilizing or utilizing different types of formalized, or explicit, as well as informal or "tacit," forms of knowledge. Each regime tends to be based on a separate sphere of society, which means that different strategies can tend to compete for resources and influence.

The locally based initiatives proceed from the ‘bottom up’. Here, forms of social action are often a kind of protest, either directly against a new project imposed "from above", or indirectly against initiatives from the outside which disturb a traditional way of life. Environmental campaigns here provide a catalyst for mobilization and revitalization of traditional knowledge and identities. The problem is that these local initiatives find it difficult to achieve legitimacy and credibility as a result of their popular modes of knowledge-making and their often overly-personal forms of decision-making.

In contrast, the ‘top-down’ projects "ecological modernization" achieve effectiveness at the price of incorporation and subordination to commercial interests and strategies. Members of the public are addressed as environmentally conscious consumers or offered opportunities for ecological employment. Knowledge-making is dominated by a managerial approach, and the tacit dimension that is mobilized is the skills and organizational routines that typify the rationalised institutions of a bureaucratised world.

The emerging ecological culture represents a synthesis which avoids the limitations which result from starting at extremes of bottom up and top down, the populist and the managerial, the residual and the dominant. Instead, there is the expanded centre on a continuum between local and global with power and resources at the appropriate level and in the hands of the appropriate social agents. The form of action is flexible and often involves experimentation in "what can be done." Knowledge is mobilized which is transdisciplinary, drawing on a range of formal disciplines in a holistic sense, as well as contingent, in a tacit sense that depends on context, situation and the reintegration of knowledge. The form of agency is both direct and representative, evolving a "hybrid" combination of the local and the global, generating a local cosmopolitanism or global ecological citizenship (Beck 1999).

Monological And Dialogical Forms
Offe distinguishes between monological and dialogical forms of organisation. Monological forms correspond to the market society in which control is alienated from individuals and is vested in an institutional-systemic world raised above the life world. In these monological forms policy formation and action occurs at the leadership level-and is transmitted downwards to the led. Power is imposed .from the top down. Dialogical forms overcome this leaders-led dualism by involving those subject to the decisions in the decision making process. Power is something which is exercised from the bottom upwards through the rank and file.

One should relate ‘neither left nor right’ of the old politics with the identification of politics with monological forms. Monological modes of action, organisation and thought are institutionalised on the terrain of market society. Properly 'ecological’ modes are beyond the alienating dualisms and separations which characterise market society. Ecological modes seek to overcome the centralising, bureaucratising and abstracting tendencies of market society. The political paradigm created by the new social and environmental movements is associated with what may be called 'dialogical' forms whereas the political paradigm of industrial capitalist society is associated with rnonological forms. 

The old 'bourgeois' paradigm was concerned with the process of accumulation, distribution of material resources, institutionalisation of interests groups and mediation of class conflict, and instituted mechanisms of collective bargaining and party competition.' The new paradigm presupposes the emancipation of the life world -of individuals from this institutional-systemic world in which control is alienated from individuals. Unfortunately, socialism as an organised political movement was inextricably involved in the very world it sought to transcend, hence its identification with the old monological or 'bourgeois' forms. However, understood in terms of Marx's original emancipatory project of overcoming the diremption of the political and the economic, abolishing the alien control of the state and capital, the proletarian modes of thought, action and organisation may indeed be depicted as 'dialogical'.






MODES OF ACTION	centralising and bureaucratising	decentralising and democratising
RELATIONS OF REPRESENTATION	organises and leads for the constituents	Organisation and leadership by the constituents
DISCOURSE	Instrumental rationality	Substantive rationality

This little schema is useful in distinguishing genuinely ecological modes of thought, organisation and action from those appropriate to and created by the alienated social world to be abolished.. The the crisis of political agencies is part and parcel of the crisis of the capital system to which they are appropriate. 

What one has in mind in conceiving revolutionary politics in terms of process is to reinstate the prefigurative dimension in the achievement of public sphere as a dialogical and communal mode. This is achieved through the recovery of overlooked themes of community - democracy, individuality and citizenship. The whole point of this emancipatory project is to recover alienated social power so that human agency and the objective self-made world will thus be unified. This means overcoming monological modes. In political terms this translates into the extension of non-hierarchic and non-bureaucratic relations through the unification of political and social relationships. Individuals as active citizens will become themselves, in their own spheres, leaders.

37 ECOLOGICAL PRAXIS AND COMMUNITY SELF REGULATION

The Green Party used to characterise itself as the anti-party party. This captures something of the sense of the party as a broader social movement. Quite so. But party or movement, it cannot be anti-political. Politics matter and, at some point, ecological issues become matters of public controversy subject to intervention, alteration and change. The challenge is to keep pushing a Green ethic and agenda whilst avoiding both the twin reefs of fundamentalism and realism, the one too anti-political, the other absorbed in the very institutions of the world which is to be changed. Many Green parties have been drawn into the world of politics and instead of changing the world, have changed themselves.

To keep the above and the below in an interactive, organic fusion means going back to the grassroots and tapping into the social and human and natural roots that feed a genuinely Green politics. This requires that Greens start organising, campaigning and talking face to face, door to door, street to street, building a Green social identity neighbourhood by neighbourhood, community by community. And the purpose is more than building up electoral support for the Green Party. Seats in the council as well as in the national parliament are important but not all-important. The political philosopher Edmund Burke wrote of the ‘little platoons’ which are the strength of any society. A genuinely ecological politics is not hollow or top heavy but is grounded in this associational space of everyday life and activity, the very identities and purposes of the people.

Within this associational space, a definite agenda and a positive message can be generated and articulated. Grassroots organising is certainly an area where the institutional form of Green politics can be filled with content, the ecological message coming to be embedded in the social practices of the people. Any attempt to engineer change institutionally via the law and politics always runs the risk of neglecting or even overriding popular and social concerns, failing to evaluate the human consequences of such policy decisions. The Green Party has made great strides in recent years here, advocating social and economic policies which indicate the extent to which ecology is a social ecology. 

That said, there is a need to respect the distinction between ecologism and environmentalism and, at the same time, be aware of that environmentalism which is merely the green wing of the very techno-industrial system which is destructive of ecology. The principal beneficiaries of such actions arc the transnational corporations whose primary interest is the accumulation of capital and profit maximisation. The Green Party needs a practise which draws attention to the way that business interests backing the reaction against environmentalism have a history of working against the public interest and not for it, against communities rather than for them. This message has been delivered for many decades. Socialists and Marxists delivered many decades before. The lesson is not learned in abstraction. The TNCs have global reach and exploit this to determine what is produced, who produces it and how it is produced. Detached from any social and political movement and organisation, individuals feel powerless to resist such power and in the main are inclined to accept it as the ‘real world’. The message cannot be understood or accepted in abstraction from the real lives and practices of individuals. There is a danger of an institutional-social engineering Green politics merely being a head without a body. The Green Party needs to be part of a broad social movement in which environmentalists work with other campaign groups, with workers, with women, trade unions and other progressive organisations to address social, cultural and development issues, holding social and ecological justice together. And acting not just as campaigns bringing pressure to bear on those in power, but in some way getting into the practices of society drawing people together within the associational space of civil society, in some way prefiguring the future social order. Burke’s ‘little platoons’ in this way become ‘little republics’, reinvigorating public life from within and below, filling out the centre with active, solidaristic and organic content. 
Without this content forming the main body of Green politics and society, the environmental movement will not even exist as a movement. It will be all institutional form, any distinctive ideas or politics being absorbed by the other parties, becoming irrelevant and being forgotten.

Connecting ecology with social justice and equity issues is the right approach, as is a positive approach to politics. In many ways, a Green politics promises to restore politics to its ancient Greek origins in the broad public life of people as citizens and communities as poleis. The word politics derives from the Greek polites, meaning those interested in public affairs. The antonym of polites is idiotes, meaning those interested only in private affairs. Modern politics lacks public life in this sense, with individuals conceived as – and conceiving themselves as – voters and taxpayers rather than as citizens. Any politics which addresses individuals as only or as mainly voters and taxpayers will necessarily have to make an appeal to self-interest – private idiocy in the Greek sense – or fall victim to it.

Here one may refer again to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, showing how the choices of private self-interest bring about not the advancement of individual freedom but a collective unfreedom that diminishes the freedom of each individual alone and all individuals together.

A Green politics still holds the promise of an ecopolis, an active civic public practising citizen democracy in a functional and organic sense, grounding in social practices and identities of the people in the everyday lifeworld of solidary exchange, reciprocity and interaction.

If The Green Party and the environmental movement as a whole act independently of each other – and of others who are outside of any organised politics, then they can be easily isolated and contained by any anti-environmental reaction. And there is the old problem upon which socialism foundered, the fact that capitalism is not a public domain subject to politico-institutional alteration but a regime of private accumulation. As Ralph Miliband noted back in the sixties, the state does not determine but is determined. Socialism’s thrust to create a social democratic state was from the first radically compromised by the institutional and systemic reality of the structure and imperatives of the process of private capital accumulation. This  is the central dynamic of the global economy, upon which all states rest, upon which all communities and people depend. In these circumstances, politics is very easily fragmented into primary and secondary interests. Vested interests easily triumph by polarisation, making employment and self-interest the primary interest, the issues of most concern to most people, claiming that ‘the system’ is the best way of satisfying these interests. The environmental interest is all too easily defined as a secondary interest, put further down the agenda, to be tackled only when the primary concerns have been finally addressed. The system keeps everyone prisoners to an undeliverable promise, exploiting its necessity as a hope.

The Green Party has been quite right to emphasise that the environmental interest is also a livelihood interest, and that environmental issues are connected closely to social issues, and that ecological sustainability is also economic survival. What is now required is an expansive approach that broadens the base of environmentalism within social practises, in the lives of communities, addressing quality of life concerns, issues of local governance, municipal and public services etc. There is a need to renew the public domain by building and uniting large citizens' alliances, forming a positive counter-point to the anti-public life, self-interested appeal of taxpayers’ alliances. Building public life from below is the only way ultimately of checking deregulated finance and the uncontrolled power of capital.

Coalition politics is the future in a networked and networking society. Digital technologies are speeding interconnections and increasing information flows. And information is power, which is why states and corporations fight for exclusive access and control. Coalition is more that party alliances at the level of political government but a way of working within the public life of community. Common cause can be made and common ground can be found between environmental groups, human rights activists, development groups and so on. By making common cause and uniting on common ground, the fact of political isolation and the feeling of political alienation can be overcome, becoming the base of further action. Grassroots community-based action not only influence the political process but form the content of the reinvigorated public life. The Green Party needs to highlight and publicise – and in some way connect and connect to - the many examples around the world where the empowerment of activism is succeeding in overcoming political disillusionment. Social and environmental groups need to work together and broaden out to build coalitions within nations and across continents. 

Again, it is time to look again at the old Green slogan of ‘think globally, act locally’. The slogan captures the interdependence of the local and the global. Terry Eagleton bemoans the fact that as capitalism has gone bigger with globalisation, large sections of the Left started to think small. The Green Party has always thought big. Ecology is an issue wholly in the tradition of the universal aspirations of the radical tradition. With the globalisation of economic relations, it is the world that is getting smaller, making it easier to think big. The technical and institutional and digital integration of the world is principally being organised around interests of finance, commerce and industry. The global social and environmental problems that also follow are of interest to all. The Green Party needs to be part of a global environmental movement that is capable of responding to these challenges, working with and drawing together other groups where common interest can be found. All over the world, movements are growing contesting the power of the TNCs and capital, demanding managed trade as against ‘free’ trade, and fighting the plundering of biodiversity and natural resources by transnationals. Isolated and independent, these groups can be resisted and contained, even suppressed.

Finally, The Green Party is often criticised for being negative, focusing upon the problems of economic growth and development. In many respects the criticism is unfair and is a plain example of scaremongering and scapegoating amongst political and economic groups with an interest in denigrated the Green message. A principle to adhere to is to always present coherent solutions – or commitments to finding solutions where none are clear - when pointing out problems. Again, working in alliance with other groups, environmentalists have to become problem solvers, committing themselves to finding viable solutions which command popular support. Again, this means working with people as citizens rather than as taxpayers and voters. To just protest at the inequality of world trade and the global environmental, social and health problems associated with globalisation is a necessary but in no way a sufficient condition of a successful Green politics. There is an analogy with chess here. Any move made can only be justified in terms of some overall strategy and desirable conclusion. At some point, there has to be an end game. Green thought, action and organisation must have as its end the ecological society. The Green Party must offer positive solutions to the problem identified and outline the contours of a Green polity and a Green economy as a feasible, coherent, potentially popular alternative to the current economic system. A movement which simply exploits ills which are obvious to most people will quickly exhaust itself through want of an alternative, popular protest fading into apathy and hopelessness. An alternative gives an end point and gives the hope which motivates effort.

Ecological Praxis
There is a deeper principle beyond a list of ‘what is to be done’. Who is to do the doing and how are they to become involved? This is the conception of ecological praxis. A clean, safe and just environment is not within the capacity of government to deliver; it requires the reality changing and constituting praxis of those who will make it work. Sustainable policies and policies require sustainable people. A remaking of society requires a remaking of people so that a new conception of what constitutes property emerges. This is the conception of praxis, in changing the world, people change themselves; it is self-change that creates the people fitted to the new social order. An ecological praxis is designed to foster an appreciation of the connection between humanity and nature, a pact that affirms "the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution." 
A system of exchange value driven by the dynamic to accumulate capital is systemically predisposed to mismanage planetary resources. Some of the real costs can be calculated and added to prices, but the real solution to the free market’s mis-allocation of resources goes beyond prices to an appreciation of real values. There are common goods and use values that should not be turned into exchange value. Their use should come through a democratic politics grounded in self-governing communities.

This is the answer to Plato’s problematic of how philosophy could rule. How to translate science and knowledge into social practice, how can reason rule the world? A democracy run by experts is a contradiction in terms. But a democratisation of power, knowledge and politics is possible and amounts to the democratization of expertise and resources.

A recent report estimates that the number of people harmed each year climate change at 325 million. The number of deaths from weather changes alone is set to exceed 500,000 people per year, mostly among those who have had the least to do with causing the pollution.1 ‘Handing the matter over to capitalism is, however, likely to prove as good an idea as asking the iceberg to fix the Titanic.’ When government and business provide free goods, the rigid property schemes and profit-driven markets result in flawed outcomes. We need a different system for valuing the world.

Achieving balance will not be easy. It is incredibly difficult to transform monetary-transactions relations once they have become entrenched. In addition to removing monetary rules governing specific transactions, government needs to be liberated from its corporate capture and the political imagination needs to be cured of its colonisation by stupefying consumerism.

The promotion of individual desire and self-interest by economic theory and practice flies in the face of the ethics of the philosophies and religions that have played the biggest role in building civilisation. Not one of the so-called axial religions hold that desire is anything but a corrosive force leading to unhappiness. Buddhism is most explicit of all in locating the source of human ills in desire. Buddhist economics (E. F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful.) is a sustainable economics which seeks to free human beings from the subjection to desire. As a prince, the Buddha learned that wealth brought no joy. Locating the source of human unhappiness in attachment, the Buddha renounced his possessions and went to the forest to live a life of poverty. Here he found that poverty brought no happiness either. Buddha came to understand that happiness comes from the Middle Path, enjoying the pleasures of the body without craving for them. This understanding makes clear that real value is not in satisfying a craving or a desire, but in meeting the need for well-being. From this understanding of real value, consumer capitalism stands revealed as a treadmill that chains people to their desires with the illusory promise of happiness at exchange of a coin keeping people in pursuit. It makes sense in a profit driven market to keep people buying, but the result is a profound unhappiness achieved by a huge expenditure of effort and resources.

One returns here to the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia, happiness as flourishing, the proper use of human capacities and faculties generating well-being. Flourishing happens in a social context, in relation to others, and acting as a social being is a central feature of affirming use values over exchange values, realising Aristotle’s politikon bion as a public life of value that corresponds and enhances the human ontology rather than contradicts and inhibits it. And this is also part of realising that human beings are not just social beings but that human society rests upon nature. The politics of value therefore embraces the environment, rejecting the commodification of nature. The arrogance of the assertion of ‘the economy’ as free from all social, political, ethical and natural constraints now stands revealed for the hubris it is. Bailed out by government and people time and again, this hubris has to be checked in face of the global ecological crisis. The will be no bailouts from Nature. James Lovelock’s Gaia thesis has reminded the modern world of a truth that ancient civilizations always knew – the human species is one of a number of species that belong to the earth, the does not belong to any species. (Boris Worm et al., "Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services," Science 314, no. 5800 (2006).

Internal social self-regulation within Gaia as a self-regulating organism recognises the embeddedness of all institutions and systems in society, and of human society in nature. This repudiates the mechanics of exchange value and affirms communities in control of their own use values. This is an approach to value that is very different to notions of politics and economics as marketplaces in which ‘everyone’ is able to vote. These are forms of ecological governance that involve the everyday practice of controlling value, resources and their distribution.

Communities
‘Just as individuals and firms, acting alone or collectively, can both reduce their own emissions and put pressure on governments to act, or participate effectively in policy formation, so too can communities, working as towns, cities, states, or in rural areas. Communities can set their own targets and show their feasibility, and thus provide examples which can be a powerful influence on national government policy’. (Stern 2010 ch 7). 

Stern gives many examples of communities taking action in this respect. ‘I have experienced this in West Sussex in the UK, where I live. At community meetings, topics range from ground-source heat pumps to cycling, local produce and diet; local business people and NGOs often join the debate. The existence of such groups means that local politicians recognise the issues and the interest in climate change as a political reality’. (Stern 2010 ch 7). 

‘By decentralising energy sources, the small town of Woking in the UK has been able to create energy where it is used, for example from local windmills, thereby reducing transmission losses and increasing efficiency. These savings make small-scale power-generation technologies competitive with grid electricity. - another example of potential gains from decentralised generation. Emissions in the town have been cut by 82% from 1990 levels.


'One of the world's largest, oldest and most successful examples of combining heat and power is the Copenhagen district heating system, which supplies 97% of the city with clean, reliable and affordable heating. Set up by five mayors in 1984, the process simply captures waste heat from electricity production - normally released into the sea - and channels it back through pipes into homes.' The system cuts household bills by €1,400 annually, and has saved the Copenhagen district the equivalent of 203,000 tonnes of oil every year - that is 665,000 tonnes of CO2. (Stern 2010 ch 8). 

‘There are also some very creative examples of plans for completely new cities which are emerging. Dongtan in China aims to be the world's first purpose-built eco-city. Its goal is to be as close to carbon neutral as possible, with city vehicles that produce no carbon or paniculate emissions and highly efficient water and energy systems. And in the Middle East, the planned city of Masdar, designed by the British architectural firm Foster + Partners, is conceived to rely entirely on solar energy and other renewable sources, with a sustainable, zero-carbon, zero-waste ecology’. (Stern 2010 ch 8). 

There are countless other examples which can be given to demonstrate not only what can be achieved, both practically and politically, but what is actually being achieved. It is a tribute to the creative energies of citizens that so many examples can be given from all over the world given that the climate science has only recently started to make inroads into the public consciousness. This public action rather than public opinion is the real strength of the movement for change. The action on the ground and the emergence of an ecological consciousness partly explains the hysterical, scarcely reasoned nihilisms of many of the deniers – Melanie Phillips sees the environmental movement as a new paganism determined to bring down Christian civilisation. The problem with such polemic is that, at the level of political debate, on TV and radio and other such forums, it is well nigh impossible to argue against. Rather than publicise an issue and generate clarity, it clouds the issue and exhausts the patience with noise.






Many Greens seek a an alternative social order based on the idea of a self-reliant community, with the commune as a political means as well as a social end. For Rudolf Bahro, parliamentary road to sustainability is counter-productive. The required social transformation is so fundamental as to involve a complete change of consciousness through a strategic withdrawal from conventional politics. Bahro compares the predicament in the contemporary world with that of the Dark Ages after the fall of Rome, calling for a 'new Benedictine order' organized in a 'commune-type framework'. Commune living not only realises human fulfilment but enables the 'longer run-up' required for achieving radical goals (Rudolf Bahro, Building the Green Movement (London: GMP, 1986) pp. 87-91). 
The commune perspective assumes really is concerned with building a new civilisation rather than even large scale reform through existing institutions. ‘We dare to make an experiment … for the principle of a life beyond the currently valid norms and career paths of civilization’. 
The (relatively) autonomous basic unit of social life is no longer economically expansive (self-reliance) and is presented as the only long term chance of building human community. The communes are an alternative to the destructive and exploitative imperatives of the existing techno-bureaucratic structure.
Social transformation through commune living is also a self-transformation. Bahro’s argument rests on a philosophical anthropology in which commune organization corresponds to human nature, avoiding the alienating effects of overscale organization. The commune is the social form which reabsorbs social power from state, bureaucratic and economic institutions and organises it as social power.
As the basic social form of a more economical way of life, the commune is concerned less with economic production than with the production of a commune-type way of life. Economic requirements are not denied but are subordinated to social relationships so that imperatives of ecology and human self-fulfilment prevail. The material and institutional infrastructure of this civilisation is grounded in the commune network so as to check possibilities for the realienation of social power.

Green Community Self Regulation
The argument focuses on various aspects of self-regulation in an ecological society.
In contrast to the ‘free market’ of the capital system, self-regulation in the ecological economy is not driven by the profit motive. Nor is it driven by technological change, or by any external forces or systemic imperatives divorced from society. The self-regulating society is powered by the social and ecological values implicit in human self-realisation. Since society is conceived as a living organism of interdependent parts, no one factor can be abstracted from and raised above the others, be it political, economic, technical, military or cultural. The one thing that matters is the whole organism as more than the sum of the parts.
The very concept of self-regulation is, of course, something of an ideal type, a Platonic ideal form that can never be completely replicated in the world of particulars, only approximated. Self-regulation therefore does not imply a society in which politics has been put on ice and tensions and disagreements do not occur. What has been eliminated is the conflict and antagonism which is based in institutional domination and alienation. Far from being the end of politics, this is actualisation a return of politics to its roots as politikon bion, the public context for the realisation and harnessing of human potentials as social powers — spiritual, political, economic, technological, and cultural.

Certain strains and perspectives associated with deep ecology give the impression that concerns with speciesism identify greens as misanthropic, preferring animals to human beings, etc. The Aristotelian formulation that man is a zoon politikon offers a way of avoiding a nature/culture, animal/human split by recognising that human beings are political animals. This allows greens to argue that such human potentials do exist and can be exercised in concert with others in society, the human self-realisation as natural and social. It is these human potentials that are being systematically suppressed by industrial capitalism and diverted to anti-social ends which contradict rather than correspond to the human ontology. The moral and political imperative is to find the appropriate social forms to manifest these potentials in public life. This does not involve the state implementing a detailed blueprint, but rather highlighting the principles and practices that enable people and communities to realise their own potentials. The self-regulating society therefore rests on social forms appropriate to human development.

There is a need to identify the combination of forms and factors that can enhance self-regulation:
•	Scale: community and bioregional organization harness potentials for the humanisation of technics through reutilization industry, distributed energy-generation, eco-infrastructure, local currency, co-operative enterprise, and so on.
*	Associative democracy:
*	Participatory democracy: ecological municipalism, ecological civic and urban design, community indicators, and pattern-language development.
*	A green regulatory framework: including community design pattern-languages, performance standards, product stewardship systems, product and substance bans, rules and systems that encourage bioregionalism, quality, and community.
*	Green pricing structures and market mechanisms: ecological tax systems, polluter pays principles, prices reflecting true ecological cost.
*	A Green financial infrastructure: account-money and community banking, credit unions, community currencies.
*	Knowledge as a regulatory force: via resource inventories, eco-accounting, product information and labelling.

These tools of economic management are necessary but not sufficient conditions of achieving sustainability. Sustainable living requires a culture in which real citizenship and community are realities through social bond, shared goals, and a common spirit. The economic forms and tools detailed above are also means towards fostering a sense of solidarity, reciprocity and commonality. They are the economic forms of extended sociality.

38 PUBLIC SPACES FOR COGNITIVE PRAXIS

A functioning social order requires extensive public spaces for social learning and cognitive praxis. A public life worthy of the name creates opportunities for citizen discourse and interaction, a civic solidarity in which citizens share social knowledge, discussing freely and critically the issues of common concern, the problems that confront all individuals collectively within communities and societies. Effective political engagement on the part of new and environmental movements is also an involvement in a public life on the part of individuals who have an "ecological consciousness". To nurture this ecological sensibility so that it contributes to cultural transformation requires a number of supportive conditions and social innovations generated by ecological praxis.

It is possible to identify a number of factors which facilitate politically significant ecological activity. 

An important task is to cultivate the support of some centrally placed public authorities alongside a network of social actors. A cadre of enlightened civil servants and politicians who are receptive to environmental ideas gives a political focus for local bases of support. Political receptivity fosters a sense of political influence. The feeling that participation is meaningful is a spur to further activity. Receptive politicians civil servants are important as promoters of environmental ideas and policies and are responsible for translating new approaches into the relevant public or private spaces. There are opportunities here for political innovation, bringing local citizens within decision-making processes or public programmes on a regular and organized basis. Governments are the originators or sponsors of myriad projects of urban ecology or local energy planning, many of which have opportunities for the involvement of social actors. Such public programmes contain the potential for making participation a reality. The greater the participation of social actors organised in their communities, the more it will be possible to induce public officials to break out of the routines of conventional bureaucratic politics and engage in social innovation. Receptive politicians and civil servants working at all levels of government work in league with non-governmental organizations, community groups, trusts, etc to bring professionalism, expertise and "official" connections to a wide range of social projects (see Jamison, ed. 1998).

 Another important factor is the need for bridge-builders. These facilitate connection and interaction between people over a number of social divisions and boundaries. This function is increasingly undertaken by ad hoc networks that are formed around specific campaigns or events or operate within particular sectors or areas of interest. The idea of nature’s web is spreading as a social principle of networking which is connecting diverse areas of activity and interest (climate action networks, renewable energy networks, organic agriculture networks, ecological design networks and environmental justice networks). Networking joins professional organizations or environmental think-tanks together with local groups, community activists and environmental campaigners, creating an extensive network of professional and social groups which helps to ensure the spread of information and communication channels and join expert knowledge with social knowledge. Networks are crucial for an effective environmental politics, connecting energy activists with different kinds of expertise with those involved in grass-roots projects, discussing strategy, exchanging information and experience. 
Another factor is division of labour so that rather than duplicating effort and resources, wasting time and energy and inviting disillusion through overwork, each finds an important role to play in the wider movement. This fits in with the way that environmental and other new social movements are carving out extensive public spaces for creative experimentation, giving everyone, from scientists to citizens, opportunities to participate and contribute. Workshops, discussion groups, forums, alliances of workers and technicians, radical science journals, citizen review boards, renewable energy workshops. All of which are forms of public involvement in social knowledge-making, a cognitive praxis which alters perceptions of possibilities and options.

There is a need to establish the conditions for such interaction, extending the space for critical reflection within the wider society and ensuring that it is channelled to the official society. 

The diminution of the public sphere is a direct consequence of the structural dependence of the state upon the private economy. This emphasises the need to make strong efforts to create a counterpublic or even a series of counterpublics to check the commodifying tendencies that dominate the contemporary world. These would form the public life in embryonic form, prefiguring the extensive public spaces which enable issues of common concern to be determined by critical reflection. This is to build a public life in the interface between the conventional political sphere and the capital system, in the universities, public agencies and non-government organizations, community organisations, environmental groups. This opens up a space for critical reflection, for discussion key questions, exchanging information and ideas, developing feasible alternatives to the existing order.

Cognitive praxis turns this critical reflection into strategic capacity, denoting the ability to think through questions and allocate resources over an extended time scale. This cognitive praxis can be institutionalized with respect to national, regional and local governments working in league with social agents with respect to technological innovation, risk assessment, land and urban planning. There is, however, always a danger of encroachment. Since officially mandated "public spaces" for reflection and debate are dependent on the support and patronage of ruling elites, there is an ever-present danger of business priorities prevailing. Like the manufactured and cosmetic consultation exercises, such public participation becomes a way of taming popular activism and confining it within the system. Hence the phrase ‘counterpublic’ denotes the need for a genuine public life constituted by the people independently of business interests and imperatives. The question then is what influence public spaces independent of commerce could have over states dependent upon commerce. The problem is that it is difficult for social actors to have more than a marginal role in policy-making within institutionalised bodies. It seems impossible to replicate the broad debates that characterize environmentalism as a "social movement" within official organs and formal institutions without this intervention being accompanied by a broader social transformation in which a strong public voice affirms the primacy of social use value over commerce’s exchange interest. 

As the conventional political sphere is increasingly aligned to corporate and business interests, there are opportunities for more independent politicians to identify the legitimate claims of broad sections of society outside of the business. Environmental politics can devote resources, time, and intellectual energy to cultivating receptive politicians and building bridges with other "actors" in the society. 

Building Bridges, Making Spaces

Contemporary environmental politics is shaped, oriented and supported in diverse ways by modes of social and cultural capital. 

The possibilities of environmental politics are shaped with respect the location of decision-making and the sites of governance, that is, whether they are centralized or decentralized, open or closed. Some countries have strong "populist" traditions and combine substantial power to local authorities with relatively open access to decision-making; other countries have stronger statist traditions and therefore tend toward more centralised and less directly accessible forms of governance. There are also differences between conflictual or consensual modes of policy-making, bipolar party systems and multiparty systems. There are also significant differences with respect to the kinds of opportunities that are made available for public interest or social-movement organizations (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1994). One can refer here to "political opportunity structures" reflecting ‘opportunity cost’ showing the kind of influence that non-governmental organizations can have on the decision-making process in the conventional political sphere. Social movements operate within political contexts which offer different opportunities for economic, cultural, and social activities (see Delia Porta and Diani 1999).

In examining the nature of ecology as politics, this essay has focused on a number of dilemmas pertaining to the kinds of knowledge that are being made, the sensibility that is emerging, the dilemmas of political engagement and the obstacles and constraint that the emerging ecological consciousness and culture faces. A consistent argument made through is that there is a need to create a new public life. The environmental issue is a public issue. However, one of the biggest problems that the environmental movement faces is that, not matter how creative and innovative social actors are, public space is in retreat. There are simply fewer public places in which the growing ecological culture can flourish. A diminishing public space makes it increasingly difficult to share the earth as a commons. Such a view presumes extensive public spaces.

The aggressive character of the dominant culture constitutes a massive obstacle. The struggle of class against class is a political question, wrote Marx. Any struggle over social purposes is a political question. Through its continuous ability to commodify any resource and hence commercialize any possible human need or want, virtue or vice, dream, fantasy, delusion, capital is capable of taking the whole world to market. Presenting the mythology of possessive individualism as freedom, it manufactures "public participation" to produce results favourable to private business. It is not that business involvement is not desirable, but only in its place, as one part of a functioning order, its productive means.


Raising Sights Understanding Collaboration
The foundations of the common vision for political action is the understanding that social and environmental justice are interdependent issues of common concern and together form the biggest challenge of the twenty-first century. Those who think that the ecological problem can be postponed until after the economic crisis is resolved are deluding themselves. Economics will always be the priority in this scenario. A system of scarcity in production and false needs in consumption will never be stable. Accumulation, claimed Marx, is Moses and all the prophets. Accumulation is the central dynamic of the capital system and, by its very nature, accumulation is endless, accumulation for the sake of further accumulation. The economic problem is never ending, which means the ecological problem will always be on hold. Gandhi stated that there is no economic problem, only a moral one, a claim that goes right to the black heart of capitalist economics as endless, meaningless, nihilistic. Challenging that false fixity and systemic determinism of capitalist economics is part of the project. Moving from a high carbon to a low carbon economy affirms the power of the human creators to conscious control their economic and technological powers. The economic problem is also the ecological problem, they are tackled together rather than apart, and this can be done with social cooperation, strong leadership and effective policy. 

The evidence and the arguments are compelling, but it will take commitment and communication at the political level to translate this resource into effective public policy and action.
The question of climate change is often treated as secondary to economic growth and development. This reaction gives some strength to the Green claim to be neither left nor right but in front with a ‘new’ politics. There is a strange alliance of the ‘old’ left and right concerning the centrality of the economy. Some on the left portray Green politics as a an upper-middle-class lifestyle issue, denying the poor the economic development required to bring their standard of living up to parity. Some on the (neo-liberal) right see environmental issues as the old socialist intervention and regulation in a green guise. Forming the left and right wings of the ‘old’ high carbon economic system, both perspectives are trapped in narratives of their own making. It is the poor who will be hit first and hardest by the impact of climate change; market failure should be addressed rather than neglected, for the economy to work as it should. The low-carbon economy offers the only sustainable economic development in the medium  and long term. 
Politics is about what can and should be done, and how it can be done, identifying and overcoming obstacles and building support and pressure for change. An accent on how the politics are moving now is essential in motivating effort to show what politics can achieve in the future. Change is slow and difficult, and to succeed it requires momentum through cumulative effort. The negatives are easy to adduce – the difficulty, vested interests, institutional inertia, short-termism, self-interest and sectional interest. But such forces are prevalent in any society, yet things get done and times change. Flexibility, imagination and creativity along with evidence, analysis and policy, the power of example below and a cooperative approach above, are all part of the solution. 

The Alternative Centre Ground
This project is concerned to rebuild the missing centre ground in a world that has gone to extremes. This centre ground exists in the social nature of human beings and can be discerned in a diffused, un-systematized state in an increasingly disaffected, disillusioned electorate whose central concerns are not being addressed within the existing political system.
The response of social movements offering an alternative to productionism is this: human self-determinism against economic determinism, democratic will against external imperatives, public life against the laws of the market. This is the centre ground that has been hollowed out in the capital system, a terrain occupied by the illusory community of the state and the invisible ties of the market. It is to reclaim the primacy of politics over against the imperatives of economics. The economic fatalism of neoliberalism serves to underline the extend to which capitalism is the end of politics. The terms of capitalism are appropriate to capitalist production, efficiency, utility, optimality whereas the language of politics affirms values of freedom, equality and democracy (Lomasky in Paul, Miller, Paul 1989:112). This affirms that that democracy is a political value and practice, the province of citizen discourse, debate and interaction; that democracy is capable of subverting the domination of market ‘laws’, accumulative logic and technical imperatives. 
This is not the rejection of technics, no more than it is the rejection of markets. Rather, it is a repudiation of the inversion of means and ends so that technics and institutions are kept in their proper place as instruments to human ends, not as ends in themselves. Any notion of 'progress' is determined by the ends and not the means: the self-determinism of individuals and groups; collective mechanisms for the long term common good; solidarity and reciprocity between individuals and groups; ecology as the guiding principle shaping the co-evolution of human society and nature, between human technics, powers and products, the social environment and the natural environment. 

The alternative therefore involves:
•	the transformation of work relationships, so that the creative human agents have conscious control over their human activity;
•	reduction of the amount of time devoted to paid work and the expansion of socially useful work so that commodity relations are less important and use value is asserted over exchange value;
•	the use of the most ecological technologies that are most efficient in terms of natural resources, maximum recycling of the by-products of human activity, and the redevelopment of brownfield  industrial and urban sites as against building on greenfield sites;
•	equality and justice ending superordination and subordination in social relations;
•	new forms of solidarity and reciprocity within society, replacing monetary ties with more constitutive ties based on self-organized activities with a social utility;
•	a move towards forms of grassroots democracy as forming the new centre ground;
•	replacement   of  asymmetrical relations   between communities (local and national) by   mutually   advantageous   relations between communities based on internal self-reliance.


The Associational Civic Public
Ralph Miliband coined the phrase Divided Societies to describe the way that capitalist modernity divides individuals according to class. The point goes further when one examines the antagonism that modern society structures between the individual and the social, expressed in the division of paid and unpaid labour, the dualism of egoism and altruism, the separation between state and civil society, between politics and economics. This dualism is a source of diremption and not only generates crises but prevents their solution. Social democracy and Communism attempted (by different means) to shift the focus from the individual to social but without transforming the diremptive structure. The result was an imputed common interest through the state as an illusory general interest, something felt as an infringement on liberty by individuals in civil society. The approach conceived society as a giant corporation. An ecological polity and economy removes the dualism at the heart of society, thus putting individual and society, egoism and altruism, together.





The associational space of the civic sphere is the locus of this transformation. The green perspective adheres to the ecological principles of symbiosis and integrated systems; it avoids dualisms, splits and separations by conceiving society as a web and a network. This sees the local and the global not as opposites nor even as two extremes but as joined together on a continuum and, further, the one being present in the other. This approach avoids the dangers of localism being a parochialism and avoids ‘small’ being narrow and powerless. The key principle is one of linking scale between levels of association — from neighborhood to planet – so that power is located and is exercised at the level at which it is most competent and effective. The challenge is to create and sustain a harmonious relationship between these nested hierarchies of regulation according to an ascending theme of power, the whole being powered from the bottom up as power rises to its appropriate level. This is a question not of size but of scale. The harmony between different levels is achieved by ensuring the integration and interdependence of the parts within the wholes; this is a principle of relative self-reliance between the levels.

To achieve this kind of regulation requires a substantial rearrangement of power and its location. The rise of capitalism was associated with the centralisation of political power in the modern state. Communities were divested of political significance. The green polity entails the political investment of civil society so that communities will have a voice in a number of areas, allowing them to exercise stewardship and impose green bans. The devolution of powers and the changing of laws is a form of reregulation from below, involving communities setting social and environmental standards through new forms of grassroots participation in governance.

In a political sense, it is in the community that the real concerns of individuals can be most effectively embedded in social and ecological development. The state here is the institutional framework within which community organisation and consciousness proceeds. The principles of the green polity integrate markets within greater levels of governance. Since this perspective affirms use value over exchange value, there is an accent upon social organisation, particularly community control and relative self-reliance. This is part of the definition of wealth in qualitative terms through ecosystem productivity and production for service rather than accumulation. This means moving beyond distribution to quality of life and sustainability in production. Growing levels of relative communal self-reliance implies greater potentials for a self-governing society on the basis of multiple interacting and complementary forms of mutual aid and support.
Society fits the contours of nature in becoming itself a self-regulating organism. Self-regulation is not a green version of the free market or invisible hand; the green economy does not operate without political intervention. Indeed, there is a much greater degree of political involvement in the sense of the conscious control of collective human powers. But this is a different kind of politics and a different kind of involvement. It is politics in the Aristotelian sense of politikon bion, as itself part of the community. This is not intervention from the outside but a conscious involvement on the inside to fulfil a social purpose rather than implement a programme from above. This is a politics forged by real social bonds. As in Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, ethical action is embedded in everyday enterprise, not exclusively in private personal life, but through the integration of individuals within social roles and identities that complement each other within the whole. Politics would be a matter of cooperation and human flourishing, not competition and self-aggrandizement.

Community-oriented self-regulation would resolve the dualism of egoism and altruism by making available to the individual a social identity which connects the personal good to the common good. This does not deny the existence of selfish drives within the individual; rather, it seeks to sublimate those drives by providing the outer-looking framework that encourages individuals to seek a richer realisation of their true self. The ethical life designs social forms and provides social identities which consciously nurture and support that positive side of the human personality, the side that transcends desires and wants to seeks harmony, growth, and meaning. This is not Utopia but Eutopia, the creation of the good place which corresponds to the human ontology and gives a home to realised human nature. 


The distinctive feature of capitalist modernity is the way that economic activity has been severed from its social context and in abstraction proceeds according to its own ‘laws of motion’. This is not a case for reverting to the pre-capitalist social order in which the economy was one part of social life subject to state control. The state as an institution originated in part as the community of all communities, securing the common good, but soon developed an interest independent of its parts, coming to order, suppress, and direct human social activity. The state in this respect is an institution shaped for domination, which over time has had to accommodate itself to changing human potentials and activities as individuals have associated to reclaim the common purpose back to the social roots from which it originated. The state as an institution for domination abstracted from the social impulses of the individuals composing the state is soon drawn into rivalry with other such states, adding another dimension of organised violence, causing each state to equip and prepare to protect against the destructive impulses of others, the very same forces of domination they have cultivated in their own citizens.

As painful as it is to acknowledge it, when leaders of the gun lobby in the USA argue that civilisation is built by the gun, they are partially stating one part of the truth. Anthropologists will confirm that organised war is the product of civilisation. As soon as cities and settled patterns of production and agriculture developed, outsiders would organise to expropriate any economic surplus by force. States and cities had to organise their own defence and protection. The greater the level of civilisation, the greater the weapons, the arms budgets, the wars. The greater the decay of civilisation, the bigger the games. Infantilisation and the wrong political choices go hand in hand.
The nexus of state, domination, civilisation and war can no longer survive. The destructive cycle of escalating violence always threatened the long term survival of civilisation. The moral powers of humankind have never quite been able to keep pace with or catch up with technical powers. Ironically, human technical creativity and ingenuity have brought us to the long run when humanity's survival is directly threatened. One of Pete Postlethwaite’s final films was called The Age of Stupid, looking back from the ecological wasteland of the future to bemoan every missed opportunity for taking practical action to avoid climate change. 
As big a danger as stupidity, however, is cynicism, the deliberate focus upon the negative and assertion of what can’t be done out of some misguided claim to realism and insight. It is a very modest claim that more sustainable forms of social organization are possible given existing levels of institutional capacity, scientific knowledge and technical innovation. Such forms already exist and have always existed as conforming to essential human nature, always marginalised, excluded and threatened with suppressed by power as domination. The challenge of an ecological politics is to emancipate and universalise these social forms and bonds on a larger scale within the polity as a whole. And the locus of this undertaking is community. For many vapid and vacuous, for others an abstract entity repressive of individual liberty, community is the expression of the social nature of human beings, the common ties, bonds and ethos that is crucial to individuation.

39 BUILDING BRIDGES AND SUSTAINING ACTION

Movement And Party
In Germany, the Green organization has always been known as ‘the Greens’, with no reference to the word "party". ‘The Greens’ were something different to a political party. Candidates for elective office were not political ‘leaders’ but delegates drawn from various local, grass-roots, citizen movements. As the ‘anti-party party’ the Greens sought to bridge the gap between extra-parliamentary social movements and the local and national legislatures. The Greens in parliament would serve to "supplement" activities in civil society. The Greens reject politics as a profession and a career so that Green candidates elected to office continue to work in their local organizations or citizen action groups. 
Petra Kelly gave a classic definition of the original Green approach: ‘We aim to democratize parliament as much as possible, putting the issues, and the costs of solving them, squarely before the public. We must set ourselves uncompromising programmatic objectives in order to stimulate debate and discussion inside and outside parliament. A place in parliament, together with the success of a non-violent opposition movement in the streets, should, we hope, put us in a position to shake people out of their apathy and quiescence’ (Kelly Fighting for Hope).

The slogan used in Green politics, ‘neither left nor right but in front’, captures a couple of things distinctive about Green politics. It avoided the traditional but exhausted split in politics between left and right whilst at the same time steering clear of the pitfalls of the middle ground. A Green politics affirms the interdependence of all the parts within the whole but does so not by occupying some vacuous middle of the road but by situating itself firmly in the future. 

Subpolitics And The Need For Global Action
An ecological culture is in the process of emerging through the activities of various sections in contemporary society. And by power of example, learning as a social process is exponential with the wider dissemination of a range of ideas and concepts, "environmentally friendly" products and practices, organizational procedures and policy proposals. Such ecological praxis is a social learning which is changing the way that people see and do things, at work and at home, in politics and economics, in the interstices of the social mileux and contexts of the everyday world.

The emerging ecological sensibility and culture faces the systematic and well-funded and well-connected opposition of the rich and the powerful. This takes two forms, from outright opposition to attempts to commercialize ‘green’ ideas and values and exploit them as business opportunities. The transformations underway cover a wide range of activities in a variety of social locations, not all of which are as green and new as they seem. Rather than argue for some homogeneous, universal phenomenon of ‘new politics’ underway there is a need to acknowledge that the whole picture comprises different kinds of rationalities, motivations, and interests.

The new environmental politics is developing modes of thought, action and organisation which are in contrast with the existing forms of conventional political activity. The developments are not all of a piece. Popular participation is a recurring theme but covers a multivaried range of social activities. In recent decades there has been a growth of what Ulrich Beck calls "subpolitics" referring to increasing significance of indirect forms of pressure and informal types of action. The term "cultural politics" underlines symbolic nature of many aspects of contemporary environmental conflicts (Beck 1995; Hajer 1996). This cultural politics indicates the extent to which political practice is becoming reflective and discursive, with debates about naming programmes and defining ambitions, the construction and design of policy reforms and organizational initiatives, and over how to develop and implement practical-technical measures.

The processes of subpolitics and cultural politics transcend the formalized domain of conventional state politics and its systems of regulation and control. This has two dimensions in that what is often proposed by policy-makers and politicians is far removed from the people policy applies to and in what is implemented is often carried out very differently in practice. These processes are also greater than the world of economics. The environmental strategies of businesses are not to be taken at face value but must also be understood in terms of their impact and consequences in the wider world. The broader relations of everyday ecological transformation are at variance with the processes and assumptions of capitalist modernity, meaning the environmentalism forever pushes at the frontiers of the constituted social order. The principal societal domains of state, industry, and civil society operate according to a formalised, systemic logic which is increasingly out of kilter with the social practices of a range of new actors involved and the social knowledge they are making.

The diverse range of activity that has emerged in the quest for more sustainable ways of living is generating an ecological consciousness which can be infused in the formalised domains of the state and the economy but also as broadly as possible into a now "globalized" civil society. 
The systemic imperatives driving economic efficiency and rationalisation consistently override and undermine the quest for a sustainable way of life. Capitalism is not a public domain but a regime of private accumulation Since the resources of the conventional political sphere are derived from the process of accumulation, the dominant strategy is to assign the main responsibility to the private sector. Ecology is turned into an environmentalism which proceeds through institutional tinkering within the constituted realms of business and politics. This involves the extension of new managerial and administrative procedures which attempt to incorporate environmental concerns into business and government (Hillary 1997). This halfway house positively invites a continuation of destructive environmental practices, with corporations in the ‘North’ devising schemes to move or transfer their more visible environmental problems - and profitable "solutions" - to the South (Agarwal et al. 1999). In this respect, ‘greening’ in one part of the world is also the intensification of environmental destruction in another part of the world. Scientific knowledge and technics come to take the form of an institutionalised environmentalism which intensifies ecological destruction within existing patterns of global inequality (Guha 2000). The integration of ecological concerns within existing institutional and systemic practices not only do not resolve environmental problems but intensify them; worse, continuing environmental failure invites a ‘green backlash’ which deliberately conflates the interventionist, expensive and failing processes of environmental institutionalization with the environmental case as such. The rich and the powerful want business and finance unregulated and unconstrained, deny that the green collar economy could ever be profitable and deliver growth and target the failures of environmental protection in making their case (Rowell 1996; Beder 1997). Arguments that the science is clear do not actually resolve the issue. The science is as clear as the science can be. But climate science can never conclusively prove precise, direct causal connections between global warming and climate change. The forces of the ‘green backlash’ exploit scientific uncertainty to imply ignorance. Undermine the authority of science and exploit popular resistance to increased government intervention and taxes is a powerful political strategy to short-circuit the emerging ecological culture. These are not forces that can be beaten on their own ground. The environmental movement requires a new cognitive and ecological praxis that develops an informed, active ‘populism’ of its own.

Something that proponents of environmentalism fail to understand – presuming that their environmental aspirations are genuine rather than an attempt to co-opt the new environmental concerns and actors – is that public actions and decisions are constrained by private forces. ‘The economy’ is a euphemism for capitalism, a regime of private accumulation, not a public domain. This blockage in thinking and practice leads environmentalists working within existing institutions to continue to overestimate the power of public opinion to constrain commercial interests and systemic imperatives. Environmental change is still, ultimately, a question of bringing pressure to bear on public institutions, underestimating the extent to which the public realm is dependent upon the private economy and must necessarily facilitate the process of private accumulation for its own resources and legitimacy. Modern society continues to be governed by an overriding capitalist or accumulative logic, the "treadmill of production" (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Working within this logic, environmentalism has concealed a process of continuing ecological accumulation involving the appropriation of local natural resources by powerful global interests, and the subsequent destruction of local environments (Kousis 1998). 

There is increasing recognition of the need for comprehensive approaches since environmental problems are also social problems linked to issues of racism, justice, equality, and democracy. There is a growing awareness that ‘sustainable development’ can be pressed into service by transnational corporations in their quest for controlling the world’s resources, intensifying existing inequalities and generating new inequalities in terms of the use and control of resources, the distribution of income, access to information, knowledge and expertise, and influence over strategic decision-making (Sachs 1999). Governments and intergovernmental bodies are instrumental in supporting corporate expansion at the expense of local, small-scale initiatives. Their transfer of responsibility to the private economy is not a matter of public choice but a systemic necessity given their need to facilitate the process of private accumulation. To believe otherwise is to fail to recognise that capitalism is not a public domain but a regime of private accumulation. Capitalism must accumulate capital as a systemic purpose. Capital accumulation is the central dynamic of the system. The economic imperative will always override the ecological imperative within this system. The state and the institutional realm must support the private economy as a condition of its own power and legitimacy. As the International Society for Ecology and Culture observes, "Small is beautiful, Big is subsidised" (Gorelick 1998).

These observations point to a need for a new kind of politics, mobilizing and organising the new social actors to generate new modes of thought, action and organisation which are capable of resisting incorporation and of opposing and subverting the existing institutionalised modes of exploitation, domination and power.

Scale Accountability Responsibility
The criticisms of science and technology are directed against big science, technological determinism, and technological imperatives which are all of a piece with the rationalisation of capitalist modernity. Technology and technological innovation contain cutting-edge potentials which facilitate a greater diffusion of power. The efficiencies issuing from a bioregional organization of reutilization industry and ecological agriculture; the interactive and decentralized character of hypermedia; distributed generation of clean energy; the participatory and distributed nature of eco-infrastructure —all contain possibilities for the democracy as a practice within community control. 

In other words ecological economic systems make democratic accountability much more possible. This is not a case of small against big but of appropriate scale in the conscious use of technology. The interesting thing is that the most resource-efficient and productive technologies tend to function most effectively on human scale. For some time it seemed that technology imposed larger scale and centralization. Now, such assertions appear to be politically loaded and self-serving.


The conscious use of decentralised technologies is only one part of achieving appropriate scale. The forms of creating community, fostering local interdependence and achieving levels of participation that resist centralisation and exploitation include some (non-account-money) local currencies, cooperative consumption (such as the sharing of tools and durables in neighborhood prosumption centers). These diverse forms of production and consumption are integrated within a strong and active civil society which is the decentralised site of the participatory citizen democracy implicit in the activities and demands of the new social movements. A thoroughgoing grassroots participation and networking establishes the ecological relationships crucial to self-regulation within the whole. The eco-infrastructure of sustainable forms and tools, appropriate scale and active democracy form the content of community self-regulation.

This is to interpret democracy as an expression of individuation in community with others. In arguing that “Democracy is the truth”, “democracy is the generic constitution”, Marx was following Aristotle’s conception of the social nature of human beings requiring a public life to its socialised conclusion: “democracy is the essence of all political constitutions, socialized man as a. particular political constitution”.

 “Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find the constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings and the real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in existence and in reality. The constitution is thus posited as the people's own creation. The constitution is in appearance what it is in reality: the free creation of man” (Marx Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State 1975).
In an ecological perspective, this equation of democracy and human development, the realisation of democracy as human self-realisation, is reinforced by the connection between participation and appropriate scale and technology in the production of life. There is also a growing awareness, particularly with respect to ICT, that complexity generates democracy in the active sense. The external forms of hierarchical control are now dysfunctional. The various forms of "internal self-regulation" develop an appropriate management and coordination in contrast with the cumbersome forms of external management which typify capitalism. Capitalism is strong in delivering quantity, but its shell and its supports rest on a top down hierarchical control of a hollowed out centre. The emptiness of its wealth creation, the meaningless of its central dynamic and its hollowed out society is its greatest weakness. The decadence of consumer culture and the apathy of electoral politics in the modern world are consequences of the suppression of democratic potentials for internal self-regulation under the weight of business imperatives, state directives and wasteful practices. Internal self-regulation on a human scale necessarily means democracy in an active sense, the socialised humanity towards which individuals should be in the process of transitioning to in their praxis. This transformation is possible through an extended sociality in community. Democracy in an active sense is not the form – it is no more electronic polling than it is ordinary polling – but the everyday practice. And as a practice it is that is embedded on the various levels of community. Further, a level of economic self-reliance enables politics to be coextensive with everyday work life. Ecological forms of production permit democracy to be practised in everyday relationships through neighbourhood and community councils as well as through explicitly political organizations. Appropriate scale allows direct accountability and general participation to be combined with competence and effectiveness in the use of power. The new information and communications technologies enhance the interpersonal connections within communities whilst connecting these communities together through regional, continental, and global networks.

Building And Sustaining Action
Political policy and purpose must be orientated towards building and sustaining broad-based agreement. This involves good design structure, embedding the three criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and equity (Stern 2010 ch 9). But it requires more. Building consensus across the political spectrum and civil society is an intensely political process in which group, sectional and self-interest, misperceptions and misunderstanding, and plain political chicanery can work to prevent focus on issues of common concern where agreement is possible. Proposals for change will be confronted by deliberate misunderstanding to try to canalise debate into sterile channels and misleading lines of argument. This requires analytical as well as political skill to avoid being drawn into a destructive cycle of in which opinion replaces knowledge, confusion replaces clarity and all sides merely reinforce their own prejudices. The transition to a low carbon economy will involve a change in social and economic practices and will generate concerns from sections of the public. There is a need to show that dealing with the threat of ecological devastation is a price worth paying in terms of a short term dislocation and that basic concerns with respect to employment, housing etc will be met. With the nation, Green politics must work with broad sections of the community and at all levels of the political process to demonstrate political effectiveness, motivate efforts by showing an end product, foster networks of communication and mutual learning within civil society, and thus create a spirit of cooperation which is deep and broad. 
Green politics means rising to the challenge of giving social movements and civic activism a political effectiveness and significance so that particular efforts have a general result. This involves persuading a range of social actors and building coalitions. Policy based on evidence, example, effectiveness, analysis, communication and alliance will be crucial in demonstrating that the party means political business. 
Of particular importance is demonstrating the principle of social action and cooperation in action. Cooperation, compromise and accommodation with respect to realities is crucial in actualising possibilities. This is a major project of integration and network-building, but with the achievement of a cooperative spirit through acting in concert and practising mutual aid and learning, political decisions with popular support can be made and results achieved, spurring further action. 
The content and sustenance of this cooperation is powered from the bottom up by social movements, civic organisations and community campaigns, sustaining longer-term perspectives and values from within the everyday social lifeworld. With this base, political institutions, policies and actions can be constructed which reflect long-term goals for the common good. Maintaining this long-term perspective through the short-term controversies and priorities which are the stuff of politics is the challenge for political leadership.

Institutions And Coalitions For Action 
The Democratic Corporation
Policies formulated and implemented at the national level will not work if governments simply leave them to the market. The problems of dealing with climate change are so complex and wide-ranging in scope that the cooperation and involvement of the whole community is required. And what applies to nations applies also to international agreement between nations. 
Involving business, trade unions and other economic agents in the construction of policy is essential. Stern describes the process of the Crenelle de l’Environnement in France in the middle of 2007 as ‘a striking example of all sections of society coming together to try and find ways forward that are effective, efficient and fair (and seen to be fair)’ (Stern 2010). Stern himself was part of the discussions, which also included scientists, policy analysts, central and local government, business groups, trades unionists, and NGOs. The exchange of ideas led to a number of proposals capable of being translated into public policy. To place this process on a more formal, more organised institutional basis would bring the initiative closer to the concept of democratic corporatism.
The performance of national governments must be checked, monitored and guided. In the UK, the Climate Change Committee is a mechanism by which the government sets itself targets, measures performance and suggests improvements. The government is called to explain itself to parliament when it fails to meet the recommended targets. What adds to the power and legitimacy of this mechanism is the agreement reached by all political parties in the UK in its establishment. There is a statutory obligation on the government to meet its targets. Rejecting or failing to meet a recommended target exposes the government to political embarrassment. Further sanctions could come through the courts. (Stern 2010 ch6). 
Making and delivering policy on climate change originates in, is sustained by and is taken on as a result the activities of a collection of forces and pressures spanning political with civil society: citizens, NGOs and firms; leadership from the top; and various political and other coalitions. In the USA we see close working relationships between political structures, relevant firms and environmental NGOs… 
‘In Europe the EU acts as a regional structure and oversees obligations and commitments. Given that the response must cut across national boundaries, the development of similar structures on other continents is crucial’. (Stern 2010 ch 6). 

Individuals, Firms, Communities: The Power Of Example
The making and implementation of policy is not just a matter for national government. There is potential here for civil society to reclaim its political significance and reorganise its social power as a governmental power. There is plenty that citizens, communities and economic agents like business, trade unions, producer and consumer groups and cooperatives can do on their own and together in responding to climate change as both risk and opportunity. Climate change is a spur to individuals and groups to cooperate, put aside differences to work together to achieve a common goal, mobilising social potential for a political effect, organising for effective action at the appropriate level. 

The focus of this argument is how to motivate individuals to join together and how to mobilise effective action within civil society for a long range political goal. This involves the right financial incentives - carbon prices, taxes, grants, or other mechanisms - but there are a number of less tangible factors which are important. Access to good-quality information on how to make low-carbon choices is one.

Of crucial importance is creating cooperative movements on the basis of joint ownership, thus building a sense of shared responsibility. The result is that individuals cease to regard themselves as alone on the market but see that their own small actions count for more when they are made in unison with other individuals. Individuals together thus comes to feel that their small actions are worthwhile and that they are a making a significant contribution to a wider collective effort. The more individuals feel that their actions are making a difference to the world around them, the more they will be inspired to make further efforts. The 'power of the example' is an important catalyst for motivating individuals and mobilising joint action together, the people participating in these activities learning from each other by seeing and doing. Stern remarks that in discussing policy with finance ministers and prime ministers, he was almost always asked, 'Has someone made this work?' ‘There is no substitute for seeing others do something successfully’ (Stern 2010 ch 7). Whenever principles are stated and policies proposed, these should be supported by a number of examples. The stock responses of sceptics faced with alternative futures and long range goals are who pays, it can’t be afforded, it can’t be done. Examples of where it is already being done support arguments for extension and justify expense by being demonstrably practicable and feasible.

Individual Action: Identifying Opportunities And Motivating Action
One of the most appealing aspects of ‘green politics’ is that it connects the personal and the political. A political choice is also a lifestyle choice, allowing individuals to participate through the exercise of personal responsibility.

There are many examples of the actions that are possible on an individual level. Showing what action is possible and giving examples of how to do it can motivate individuals to change their habits and behaviour and to exercise moral choice in their purchasing decisions. Much depends on making information available, giving details of publications, institutions and websites. Individuals are given access to information concerning the advantages of insulation, materials and products available through local firms, the options and opportunities via governments and banks. All of which generates a general momentum through individual responsibility. 





Political Pressure And Public Opinion
In addition to taking action as individuals to reduce their own emissions through lifestyle choices, individuals can join together as citizens to work through civil society to mobilise pressure on governments to establish a policy framework and timetable for climate change and to agree a global deal. Many actors here are pressure groups of long standing, such as Friends of the Earth, WWF and Greenpeace. Individuals could engage in direct action and community campaigns. The prospects of moving from protest to politics, forging alliances around issues of common concern with wider sections of the community in order to move forward needs to be analysed.
The Greens should be wary of engaging in the ‘catch all’ politics of the mass parties, not least for the reason that the ‘mass’ electorate seems to be in retreat. No one person is any one thing in an increasingly complex and pluralistic society of diverse loyalties. The days of a small number of political parties being able to ‘catch all’ sections of the mass electorate are disappearing. That said, the Greens’ have plenty to work with. The evidence consistently reports that a substantial number of people see climate change as an important problem. And the same evidence also indicates that people are ready to support strong policies to deal with climate change, if the policies do as they say. There is a wide and growing understanding of the climate science and of the need for public action. The purpose of organised politics is to galvanise that popular potential and deliver the policies and practices which will command widespread support. There is plenty of work to be done in communities to build pressure for action on climate change. If the public demand for action is strong then governments will have to respond at the level of policy making. But building this public demand for action is not primarily a question of influencing public opinion through debate, argument and information. That is one route, one which has all number of dangers with regard to reducing a complex issue to spectacle and theatre, politics as entertainment. This can be built by the power of example, mutual learning by seeing and doing, an ecological praxis. Further, there is a role for clear and decisive leadership by in informing and educating the public, giving the sense that citizen efforts and demands already have a political voice and already have some purchase within the political system. 

Movementism And Coalition Politics
There is a danger of a naïve ‘movementism’. Groups, campaigns, organisations have particular interests and often very narrow, sectional or single issue aims. There may not be a common cause, although they may have a common enemy – the impact of global economics in specific areas. Somewhere, the objective must be to create a Green polity and this, in the view presented here, is an associative civic public based on a welter of intermediary associations. The words of Jurgen Habermas outlining the contours of a ‘new politics’ are appropriate here. The ‘new politics’ centres on 'the peace movement, the anti-nuclear and environmental movement, minority liberation movements, the movement for alternative lifestyles, the tax protest movement, religious fundamentalist protest groups and, finally, the women's movement' (Roderick, 1986, p. 136). However, these groups are mainly oppositional whereas the creation of a civic public requires a reconstructive approach also. And not all protest is emancipatory or in the public interest. The various groups, campaigns, organisations etc need to be evaluated for their emancipatory potential, distinguishing between those that seek 'particularistic' change and 'those that seek fundamental change from a universalistic viewpoint'. 

For all of the claims that identity politics forms a new politics, the result seems to be a transformation of culture and lifestyle within rather than against existing power structures and relations. Back in the 1980s Eric Hobsbawm warned that the great principles, struggles and slogans of the Left are universalistic and apply to all human beings equally. Without this universal ethic and there is no Left left. One returns to the point that as capital went big, went global, the Left started thinking small. The key is to identify the universal implications of particular struggles and unite the particular together in a general emancipation. At present, the ecology movement is the movement which seeks fundamental transformation from a universalistic viewpoint. An ecological society requires a fundamental transformation in power relations and the social structure to ensure public good in a concrete life situation.

The source of social transformation is located in a sphere which is not opposed to particular consequences but is totally opposed to the claims and imperatives of the dominant techno-urban industrial system. Yes, that is an awkward euphemism for the capital system. Yes, a Green politics achieving the ecological society is revolutionary. But isn’t it better to let people find this out for themselves, through their own efforts and actions, rather than being told this as an abstract lesson in political economy, delivered outside of constitutive ecological praxis? 

To offer a Green coalition politics as a new politics capable of constituting the new civic public is not to blandly argue that all social movements or even social movements as such are agents of political and social transformation. Lacking a common interest, they cannot act coherently, unless that common identity is manufactured from the outside, the Green polity as the old state as abstraction. Various social movements do not have a ready-formed identity and cannot be given one by external political action. This is true, as the history of party state socialism proved. 

The failures of socialism to constitute a genuine public life are salutary, engineering a collective interest from above, institutionally suppressing particular interests. But this is the very antithesis of a civic public. The critical project would precisely reject engineering a common identity between heterogeneous groups by identifying those groups, organisations, movements etc whose aims and objectives most profoundly challenge the presuppositions on which existing social relations and structures depend. By integrating oppositional and reconstructive approaches within a universal ethic, it will be possible to resist absorption by the system it seeks to overcome.

All groups with emancipatory content and potential can unite around a Green vision of a cooperative, ecological way of life.

In the environmental movement, a Green politics offers new grass-roots focus and more democratic dialogic modes of thought, organisation and action. There is a need to keep the local and the global integrated, connecting particular and universal at all levels. A Green Party that becomes too focused upon the level of institutional politics risks leaving a vacuum behind them, a space occupied by environmental groups and activists who can, in turn, repudiate the Green position as overly political, as part of the system to be transformed. An effective political approach could devote energies and resources to aid people form local groups and address local issues. The political framework offers advice and information, technical and legal help, teaches organisation skills and engages in lobbying at the political level. These efforts, however, are given content by the sustained activities of the diverse citizens' and community groups, large and small, organized and ready to take action to protect their communities. Again, these form the content of the civic public.

Through this work, the people most directly affected by the impact and disruption of an economy based on ecological harm start to raise fundamental questions about the nature of the economy and its institutions. 

A Green politics transforms the way that individuals work to create alternatives to our present way of life. The universal ecological vision and ethic fosters strong ties between particular efforts in different spheres, forging links between consumer and producer co-ops, and promotes the adoption of actively democratic forms of organization. A Green politics must be involved with local, community, cooperative efforts to create working alternatives, giving people viable options to withdraw themselves from the system that oppresses us all. At a time when the dominant economic system is proving increasingly unable to meet people's basic needs, a Green politics must be committed to a vision of new ways of living and working together and must have the goal of putting that vision —a vision grounded in a variety of local and particular struggles and campaigns the world over — on the political agenda. As the system careers to moral, economic and ecological implosion, it is more important to outline the contours of a viable alternative than to win seats and win votes and bring pressure for change on already constituted power within the system.


Participatory Planning And Green Municipalism
The defining principle of an ecological politics is that it pervades every area of life as a principle of natural power produced and reproduced in everyday life. Ecological politics affirms the interpenetration and interaction of the parts within the whole and is directed toward overcoming autonomy of and boundaries between various components. 

The development of the ecological community obviously has implications for urban design and city building, encompassing all areas of life valued by the people constituting the community. A green plan would be drawn up by specialists and experts in conjunctions with community members and form the basis for the development of community indicators according to ecological standards: community guidelines, approximate targets, performance standards, community finance. The plan would be based on detailed information concerning eco-accounting and resource evaluation. And it would draw on the principles affirmed by social movements and community groups. The idea of an eco-community plan is rests on an ongoing cooperation between activist/experts in various sectors (local employment, transportation, energy, food system, and housing) and invites contributions from local labour councils, women's associations, antipoverty groups, environmental coalitions, and progressive business representatives to discern an ecological development strategy that factors in community concerns. 

Democratisation is a process that travels two ways at once. At the same time that an emphasis is placed upon the political investment of the social world through grassroots alternatives, so the formal institutions of the conventional political sphere must also be democratized. The formal sphere remains within the Green polity and continues to set the institutional framework for the overall rules of the game. It follows that democratisation is as relevant to the formal sphere as to the social sphere. “Democratizing the state" and democratising society from the bottom up are two parts of the same process.

Some visions look pass the state. Murray Bookchin proposes a political structure of direct democracy based on active and informed citizens participating in town councils and local communities (Bookchin, 1995; Biehl, 1998). The active democracy of a green municipalism does not imply that ‘all as individuals’ decide on all policy details at all levels, as Hegel’s repudiation of direct democracy would have it. Rather, democracy is a combination of direct and participatory forms with power residing at appropriate levels of competence. The principle of subsidiarity means that the base level of the "nested hierarchy" of regulation is the one that powers the other levels, thus making the "hierarchy" a "lowerarchy" (Brandt, 1995). Like power, representation exists at each level, with some levels higher than others. But this is a functional and organic representation in which higher levels are responsive and responsible to lower levels, not the top down abstract representation of the modern state. This is to see direct and representative forms as complementary rather than contradictory.
The basic political unit of a green municipalism is the citizen assembly, encompassing neighbourhoods and parishes, according to different contexts and traditions. Citizens would assemble to discuss and decide on affairs of common concern, citizen interaction and input formulating policy. Citizens would elect representatives, who would be subject to recall, and who would be charged with negotiating with others to secure the interests of the people they represent. They would not be delegates carrying out mandated decisions since such a notion precludes discussion, negotiation and compromise at a higher level, stifling politics. The job of representatives would be to articulate the will of the community on the next higher level of assembly, to negotiate rather than assert, to find the basis for commonality at a higher level. They would also, in turn, elect the representatives who would proceed to the next higher level of assembly and who would proceed according to the same principles. In this manner, communities would be confederated with other communities; interdependence would be institutionalised as against the coercive hierarchy of the top down state (McConkey, 1991). This amounts to the realisation of Aristotle’s definition of the state as the community of communities, the legitimate claims of each and all recognised within the appropriate spheres. This political framework articulates regional, national, and even planetary interdependence based on relative independence. What Aristotle understood as autarkia.

The idea of green municipalism is the political form of the original conception of green movements as forming the "anti-party party." In other words, it keeps alive the vision of a ‘new’ politics, something essential to avoid green parties degenerating into conventional ‘catch all’ machines preoccupied by electoral appeal, policy and legislation. The time perspectives of electoral politics are necessarily short term, the message being directed from one election to next at various levels. To be politically organised and effective without becoming absorbed in the narrow affairs of conventional politics is a difficult task for a movement focused upon long term strategic thinking. Green politics succeeds or fails to the extent it achieves this long term strategic focus and structural change. Which is where the connection to movements and municipalism comes in. The challenge is to combine a short and long range perspective in green politics. Until citizen assemblies are strong and functioning and capable of constituting the municipal order, the movements could still participate in the formal political sphere, standing as candidates and being the voice of citizens and social actors in existing political institutions, thus advancing green politics through their moral and educational power.
True democracy is the de-professionalization of politics with the emphasis on citizen participation at various levels of government. The municipalist argument holds that the conventional political sphere with its organised parties are fundamentally antidemocratic in the way that they replicate the hierarchical relationships of the central state and capital system.
To conceive the Green Party as the ‘anti-party party’ gives members and supporters the onerous task of squaring the circle and making the means correspond to the ends. In this scenario, green parties are formed to give non-party social forces a political effectiveness. It requires that the law of political physics be bent out of shape, a political equivalent of Einstein, Heisenborg and Bohr. It requires that a political party uses both party and non-party means to give political voice to social movements and actors at the level of elections, policy and legislation in short term conventional politics whilst at the same time fostering ecological structures and infrastructures and community networks in order to create the broader municipal networks which form the basis of the green polity. It takes a sentence containing 63 words to define the scale of the task in front of the ‘anti-party party’. It requires that the need for political engagement and political effectiveness be prosecuted without forgetting its point and purpose and without losing its organic connection with various forms of community self-governance. Local government and local utilities would be involved in formal politics at the local level, and it is possible that much of the administration of these programmes could be undertaken by community groups, activists in league with experts. In this manner, the party becomes the non-party by absorbing formal governance into the self-governing community. This is to see the party as self-dissolving the more green municipal political structures become viable. The vision of green municipal citizen assemblies taps into the vast potential that exists for democracy in the sense of active and informed citizens in civil society.

40 ENVIRONMENTAL RULES AND REGULATION

Environmental Policies And Practices
New and environmental social movements experimenting with various forms of social control and urban governance are movements which attempt to assert use value over exchange value, resisting the transformation of the commons into private property and the destruction of ways of managing shared resources. The challenge is to create collective mechanisms of common control that not only work for society but also for the planet. The local knowledge embodied in commons systems now needs to expand to acquire a planetary dimension. In the name of Jeremy Rifkin’s book, this is a Biosphere Politics. The ecological debt is growing and the problem here is that "Mother Nature doesn't do bailouts." There is a wealth of scientific research which points to the damage that the human species, those living in the richest countries most of all, has done to the planet. This point applies most of all to those living in the Global North. If everyone on the planet were to pollute to the level of the average United States citizen, it would take nine Earths to absorb the carbon emissions. The level of CO2 equivalent in the atmosphere stands at 390 parts per million and is rising at 2 parts per year. The best scientific knowledge available that this should be below 350 parts as a question of the survival of human life.
Governments are enmeshed within a global economic system in which powerful economic agents use private power and their global reach to shape public policy. This is a powerful cause of government inertia. Governments need power and legitimacy and the private control of economic life entails a systematic predisposition towards ‘the economy’ as against social and environmental issues. Nevertheless, even governments are increasingly realising the necessity of coordinated action on greenhouse gas pollution. Whilst this is long overdue, the beginning of international governmental action legitimises the social and environmental cause and opens the institutional space for the intervention of those promoting use values into the official sphere. It is evident that a fundamental structural transformation is required in the Global North to wean people off their excessive use of resources whilst massive investment is required to make non-fossil-fuel energy available in the Global South. The problem lies in how to achieve this transformation by a combination of coordinated governmental action above and transnational social movement mobilisation from below. Current thinking at governmental level is restricted within the existing institutional framework, an incremental environmentalism leaves the market to do most of the work. For instance, the ‘cap and trade’ system acknowledges the atmosphere as a public good only to proceed to treat it as a private resource. The ‘cap’ fixes pollution levels and the ‘trade’ allows polluters to buy "pollution permits" from others to ease the burden of transition to a low-carbon economy. Putting a price on carbon allows the market to resolve the issue.
There are many objections to this approach. The most obvious is that this market-based approach actually institutionalises the pollution that is to be curtailed. The atmosphere as a public good becomes something that private forces can pollute for a fee. Both government and business gain a stake in pollution through the resources they gain from polluting practices. Pollution trading is a licence to continue the unsustainable practices that are destroying the planet. On top of this, however, is the danger that the cause of environmentalism as such becomes identified with the costly, bureaucratic and failing schemes which government and business agree to pursue within the existing system. Worse, the trading that goes on amounts to an invitation to institutionalised corruption that opens environmentalism up to the charge of hypocrisy as well as inefficiency. 

What is required is a range of policies and practices that involves increasing numbers of people in an ecological praxis. Using pricing mechanisms and relying on the market works within the logic of the system that is destroying the planet. This means relying on the potentials of human nature more than the instrumental rationality of a market economy that, given its central dynamic and imperative of capital accumulation, is lacking in ethical responsibility and incapable of self-regulation and self-restraint. Human beings are social and rational animals, zoon politikon and homo sapiens, defining traits which indicate the capacity for insight, foresight, ingenuity and problem solving. Human beings can be selfish, but this is one part of human nature which is intensified by the market economy. There are other attributes, a sense of gratitude and fairness, a capacity for reciprocity, cooperation and altruism, all of which point to justice as a social virtue and democracy as an actual practice on the part of the individuals composing the demos. This is all possible when human beings, as homo sapiens, rational beings, lead themselves by their nous instead of allowing others to lead them by the nose.

The ecological debt that needs to be paid off begins with rich countries of the Global North paying what they owe to the South.

Markets are ineffective in breaking the addiction to gross materialism. The global crisis is a combination on a global scale of a number of system wide tendencies and contradictory dynamics which cannot be contained within the system. This is part of a long range transition to a different social order. New rules and regulations are required to value the resources that people all over the world have in common, and these are most effective when the people who have to make them work have played a part in devising them. The idea of a commons involves rules and regulation, but also shared goals and values, solidary exchange and reciprocity within close ties in community and fosters a practice in which a true value is put on global resources. Therefore, "if you want a system for valuing climate, let's start with what we've already got. People don't have any problem with valuing land and destruction that has already taken place. That's only one example. The first step is to connect the climate problem with things that people already know how to value" (Lohmann).

There will be no revolution as a one-off political event. The scale of the problem is too big and the number of actors around the world are too large. The resolution of the problem of environmental crisis is a process involving social movements below and government action above, contributions from different sectors, guided by scientific evidence and knowledge and facilitated by technological innovation. In this process all participants will gain a greater sense of the public good, actual movement on the ground changing cultural attitudes toward the use of resources, and building a constituency for the long term vision of clean energy, eco-cities and communities and green jobs by achieving short range objectives that yield tangible benefits in terms of a of more clean, more safe and more just environment.

New Rules And Regulation
Democratised political structures and participatory planning provide the institutional framework for new forms of regulation, a social order based on rules which reflect principles defined by social actors. This order directs purposes, provide incentives, coordinates activities and supports innovation and experimentation. The Green plan lays out the objectives and the principles according to which the rules are evaluated.

As with scale and participation, regulation requires substantial changes in law and administration. If a political movement is strong and effective enough, laws can be changed in implementing vision and policy. 

All social orders are rule based, from norms and codes to laws which define the way that things should work. The rules of the eco-polity are distinctive in a number of ways. They are an explicit statement of vision, making clear the goals and purposes of social action; they are simplified in being built into everyday social practices. The vision is strengthened by being given performance standards, excellence, incentives and disincentives for resource use, mandated activity. This new regulatory system is designed to catalyze resource-efficiencies, place limits of chemicals and materials, impose product bans, improve human health and habitat, reduce pollution, and create local high-skilled work. 

Product and material bans have a role not only in cleaning up the environment and boosting health but in fostering bioregional economies. Bans enable substitution as a multidimensional process. Material and substance phase-outs are part of an overall strategy leading to the creation of the ecological economy, with the substitution of one chemical for another generating an extra industrial development, in the way that plastics, for instance, made possible a new transport-based food industry. Bans forcing substitution create economic incentives to create local and regionally based systems, say of fresh healthy foods produced by local farms, generating local employment, giving a community an identity. Bans could also give a stimulus to greenhouse technology and production with "solar cooling" and refrigeration. The possibilities are endless. Designed with the local and regional economy in mind, green taxes could add a further stimulus to turning waste streams into resource streams, based on technical knowledge concerning possibilities for economic conversion and detailed information of the bioregion.






The green vision has two components, the realisation of human nature within society, and the symbiosis between this realised human society and nature. At the heart of the new productive forces is human self-development. This achieves a human culture of productive activity and creativity in its widest sense. The character of society is determined by the character of the individuals composing it. Sustainable living is based not only on a natural and social ecology but an ecology of mind. 

William Blake identified the extent to which oppression can be attributed to mentalities as much as modalities: “I wander thro' each charter'd street, Near where the charter'd Thames does flow, And mark in every face I meet Marks of weakness, marks of woe. In every cry of every Man, In every Infant's cry of fear, In every voice, in every ban, The mind-forg'd manacles I hear.”
The capital system is based not only material scarcity but a psychological scarcity. The economic dependence of employment and income is associated with the addiction of want, desire, consumption as people robbed of their essential humanity attempt to fill up their inner hollowness. It is an addiction and a dependence that diverts people from who they are, from what they have lost and from what they could gain. It is the mental slavery identified and opposed by Blake.

“I will not cease from Mental Fight, Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand:
Till we have built Jerusalem, In England's green and pleasant Land.

Sustainable living requires new forms of ecological practice based on human creativity, new social skills which involve service, both to other people and to the planet. But the creation of an ecological sensibility is not merely a matter of changing our values or beliefs. Consciousness is changed in the process of changing reality. It is a question of praxis, the changing of circumstances and of the self as coincidental, generating the forms of awareness appropriate to the society brought into being. This praxis can take many forms, but the main point is that it cannot be the product of parties, political leaders, poets or visionaries. Self-change cannot be separated from social change.

The second component of the green vision is the connection of human and nonhuman nature. The notion of qualitative wealth addresses the controversy between social ecologists and deep ecologists by affirming the interrelation between human and biospheric interests. When human beings act to humanize the social order, they are acting in their own deepest interest as social beings. Acting in accordance with this deepest nature is, of course, precisely what the ontology denying structures of the quantitative economic system blocks. The task of an ecological economics is to make it clear that human beings are falling short of their capacities and potentialities when pursuing narrow, short-term self-interest. The feedback loops for human ignorance are becoming tighter and tighter as human beings are becoming increasingly aware of a deeper sense of identity with the society of others and with the environing nature that sustains life on earth.

This argument places the accent on the ontological interrelationship between individual, social, and environmental change as a co-evolution that issues in the integration of culture and nature. The challenge to eliminate relations and forms of exploitation and domination is also a quest to emancipate repressed human potentials as expressed in the emergent productive forces. 

The practical task of establishing alternative forms of social intercourse in every area requires extensive networks and connections. This is nothing less than civilisation building. The roots of civilisation lie in the institutionalization of domination and exploitation of both people and nature as resources. The task is to eliminate the forms and relations of domination and exploitation whilst reinstitutionalising on the basis of human and ecological potentials. The point is that the repression of nature without was associated with the repression of nature within, resulting in the creation of social forms which contradicted the human ontology. By creating regenerative relationships with and between the nature within and without will generate social forms which correspond to the human ontology.

This project combines both technical and spiritual dimensions in a holistic growth. Science and technology have a vital role to play in this growth as means. Their misuse through their subservience to capital and state power has encouraged some to see science and technology as a rational madness The problem is one of use as means within specific social relations. Science and technology have a role to play within ecological forms of production and organization which employ human intelligence and creativity in order to conserve nature's materials and energy. To achieve this requires that alienation and the inversion of means and ends be overcome. Just as machines should cease to be subservient to the end of capital accumulation, so humans must cease being appendages of the machine and systematically develop their technical knowledge by expanding their holistic sensibilities. Human and ecological health and well-being are interdependent. Human ingenuity and creativity is built into the design of the ecological economy, with ecological production and consumption proceeding through a decentralized economy which furnishes the basis for direct democracy and social justice and equality.

This is to reclaim the connection between economics and ecology, a connection severed by the increasing abstraction of civilisation from nature. This is to see economic production as necessarily an ecological production. Economy and ecology share the same stem in the Greek word oikos, meaning household. Both concern what Barbara Ward called ‘the home for man’. Economics is the human side of ecology, the science of how human beings manage and organise scarcity through their productive interchange with nature. The problems of the modern world are problems of overdevelopment, of an economic system that is separated from nature and which operates by its own laws and imperatives. By implementing economic processes that function as subsystems of nature human beings can be more productive, both in terms of the development of human capacities and the potentialities of productive forces. Ecological economics is inherently predisposed to using less to produce more. It achieves this by directly targeting inputs to the output as measured by social and environmental need. This is a form of natural engineering which mimics the elegance of living organisms. It is basic systems analysis. The problem with the capital system is that it is not a self-regulating closed system which generates its own resources but a parasitic system which survives only on the basis of inputs which are extracted from nature and labour. Whereas ecological economics forms a living system that is capable of replenishing and renewing itself, the capital system is a form of necromancy, capital is ‘dead labour’, its energy, oil, is dead matter. Sustainable living requires an economy which is integrated into the natural productivity of nature, its institutional framework thriving on the basis of an eco-infrastructure. The system thrives by replicating the multifunctionality of ecosystems within human-made institutions and organizations.

Scientific knowledge and technological innovation makes it possible to "do more with less" whilst leaving nature to its own restorative processes. For instance, an environmentally benign "carbohydrate economy" can be facilitated through the use of enzymes and plant-based chemistry, replacing the use of petrochemicals and other non-renewable matter. The knowledge of ecology makes it possible to build "living machines," mini-wetlands and greenhouses that can purify water without chemicals or non-renewable energy inputs.

Ecological production offers an answer to the problem of unemployment. Decades ago, books like World Without Work were predicting social crisis through the application of technologies wiping out millions of jobs at a rate faster than the economy was capable of generating them. One of the greatest defences of the industrial revolution is that it created opportunities for paid labour that overcame the endemic problem of unemployment and underemployment. It is now apparent that the old ideal of full employment cannot be achieved without a drastic redefinition of what constitutes work. Stable, full-time work is being replaced by insecure, casual, marginal, part-time work. Decades ago Hannah Arendt had foreseen the problem and asked what would happen when 'the work society runs out of work'. Books such as The Collapse of Work (and World Without Work (Merrit) focused on the impact of microelectronics on employment. Rather than explore the possibilities new kinds of useful work or even a world of constructive and creative leisure, the labour market and work ethic appropriate to a byegone age remains intact, with society organised around an outmoded notion of employment.

The intrinsically people-intensive nature of eco-production makes it possible create a society of useful work. Marx argued that ‘a society of too many useful things produces too many useless people’. And too many unemployed people. Eco-production puts the accent on useful people engaged in useful work by replacing materials and energy with human intelligence. This checks the tendency to displace people with machinery and materials. The paradox of capitalism generating too many ‘useless’ and unemployed people is that there is never a shortage of useful work to be done. The problem lies in the system of wage labour which rations the opportunities for paid employment, leaving those outside the paid formal sector. This focuses attention on the need to properly remunerate all useful work, inside or outside the formal sector, so as to share out the wealth created in a more equitable manner. There is ample scope here to revalue useful work since eco-production is undertaken in all places—urban spaces, green spaces, community projects, residential buildings, city parks and gardens, streets, townscapes, on rooftops. Local currency schemes, exchanging work, time and talent for services or even direct forms of renumeration with respect to food, energy, water, feedstocks, and services. A whole eco-sector can be developed through mechanisms such as local currencies, credit unions, community banks and basic income plans, all of which are designed to support essential forms of eco-production and realize opportunities for useful employment. (Illich)

Alternatives - The Emergent Productive Forces
The realisation of the potentials of the emergent productive forces in the form of sustainable living changes politics as much as it changes economics. Beyond institutional questions concerning the formulation and implementation of policy and the need for effective planning mechanisms, the form and content of politics are transformed. Since the new productive forces or technics are everywhere as part of the eco-instrastructure, the everyday social lifeworld becomes co-extensive with the field of political action. Civil society is invested with political significance and becomes a sphere of governance, deliberation and decision making. At this point, social movements become more than vehicles of protest and opposition and instead become active players in the creation of feasible, working social and economic alternatives.

The question of not one of small against big, decentralisation against centralisation but scale ensuring that power resides at the appropriate level of competence for the issue. The key problematic is dehumanisation, involving creativity, participation, equality, and the direct satisfaction of need against a systemic-institutional world that is abstracted from human purpose and functions according to its own imperatives. In contrast to capitalism's priorities of accumulation based on exploitation and domination, the emerging ecological mode is in congruence with the new productive forces. The forces of exploitation and domination have the power of institutional force and inertia behind them, but they are ‘false fixities’ which are increasingly challenged by the liberating potentials of the emerging productive forces. This clash between the narrow purpose of the capital system and the productive power of the new technics will be the groundwork of politics until the social and environmental movements generate a commensurate power though the involvement of a range of social actors in the realisation of feasible alternatives.

Marx somewhere argued that the most important of the productive forces is the working class itself, labour not only as the creator of capital but of human social reality in general. This view is capable of extension in terms of valuing the contribution that all social actors make in constituting and transforming reality. Science, technology, ecology too are all important productive forces, human culture generally, hard and soft culture. Technics as human culture, technics of thought, ideas, values. Here one can value the role of new movements organised around ideas and identities, issues of gender, race, ethnicity, peace, ecology. The most important thing that these productive forces produce is people. The new civilisation is about people-production, the free and full realisation of human capacities and their exercise as social forces. These forces challenge and subvert every form of exploitation and domination embedded in civilization, and push the questions of justice and equality beyond the distribution to focus on the way and what kind of wealth is produced in the first place. Going beyond ‘movementism’, these various social actors need to find the common ground that they share and proceed to developing concrete alternatives which are socially viable and politically compelling.

The transition from movement to party, from protest to politics, is a test of how far social agencies and forces are capable of moving from demanding change from someone or something else to actually delivering change themselves. That is the only way that a new society will be constituted and will continue to exist as a viable social order. The central importance of developing feasible alternatives in transformative strategy follows from the conception of praxis as social change as a self-change and also reflects the need to build in the power of example. It also recognises a fundamental change in the conception of politics in the ecological society of sustainable living, the ecopolis. Human culture and technics have progressed to such a level of sophistication as to require more participatory and direct forms of governance to realise their full potential with respect to humanising social power. Productive activity achieving human self-realisation through the integration of society and nature requires an overarching framework of conscious planning that embraces and is powered from the grassroots level upwards. Both the unconscious play of market forces and the unwieldy bureaucratic impositions of the state are incapable of organising the new forces. These require more fluid and flexible structures of participation and coordination, networks of all kinds which are capable of responding to every change in the microclimate.

A green economy implies a new role for the state. The environmental and social crisis is not one of management but of design (Paul Hawken 1993). Contemporary problems originate in the clash between the old institutions and arrangements and the new potentials. The recurring, accumulating crises are not ones of political parties and politicians, of governments with alternative regulatory apparatuses. The problems originate in a faltering system, requiring the fundamental redesign of the central dynamic, the structure, the content and the end of the economy. This redesign is a transition from a quantitative to qualitative social order. The role of political organisation here requires that the state live up to its claim to be the realisation of ‘rational freedom’, eliminating the excesses of accumulation and exploitation and setting the economic life of the community within a broader institutional and moral framework.

One way of reorienting the economy is to redefine outputs in terms of their service qualities so as to create an "ecological service economy." Such an economy would incentivise the provision of service and disincentivise the use of materials and energy. An ecological design would encourage access or mobility over cars; heat and light over electricity; nutrition over fast and processed food; live entertainment and socialising over home based TV. 
The transition to sustainable living is ultimately driven by new kinds of values rather than interests, self or sectional. The world of making money out of matter on or about the world’s surface needs to be returned to its proper place, as one part of a functioning whole, the means to an end determined by conscious human purpose.
There is a need to show how the principles of end-use and ecological design are practically applied within community-based economies. 
The argument will show that the knowledge-based economy is an economy of service and one that is well within institutional and technological capacities. 

41 THE INSTITUTIONS OF AN ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY
The scale of the task should not be underestimated. An ecological praxis amounts to remaking society, remaking society’s interchange with nature, remaking people. This is more than formulating policies, manifestoes and election slogans. It appeals to people not as voters, taxpayers and consumers, an appeal to people as individuals, but to people as social beings capable of acting in concert to reclaim a common space and a common good. The capacity to confront the market society and its commodification of public life and public goods will mean confronting the interests that benefit from these arrangements. One can state the project philosophically as the practical reappropriation of power alienated to the state and capital and the reorganisation of this power as social power. Human beings as social beings in conscious control of their power and practising forms of social self-government. The implications of this general principle in practice are radical and point to conflict with vested interests in the public and private sector that are, structurally and institutionally, part of the problem, not part of the solution. The very demand for justice and equality and democracy implies their absence in the present, which further implies that who have institutionalised their power do not want justice, equality and democracy. History shows that those who benefit most from the status quo do not appreciate movements and forces for change. 
Arguing for a new way of relating to and valuing the world does not imply the end of markets. On the contrary, it implies the proper functioning of markets as effective mechanisms of decentralized decision making facilitating exchange. The problem is not so much with markets as with the endless, systemic and overarching imperative for exchange value and accumulation that is driving humanity to the brink of ecological catastrophe through its own technics. There are different ways of valuing the world and these are perfectly compatible with what Diane Elson calls socialized markets. Whereas the social market or market socialism remain within the accumulative logic of exchange value, socialised markets are embedded in society through use value focused on need rather than not profit. (Diane Elson, "Socializing Markets, Not Market Socialism," Socialist Register, 2000.)
The concentration of resources and power in the hands of a minority, the state and capital as external, alien powers, militates against democracy as active self-government. The individuals composing the demos have been denuded of the power to make democracy a fact. What is required is a more active and expansive conception of property that is compatible with concerns of equity and sustainability through the proper valuation of the contributions that people make to society. ‘Democracy’ isn’t some programmatic ideal that one votes for but is a practice that rests on empowerment, an idea that democracy is active and participatory, engaging the whole person and the whole community in working out the best way of using and sharing the world's resources.
The movement towards a more equitable and sustainable way of life is ongoing. It is nothing new but extends back to the practices and knowledge of pre-capitalist formations, is carried through labour struggles and is being taken further by social and environmental movements. The old idea of workers’ control can be revived here. The German system of co-determination shows the extent to which the involvement of workers in policy making and economic governance shows greater levels of economic success and social justice.  And it points to a principle that goes beyond the social market to a new way of valuing labour. 
One can also highlight the importance of credit unions, in which the owners are all those who save with the union. With interest rates higher for savers and lower for borrowers, the credit union is more responsive to community demands, and less vulnerable to the vicissitudes of financial crisis. There is a need to collect and highlight the smaller examples drawn from the everyday life world of individuals joining together and working in concert to share resources in the common good. 
Human beings have been socialized into thinking only in terms of the price of something, a behaviour which derives from the colonisation of the world by exchange value. This diminishes not only the world but human imagination and possibilities. Social engagement and praxis is an educative process in which individuals learn to use the full range of faculties and senses; in creating the world, human agents come to know the world in different ways. Marx defines the state and capital as alienated social power that can be reclaimed by people in society. The alienating process is more than physical but is also cultural and psychological, denuding individuals of their inner resources. Constitutive ties which foster discourse, reciprocity, restraint, trust, generosity and patience are ways to widen connection with others for the greater, long term good. These are cultural and psychological resources which monetary imperatives have stripped from individuals and communities. By acting together and exercising these faculties in an ongoing praxis, individuals recover their psychological and cultural powers and strengthen them in the process. There is a long road ahead and the various campaigns, elections, parties etc are mere vehicles to be used on the journey, not journey’s end. Ultimately, the greatest opponents are not the ‘artificial’ people without but the ‘artificial’ people we have become. We need to relearn the value of our human faculties and capacities and do some of the walking ourselves. The old gospel song says ‘you have to walk that lonesome valley by yourself’. The valley leading to a fairer world is not a lonesome one at all and individuals are not on their own. The most daunting part is in rejecting the passivity that consumer democracy has fostered and becoming active as a citizen and experimenting with new ways of using, valuing and sharing the world. And this means participation in social and environmental movements to build the collectivities that empower the social domain against extraneous power.

To reclaim the original meaning of politics requires the reinvigoration of human faculties, nerve, nous and imagination. A lesson here is that the greatest achievements of electoral politics have been the result of movements and actions outside the conventional political sphere. The ballot box registers a wider sea change in society itself. It follows that the foundations for an effective democracy are laid in society and social practice. Amongst many things, the social movements offer the possibility of politics, the possibility of participating in public life. 

A sustainable society puts the economy firmly in its place as a means to ends set by people working in concert. The failure to reign the economy in liberates desires, motives, and passions to continue to deplete and destroy social, cultural and natural resources. A planetary politics requires that human beings see themselves as part of the living organism that is Gaia and hence come to value and steward the world in a much more balanced way. This is a collective project, bringing individuals out of their egoistic and passive existence within market society, replacing the solitary pursuit of an illusory happiness with the genuine happiness that comes from acting, working and living together in valuing and sharing a common world with a view towards a common future.

The Low Carbon Economy
The low-carbon economy not only offers sustainable growth, as against the high carbon economy, it offers a way of organising the productive interchange with nature on a cleaner, safer, quieter and more biodiverse basis. The necessary technologies and new energies for this green economy are known, it is a case of designing political institutions and social structures and developing the mind-set that can make this productive activity work. It is about modalities and mentalities, fitting human agents to natures via their technics and institutions. The role of politics is to organise clarity of purpose and of analysis, inspire commitment and mobilise action and practise cooperation. 


This is to advocate economic growth ‘of the right kind’ (Stern 2010). This differentiates sustainable growth from capitalist accumulation, an endless expansion that dissipates the world’s natural resources to produce goods and services that are not needed. The promise – capitalism’s bribe - of endless material expansion is a nightmarish vision of the end of history, the future becoming no more than the present enlarged. Except that the present cannot be materially enlarged infinitely. Resources are finite. There is a need to recognise limits and reassert needs over wants. Two things are crucial to real economic growth: ‘first, to find a way of increasing living standards (including health, education and freedoms) so that world poverty can be overcome; and second, to discover ways of living that can be sustained over time, particularly in relation to the environment. Strong growth, of the right kind, will be both necessary and feasible for many decades’. (Stern 2010). 

The Transition To A Low Carbon Economy
The transition to a low carbon economy is well within human capability. Stern identifies four conditions. ‘The first is to make much more efficient use of energy, which is used very wastefully across the board - in buildings, industry, transport, power generation, agriculture and so on. The second is to halt deforestation…The third is to put existing (or close to existing) technologies to work quickly. In electricity these include wind, solar, hydro, wave and tidal, geothermal and nuclear; and since hydrocarbons will be used for some time we must move quickly on CCS for coal and gas. Emissions from cars can be reduced rapidly through the design of engines and control systems, by the better use of vehicles and improved infrastructure, and by driving habits, choice of car and choice of transport; much greater use of electric cars can be made fairly rapidly. The fourth is to invest strongly in new technologies which are on the medium-term horizon, although in many cases not so far off. These include still further improvements in solar power, better batteries, enhanced photosynthesis, new generations of biofuels, nuclear fusion and so on. The possibilities are both exciting and enormous’. (Stern 2010 ). 


These measures leading to the low-carbon economy are motivated by a concern to avoid the devastation that will result from global warming and climate change, but generate many other desirable results. ‘Low-carbon sources of energy are generally much cleaner in terms of particulates and local air pollution, and are less polluting of water supplies; clean cooking fuels greatly reduce domestic pollution, which is a major cause of disease and death in developing countries; stopping deforestation protects biodiversity, while the loss of tree cover damages water retention and can have a dramatic effect on water flows, flooding and soil erosion (the floods in Bihar in the summer of 2008 were largely caused by silting of rivers in Nepal, leading to overflow, as a result of soil erosion from the loss of trees)’. (Stern 2010 ). 

Since renewables like wind, solar, ground source and geothermal do not require the import of fuels, the same applying to much of hydroelectric power (notwithstanding the increasing importance of cross-border water issues), energy supplies will be more secure than in a world dependent on non-renewables, hydrocarbons, which are mostly sourced in unstable parts of the world. There is greater security in the range of energy supply. In contrast to many parts of the world where families and businesses are dependent upon corrupt and unreliable local grids and suppliers, households and firms would achieve greater security through being able to control their own supplies of solar and wind power and biogas. 

Pierre Bourdieu calls for the re- establishment of Utopian thought with scientific backing. It is a call for feasible Utopia, an alternative future, so as to 'launch realistic projects and actions closely matched to the objective processes of the order they are meant to transform' (Bourdieu NLR 227 Jan/Feb 1998:128).} Likewise, Noble argues that there is a need to 'envision other technological possibilities and alternative futures' so as to challenge the way that the agenda is being set by those working within the dictates of technological progress. Any 'ideal' in this sense is never abstract but is always located within the real world. Thus Boris Frankel criticises the post-industrial Utopians for the way that their alternative futures are 'not linked to concrete plans of action and organisation' (Frankel 1987:18). The point is that the transition to a low carbon economy involves ‘concrete plans of action and organisation’ which involve wider connections across society and generate results which amount to a vision of a ‘feasible utopia’. The low carbon world is a very appealing one in its social and ecological practices and effects, but it is feasible rather than fanciful. The policies and technologies required to construct this world are available now, and can be organised and implemented with a little institutional modification and political will. The low carbon path enables us to achieve the interdependence of goals with respect to development, sustainable growth and social and environmental justice across all nations. And once underway, changes in investment and technologies generate an innovative cycle of progress that is able to achieve deep cuts in emissions within the required timescale. 

Some figures may shed light on the costs and benefits of the environmental wager. Stern thinks that 2% of GDP per annum is required to reduce the chances of temperature increases above 5°C from around 50% to about 3%. 2% of GDP changes the odds on the survival of life as we know it from a 50-50 flip of the coin to 32.3333 to 1. This is a substantial reduction of the risk of ecological devastation for the costs incurred. Whilst 2% of GDP per annum appears great, it should be evaluated in relation to the reduced risk it buys. 

‘The resources required in the case of climate change are equivalent to a one-off 2% increase in a cost or price index: it is 'one-off because costs will be incurred mainly from using one method of generating energy rather than another; once we have made the shift, we will stay with the new methods or base technical progress strategies on moving beyond this new blend of activities’. 

Another element of good policy is costing, delivering value for money through the design and implementation. This requires expert analysis and close scrutiny. What this achieves is evidence based policy that is feasible and affordable.


Economic Conversion And (R)Evolutionary Strategy
The intention of this book has been to highlight processes of contemporary change that point beyond economics. Fundamental transformations in the productive forces are altering the conception of wealth, away from material things that can be quantified, commodified and subject to exchange value to the quality of life and being, useful people doing useful work and producing useful things. Paradoxically, millions of people are suffering material depravation and ecological destruction precisely because the capital system blocks the transition from material production to production for human growth. But human growth as the realisation of nature within in relation to nature without. Truly human growth depends upon exchanging limited materialism of capitalism, the world of dead matter, for the genuine materialism of nature as a living organism.

The connection between the new wealth and human growth makes it clear that the ends to be served are not material wants but the anthropological needs of the whole human being. This goal requires a new understanding of social transformation as an ongoing process of self-emancipation and self-development in time, not a one-off event. Ecological praxis is an incremental organic process akin to ecological plant succession (Robert Rodale 1985). Prefiguration refers to the process by which the future social order is gradually built within the shell of the old. The task is to do this without co-optation within the status quo. The transformation of quantity into quality holds that it is possible to further gradual organic change that is ultimately radical and qualitative. The key to this transition is the growth of grassroots alternatives guided by large social visions as the content.

Revolution is an exciting word but an incredibly long, painstaking practice. To many erstwhile radicals, such ongoing practical activism is onerous and dull. Much more popular is postmodernism, a decadent form of intellectualistic liberalism. Sounding clever in its scepticism with respect to ‘grand narratives’, it soon degenerates into a hopeless cynicism that rules out any large social or political vision. Lacking any alternative, lacking any reason to seek alternatives, postmodernism disappears into its own pointlessness. Fortunately, most people have a good belly to earth understanding of meaning, truth and reality and these are the change agents engaged in developing vision through practical alternatives. This paper has offered a perspective on this with regard to green politics in general and green parties in particular.

The direct and practical character of ecological economic alternatives explains why their potential appeal is so great. The green wager is a "no regrets/win-win" proposition. Properly designed, green initiatives can reduce costs and increase benefits, protect the ecosystem and give a higher quality of life with more useful and interesting work. A great number of materialist wants, the gross materialism of consumerism, is sacrificed, but this is to give up the satisfaction of wants in order to achieve the satisfaction of needs of a much higher order, from recognition to self-actualisation—a higher, more fulfilling quality of life replaces the treadmill of consumption. For the first time in history, individuals can truly "Get a Life" (Roberts and Brandum, 1995), realising themselves by serving society and the planet.

With this "ecotopia" we move from utopia – no-place – to eutopia – as good place. This concern with real needs and capacities and qualitative factors is the most powerful resource of the ecotopian vision precisely because it is rooted in essential human nature. This is the vision that sustains belief in an alternative beyond the many and often necessary compromises with existing institutions and practices - "managed" global trade, democratisation of the state, wage pacts, and international environmental agreements. The compromises reach more people but only on levels within the system; the ecotopian vision addresses people at a much deeper level. The compromises reach more people with respect to issues and institutions of immediate relevance, but there always remains a need to go deeper and provide practices of substance that resonate with people's real needs and hopes.


Community economic development can be used by central governments to abrogate their responsibilities. It could also be used as a way to keep people occupied in marginal self-employment while the corporations continue to monopolise the big money in world markets. Genuine community economic development requires that CED's become the main agents of productive activity. The task of greens politics is to demonstrate how this can be achieved. The increasing polarization of society between rich and poor and the way that the financialization, liberalisation and privatisation of economic life is fracturing society makes it essential to go "to the roots" of current problems and develop alternative plans that serve social and environmental needs whilst unleashing human potentials. This involves a strategic perspective based on existing trends and emerging potentials.
Utopianism become practical as an ecotopianism. Green politics is oriented towards starting and sustaining projects and cooperative enterprises in every sector of the economy. Everything worth doing can be done in an ecological way. Done well is shaped by an understanding of the meaning of the word ‘well’, the eu in eudaimonia or good spirit or happiness and in eutopia as good place.

Social movement activities grow more positive when the accent is placed on the good — seeking an end to poverty, homelessness, exploitation and domination, racism. These and other injustices and inequalities are addressed by the development of grassroots alternatives as well as campaigns. This is to go further than defending past gains such as universal health, education and welfare by demanding more comprehensive, more proactive community-based services. Campaigns against corporate trade agreements and ecological half-measures are bolstered by alternatives already underway in many parts of the world. Radical solutions mean going to the root, not to extremes; solutions are centred and organic in a way that the institutions driving crises are not. Integrated systems and interactive cooperation can deflect attacks and force them to the outside whilst expanding the middle, thus turning the negative into positive. Arguments over left and right are thus beside the point. Intellectual clarity at the expense of sharp political division and practical movement is of no use. The great benefit of ecological praxis, based in alternatives and demonstrating practical effect, is that, whatever the obstacles, it provides tremendous personal fulfilment and sustains hope in the future. There is great personal satisfaction in working with others to have a positive impact on the environment, making community gardens, in building ecological structures, in providing regenerative human services, a natural, ongoing, organic process which contrasts with the physically and psychologically exhausting politics of protest, with its endless opposition. Instead if being focused on the negative, organising and acting against, it is more healthy to be focused on organising and acting for something. Instead of constantly opposing a recalcitrant present, it is more much positive to be working towards the possible future.
















The Greens’ task is to convince people that low-carbon growth is necessary, to design policies and practices which show that it is possible, and outline the contours of the ecological society to show that it is attractive. This also involves showing how the transition from current patterns to the future can be managed with minor dislocation to people’s lives and livelihoods. The case must be made not only at the level of evidence, analysis and policy but also practically by demonstration and example. Some of this is necessarily counter-factual: the rich-country high-carbon economy actually exists whereas the low-carbon economy has still to be created. But there are examples of low carbon energy and practices, which could be used in providing an analysis of what the low-carbon economy looks like. Effective politics involves evidence based policy and a clear sense of direction with strong political leadership. 

Effective policy needs to be based on scientific evidence and analytical rigour, which entails that there is a close interrogation of the science. The call for extensive public action and substantial investment of resources demands nothing less than that the science be as certain as it can be. That same precautionary principle applies also to those who would deny the validity of the science and the urgency of public action. The prospect of ecological devastation wiping out the basis of civilisation in the next couple of centuries requires that the scientific evidence is examined in a serious and judicious manner, without the usual predispositions and prejudices that accompany political opinion.

Criteria For Public Policy
Stern establishes three central criteria in forming policy – effectiveness, efficiency and equity. ‘The central economic criteria in forming policy must be: effectiveness in reducing emissions on the scale required; efficiency, to keep costs down; and equity, in recognising differences in incomes, technologies and historical responsibility. The earlier we start to put the policies in place, the longer we have for a calm and measured response. Delay now and haste later not only build up damage but also risk expensive mistakes in investment decisions. The greater the coordinated involvement of all emitters, the more successful, cheaper and equitable are the actions and outcomes’. (Stern 2010 ). 
The longer the delay in acting and the poorer the policy, the more devastating the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty first and after. The world is already experiencing adverse conditions, extreme weather and record breaking events, whether they be high or low temperatures, melting ice caps, rain and floods, droughts or hurricanes. Whilst the science cannot attribute these directly to climate change – no more than a doctor of medicine can attribute lung cancer to a particular packet of cigarettes – climate scientists have long predicted such events of increasing frequency and devastation with climate change. There are some who seize on the lack of absolute certainty here to justify complacency. This is where judgement is called for. Whatever the precise causal link, the 0.8 °C temperature increase which the world is experiencing is associated with record events. Even with strong and decisive action of sufficient scale now, there is an increase of another 1.5°C or 2°C to come. The longer the required action is postponed, the greater will be the costs of adapting to these changes when they occur. 

Strong and decisive action on sufficient scale and with sufficient resources should begin now in all the countries of the world. Action to curtail emissions, convert to the low carbon economy and planning for adaptation are political priorities. The Green Party is well placed to link these priorities with an overall view of the ecological society, connecting green principles to action plans, policies and initiatives.
Greens once made a great thing about being a ‘new politics’, but it should also have a great deal to say about a ‘new economics’. The necessary reorientation of the economy to reduce the use of carbon and to manage the effects of climate change is an opportunity to outline the contours of the green economy. This question concerns more than the economic management of the low carbon economy and addresses human relationships to each other and to the natural world. 
Political leadership is vital, as that is the only place at which the kind of mutual understandings and bargains that are necessary for effective political engagement. Cooperation and agreement may evolve across a range of issues such as trade, health and financial stability, developing the most expansive definition of ecology. 
Stern argues for institutional coordination on a global level, ushering in an era of international cooperation, peace and prosperity.
‘Furthermore, the process of reaching a global deal may lay the foundations for future international cooperation on broader issues… Only if world leaders give this issue the attention and priority it deserves can a deal be made which reflects the magnitude of the risks and the scale of action required’. (Stern 2010 ). 

Policies To Reduce Emissions
The economic and technological instruments that are adopted and the arrangements for international action that are made. A global deal requires a set of principles and policies which reflect three criteria – they need to be effective, efficient and equitable. These three criteria determine the adoption of economic and technological instruments and the arrangements for international action undertaken. ‘If the global deal is not effective, we will be sentencing future generations to living in a very risky world; if it is not efficient, we will have wasted resources and possibly undermined support for action; and if it is not equitable, we will not only be treating poorer people unjustly, but we also risk damaging the international coalition for action which is vital for success’. (Stern 2010 ch6). 

Communities, Urban Design And Public Transport
The design of towns and cities and the provision and pricing of transport infrastructures are policy issues which have profound implications for efficiency with respect to the use of time and energy. The congestion of roads is responsible for substantial annual losses, much of which is avoidable. The issue concerns not only the construction of the infrastructure for roads, buses and railways but also the pricing and management of transport infrastructures, the design of cities to provide a plethora of transport options, regulations concerning the location of housing, and restrictions on the use of cars. It also involves making changes at the workplace, using ICT to avoid or reduce the need for physical attendance, resolving problems of commuting to work. The design of cities and business location, extending networks, also can save time and reduce distance, lowering the pressure on limited resources.

This means reducing the cost of public transport relative to private transport so as to make it more attractive, thus reducing the waste from congestion. ‘Introducing road pricing could decrease congestion by 50% and yield annual benefits of £28 billion in 2025.'

Transport and urban design policies must:
1.	charge for greenhouse gases;
2.	price congestion properly so that we make much better use of our infrastructure, while at the same time encouraging shared transport - for example, traffic lanes for cars with multiple occupancy;
3.	seek out ways of improving energy efficiency much more vigorously
4.	invest more strongly, with due care to cost and efficiency, in public transport;
5.	make walking and cycling easier and safer;
6.	regulate the expansion of cities and improve design, with still greater focus on the ability of people to use them with as little private transport as possible;
7.	make it easier for people to generate their own electricity and sell to the grid;
8.	look at the potential within a community of combined heat and power - local energy structures are important;
9.	encourage local work practices which allow people to travel less and at more efficient times;
10. encourage recycling by making it easier.

‘These ten points all require public or collective action. They have in common organisational and policy requirements that go beyond incentive structures for individuals’. Effective policy thus requires rational thinking embedded in the institutional framework so that individuals are not thinking and deciding in abstraction from each other but are conjoined for the greater good.

In addition to being more efficient and sustainable in terms of energy use, the changes required invite innovation in civic and urban design, transport infrastructures, communications and networks at work and within communities. In fine, the potential is there to connect economic and technological changes with the broader concerns of the human habitus. Integrated policy and action across these fields will restore community life and spirit, communitas, will extend sociality through greater spaces of interaction and greater networks, and will foster more participatory modes of life within a more just and equitable society. 

Designing Markets For Regenerative Exchange
Despite the scepticism of many green social actors, the market is simply one institution among others. The market-oriented approaches of the eco-capitalists are problematic not because of ‘the market’ but because of the environing relations of the capital system which shape economic behaviour as expressed in the market. The market is an institution facilitating connection and exchange between countless millions of individuals, coordinating any number of individual actions and decisions. It follows that the market is a valuable institution that forms a part of the ecological economy. The task is to rearrange the parameters within which market mechanisms operate so as to encourage ecological activity. This is not the same thing as incorporating social and environmental costs into market prices, an approach which presumes the continuation of an economy driven by the profit motive. Worse, it rests public resources on the very behaviour to be discouraged. The concept of "making the polluter pay" is supposed to be a disincentive to pollution but it could also mean that, if the polluter does pay, he or she is entitled to carry on polluting. 

The market mechanism needs to be detached from the imperatives of capital accumulation so that markets become sites for the exchange of use value as against the accumulation of exchange-value.

The decentralized forms of production characteristic of the ecological economy functions on the basis of local currency. 

The ecological economy requires municipal ownership of the primary means of production to ensure that a genuinely universal interest prevails. This is the case for common ownership. Trade unions and worker co-operatives could just as easily replace the rule of self-interest under capitalism with the rule of sectional interest, thus reinstating an economy driven by accumulation. 

The problem is that common ownership of productive means generates more or less the same problems as nationalization. It's a collectivization that is the obverse of individualism, the other side of the same capitalist coin. It lacks human scale and flexibility. Society does not need to go to the extremes of collectivisation in order to defeat egoism, merely create the institutional framework and regulatory infrastructure so that the economy does not continually reward and therefore encourage egoism. This enables individuals to choose economic actions and engage in social practices that foster the communal good. The precise role played by communal or municipal ownership is determined by appropriate scale and function rather than as a political assertion of collectivisation over individualisation, an opposition which presumes the very dualism of individual and society that is to be eliminated. 




Environmental taxes are key instruments in "making prices tell the ecological truth" (von Weiszacker 1994: 117-28). These taxes have a number of purposes: to discourage pollution, to deter destructive practices, to raise revenue, to encourage public transport and discourage private transport, to change consumer behaviour, to incentivise eco-friendly living and so on (Morris, 1998). Environmental taxes can work as tools in the creation of an ecological service economy. This is something that market mechanisms cannot do in themselves. Environmental taxation is useful in achieving in the short run what regulatory changes attempt in the long run, reversing the relationship between materials and labour. Environmental taxes create a level playing field so that eco-materials can compete effectively with nonecological products. This is all part of creating the ecological economy that discourages waste and is people-intensive rather than capital-intensive.

The revenue from environmental taxes can be used to finance basic income (guaranteed annual income) schemes (Tindale and Holtham, 1996), encouraging community eco-production through valuing useful work. Like local account-money systems, basic income programmes would undermine formal/informal economic divisions, breaking the disparity between paid and unpaid labour. As one simple programme, the basic income scheme is a substantial improvement over the many support programmes of existing state welfare systems (Van Parijs, 1992). Individuals would be free to earn more on top of the basic income. The basic income programme could function as an integral part of the community-based economy, with income combined with environmental training in food growing, energy retrofit, solar and wind power, preventive health care, and other skills of benefit to the community. Whilst not as intrinsically self-regulating as an account-money system, basic income programmes act as a transitional support for community development until community currencies are sufficiently developed.


In fine, environmental taxes can be utilised as positive measures that involve ecologically effective state intervention in the economy, the end of which is to enhance the intrinsically self-regulating character of the economy. Taxing the bads and rewarding the goods, creating a level playing field for ecological and non-ecological products and practices, and establishing a win/win scenario for all but the serial offenders. Environmental taxes are part of a number of green economic mechanisms designed to expand spaces in the economy for communal and ecological purposes.

The Alternative Economy
At this point we can outline the contours of a feasible alternative economy. This alternative cannot be located within the left-right division in which politics presumed the basic shape of the economic systems, disagreeing not over production but distribution. The divisions appropriate to an outmoded system are not appropriate within a new paradigm. 

The guarantees of employment and income are effective only if responsibility is mutualized, falling on all companies in cooperation with government, trade unions, local banks, and schools and colleges in the community. Just as unemployment is the responsibility of society in general, responsibility for employment also becomes a social responsibility. Socialising the economy in this way fosters solidarity, generates a sense of belonging and increases motivation.
 
'Mutualization' pools contributions and taxes and employs them as the social resources of an active citizenship. Such a notion empowers political society and anchors ‘the economy’ in a social and political responsibility. This approach ends the dualism between 'political society' and 'civil society' and thus overcomes the existence of public and private at the extremes of 'state' and 'market', with approaches that swing from one one-sided approach to the other and back again. It is an approach which is situated within the associational space of civil society as the centre ground between the monopolies of public and private power. It is here that community is constituted and the outcasts and the marginalised as well as the gatefied are brought back within an expanded middle. In this sense, the associational alternative is a new organicism, creating new constitutive ties of solidarity, taking charge of its own social resources from the bureaucratic welfare state. The associational alternative incorporates 'individual' aspirations to be responsible for one's affairs within a collective project that gives control over supra-individual powers. 

A Socially Useful Third Sector
To extend solidarity by a basic income as universal allowance is technically, financially and institutionally feasible. A new sector of socially useful activity can be constructed in the associational space between state and market. Organisations in this sector would use public resources now devoted to welfare to employ and remunerate workers, costing no more than unemployment costs now. Workers in this sector would be remunerated in accordance with existing social legislation. They function as intermediate agencies undertaking socially useful activities, removing the distinction between paid and unpaid work, between formal and informal sectors (the work done by women which is unpaid, social and environmental work which is undertaken infrequently or not at all owing to expense).

This intermediate sector of socially useful work would be subsidized but would generate new areas of activity. Like the multiplier effect concerning how additional spending in one instance generates further spending in a chain of consequences, so useful activity generates further activity. 

‘In the case of workers on the minimum wage, their costs to an employer are actually 75 per cent higher than that wage, because of social security contributions and other taxes. If unemployed people on the universal allowance of two thirds the minimum wage keep this when they get a job, and do not pay contributions, there are no financial implications for the state. However, it only costs the 'intermediate agencies' the missing third to bring them up to minimum wage level, thus opening up a wide range of possible activities at present not financially feasible. (Lipietz 1992 ch 9). 

The main obstacles are political. A thriving intermediate sector demarketises and decommodifies exploitable resources, most of all workers. Business has no problem with the state subsidizing workers at firms for reasons of training, work experience etc. Business will have a major problem with a socially useful intermediate sector which encroaches on the system of accumulation and deprives it of exploitable resources. The intermediate sector is a real employment creation scheme which involves any number of social and environmental needs of use to the community – quality of urban life, preservation of land, work on local farms, regular maintenance of the built environment, social housing, home help for convalescents and the elderly, local cultural activities in museums, galleries, theatres etc.

At some point, the intermediate sector between private and public encroaches on the institutional-systemic world. It is clear that the universal allowance, financed by contributions, taxes, and unemployment benefit, is quite distinct from work experience and training schemes in the private sector. Private sector employers will clearly see this sector as encroaching on their interests and pressurise government against funding the intermediate sector. Capital will not relinquish control of the labour market without popular pressure. The symbiotic relation of state and capital will ensure that the expensive, wasteful, soul destroying, bureaucratic welfare state will continue as against an intermediate sector of socially useful work that generates greater value for the resources used – unless social movements can entrench the ideal and the practice in the associational space of civil society. 
There are many instances of social and environmental work. Take subsidized housing: the intermediate sector undertaking tasks in conjunction with local tradespeople and building contractors. It is a way of bringing unpaid and informal work in from the margins, bringing people of different ages and ethnicities together in improving their habitat, making it truly a living environment. Located within the community, the intermediate sector reinvigorates society from within, restoring the built environment whilst checking isolation, marginalization and exclusion. It is a practical and productive way of overcoming urban diremption.

‘The third sector has what it takes to endure; financial help on a permanent basis, to produce goods and provide services which are not profitable by normal capitalist standards. It is fitted to play a social integration role and take on social outcasts, though not exclusively, since it can change marginalized people into fully fledged citizens. The third sector will have its 'successes', its permanent staff and its home-grown intellectuals. I even think that it will succeed where the education system has failed - in integrating and giving another chance to the children of immigrants and to marginalized young people’. (Lipietz 1992 ch 9). 

Between the plan and the market there is not ‘nothing’ but an intermediate place, occupied by the third sector. ‘It is partly subsidized to ensure its 'right to exist', but it makes up the rest by charging its customers. It therefore has to convince its direct beneficiaries that what it provides is socially useful…’ (Lipietz 1992 ch 9). 

‘Workers in the third sector combine in self-governed agencies, perhaps advised by management panels and professional training agencies. They make contracts with groups of end-users, local government, regional sickness insurance funds, agencies for energy efficiency, and so on. Under the contract, these customers pay the intermediate agencies sums of money which are added to the universal allowance to give members a normal wage. The quality of the service provided is assessed periodically by the two parties to the contract. It is not a matter of the bureaucratic abolition of commodity relations, but a situation where commodity relations give way to contractual and partnership relations’. (Lipietz 1992 ch 9). 

The intermediate sector based on social utility replaces the waste and bureaucracy of the welfare  state with self-directed, self-organised productive activity that is of tangible benefit to the community and which fosters independence and growth in the producers. Those employed in public  and private sectors see a socially useful product for their contributions and taxes whilst those employed in the intermediate sector are seen to be engaged in productive activity that is valued by society. This intermediate sector has potentials for being the ecological economy in embryonic form, innovating new social forms with respect to community-orientated self-managed cooperative agencies relating producers to end-users, establishing new relationships in the provision of services which are no longer commercial or bureaucratic but  contractual and consensual, with actively democratic control  by customers to ensure that the activities of the producer cooperatives live up to their claim of being 'socially useful'. (Lipietz 1992 ch 9). 

For Alain Lipietz, the new sector could be ‘a learning process for self-management, equality of the sexes and democracy in the area of job specification’  and in this manner ‘a further step in the humanization of economic relations’ (Lipietz 1992 ch 9). 

Of course, business will be opposed to any attempts at autonomy in economic relations and will resist any attempts to challenge its control of the labour market. To business, workers are human resources to be knocked into shape through being subject to an employers’ authority, discipline and ways of thinking. This is a clash between different conceptions of social relations focused on the control and purpose of the labour market. Workers in the associative sector go through the learning process of self-management, setting their own end-values which are of service to the community, and thus develop an autonomy in their productive life which makes them less likely to subject themselves to the routine of regulation and surveillance, working for purposes which are external to them. 

Initiative And Solidarity: The Community Synthesis
The conception of the associative sector recognises the need to combine autonomy and solidarity. The problem with state managed solidarity is that it is abstract, anonymous, formalistic and bureaucratic, wastes resources without solving social problems, suppressing initiative and rendering people passive clients rather than active citizens. ‘State socialism’ fell so quickly because it was all form and no content, it transferred solidarity from social relations and practices to laws, institutions and organisations. It failed to tap into initiative, independence, practicality and purpose. Solidarity cannot be imposed from the outside. Capitalism is a rationalistic desolidarisation which compels citizens to project community upwards to the abstract form of the state. But it is not a real commonality or solidarity, it is an illusory one. It lacks content. Since the only autonomy that State socialism recognised was that of private business and finance, it lacked any sense of workers' and citizens' initiative and frankly resisted both. Unable to conceive of commonality and solidarity from any other than a bureaucratic standpoint, or of autonomy as anything other than private enterprise in the ‘free’ market, state socialism subjected all individuals to the external constraint of an artificial institutional-systemic world in which ends and purposes are imperatives. 

To re-connect autonomy and solidarity, requires a transformation of social relations so that the social identity connecting egoism and altruism is made available. 

Those proposing action to deal with the environmental crisis are often urged to ‘live in the real world’. It is an assertion that comes from people who cannot get beyond price – what they have to pay – to see value. The real world is the natural world and what human ingenuity and expertise has built out of it. The people who make the most noise about ‘living in the real world’ are usually tools rather than makers, passively receiving the efforts and resources of someone or something else. The thinkers, the scientists, the technicians, those who apply intellect beyond the immediate and the obvious given to the senses are the architects of this ‘real world’. To make a home in this world requires going beyond what is given to the senses in the form of price to see value. The sense of reality needs to be reorganised. People, place and planet are weighed in the balance of monetary flows. We need to see that the money economy is contained as a transitory human institution within a global ecology. We have to come out of the artificial world of prices so that we may continue to live in the real world.

It should be emphasised, however, that local community does not imply the end of politics. There will still be conflicts, but the emphasis on what unites rather than divides individuals generates a mutual interest that forges a genuine common good in the interstices of social reality rather than on the abstract level of the state.





Beyond The Bioregion Planetary Transformation
The focus of this paper is on ecological praxis and transformation in the developed world. The economies of the North are the main source of the global problems of ecology and poverty and are the principal obstacles to their resolution. 

There is, however, an interdependence of the local and the global. Feasible alternatives emerging on the local and regional levels are apparent the world over. They are international alternatives which contain the potentials for extended sociality on a global basis for the long-term. The transnational corporations are globalising economic relations and creating the technical basis for a globally integrated mode of production. In a sense, this creates the economic and technical basis for global integration, cooperation and could even be described as a global level of community. Community at global level will, however, be realised only when global initiatives are organically connected to community power at the local and regional levels.

In this respect, municipalism has an international dimension, which is expressed in "confederalism" as the philosophy and practice of interdependence through a structure of network organization. Municipal confederations proceed from groups and individuals in a specific area to comprise citizen assemblies at regional level and upwards. The smaller communities are bound by their responsibility to the larger communities, up to the global community. International communication and support represent the pinnacle of extended sociality and require local and regional and national structures to ensure that solidarity is not thin through too great an abstraction in relationships.

International solidarity is a goal with a long religious and political pedigree, from the claims of the universal church to the socialist internationals. Past attempts at universalism fail either on account of being an attempt to coerce community into existence – empires from Rome onwards – or in being based on ties of solidarity that become thin and weak in extension. Networks and support structures need to be thicker so that extended sociality becomes a reality rather than a false and ultimately hollow claim to universalism. International solidarity is alive and well in the pressure to establish human rights, democracy, and fair trade practices. 
 The reduction of production and consumption and a massive redistribution of wealth throughout the world is important but the notion of development must be based on changing conceptions of "wealth". Real development, like real wealth, is more than the transfer of money or resources in a quantitative sense. This transfer is part of the solution, but the crucial factor is the restructuring of power. This begins by devolving power to the grassroots level, at home and abroad. This is to define a conception of global economic and ecological cooperation.

Green politics should have a position concerning the relationship of trade and investment to the environment. Two important concerns here involve increasing restrictions on the wasteful long-distance flow of material goods and resources and decreasing restrictions of the flow of information (Herman Daly 1996). Within capitalist relations, globalization reverses these priorities, decreasing restrictions on the long-distance flow of goods through the promotion of ‘free’ trade, and increasing restrictions on the flow of information through enforcing intellectual property rights. Corporate globalization is forcing governments to agree to trade agreements which tie economic policy to purely quantitative eco​nomics and money-making for its own sake.

From this perspective, measures such as capital controls and global (Tobin) taxes on speculative financial transactions are limited without an overall restructuring of power. The key general principles of the ecological economy are:

1.	An ecological trade policy should discourage most external trade and direct investment and encourage the flow of information so as to helps communities and regions generate and employ their own capital while cultivating productive activity through their own natural and social resources.
2.	Any external trade proceeds without subsidies to brown industry and cheap energy. Global trade will no longer be possible on the basis of dirty energy and minimal transport costs.
3.	The incentives and disincentives of global trade should be based on eco-indicators, full-cost accounting, and real social need. 
4.	Ecological development should be prioritised.

International Institutional Structures
The problem, of course, is that practical politics is always caught between ideals and realities. It is easy to draw up ‘what should be done’ in abstraction from political realities, but in that world of real politics the starting point is the here and now. There is no 'clean sheet' on the institutional front. ‘But we must ask ourselves whether the task of taking forward an agreement on climate change, in the context of other environmental challenges facing the world, requires a new organisation. However, the building of an agreement is so urgent it will have to be carried out with existing institutional structures. Institutions take time to be agreed and built and to deliver action’ (Stern 2010). The problem is that the timetable of politics always puts the making and implementation of policy before institution building. Stern argues that a new institution is necessary on the basis of the functional prerequisites of transition to the low carbon economy. ‘A global agreement along the lines described and, indeed, most if not all the plausible agreements one might imagine, would need to take on the following tasks:

*	the development of global and distributed emissions targets, timetables and milestones
*	the detailed design of a new, greater scale and more extensive CDM mechanism
*	the establishment of the trading element of any cap-and-trade system
*	the creation of systems to supervise, monitor and verify delivery against   commitments   including   any   pilot   global    sector agreements
*	the emerging forestry carbon regime
*	the coordination and increased funding of advances in climate change-related science and low-carbon technology development
» the development of an improved and joined-up understanding of the  potential local risks from climate change and the responses as they develop
*	the development of processes for dispute resolution
*	the examination and proposal of coherent links concerning other global challenges, including development, trade, biodiversity, food and energy - relations with other international institutions will be important here
*	the analysis and proposal of ideas for the funding of the range of activities described and for rules of operation of the allocation of funds, which will change over time as lessons are learned and circumstances change

The new institutional framework will have to be flexible enough to respond to short term considerations whilst retaining credible long term horizons. ‘I would emphasise just one issue here, and that is governance. If this new institution is to work effectively, it must start with a governance structure and with rights to shape and determine decisions which reflect the whole world in an even-handed way’. (Stern 2010 ch 9). ‘If a new organisation is designed with this in mind, it is likely to make a contribution way beyond the environment and climate change: it could revitalise the whole international institutional structure, not only by giving an example of how to be effective, accountable and well governed, but also because it can show that if we act together we can take on the most difficult of problems, for the good of the world as a whole. (Stern 2010 ch 9). 

The solution is to place realities and ideals on a continuum and infuse means with ends, building strong learning processes within the institutional practice to ensure that particular action is canalised within a long-term framework. 

The Need For Political Leadership
Political leadership is important, and will determine the extent to which the problem of managing climate change can be connected with a recognition of its growth potential. 

The continuation of public discussion and pressure for action is of critical importance. The challenge is to present the complicated science of climate change in a straightforward way at the level of politics and policy. The need is to present the essentials of the arguments in such a way as to be clear to all, to supply evidence and to present policies and give examples in their support.
The time has passed for debate concerning the findings and the implications of the science. The science is as clear as science can be. Science has done as much as science can be expected to do. The onus of responsibility is now upon the world of politics. Institutionally and psychologically, the world of politics needs to be prepared to respond precipitously to the science and act strongly by developing the policy and strategic response. In terms of the science, the main features of climate change are now sufficiently clear and understood to establish the parameters of public policy – governments need to commit themselves to deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions whilst promoting a measured adaptation to the effects of the climate change which is already in the pipeline. 
The Green Party should offer an outline or design of what the ecological society looks like and how it fits the contours of the global ecology. Part of this task will involve proposing policies which detail how climate change can be managed in such a way as to unleash a new era of sustainable growth and prosperity. It means showing how social and environmental justice are achieved in one and the same process. This means identifying strategies, fostering agreement from sub-national to supra-national level, formulating the principles that will guide action and framing the policies that will put aims and objectives into effect. The environmental crisis is the biggest market failure the world has seen, and invites the development of feasible economic alternatives, the embedding of practical learning across the whole of social life, a whole range of experiments in associative democracy and ‘third sector’ activity. The ‘Green collar economy’ shows the possibility of a cleaner, safer, more sustainable pattern of growth and development.

44 THE WAR OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The environmental crisis of the twenty-first century proceeds against the back-drop of global poverty. The two problems are interrelated and are to be tackled together. The responsibility of the North for this crisis is clear. North-South relations need to be stabilised by a global social compact that commits itself to even development as a condition of planetary safety. Otherwise, North South relations will degenerate into a global war which will decide the future of the environment. The threats to the planet are connected with poverty and inequality, overdevelopment in one part of the world, underdevelopment in another. The life and livelihoods of future generations depends on the achievement of a global social compact that enforces measures on the environment. This means putting ecological and social restrictions on ‘free’ trade, managing trade in the interests of place and people rather than money. Some business and political elites in the South see this as a threat to their own aggrandisement, rightly. These social and environmental clauses are designed to restrict the freedom of the rich and powerful so that development is a sustainable living to the benefit of all. 
Of course, the rich and powerful ‘cannot afford’ the environment, freedom, democracy, human rights …they never could and it is pointless postponing action until elites give their consent, they never will.
The scientific evidence is clear and brings an imperative with respect to policy making - increase of CO2 in the atmosphere is creating a greenhouse effect that is causing global warming leading to catastrophic climate change. Major changes in human activity are necessary. This is where a global social compact is required so that social and environmental justice is connected. The idea of ‘established rights' reproduces the inequity of the contemporary world, seeking to stabilize and then reduce CO2 emissions over a period of time, but with the countries most responsible for polluting the biosphere keeping their 'share' of the world's right to pollute. The countries least responsible for the greenhouse effect have to share out the remaining share. The overdeveloped countries are allowed to live off the benefits of their industrial revolution; the underdeveloped countries are denied an industrial revolution of their own.
The alternative approach practises autonomy and solidarity by proceeding from the idea of equality of rights for all human beings. This establishes a global annual pollution quota compatible with the regeneration capacity of the world ecosystem, sharing it between countries according to population. Each country chooses its own response to the quota, in return for a pooling of technology which restricts pollutant energy use. This implies a massive transfer of the 'right to pollute' from the North to the South within a commitment to even development. The developing countries will accept ecological norms so long as their economic interests are not sacrificed by the overdeveloped North. The eco-imperialism of the North amounts to an assertion of the continued right to pollute. It invites the same callous disregard of the planet on the part of nations from the South.

The more enlightened governments of the North can work with nations of the South to agree a deal, backed by powerful non-governmental  organizations  in  the  North (WWF,  Greenpeace,  Friends of the Earth) and the popular movements of the South. The struggle to reach agreement at global level is long and hard but progress has been made and will continue to be made in the direction of planetary health in the interests of all. To prevent this progress stalling and fracturing into exclusive interests requires practical movement on the ground in accordance with the norms and values of an alternative social and ecological model.

On the night of his presidential election victory, 4 November 2008, Barack Obama defined the ‘challenges that tomorrow will bring’ – ‘two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial crisis in a century.' The future of the twenty first century sound remarkably like the history of the twentieth century. These problems are not new but are endemic in the urban-techno industrial system which exploded in the mid-eighteenth century and built a civilisation around its perfection of means. Weber called this process one of disenchantment. Reenchantement will require a recover of meaning, purpose and ends. The problems are interlinked. The doomsday that came for well over 100 million people as a result of organised war is all of a part of the mass pandemic which is seeing species wiped out in record numbers. Exterminism and extinction have their cause in human activity driven by means but ignorant of ends. Acting to tackle the threat of climate change involves putting economics on a sustainable footing, not only securing lives and livelihoods in the future but generating a cooperative effort and spirit that brings communities to life within nations but fosters an internationalism that removes the sources of global conflict. ‘The cooperation across nations that this path demands can itself herald a new era of internationalism that could make wars less likely in our generation, and also enable us to tackle more effectively the other problems that require a global response, including trade, financial stability, disease, drugs, nuclear proliferation and poverty. If we start now in a strong and measured way to create the activities, technologies and investments that are necessary to build a low-carbon economy, we can give the boost to demand that the world economic slowdown requires, and lay the foundations for the key driver of sustained growth over the coming decades - new environmentally friendly technologies’. (Stern 2010 ch 10). 


The direction is clear and the elements for making progress are in place in terms of the technologies and economic policies. This is a learning process and further discoveries and new information will inform praxis along the way. In this way, activity builds on itself. The key obstacles are political and psychological: there is a need to build institutions and formulate policies which give knowledge permanent, public form, and foster mutual learning through cooperative structures. 

The politics of pessimism is a dead-end, a non-politics where short termism and the sectional and self-interestedness of people and politicians mean that the future is no more than the present enlarged, the end of history in more ways than one. Against that, there are grounds for optimism in the growing mutual undertakings and commitments that broad sections of the public are making, building communities of common interest and networks of mutual support. Canalising these for maximum political effectiveness means that there is every reason for thinking it possible to respond to the challenges of climate change at the appropriate level. This is to appreciate the logic of the alienation thesis of Hegel and of Marx. These are not forces beyond human comprehension and control. On the contrary, as human products they are human powers in alien form which can be practically reappropriated and reorganised as human powers, ‘social forces’ as Marx calls them, powers which are exercised in human form when people work in concert for the common good. 

The idealism of the end should not lead one to underestimate hard political realities. The narrow perspectives of self-interest have the ability to blind people to reasoned argument, to make people deaf to the appeal of enlightened self-interest, to proof that the good of all individuals is a condition of the good of each individual. 

‘There is no doubt that the economic crisis is of great seriousness and requires coordinated and strong action both nationally and internationally; the error lies in seeing action on the economic crisis and on climate change as conflicting. They are not’  (Stern 2010 ch 10). 

‘There are two key lessons we should learn concerning the relation​ship between the economic crisis and the planetary crisis. The origins of the financial and economic crisis the world now faces go back twenty years. Financial markets were deregulated; complex derivatives were erected on the back of a housing bubble; and ultimate lenders were separated from ultimate borrowers; the spending on the basis of the bubble was facilitated over the last decade by a willingness from the rest of the world to finance the growing deficits of the US... The lesson should surely be that the longer risk is misunderstood and ignored, the bigger the consequences when the crash occurs. We must not make the same mistake with climate change’. (Stern 2010 ch 10). 

The new technologies and investment opportunities of low-carbon growth are the new drivers that will take the economy forwards in a sustainable manner. ‘These investments will play the role of the railways, electricity, the motor car and information technology in earlier periods of economic history. Let us organise our emergence from the crisis by investing in the shorter-term projects, such as energy efficiency, which can generate demand and employment quickly and by bringing forward some of the energy and transport infrastructure investments which can lay the foundations for medium- and long-term growth’. (Stern 2010 ch 10). 

Climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy is a global question which requires concerted action between all nations. This implies international cooperation on an unprecedented scale, nothing less than the realisation of the visions of perpetual peace as found in Grotius, Leibniz and Kant. Cooperative action on this scale can be supported by different forms of mutual understandings and agreements, but a spirit of internationalism, a sense of mutual dependence and a recognition of a shared identity and purpose are all essential to realising the common good through public institutions. Creating this public purpose on an international level amounts to the realisation of the highest ideals of political philosophers, from Dante to Pufendorf. Dealing with the problem of climate change brings humanity closer to its highest ideals than ever before possible. That is not only the premise of environmental politics but its promise.

There will be many who will stick hard and fast to narrow perceptions of short-term self-interest, giving voice to confused short-term arguments at best and plain misinformation and distortion at worst. A French philosopher cautioned that it is impossible to defeat an ignorant man in argument. Certainly in the world of opinion, where anyone can say whatever they like and few are able to check the errors. Political debate is more about entertainment than enlightenment, a theatre in which people merely assert and reinforce their own prejudices. Far more productive is to focus on the real practical activities underway, winning the debate and buttressing argument and evidence by force of example. This is to concentrate politics on the people from all sections of the community who understand the nature of the science and have the nerve and the nous to take on the challenge. 

In fine, there is a need for evidence, analysis, effective policy, and political leadership which combines intelligence, courage and vision. That’s the kind of politics which gives hope to and inspires effort from people, The evidence making the scientific and economic case for strong action is compelling. It is the job of politics to make that case to the people. There is no need for hyperbole. Whilst the threat of ecological devastation in the future is real, the massive reduction of this threat is technically and institutionally possible through strong, coherent, effective policy in the here and now. Courageous leadership is required too, not so much in confronting the vested interests which will continue to misinform and distort evidence in order to obstruct action, but in sticking to evidence, argument and logic in face of this reaction. The danger of confrontation is that it can draw the world of reason and logic into the cacophonous political swamp where everyone is talking, no-one is listening, anything can be said and nothing gets learned. Such a theatre is entertaining enough for those who want their prejudices confirmed, like reading the newspapers. It is a time for nous and nerve, for clear and distinct ideas and for practical action. And that is time enough. Political debates on TV and radio, studio discussions et al seem utterly profitless and risk a mutual cancelling out in the endless claim and counter-claim, reinforcing public confusion and cynicism. 

Political leadership is ineffective if there is nothing and no-one to lead. An effective politics practises a division of labour in which the contributions of all are welcomed in the creation of the new world. There is a lesson here in symbiosis and integrated systems, pulling people with a variety of skills and expertise together so that community by community, state by state, people will for the first time make history according to a rational purpose that they themselves, not their technics, systems and institutions, have determined. To realise this fundamental end requires common effort and cooperation from the local to the global, coordinated through public institutions and sustained by community action and organisation. Rising to the challenge of climate change is not just a threat but an opportunity for human beings to creatively live up to their powers and in the process finally realise their highest ideals.

45 TOWARDS A RADICAL HUMANISM
At  every  point, whether the problem is one of politics, of economics, of technology, of ecology, the question comes back to one fundamental theme: the ethical and spiritual capacity of humankind. The environmental crisis is ultimately a question of ‘man’s place in nature’ (to use the title of Huxley’s book), which in turn is a question of who and what human beings are. If the human species does have a future, that future will be decided by knowledge not just of the external world but also of the internal world. Place and being go together.
For all of the talk of technological imperatives, laws of economics, and of political science, the identifying mark of science, of technology, of politics, of economics is that they represent in various ways the actual powers of human beings to act and create and to reflect upon and think about this action. The problems of economics, politics, science, technology, therefore, are problems not of external forces but of human action and how to deal with its consequences. These problems therefore contained the means of their resolution. Alienation is a revocable problem. Human powers out of control as alien powers can be recovered and brought under human control. The reification of these human creations as autonomous forces is a ‘violence of abstraction’ which has deadly consequences.

The old question of ‘what is to be done?’ has been answered many times before, The real question is ‘can these things be done?’ The answer is a very clear ‘yes’. The institutional capacity, scientific knowledge and technical expertise exists to do all of these things. So we come back, again, to culture, psychology, political will and imagination. What is to be done is clear. We now need to build the movement of doers, engage larger and larger numbers in an ecological praxis that connects the local and the global. Without that active contribution to changing the world, the technical means and imperatives remain in control. The system as it is currently rigged is committed to a suicidal course of technological destruction, industrial avarice, and international conflict. 

Everywhere in the Weberian modern world one finds the clamour of competing gods and loyalties. A politics of nature within and without cuts past the cacophony of words and bases itself on ontological and natural realities. A good loyalty like a good god is one which is an integral part of living the good life. And not just for one but for all. That social component is endemic to the tradition of rational freedom and is stated in different but consistent ways by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Averroes, Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, Grotius, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx. There are sufficiently debilitating struggles between any number of gods around us; and there are also sufficiently narrow loyalties around us which serve to channel our communal spirit into all manner of sectional cul-de-sacs. But the environmental crisis inveighs us to finally find a species loyalty that is expansive enough to go beyond divisions of race, colour, class, creed and nation, but to find a place in nature as a living organism in connection with all other species. There is no doubt that the struggle on the part of human beings to ascend to the good life will continue under many names and many signs, but all of these are narrow and sectional within the one root faith. The political struggle has shifted. The battle between the 'isms', between left and right, will continue, but the bigger struggle is over the nature of ‘the political’ itself. This struggle is over not the left and the right but the left and right of ‘what’. That ‘what’ is a humane world in harmony with the natural world without and the natural world within.
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